Kitsch

Andrea Mecacci

Abstract： Used improperly as a synonym for “bad taste”， the term kitsch refers to one of the most important aesthetic categories of the last century. This paper， after trying to provide a historical framework of kitsch， focuses on two themes： the kitsch object and the link between postmodernism and kitsch， which will be referred to as neo-kitsch. In the first field of investigation， through the morphology of the kitsch object， the opposition of the kitsch aesthetic to that of functionalism will be outlined. Neo-kitsch， on the other hand， will be interpreted as a process of aesthetic hybridization， one of the most obvious results of postmodern aesthetics.

Keywords： aesthetics; kitsch; functionalism; postmodernism; neo-kitsch; contemporary art

What Is Kitsch?

Kitsch is， and above all was， one of the most elusive dimensions of modernity. For over a century， since the end of the nineteenth century， more than the contours of a category of aesthetics， kitsch took the form of a cultural question with regard to both the identity of the twentieth-century subject (in terms of tastes， choices， behaviour) and the objects upon which this identity elaborated itself. With its absolutely transversal characteristics， conceptions of kitsch have often changed， on occasion providing a pretext for investigations of the increasingly unresolved issues of bourgeois culture： from romantic sentimentalism to the crisis of modern art， from mass culture to the hybrid practices of aestheticized contemporaneity.

Answering the question “what is kitsch?” requires an analysis that problematizes its object. If we try to answer this question by creating an arbitrary list of examples， we are immediately confronted by many， perhaps too many， issues seemingly unrelated to each other， and yet we soon perceive that these phenomena are clearly connected. What is kitsch? A teddy bear holding a red heart? Valentine’s day cards? Wedding or funeral speeches? A pop star who at a concert starts talking about world hunger or civil rights， or a Miss America， who， on receiving her prize， tearfully wishes for world peace? Elvis Presley’s Memphis Graceland， or Tony Montana’s mansion in

Scarface

? Elton John singing “Candle in the Wind” for Marilyn Monroe， or， in 1997， singing the same song for Lady Diana? The cover of any album of heavy metal band Manowar? The tourist souvenirs of the Eiffel Tower or the Tower of Pisa， or the tourists themselves， taking photographs in front of the two monuments， perhaps pretending to support the leaning tower. The novel

Love

Story

by Erich Segal， its film adaptation by Arthur Hiller， and the soundtrack of the same name by Francis Lai? Plastic figures of the Beatles or gypsum statuettes of St. Padre Pio? A room all in pink? A collection of little angels? A piece of classical music transformed into a jingle? Children’s song competitions? Or the suburban garden gnome， “the archetypal image conjured up by the word ‘kitsch’”? (Dorfles， “Kitsch” 14)

Tracing a common denominator in all these examples is not an easy task. One could come up with useful approximations， all of which could be partially justified， but none entirely satisfactory. From this perspective it is possible to grasp in kitsch a general phenomenon of aesthetic inauthenticity or inadequacy (life as a pseudo-event played out amongst pseudo-objects)， or rely on false synonyms that consider kitsch an exercise of bad taste or the realization of a pseudo-art. Certainly kitsch describes， as suggested by almost all its interpreters， a logic of falsification in which the formula (the cliché， the commonplace， the banal) replaces the complex and arduous construction of the link between form and content. This is what can be drawn from the definitions of kitsch found in dictionaries， such as that included in Knaur’s Encyclopedia and cited by Lotte Eisner in one of her essays： “Kitsch is a realization of artistic motifs falsified by stylistic hypersentimentality or inadequacy” (200). The ambiguous etymology of the term does not help. We know the use of the word kitsch developed in the 1860-1870s in the art markets of Monaco， referring to artistic products of poor quality. Robert Musil gave an interpretation of the word in this sense in a 1937 essay devoted to stupidity：

The word kitsch also comes to mind， a term of immediate reaction beloved of artists themselves like no other; without， however， at least so far as I am aware， its concept being defined or its applicability explained， except by means of the verb verkitschen， which in common parlance means something like “selling below value” or “dumping”. Kitsch， therefore， has the meaning of wares that are too cheap or throwaway， and I believe that this sense， of course transposed to the intellectual level， lurks in the word every time it is unconsciously used correctly. (277)

Ludwig Giesz pointed out three other possible derivations. In the first， kitsch would be a calque of English word

sketch

， and it would testify to the habit of English or American tourists to buy cheap paintings or artistic reproductions. Giesz traces the other two etymologies to the verb

kitschen

and two of its meanings： either “sweeping mud from the street” or， in the acceptation of Southern German， “passing new furniture off as antique” (21). The uncertain etymology of kitsch leads to a further question： has kitsch always existed， or is it the product of a given historical period?Abraham Moles， for example， identified in three major cultural macrofactors of the late nineteenth century the roots of kitsch： fetishism (the absolute predominance of the object and its power of fascination)， aestheticism (the raising of the cult of beauty as a value in itself)， and consumerism (the meeting between industrial production and induced needs) (

passim

). If it is true that， as Karl Rosenkranz notes in his

Aesthetics

of

Ugliness

， “all arts have their commonplaces; all epochs have theirs” (13)， then we might claim that kitsch has been at the heart of the aesthetic clichés of modernity. Milan Kundera has repeatedly insisted on the epochal value of kitsch， which he describes a pervasive force that gives rise not so much to aesthetic taste but to an anthropology， a sensibility， a way of being in the world. In this reading， kitsch is “the need to gaze into the mirror of the beautifying lie and to be moved to tears at one’s own reflection” (Kundera，

The

Art

of

the

Novel

135) or， more incisively， kitsch “is the absolute denial of shit， in both the literal and figurative sense of the word; kitsch excludes everything from its purview which is essentially unacceptable in human existence” (Kundera，

Unbearable

248).Kundera pairs the term kitsch with

b

ê

tise

， the stupidity， the “no-thought of clichés” that haunted Gustave Flaubert throughout his life. Bourgeois culture is seen as an immense exercise in self-boasting idiocy， a list of hackneyed phrases， a set of ready-to-use refinements and banalities that Flaubert will gather in his caustic

Dictionnaire

des

id

é

es

re

ç

ues

(at the entry “taste” one reads： “What is simple is always in good taste”; at the entry “poetic inspiration”： “Things that cause it： the view of sea， love， women， etc.”) (43，51). A set of guidelines that today could be combined with the formulas of political correctness or with the deliberately counter-intuitive claims that are considered， by those who say them， if not smart， at least fashionable. If the essence of the nineteenth century， in Kundera’s reading， is

b

ê

tise

， the next century identifies itself with kitsch： “To please， one must confirm what everyone wants to hear， put oneself at the service of received ideas. Kitsch is the translation of the stupidity [

b

ê

tise

] of received ideas into the language of beauty and feeling. It moves us to tears of compassion for ourselves， for the banality of what we think and feel” (Kundera，

The

Art

of

the

Novel

163). But the twentieth century also registers the shifting of kitsch from bourgeois to petit bourgeois ideology， a process linked to massification and the ubiquitous power of mass media. The meeting of mass society and kitsch was historically inevitable： the masses’ never before attained access to cultural assets was modulated through the consolidation of what Kundera called “the dictatorship of the heart”. Nobody is immune from this regime of globalized feeling， which is based on archetypal， transversal， and inevitably shared and shareable images that are rooted in the depths of modernity’s collective unconscious： “The feeling induced by kitsch must be a kind the multitudes can share. Kitsch may not， therefore， depend on an unusual situation; it must derive from the basic images people have engraved in their memories： the ungrateful daughter， the neglected father， children running on the grass， the motherland betrayed， first love” (Kundera，

Unbearable

250).

Wanting to grasp the distinctive features of kitsch， but also to highlight the changes our conceptions of it have undergone， the present essay aims to investigate the evolution of the phenomenon. Therefore kitsch is here considered a historical and conceptual category， and not as an abstract entity. It is a label with poorly defined contours and therefore easily applied to various phenomena， a category that changes according to historical and social processes， as the various theories of kitsch have shown. First， we will consider the historical and theoretical premises that generated the notion of kitsch. This is a problematic starting point， as these premises are always the subject of varying interpretations， although the eighteenth-century debate on taste provides their essential background. The identification， certainly approximate and debatable， of kitsch and bad taste represents not only a simplistic lexical solution， but also betrays deeper preoccupations. The emergence of taste as both a subjective and collective phenomenon exhibits the slow but unmistakable rise of a middle class in search of an aesthetic that has to be more and more disconnected from the constraints of classical norms. Eighteenth-century analyses of taste already demonstrate the dysfunctions of this faculty that is at the same time common to all and particular to each， a subjective faculty that attempts to find its complex and shared definition through the distinction between good and bad taste. Allied to this bifurcation， which is decisive for the genesis of kitsch， is an equally crucial concept that emerges around this time： amateurism. In the thematization of amateurism in the works of Goethe and Schiller， a number of typical characteristics of kitsch can be detected alongside， especially with regard to the person who feeds on kitsch， a vision of a kind of aesthetic naivety raised to a fictitious critical norm. In symbiosis with amateurism we find a romanticisation of feeling： sentimentalism， probably the most important aesthetic ideology of kitsch， which will find its ultimate symbolization in the literary figure of Emma Bovary. A key moment when “the bourgeois dreamer becomes the heroine of the novel， while the heroine of the novel has become the bourgeois dreamer who reads it” (Morin 52)： it is so crucial a moment that many scholars and interpreters have identified kitsch with this romantic tendency， indeed crystallizing the real beginning of kitsch in the historical period of Romanticism and the Biedermeier. The denunciation by modern functionalist rationalism of the ornament， perceived as a leftover from romanticism， runs parallel to this tendency. The aspiration emerges to free the object from its nineteenth-century heritage， from an aesthetics that values ornament over function and， consequently， industrial production processes.

The Kitsch Object

In the slow evolution of design practices that have at their center the formal elaboration of the object of use， in a word design， there will be a severe struggle against the double heritage of art and craftsmanship. Finding an aesthetic formula capable of redeeming the object from this heritage would first lead to a questioning of the relationship between the useful and the beautiful， and towards the end of the nineteenth century to the link between form and function. And it is in the exploration of this new couple that kitsch assumes the role of enemy， of negative model. In all the programmatic writings of the great protagonists of the modern movement， of design rationalism， it is actually not the word kitsch that is attacked， but another that almost assumes the figure of its double： ornament. Mies van der Rohe’s famous motto， “less is more”， encapsulates all the conflict of this affair， the idea of a formal emancipation that mirrors social progress. The kitsch object became in this way the representation of the obstacle of this process and the ornament its most tangible manifestation： vulgarity， luxury， bad taste.

German functionalism， from the Deutscher Werkbund to the Bauhaus， essentially proposed a single great idea. To make form achieve function meant to give the object a structural antidote to an anachronistic aesthetic (artistic， artisanal) and to allow the object to become the promoter of an education in (good) taste in industrialized society. After all， Gottfried Semper， in his account of the Great Exhibition of 1851， had already found in the objects on display “a jumble of forms”， “a childish amusement”. The great formal problem was essentially the unbalanced relationship between the structure and superstructure of the object. The aesthetics of the object was manifested not in its physiognomy， but in the ornamental accessories. This decorativism entailed a double deformation： either it was totalizing with respect to the object， hiding its function， or it was completely alien to it， affirming a gap between form and function. Hermann Muthesius， in his founding speech of the Deutscher Werkbund in 1907，

The

Importance

of

the

Applied

Arts

， highlighted the need， at once historical， aesthetic and social， to abandon forever the “worn-out schemes” of the art of the past. Functional beauty for Muthesius is the result of a balance of three principles that cannot be violated： the function of the object， its structure and the material suitable for function and structure. From the perspective of the philosophy of the Deutscher Werkbund， strict adherence to these three formative principles did not mean rejecting an “affective” dimension， but promoting a new aesthetics of form that was actually an ethics of form. The “evil” of this ethics of form was easily identified：Inflexible adherence to the principles of modeling according to purpose， material， and structure constitutes a bulwark that preserves against lapses into historical sentimentality and thus lack of functionality. Modeling inspired by historical reminiscences almost inevitably led to a violation of those three principles. This is proved by the industrial art of the era of stylistic imitations， namely， especially of the second half of the nineteenth century. That epoch， with its rapid succession and alternation of stylistic fashions， is at once that of the worst aberrations in the sense of irrational adornment and simulations of all kinds. Surrogates and imitations celebrated their triumphs. Wood was imitated with cardboard， stone with stucco， if not with rolled zinc， bronze with tin. [...] The horror of these imitations became the dominant motif of the new industrial art. (Muthesius，

L

’

importanza

84-85)And it is precisely within German functionalism that the kitsch object is analyzed， probably for the first time and beyond any declaration of intent， in all its formal and material characteristics. Gustav Pazaurek， member of the Deutscher Werkbund and director of the Landesgewerbemuseum of Stuttgart， was responsible for the most radical assumption of the pedagogical role of the new applied arts and the idea of a culture of taste rooted in everyday life. Pazaurek’s intent is simple： in order to create the beautiful it is necessary to confront the ugly. Kitsch became the negative model for every design. Thus， in 1909， a wing of the museum was set up with a very explicit name： “Aberrations of taste in applied art” (Geschmascksverirrungen im Kunstgewerbe). The exhibition showed that for Pazaurek kitsch was not so much an artistic problem as a problem of daily practice， of a practice that， industrially， lived in the combination of production and consumption. This was the underlying theme of his 1912 text

Good

and

Bad

Taste

in

Applied

Art

. The book is composed of three sections that touch respectively on the theme of materials， the relationship between functional form and technique， in fact design， and ornament. In this last section Pazaurek expressly dedicates a section to kitsch， but in reality Pazaurek’s entire text is an enormous identity card of the kitsch object.

In the section on materials are indicated as manifestations of ugliness the use of poor or contaminated material， of bizarre or showy material， the wrong use of a material (the author speaks of “violation” of the nature of the material)， the recall of a material through another， the surrogate material and imitation of materials. In the second part， which highlights the relationship between functional and technical form， design errors are analyzed： incomprehensible objects， functional lies， fictions and false technical references， cheap originality， the patenting of playful but useless objects， techno-design naivety. The third section dwells on more strictly aesthetic issues which for Pazaurek are identified with the theme of ornamentation. The most common shortcomings are： disproportions， misplaced or invasive decoration， an excess of decorative originality， the abuse of decorative motifs extraneous to the object， anachronistic or exotic decorations， the exaggerated use of effects on the surface of the object， the incorrect calculation of chromaticism， the tendency to trivialization and leveling， and almost to end this list， kitsch.

On the whole， for Pazaurek， kitsch is the opposite pole to quality work， and indeed it is identified with “rubbish without taste”， which “does not care about any ethical， logical or aesthetic instance”， but which perpetrates “every crime and every infraction against material， technique and purpose” (348). Taking note of this negativity of kitsch， Pazaurek offers a definition of the kitsch object： “the object must be cheap and in addition， however， make believe as much as possible that it has a superior value” (ibid.). This process of falsification is identified by Pazaurek in five modes of kitsch. And it is interesting to note how Pazaurek in focusing on these five types of kitsch shifts the focus from the object to the subject， from the universe of the falsified objects to the world of the hypocrisies of the subjects. The first kitsch is the patriotic kitsch (

Hurrakitsch

) that speculates on feelings of belonging. It is the exhibition of easy symbolism and that from an aesthetic point of view is manifested， this is the example of Pazaurek， in porcelain beer mugs with the effigy of Bismarck’s face. Very close to this kitsch is religious kitsch (

Devotionalienkitsch

)： prayer books with naïve illustrations， images of saints inlaid in wood or spread in colorful lithographs. The third kitsch is very modern：

Geschenkkitsch

， the gift kitsch. It is the infinite galaxy of trinkets， objects for special occasions (birthdays， anniversaries， weddings) and souvenirs that supports the nascent tourism industry. Its close relative is the commercial or adverstising kitsch (

Reklamekitsch

). It is the kitsch conveyed by what today is the media network and that in Pazaurek’s time was offered in theaters， in the first films， in circuses， in general in the entertainment industry， but also and above all in posters， signs， and packaging. Finally， the most elusive category： the social kitsch (

Aktualit

ä

tskitsch

). It is the kitsch that pervades public life， its reiterated and codified rituals. It is the kitsch of fame， of and by celebrities， the cult of success that makes Bismarck and Wagner indistinguishable： “no popularity without social kitsch”.It will be necessary to wait almost sixty years to have a new radiography of the kitsch object： Abraham Moles will propose it. Kitsch as a latent and connotative phenomenon of contemporaneity， as an opaque “wasteland” between art and conformism and as an expression of an age that records the excess of means over needs： these are the guidelines of Abraham Moless interpretation contained in

Le

Kitsch

：

L

’

art

du

bonheur

(1971). Moles， as we mentioned earlier， argues that the spread of kitsch was made possible substantially by three macro-factors that emerged strongly in the second half of the nineteenth century and that in the twentieth century were consolidated to the bitter end： fetishism (the exclusive centrality of the object in industrial civilization)， aestheticism (the affirmation of beauty as an end in itself) and consumption (the underlying structure of capitalism). To investigate this problematic scenario of the modern， Moles resorts to a descriptive methodology that in part recalls Pazaurek’s meticulous classifications. Kitsch is derived not from a general theory， but “essentially with examples”. An inductive method that has as its starting point the morphological aspects of the objects. The result is two suggestive， and always useful， sketches of the kitsch object： the principles of kitsch and the relative typologies of its elementary forms.

By circumscribing kitsch to the universe of objects， a perhaps simplistic move that investigates kitsch in its most traditional expression (but motivated by the fact that the object has a generalizable fruition that is not mediated by linguistic competences， for example， necessary for the comprehension of literary kitsch， because if one does not know German， it is complicated to analyze German literary kitsch)， Moles identifies the historical shift of the kitsch object from its prehistory to its industrial massification. The kitsch object is no longer the eccentric testimony of bad taste， an aesthetic relic of the past that is updated， but a component of industrial production， one of the two possible forms of design that flanks its opposite， the functional object. The epic of kitsch is therefore the shadow of that of functionalism， of the utopia of modernist rationalism. As a visible symptom of the drifts and crises of twentieth-century functionalism， kitsch elaborates its own specific grammar， an accomplished aesthetic.

Moles identifies five principles of kitsch： the principle of inadequacy， accumulation， synesthesia， mediocrity， and comfort (67-72). The principle of inadequacy exhibits the gap between the object and its purpose， the anti-functionality that annihilates use value (a bust of Jesus used as a bookmark for a prayer book， one of Moles’ examples). In the inadequacy there is always a kind of schizophrenia： the object is “well done” and “badly done” at the same time. The realization is perfectly successful from a technical point of view， but the concept of the object， its function， is distorted. The principle of accumulation betrays the

horror

vacui

of the civilization of consumption. The accumulation proves that individually non-kitsch objects once put together configure dimensions of bad taste. This process is， so to speak， doubled when the accumulation of the object is added to that of the materials， as in the faux-marble columns， that is， when “the form is borrowed from an originally different material”.(ibid. 70) The third principle concerns synaesthetic perception. If in accumulation the object is the center， in synaesthetic perception it is the subject， whose senses are besieged simultaneously， that defines its value. Scented books， greeting cards with music boxes， the layered wedding cake engage multiple sensory channels configuring a caricature of the Wagnerian idea (once again) of a total work of art. The principle of mediocrity represents the qualitative dimension of kitsch， its incapacity to introduce the new， contrary to the avant-garde， and the perpetuation of the logic of the inauthentic. It is essentially the petit-bourgeois taste， the reduction of any aesthetic complexity in favour of an increasingly invasive and at the same time conservative massification. Linked to mediocrity is the principle of comfort. The ease of use that consumption ensures. A concept that unites in the same aproblematic ideology of comfort the

Gem

ü

tlichkeit

of the German Biedermaier， the muffled and reassuring atmosphere of family intimacy of nineteenth-century Germany， and the easy way of life of the “throwaway” well-being of American society.

These five principles， which find their synthesis in the two symbolic objects of the “disease of functionality”， the souvenir and the gadget， are poured into five formal typologies (ibid. 47-56). In the first place， the curved line， a direct legacy of the aesthetics of the early twentieth century. The principle of accumulation is clearly expressed in the second characteristic： the decorative excess. Almost never the kitsch object shows regular or uninterrupted surfaces， on the contrary， it is the ornament to the bitter end that is the most common elementary form of kitsch. The third typology is the “sentimental” chromatism： the candy pink， the violet， the “sunset” tonality of the paintings in the markets of amateur artists. But even the arbitrary combination of colors specifies the kitsch object in its playful character. The chromatic arbitrariness is also reflected in the fourth formal principle， the falsification of materials. It is the triumph of the surrogate in which every material is presented for what it is not： wood is painted in imitation of marble， bronze statues simulate gold just as iron columns simulate stucco or a Gothic arch. The principle of interchangeability reigns supreme. The counterfeiting of materials follows the same logic of literary lyricism： in the object， the noble material is simulated in the same way as the poetic is constructed in the literary text through an inversion of form and content. Finally， the distortion of the object’s dimensions. Enlargement and reduction preserve “in manufacture a recognizable form rather than an existential immediacy”(54). This is the typical case of souvenirs of monuments (the alabaster miniature of the Tower of Pisa) or of certain advertising strategies (a gigantic shoe in front of a shoe store).

Kitsch is not a simple “catalog raisonné” of eccentric morphologies nor an indefinite aesthetic metastructure that reveals socially classifiable tastes as petit-bourgeois. The many studies of Gillo Dorfles on kitsch try to probe the area left unexplored by these two approaches： it is necessary to unite the taxonomic and the phenomenological， to identify the areas in which the characteristics of an object and the behaviours and judgements of a subject meet in the same definition of kitsch. Kitsch， therefore， is not only the Tower of Pisa in alabaster， but also the way to enjoy the same masterpieces of art. Kitsch is therefore to be found not only in the object， but in a subjectivity that recognizes itself in certain objects or ways of fruition. In other words， if in itself the

Mona

Lisa

is

not kitsch， it is kitsch the tourism that crowds the room of the Louvre where it is exposed buying gadgets/souvenirs that depict the painting. A mechanism that would not seem to need much analysis for its banal evidence. In reality， it is a process that stages precisely the phenomenology of the kitsch object and kitsch subjectivity. Dorfles’ studies have probed this universe.Kitsch seems to be crossed by a general characteristic： non-authenticity (Dorfles，

Nuovi

164-181). This is a dimension both of the object and of the subject. In the first case we are dealing with an “intentional falsification”， in the second case with an “absence of aesthetic distance”. In the intentional falsification the kitsch object can be either a work of art or a surrogate. If it is in a work， we are dealing with a “degradation” (Giesz had spoken of

Verkitschung

von

Kunstwerken

， the making kitsch of masterpieces). A classic example is the transfer of a work into another context： the verses of Shakespeare， Byron or Baudelaire into the packaging of a chocolate or Beethoven’s Romance in F major op. 50 for a liquor advertisement. The process of decontextualization (the work that is lowered) is accompanied by its opposite， the surrogate or aesthetic fetish (the copy that is raised). The miniature of the Tower of Pisa clearly falls into this category. Wherever the unique is conceived as reproducible， kitsch appears. Figurative art lends itself so easily to counterfeiting that artistic surrogates are often interpreted as the very symbol of kitsch： Venus of Milo in the garden. Another surrogate strategy is “adaptation from one medium into another, from the means of expression of one type of art into that of another”(Dorfles, “Transpositions” 87). This betrayal of the medium is particularly visible in film or television versions of literary masterpieces. To transpose a work into another medium (the novel into a television script， film or comic strip) is an operation of high mimetic complexity. Kitsch impoverishes this complexity highlighting only single aspects of the work， the most consumed and easily usable.The intentional falsification， centred on the object， is projected in its subjective dimension， the absence of aesthetic distance. The contribution of the subject to the definition of kitsch， this “unforgivable mediocrity”， to take up a caustic formula of Lotte Eisner， is decisive and unfolds in two ways： the sentimentalism and the “aberrant fruition”. The first modality represents a cornerstone of any interpretation of kitsch， it is an essential constitutive element. The sentimental immanence that becomes the only aesthetic answer， the complacent and uncontrolled dramatization of pathos， the stubborn conviction that the aesthetic experience must be first of all， if not exclusively， an experience of emotion. This simulation of feeling flows into what Dorfles has indicated as “aberrant fruition”. Just as there is a distortion of the object， there is also a distortion of subjectivity. And not even geniuses are immune from this distortion. It happens in fact， Dorfles argues， that great artists are deaf or to arts that are not their own (Tolstoy’s idiosyncrasy for music， which Dorfles cites as an example on the basis of Giesz’s reading of

The

Kreutzer

Sonata

) or to other authors of their own art (the distrust of the great masters with respect to the works of younger authors， Rothko’s disgust for Pop Art or Goethe’ famous incomprehension of Hölderlin’s poetry). The aberrant fruition ranges from inattention (the distracted listening of a piece of music on the radio， the bored contemplation of a painting in a museum) to the most extreme identification (the artificial empathy of reality shows). Sentimentalistic invasiveness and aberrant fruition constitute the structure of “ethical kitsch”， “a kind of bad taste which does not so much effect the work of art， as dress or moral attitude， and which inevitably rubs off on anything artistic or pseudo-artistic which might come into contact with (Dorfles， “Kitsch” 129). It is first of all the universe of socio-familiar rites： births， communions， weddings， Valentine’s Day， funerals， but also the most indefinable scenario of everyday life in which kitsch develops its own aesthetics： commercial myths (in which fetishism and artifice overlap)， regime art (political kitsch in all its ideological expressions)， the thorny issue of religious kitsch (where transcendence is translated into childish imagery)， tourism (the massified exercise of the homologation of discovery， “the world as it appears to the tourist”)， the relationship with nature (there is kitsch every time “nature imitates itself”)， pornokitsch (at the same time codification of sexuality and calculated euphemism of pornography) and “traditional” kitsch (trinkets， souvenirs， gadgets， dwarfs in the garden).

Towards Postmodernism and Neo-kitsch

We owe to Umberto Eco a further focus on the problem in

Apocalyptic

and

Integrated

(1964). The analysis focuses both on the stratification of mass culture (“Mass culture and ‘levels’ of culture”) and on kitsch (“The structure of bad taste”). Kitsch exemplifies an internal aesthetic within the triadic modulation of culture (high， middle， and low). Eco provides a first approximation to kitsch： “it is the definition of bad taste， in art as prefabrication and imposition of the effect” (

Apocalittici

66). But with Eco we also enter a further phase of kitsch that now opens itself to the hybrid dimensions of contemporaneity and in a way loses its identity. Associated to other， similar categories such as camp or trash， kitsch becomes both all-pervasive and invisible. In the horizontality of postmodern cultural practices， falsification is authenticity， the simulacrum the archetype， the copy the model. In this framework， the vertical hierarchy through which kitsch had always been coded and analysed loses its validity. Bad taste and pseudo-art now appear as almost archaeological categories. Kitsch is no longer what happens in Monaco and Vienna， or what is exemplified in the design of Ludwig’s castles in Bavaria， but the defining characteristic of the cities of Los Angeles or Las Vegas， what can be found at Disneyland. Yet in this apparent levelling， in which kitsch itself is raised to a cultural model (as in the case of some artistic experiences， which could be termed neo-kitsch)， or a legitimate， enjoyably harmless aesthetic experience. In his reconnaissance of the most tautological America， a true “travels into hyperreality” (Eco，

Travels

)， Eco documents in his reportage， we are in 1975， a universe that seems to go beyond those cultural languages that had recently been codified under the label of pop. The procedures of kitsch within mass culture are now reinterpreted in the light of a new paradigm， “the absolute fake”， with which the simulacrum is the only recognizable and shareable cultural matrix： the absolutization of the false is the desire for a possible used as real： even better than the real thing. Hyperreality is the new stage of kitsch in which every reference (whether historical or aesthetic) becomes a horizontal practice， untied from any vertical criterion of hierarchy. The desire for authenticity can only be expressed in the logic of absolute fake. Everything is duplicated， particularly the past that undergoes a pervasive iconic cannibalisation： “the ‘completely real’ becomes identified with the ‘completely fake’” (ibid. 7). This involves a shift in the role played by the mimetic. Now Plato’s targets， activated by the mimesis (illusion， double， iconic seduction)， become a cultural strategy： the fake parts from the mimetic process， that process which considers itself still tied in a subordinate way to an original model， becomes the sign of itself， creates a new dimension of reality， the hyperreality. Even the aesthetic pleasure aroused by the hyperreal has its own inner logic. The fake is not so much the reaching of a technical perfection as the theorising for which， in front of this absolute iconism， the real will always be inferior and therefore less pleasant and desirable： the falsification (absolute) turns into a criterion of aesthetic pleasure. And this marks， as we shall see， the shift from the urban paradigm in Las Vegas to the one of Disneyland (ibid.39-48).The German historian of architecture Heinrich Klotz at the conclusion of his

The

History

of

Postmodern

Architectur

e has identified ten oppositions between the modern and the postmodern (Klotz 421) and one might add that just in the space opening from this dialectic that fake finds its operativity. The ten characteristics proposed by Klotz revolve around a basic bipolarity： the postmodern has placed at its centre a fictional representation marginalizing the totem of modernist planning， the function. In other words， it replaced the function of truth， the realization itself of

techne

， with the tale of illusion， the extemporaneous work of the imagination. It dismissed the primacy of technological utopianism and replaced it with a multiplicity of meanings. This grammar resumes wholly the vocabulary of fake (fiction， illusion， allusion) and transforms the fiction (the fake) into the new function (the truth)， a perfect exchange of values that leads directly to Disneyland.We thus enter a phase that we can define as “neo-kitsch”： this term defines a taste or an artistic perspective that deliberately refers to the contents of kitsch aesthetics， whose principles and values are neither debated nor discussed anymore， but are used instead and exploited for any possible aesthetic， artistic or commercial operation. This perspective is often framed within the most typical manifestations of postmodern aesthetics and， in general， of contemporary processes of aestheticization. neo-kitsch may be observed mainly as an operative aesthetics. The notion of double-coding (Jencks 6-8) can exemplify the Neo-kitsch poetics of hybridation as the attempt to overcome the aporias of Modernism， of whom kitsch is the worst enemy： the ability to let two levels of communication — the first addressed to mass and the second to the specialists — coexist in the same text， building or art work， that which realizes a continuous quotation of past and an evident style mixing. The work that merged hyperreality， neo-kitsch and Postmodernism was

Learning

from

Las

Vegas

by Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown， a text written in collaboration with Steven Izenour. Las Vegas is the city where the principle of accumulation becomes the urban landscape， almost an ontologic paradigm; that place is an uninterrupted decalogue of stilistic contradiction in which the surrogate emancipates itself and eventually becomes an archetype. Las Vegas gives yet another version of kitsch： it is recognized both as an “anthological” and a “metalinguistical” practice， it presents itself as neo-kitsch.The neo-kitsch also became an identifiable style in some American artists of the 1980s within a strong

pop

revival

atmosphere. Especially in the field of sculpture kitsch was programmatically used. The inauthentic， the vulgar， the copy， the childish defined the poetics of such tendency. Between 1982 and 1984， Allan McCollum conceived a series of plaster-imitations of paintings：

Plaster

Surrogates

. Even more faithful to kitsch was a work of 1988 (

Perfect

Vehicles

)， a series of reproductions of jars characterized by seriality and excessive size. In

Ultra

Red

#2(1986) by Haim Steinbach， the accumulation principle is fetishized through the utopia of spatial order： several objects of the same kind are arranged on a shelf. The greatest exponent of neo-kitsch art is Jeff Koons： the banal object (Koons prefers the adjective “banal” to “kitsch”) is nothing else but a pretext to explore the tastes of the middle class， those aesthetic conventions that the art world actually considers as vulgar， non-artistic. In the year 1988， in the series

Banality

， the kitsch object is artisticized while the luxury object is turned into a prosaic one： “My work has no aesthetic values， other than the aesthetics of communication. I believe that taste is really unimportant” (Koons 31). An exemplification of the notion of artistic capitalism may be found in the work of the British photographer Martin Parr， where， by the means of everyday-life aesthetic experiences as tourism， food and fashion， the contemporary imaginary shows the consumistic frame within which the neo-kitsch acts as an absolute aesthetic reference. In neo-kitsch the focus is not on the object (the work of art)

per

se

or on its mystification anymore， beause the attention is shifted on the exploration of average taste， on the building-up of its imaginary and on its projections on extra-artistic objects or behaviours which transgress the codified taste.

Works

Cited

Dorfles， Gillo. “Kitsch.”

Kitsch

：

An

Anthology

of

Bad

Taste

. Ed. Gillo Dorfles. London： Studio Vista， 1969.13-36.- - -. “Transpositions.”

Kitsch

:

An

Anthology

of

Bad

Taste

. Ed. Gillo Dorfles. London: Studio Vista, 1969. 85—87.- - -.

Nuovi

riti

，

nuovi

miti

. Torino： Einaudi， 1979.Eco， Umberto.

Apocalittici

e

integrati

. Milano： Bompiani， 2005.- - -.

Travels

in

Hyperreality

. Trans. William Weaver. New York： Harcourt Brace Jovanovich， 1986.Eisner， L.H. “Kitsch in the Cinema.”

Kitsch

：

An

Anthology

of

Bad

Taste

. Ed. Gillo Dorfles. London： Studio Vista， 1969.197-218.Flaubert， Gustav.

Dictionnaire

des

id

é

es

re

ç

ues

. Paris： J’ai Lu， 2008.Giesz， Ludwig.

Ph

ä

nomenologie

des

Kitsches

. Frankfurt a. Main： Fischer， 1994.Jencks， Charles.

The

Language

of

Post

-

Modern

Architecture

. London： Academy， 1977.Klotz， Heinrich.

The

History

of

Postmodern

Architecture

. Cambridge， Mass.： MIT Press， 1988.Koons， Jeff.

The

Jeff

Koons

Handbook

. London： Thames & Hudson， 1992.Kundera， Milan.

The

Art

of

the

Novel

. Trans. Linda Asher. New York： Grove Press， 1988.- - -.

The

Unbearable

Lightness

of

Being

. Trans. Michael Henry Heim. London： Faber and Faber， 1984.Moles， Abraham A.

Le

Kitsch

：

L

’

art

du

bonheur

. Paris： Maison Mame， 1971.Morin， Edgar.

L

’

industria

culturale

. Trans. Giuseppe Guglielmi. Bologna： Il Mulino， 1963.Musil， Robert. Ü

ber

die

Dummheit

. Frankfurt a. Main： Bermann-Fischer， 1937.- - -. “On Stupidity.”

Precision

and

Soul

：

Essays

and

Addresses

. Eds. and trans. Burton Pike and David S. Luft. Chicago： The University of Chicago Press， 1990.268-86.Muthesius， Hermann. “Die Bedeutung des Kunstgewerbes.”

Dekorative

Kunst

10.5(1907)： 177-78.

Pazaurek， Gustav E.

Guter

and

schlechter

Geschmack

im

Kunstgewerbe

. Stuttgart a. Berlin： Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt， 1912.Rosenkranz， Karl.

Aesthetics

of

Ugliness

：

A

Critical

Edition

. Eds. and trans. Andrei Pop and Mechtild Widrich. London： Bloomsbury， 2015.