基于混合策略博弈的生鲜企业构建标准化冷链监管研究

曾世华 吴婷

摘要：随着近年来国内一系列冷链物流标准和冷链食品标准的制定和出台，加快企业冷链标准化实施和监督正在提上日程，针对生鲜企业不一定会构建标准化冷链，生鲜食品企业构建标准化冷链需要考虑实施成本和政府检查的处罚成本，政府监督需要考虑检查效果和检查成本，需要建立政府和生鲜食品企业之间的良性博弈关系。文章采用完全信息静态博弈方法，构建政府监管机构与生鲜企业之间的混合策略模型，提出政府应适当加大处罚力度、适当提高抽样检查的概率、构建政府和企业的责任损失机制、制定高效低成本的檢查措施等策略。

Abstract： With the formulation and promulgation of a series of domestic cold chain logistics standards and cold chain food standards in recent years， accelerating the implementation and supervision of enterprise cold chain standardization is on the agenda. For fresh food companies， it is not necessary to build a standardized cold chain. The establishment of standardized cold chains for food companies requires consideration of implementation costs and government inspection penalties， government supervision needs to consider inspection results and inspection costs， and the establishment of a benign game relationship between the government and fresh food companies. The article uses a complete information static game method to build a mixed strategy model between government regulatory agencies and fresh enterprises， and proposes that the government should appropriately increase penalties， appropriately increase the probability of sampling inspection， construct a responsibility loss mechanism for the government and enterprises， and formulate efficient low-cost inspection measures and other strategies.

关键词：政府检查;生鲜食品;标准化冷链;混合策略博弈

Key words： government inspection;fresh food;standardized cold chain;mixed strategy game

中图分类号：F274                                      文献标识码：A                                  文章编号：1006-4311（2020）20-0116-03