语言、意向行为与价值变换——“假装”别于“说谎”与“欺骗”的符号学阐释

杜世洪 查尔斯·皮尔森

（西南大学，重庆，400715；美国符号学研究所，乔治亚州，30106）

语言、意向行为与价值变换
——“假装”别于“说谎”与“欺骗”的符号学阐释

杜世洪 查尔斯·皮尔森

（西南大学，重庆，400715；美国符号学研究所，乔治亚州，30106）

语言是用来表达意向的。然而，当意向与价值变换发生关系时，人们会对同样的符号交际产生不同的意义解释。经实验观察，发现不同的人会把同一行为认定为“说谎”，或者“欺骗”，或“假装”。为什么会有这样的解释差异呢？对于这个问题，皮尔森的“普遍符号语义框架－2000”提供了相应的符号学阐释：同一交际事实中的意向行为存在着三种可能性判断：价值判断、真值判断和效用判断。从符号学阐释角度可以得出结论：“假装”不同于“说谎”和“欺骗”，因为假装接受的是效用判断，说谎接受的是真值判断，而欺骗接受的是价值判断。

符号学，意向行为，价值变换，假装，普遍符号语义框架－2000

1．Introduction

Man differs from lower animals because he can use language to cover or reveal his real intention．Although both man and animals are capable of pretending to carry out certain intention，it is only man who develops the habit of transvaluating his intentional actions by means of shifting evaluative words from positive to negative，or from negative to positive．The transvaluation of actions is made possible just because of the fact that human language has two systems of expression for the same thing：one positive and one negative．That is，the same fact that one country’s armed force enters another country can be described either destructive invasion or constructive support．The transvaluation of this type is completed on the basis of taking sides and shifting words．

There exists in language another type of transvaluation，in which what are shifted are not the words but the intentional actions．One typical case of this transvaluation is found in human pretending．The present paper attempts to focus on human pretending for a semiotic analysis of the difference betweenpretending and lying／cheating as well as the double standard of value judgment over behaviors of pretending．The general concern of this paper is about the semiotic mechanism of transvaluation of pretending．In addition，this paper is going to attack the following specific side questions：First，is human pretending morally good or bad？Second，by what criterion can we differentiate pretending from lying and cheating？2．Intentional action

When it comes to the termintentional action，we cannot help thinking about the combination of intention and action．We seem to be certain about what an action is，but uncertain about what intention is．More often than not，in philosophy for a seemingly－simple question，there is no simple or single answer which can stand on its own right without causing further questions．Different philosophers have offered more or less different answers to this complicated question，but the focus of our concern is not on the ontological question of intention．Instead，we will concentrate on the action that is capable of revealing information of intention．

As a matter of fact，action always goes hand in hand with intention．If you stick out your foot to trip me，your action is intentionally carried out．Roughly speaking，intention is a feature of action．Some philosophers and psychologists tend to base their account of intentional action upon an account ofintention as a feature of action．On this account，intentional actions are explicable by reference to belief and desire of an agent．Dennett（1989：7）believes that intention belongs to the family of such mentalistic concepts as belief，desire，expectation，and etc．．According to Anscombe，when a person says he is going to do such－and－such，we should say that this is an expression of intention．However，Anscombe warns us of a point that“an action can be intentional without having any intention in it”，because“intention always concerns with the future”（Anscombe 1957：1）and not all of the actions concern with the future．In folk psychology，“the concept of intentional action is used in the process by which people assign praise and blame”（Knobe 2006）．

Inspired by Knobe’s experimental study of intentional action，we have conducted a research on the actions of human pretending，for the purpose of distinguishing between intentional pretending and unintentional pretending．At first glance，people may tend to think of all kinds of pretending as intentional actions．However，if intentional action really concerns with the future as Anscombe claims，some actions of pretending cannot be regarded as intentional．For example，among the four types of pretending（Du 2013），the children’s pretending play and the theatrical pretending are merely immediate actions without concerning with the future．When a child pretends to make a phone call by grabbing a banana as the telephone receiver，he does not have any future intention．Instead，he is simultaneously pleasing himself or his parents on the spot．In the same manner，when a magician is pretending to be sawing agirl on the stage，his action does not concern with the future either．If the statement that intentional action concerns the future can be used as a criterion，we can put the four types of human pretending into Table 1．

As the table shows，we can well frame a hypothetical claim that only the obscure pretending and the surreptitious pretending can be attributed as intentional actions．In order to verify this hypothesis，we have made an experimental investigation of the people’s opinions about the following cases：

Table 1 Distinction between intentional and unintentional actions of human pretending

Case 1：

In a middle school in China，ayoung teacher had applied for a chance of being accepted as a doctoral candidate by a university．After giving him a series of examination，the university promised to grant him the chance only on the condition that the young teacher had to obtain the permission from his headmaster of the middle school．However，the headmaster decided against the young teacher’s application．Consequently，the young teacher lost the chance．

We have used this case as the experimental materialsto have 100 Chinese subjects judge whether the headmaster’s decision is intentional or unintentional．The result shows that 91 subjects think of the headmaster’s decision as intentional action．Only 9 subjects regard the decision as unintentional．When asked for the reason for their judgment，the 91 subjects hold an unanimous opinion that the headmaster should have realized that his negative decision would result in a big loss to the young teacher．This experiment shows that people tend to place value－judgment on actions．If there is a value involved in the action，the action is regarded as intentional．We have found this result is as the same as that from Knobe’s experimental investigation（Knobe 2003）．The implication from both our investigation and Knobe’s is that there seems to be no cultural difference in how people ground their value judgments on intentional or unintentional actions．

Case 2：

In a middle school in China，ayoung teacher had applied for a chance of being accepted as a doctoral candidate by a university．After giving him a seriesof examination，the university promised to grant him the chance only on the condition that the young teacher had to obtain the permission from his headmaster of the middle school．The headmaster decided in favor of the young teacher’s application．Consequently，the young teacher caught the chance．

One month after our first experimental investigation，we have used this case to let the same group of subjects make a judgment over the headmaster’s decision．As a result，79 subjects hold that the headmaster’s decision is not an intentional action at all but a routine job in his administration．Only 15 subjects think that the decision is intentional，while the rest of the group holds some irrelevant opinions．Comparing Case 2 to Case 1，we may well draw a conclusion that people tend to attribute bad results to intentional actions whereas good intentions tend to be neglected as unintentional．

Case 3：

In a middle school in China，ayoung teacher had applied for a chance of being accepted as a doctoral candidate by a university．After giving him a series of examination，the university promised to grant him the chance only on the condition that the young teacher had to obtain the permission from his headmaster of the middle school．When the young teacher went to the administrative office，the headmaster expressed his willingness to help the young teacher to catch the chance and said he would mail his approval in person to the university．However，several weeks later the young teacher received a rejection letter from the university，telling him that the middle school did not permit him to do his doctoral studies．

When asked to describe the headmaster’s decision or action，the majority of the subjects have used such words as hypocritical，morally bad，cheating，lying and pretending．All of the subjects think that the headmaster’s decision is intentional，but only a few subjects hold that the headmaster’s intentional action is not morally bad．Some subjects said that the headmaster pretended to help the young teacher，but indeed he had obstructed the young teacher’s plan．Some held that the headmaster was a liar and had cheated the young teacher．

From the three cases，we have found a point that intentional action is bound up with value and a

would－cause－a－loss－of－value－to－someone－action tends to be easily regarded as intentional．From Case 3，we have found ourselves in a complicated situation that people’s opinions are divided on the same fact．In Case 3，the headmaster has been viewed as a liar，apretender，and a cheat．That is，according to the subjects，the headmaster did all of the evil things as lying，cheating and pretending．In this case，such verbs as lie，cheat and pretend have been classified as evaluative－assertive words instead of fact－assertive words．We have been led to ask the following questions：Is human pretending morally bad or good？How do we differentiate pretending from lying and cheating？

3．Transvaluation

If we judge only from Case 3，we may jump to a hasty conclusion that human pretending is morally bad．However，this hasty conclusion is capable of causing the following doubts：Is there any good action of pretending？If Goldthwait（1985：3）is right with the belief that most people want their conduct to be morally good，and since human beings are capable of pretending，can we find a case of pretending that is in favor of the group rather than the individual？If human pretending is in favor of the group，it should be morally good．If there is such good pretending，we can safely say that the word pretend harbors both a positive value and a negative value．If there occurs a shift from positive value to negative value on the same word pretend，we can claim that human pretending has transvaluation．Let’s look at the following examples：

a）a．I beat my wife to death．（morally－bad）

b．I PRETEND to beat my wife to death．

（morally－good due to pretending）

b）a．I love my wife．（morally good）

b．I PRETEND to love my wife．（morally－bad

due to pretending）

The two examples here demonstrate to us another kind of tranvaluation which is different from what we have mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper．The same word can be either positive or negative．This function of the word pretendshows that human pretending can be morally good or bad．

Since pretending can be good or bad，that thesubjects in Case3think of the headmaster as a pretender should be re－evaluated not from the viewpoint of the subjects，but from the headmaster’s point of view．Having said this，we have found that as far as pretending is concerned the headmaster may have a value－judgment over his pretending action totally opposite to the subjects’value－judgment．The reason is that the pretending action per seindicates the possibility of transvaluation．

When the subjects label the headmaster as pretender，we want to ask what they are using language to do．If we bring this question to Austin and Searle，we may find that language can be used to do things．

When Austin differentiates three kinds of speech acts，he is concerned with how to do things with words（Austin 1962）．According to Austin，once an utterance is let out，what has been performed is locutionary act，illocutionary act and perlocutionary act．The hypothesis of speech act theory is，as Searle puts it，that using a language is engaged in a rulegoverned form of behavior（Searle，1969：22）．In accordance with speech act theory，the four types of human pretending can be measured with strong or weak illocutionary forces．

However，we cannot rely on speech act theory for every possible interpretation of pretending．One main reason is that a particular intentional action of pretending usually harbors double intentions，one of which is ostensibly to be carried out to cover the other，the real intention that is well justified on the part of the pretender．Therefore，an intentional action of human pretending reflects a combination of private value and public value，or in other words，a contrast between negative value and positive value．Table 2 illustrates the intentional actions of pretending and their corresponding value－judgment．Note that Table 2 cannot be regarded as the perfect picture of all kinds of pretending．What is listed in the table is merely an indicator of the different value－judgments possible on the part of the pretender himself．Since pretending holds the possibility of transvaluating，this table indicates the corresponding situations．More importantly，Table 2 provides a definite answer to the question about whether human pretending is morally good or bad．In the case of pretending，people may display a double standard of evaluation．Judging from the intention，people would say：when pretending springs from evil intention，it is bad，and when pretending comes from good intention，

Table 2 Value judgment of intentional actions of pretending（vs．unintentional pretending）

it is good．In addition，the possibility of transvaluation also provides us a tentative explanation of the divided opinions about the headmaster’s intentional action in Case 3．People differ from each other on the same fact because they have positioned themselves differ

ently．

4．Lying，cheating and pretending

In our experimental investigation of the subjects’ opinions on the headmaster’s action in Case 3，we have found that the same action has been labeled in three ways：lying，cheating and pretending，obviously the three having become evaluative expressions．Thus，our question here is how the subjects come to their respective labeling．To put it in another way，how do the subjects differentiate pretending from lying and cheating？

In order to find the answer to the question，we have reframed our experimental investigation of Case 3．We suppose that there are three types of evaluative expressions：truth－judgment，value－judgment and effectjudgment．First，as Table 3shows，we let a new group of 100 subjects to decide over the headmaster’s action in terms of lying，cheating and pretending．Then，as Table 4 indicates，we ask all the subjects to make a choice among truth－judgment，valuejudgment and effect－judgment for the three labels of lying，cheating and pretending．

As Table 3 shows，the subjects are divided on their opinions about the headmaster’s action．Although a relatively larger number of people thinkof the headmaster as a liar in Case 3，quite a few people think that the headmaster has performed cheating and pretending．Interestingly，when asked to make a differentiation of one action from the other two，the subjects seem to know for sure how to tell lying from cheating or pretending．Obviously，the majority of the subjects think that lying can be identified by means of truth－judgment．It is similarly evident that most people think that cheating involves value－judgment．What is less evident is the subjects’conception of pretending，which can be identified through either truth－judgment or value－judgment in spite of the fact that more subjects tend to attribute effect to pretending．

Table 3 Judgment over the headmaster’s action．

Table 4 The most salient feature of each of the three actions．

Roughly，lying seems to be morally unacceptable，but lying can be in favor of both the liar and the lierecipient．A white lie or a noble lie is morally good．Therefore，what counts in identifying a lie is not the value but the truth．Lying is a verbal action without truth as its condition．Unlike lying，some actions of cheating may have sound truth as their bases．However，cheating is always morally unacceptable．Cheating is not necessarily fixated on a same particular kind of behavior because any behavior itself cannot be labeled as cheating－specific．On the contrary，cheating can be completed through any behavior．Therefore，cheating is a general term of value－assertive action．By the same token，pretending is a general term of actions．A case of pretending can be realized through lying or other verbal actions．However，for pretending to be called pretending，the key element is the effect that has been brought about from intentional actions of pretending．If there is no realization of the covert intentional action，there is no pretending in its true sense．

In a brief sum，you can lie for the purpose of cheating or pretending．You can also cheat through pretending．Lying，cheating and pretending are sometimes mingled together as a composite in conception．That’s why the subjects are divided on their views on the headmaster’s actions．Their divided opinions reflect their different aspects of thinking．Therefore，if we put Case 3 into the perspective of semiotics，we can well disclose the mechanism of transvaluation of human pretending．

5．Semiotic analysis

According to Peirce，all thought is in signs and all thinking is dialogic．The dialogic nature of sign is evinced in the different processes of two participants’interpretation of the same objectively observable part of sign for different purposes．In the case of human pretending，the pretender，the person who pretends，and the pretendee，the person who receives the pretender’s information，share a same observable part of the content of pretending，while the two have different interpretation of the observable content．

According to Pearson’s USSD－2000，a sign is actually composed of two triadic relations which are linked together by a common sign vehicle．We have found that Pearson’s USSD－2000 can shed a light on the complicated situation of Case 3．By employing Pearson’s USSD－2000，we attempt to tackle the following question：Why a seemingly simple event may have caused different evaluations？In other words，what is the semiotic mechanism of transvaluation of pretending in this case？

Pearson’s USSD－2000is the“guts”of his USST，which has been developed from Peirce’s corresponding semiotic theory（Pearson 2008）．The leading power of Pearson’s USST is its systematic method of explanation and description．In order to answer the question raised in the previous paragraph，we will concentrate on Pearson’s USSD－2000 for a systematic analysis of Case 3．

Among the three principles of Pearson’s USST，the representation principle，which is the epitome of Pearson’s USSD－2000，gives the most accounting power to our question．In terms of the representation principle，“a sign must consist of a real triadic relation that signifies．A sign，therefore，consists of three parts：a syntactic structure，apragmatic structure，and a semantic structure．”（Pearson 2008）

If we take for a sign the whole event of Case 3，the syntactic structure in this case contains the following elements：the medium of message giving and receiving，the syntactic context，and the form of the message．When the headmaster in Case 3 expresses his willingness to help the young teacher to seize the chance of seeking academic advancement，the form of his expression and the tone of his speaking are in tune with the context．Therefore，the young teacher believes that the message he received from the headmaster is favorable．On this level，there exist two diverging positions：in favor of the headmaster or the young teacher．

It turns out that the message given by the headmaster is favorable not to the young teacher but to the others．Why does the young teacher misinterpret the headmaster’s message on the spot as that in favor of him？The syntactic structure alone cannot give us the real answer．Therefore，we have to turn to the pragmatic structure for more information．We have to take the“source sign”and the“target sign”into consideration．In addition，there is the third interpreter．The three interpreters may position themselves respectively，thus giving rise to different evaluation．On the pragmatic level，at least three diverging positions will appear．That’s why the 100 subjects in our investigation are divided on opinions about the same event．

When the subjects position themselves differently，what decides their difference is the semantic structure．The cognitive context，the cognitive mentellect and the cognitive ground determine the connotation（and even denotation）difference．To exemplify this，we may use the following example．Your prompt and spontaneous action may well be described negatively as“naive and impulsive”．Why？There is a shift of evaluative connotation from positive to negative．

In Case 3，if we simply regarded the event as an irreducible monad，we would have less diverging evaluation．However，this event is a composite that can be broken into such structures as syntactic，pragmatic and semantic first，and then each of the three structures can be broken down into further sub－structures．Each sub－structure contains diverging possibilities that are capable of bringing about differences to different participants in a semiotic process of communication．In the case of human pretending，transvaluation occurs wherever there is a possible shift of position．

6．Conclusion

Human pretending is closely related to lying and cheating，but the three cannot be regarded as the same．In measuring the three，we have found that lying is susceptible to truth－judgment，cheating is characterized by value－judgment，and pretending is marked with more effect－judgment than truth－judgment or value－judgment．

In light of effect－judgment，human pretending falls into intentional and unintentional types，while in terms of value－judgment human pretending can be morally good or bad．The value－judgment of pretending is determined by the agent’s transvaluation of action．When pretending is viewed as action，the transvaluation of pretending demonstrates the semiotic mechanism of human pretending．In accordance with Pearson’s USSD－2000，people differ in interpreting the same action just because they may base their respective judgment either on the syntax，or the pragmatics，or the semantics of the same semiosis．

REFERENCES

Anscombe，G．E．M．1957．Intention［M］．New York：Cornell University Press．

Austin，J．L．1962．How to Do Things with Words［M］．New York：Oxford University Press．

Dennett，D．C．1989．The Intentional Stance［M］．Cambridge：The MIT press．

Du，S．2013．The sign system of human pretending［J］．Semiotica 193：165－74．

Goldthwait，J．T．1985．Value，Language and Life［M］．New York：Prometheus Books．

Knobe，J．2003．Intentional action in folk psychology：An experimental investigation［J］．Philosophical Psychology 16（2）：309－24．

Knobe，J．2006．The concept of intentional action：A case study in the uses of folk psychology［J］．Philosophical Studies 130（2）：203－31．

Pearson，C．2008．Beyond Peirce：The new science of semiotics and the semiotics of law［J］．International Journal for the Semiotics of Law21（3）：247－96．

Searle，J．R．1969．Speech Acts：An Essay in the Philosophy of Language［M］．Cambridge：Cambridge University Press．

（责任编辑 甄凤超）

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杜世洪，西南大学外国语言学与外语教育研究中心教授、博士生导师。主要研究方向为西方语言哲学、广义认知语言学。电子邮箱：dushihong2008＠126．com

查尔斯·皮尔森（Charls Pearson），美国乔治亚理工大学退休教授，美国符号学研究所主任，著名符号学家Charles Morris的学生。主要研究方向为皮尔士符号学研究、西方语言哲学。电子邮箱：dr．charls＠avillager．org