《中国科学技术史·语言与逻辑》选译（二）

李约瑟 译注/陈国华 卢培培

【譯者言】我在2020年发表的“诗歌翻译的五个公设、三个标准和一个原则：以《再别康桥》的英译为例”这篇文章里，提出“可以从原文和译文的语言、原文和译文的真值、原文和译文的美学价值这三方面来比较和判断译文的优劣”“语言标准首先指译者须按照原作的语言系统来解读作品，解读的结果须说得通;其次指译者须按译作的语言系统（包括规则和习惯）来构造译文”。这里说的“规则”，即文法规则;“习惯”，即行文习惯。拿我最近遇到的一个中译英案例来说，“乘2022冬季奥运会的东风”最好译成riding the waves of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games，才符合英文行文习惯;否则译成riding the east wind of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games，会让英语读者读起来觉得怪怪的。但将 “东风”改成waves，似乎有违真值标准，即译文和原文须“在语义或所指上相符，相符为真，不相符为假”。不用说，“东风”和waves，无论在词义上还是在所指上，都是两码事。

本期译注的文本里有一个类似的例子，但这一次我的处理方式却不同。原文里有这样一句话： Twice the Chinese appear to have been interested in explicit logic for its own sake. 在几周前的翻译课上，我为学生提供的参考译文将这句话译为“先后有两次，中国人似乎都对显性逻辑本身产生了兴趣”。可是最近一次翻译课，我让学生翻译亨利·纽曼《大学之道》（The Idea of a University）的选段，纽曼两次提到求知的目的，一次是the pursuit of Knowledge for its own sake，另一次是“Knowledge is … an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake”。纽曼的阐述让我对for its own sake有了更深刻的理解，于是我把李约瑟的话改译成“先后有两次，中国人似乎都因为显性逻辑本身的缘故而对之产生了兴趣”。

我的学生卢培培在修订和补充这篇译注时，看到我对原先译文的修订，向我提出了一个令我难以用一言两语回答的质疑：为什么“乘东风”可以变通地译成更符合英文表达习惯的riding the waves，而interested in explicit logic for its own sake却不能变通地译成更符合中文表达习惯的“对显性逻辑本身产生了兴趣”？

对于这个问题，我将在下一期文章里回答。

FOREWORD （II）

In what had originally been thought of as a slim Volume 6 we now have or shall soon have several volumes1 on such subjects as botany and agriculture with their related studies and technol-ogies， to be followed by contributions2 on things medical and pharmaceutical.

All these were reasonably3 specific and objective. But now， in Volume 7， we return to that most proper4 study of mankind， namely human speech and thought processes， as5 they occurred in China.

I had originally arranged6 with the distinguished logician， Janusz Chmielewski7 of Warsaw University， to write a part of Section 49 in the seventh volume of Science and Civilisation in China， covering Chinese language and Chinese logic， as we then expressed it8. But by September 1983 he had made it clear to us that his own failing eyesight， the illness of his wife， and the sheer physical difficulties9 of living in Poland at that time， made it impossible for him to go beyond10 the first two chapters which he had by then written. This was but the first of many setbacks we received in the writing of Volume 7. Janusz Chmielewski did， however11， recommend that the work should be entrusted to Christoph Harbsmeier. We gratefully followed up this suggestion. Christoph went to see Janusz， and a smooth and cordial handover was arranged12， which the author of this volume refers to on p. 1. We were very sorry that Janusz was unable to bring to a successful conclusion the work to which he had devoted much precious time， but are most grateful to him for ensuring its continuation in the hands of his gifted pupil13.

Christoph Harbsmeier， in writing on Language and Logic in Traditional China， has given us a contribution which is not only erudite in its ability to draw together East and West14， but also stimulating and entertaining. He feels that what logic amounts to is the history of the philosophy of science， and that this should be recognised as central to the intellectual scheme15 in Science and Civilisation in China.

In the pages16 which follow the reader will find many common preconceptions challenged. Early Chinese17， for example， was an isolating18， but not an isolated language. Literary Chinese19 was no vague and poetic language unsuitable for science， provided it was used by a competent scientific thinker. Nor were the Chinese uninterested in logic， explicit or implicit. Twice the Chinese appear to have been interested in explicit logic for its own sake20， once in the Mohist School， and once again with the Chinese Buddhist commentators21， in whose logical minds the ambiguities of Sanskrit were resolved when translated into Chinese. But the Chinese were always more interested in the truth on which assumptions were based than on the verbal machinery for developing these assumptions. Explicit logic did not therefore have that continuously sustained interest which it has received in the West.

Many readers will be anxious to know how Chinese compares for clarity with， say， classical Greek， and will turn to Section （c， 6） on ‘Complexity’， where translations from Plato’s works into Literary Chinese by skilled translators are compared. It would be wrong of me here， however， to anticipate22 the author’s findings.

Granted that Literary Chinese was capable of expressing scientific ideas， what actually happened when it was so used？ This， as the Americans would say， is a whole new ball-game23 for which the reader will have to await a subsequent volume24.

Joseph Needham

Cambridge

9 May 1994

前言（下）

在最初认为会是薄薄的第6卷里，我们已有或很快就会有几册阐述植物学、农学及其相关研究和技术的书问世，随后几册阐述医学和药学。

所有这些都比较具体和客观。但在第7卷中，我们回归到对人类最理所当然的研究上，研究人类的言语和思想过程，看它在中国是怎样发生的。

我原本与华沙大学杰出的逻辑学家雅努什·赫米耶莱夫斯基商定，由他在《中国科学技术史》第7卷中撰写第49节的部分内容，涵盖中国语言和中国逻辑，就像我们当初说的那样。但到了1983年9月，他明确向我们表示，自己视力下降，妻子患病，加上波兰当时的生活条件十分恶劣，使他无法在已完成前两章的基础上继续往下写。这只是我们编写第7卷时所遇众多挫折中的第一个。好在雅努什·赫米耶莱夫斯基提议将这项工作托付给何莫邪。我们心存感激，落实了这一建议。何莫邪见了雅努什·赫米耶莱夫斯基，二人顺利友好地做出了交接安排（本册作者在第1页提到这一点）。对于雅努什·赫米耶莱夫斯基无法完成这项他投入了大量宝贵时间的工作，我们深感惋惜，同时我们又对他感激涕零，因为他确保这项工作得以在他这位天分极高的弟子那里继续下去。

何莫邪撰写《传统中国的语言与逻辑》，成功牵手东西双方，不仅展现了他的深厚功力和渊博知识，而且还让我们深受启发，饶有兴趣。他认为，逻辑学说到底就是科学哲学史，而这一点应该被视为《中国科学技术史》思想架构的核心。

在后面的篇章中，读者会发现许多先入为主的常见观念受到挑战。例如，早期華夏语言虽是孤立语，却并非一门被孤立的语言。文言文并不是一种语义模糊、适合诗歌却不适合科学的语言，一切全看是否有一个有能力、懂科学的思想家来驾驭它。中国人也并非对逻辑（无论显性或隐性）不感兴趣。先后有两次，中国人似乎都因为显性逻辑本身的缘故而对之产生了兴趣，一次是战国时期的墨家，另一次是汉唐时期的佛经译注家。在这些译注家富有逻辑的头脑里，梵文的歧义在中文译本中得以澄清。但中国人更感兴趣的总是各种假定所依据的真理，而不是用来建立这些假定的言语机制，因此显性逻辑在中国没有像它在西方那样受到持续不断的关注。

许多读者会急于知道中文与其他语言（比如说古典希腊文）相比，清晰度如何，他们可以马上翻到本书阐述“复杂性”的第（c， 6）节，这一节对翻译高手用文言文翻译的柏拉图著作与原文做了对比。不过，我如果在这里剧透作者的发现，那可就是我的不是了。

既然文言文能够表达各种科学观念，当人们这样使用文言文时，实际情况又如何呢？用美国人的话说，这可是“一项全新的球类运动”。读者欲知后事如何，只好且听下册分解。

李约瑟

剑桥

1994年5月9日