Japan’s Meddling in the South China Sea: Current Movements and Future Developments

Zhu Haiyan



Japan’s Meddling in the South China Sea: Current Movements and Future Developments

Zhu Haiyan

Zhu Haiyan is an associate professor at the College of History and Culture, Henan University.

J apan is not a claimant country of the South China Sea. However, it has been meddling in the South China Sea issue in recent years. Japan’s meddling has brought greater uncertainties to the already complicated situation, and it increases the challenges China faces in safeguarding its maritime rights and its initiative for the development of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

Major Actions Taken by Japan in the South China Sea Issue

Since Shinzo Abe became prime minister for the second time at the end of 2012, his administration has actively involved in the South China Sea issue in a high profile, making Japan one of the major outside forces influencing the situation in the South China Sea.

Pushing for the internationalization of the South China Sea issue

Using the justification of “freedom of navigation and overflights,”the Abe administration has worked hard to support some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries’ occupation of China’s territorial islands and islets in the South China Sea, sought to make the South China Sea an issue between China and all ASEAN countries and pushed for internationalization of the issue. During Abe’s frequent visits to ASEAN countries, freedom of navigation and the security situation in theregion have been his core topics. Japan’s Southeast Asian diplomacy centers on the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries which have the territorial disputes with China. The Japanese government has been working hard to build a network of relations closely related to maritime issues. In February 2013, to deepen their strategic partnership, Japan and the Philippines built a “3+3”framework for their maritime security cooperation with the participation of their foreign ministries, navies and coast guards, making maritime security cooperation a pillar of the two countries’ strategic partnership. Japan has also supported the Philippines’ submission of its South China Sea dispute with China for international arbitration. Japanese high officials have visited Vietnam on frequent occasions, and Abe paid his first visit to Vietnam after he returned to office. All most all senior Vietnamese officials have visited Japan.

Besides, Japan has been making efforts to improve its political and security relations with Indonesia, and the South China Sea issue was for the first time included in the bilateral “2+2”talks. Apart from ASEAN, when dealing with the likeminded “democratic”countries of Australia, India, the United Kingdom and others, Japan has made use of the values of “freedom,”“democracy”and “the rule of law”to kidnap these countries to follow Japan’s position on the East China Sea and South China Sea issues.

In addition to bilateral talks, Abe has also made use of almost all international occasions to internationalize the East China Sea and South China Sea issues. At international occasions such as G7 and G20 summits and the East Asia Summit, ASEAN + China (“10+1”), ASEAN + China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (“10+3”) meetings, and the Japan-Pacific Islands Conference, Japan has forced the South China Sea issue into meetings under the pretext of maintaining international laws and the freedom of navigation. To “define national maritime rights and interests in accordance with international laws and to support an early conclusion of a code of conduct”and to “support the settlement of maritime disputes in the South China Sea through diplomatic and legal means including international arbitration”are just two of the assertions Japan is using to exert pressure onChina. Japan has also criticized China’s island reconstruction and facility building on some of its South China Sea territories.

Helping ASEAN claimants strengthen their maritime defense capabilities

On the one hand, Japan has provided equipment support to the Philippines, Vietnam and other parties in the South China Sea disputes to strengthen their maritime military capabilities so as to contain China’s frontier forces. Abe claimed at the 2014 Asian Security Summit (the Shangri-La Dialogue) that Japan would “support”through actions the building up of the maritime military capabilities of the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and other countries.

When meddling in the South China Sea issue, Japan takes the Philippines as the key country as it holds the most hard-line stance on the South China Sea issue, and provides military and technical assistance to it. Japan has announced it will provide 10 new patrol ships to the Philippines coast guard and help it improve its long-distance communication system, to enhance its maritime monitoring and surveillance capacity.

To further strengthen the Philippines military capabilities, Japan has reached an agreement with the Philippines for long-term military equipment and technology transfer according to its “three principles of defense equipment and technology transfer.”Japan and the Philippines also started negotiations on an “agreement concerning visits to bases”to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) aircrafts and ships to use bases in the Philippines for refueling and supplies, facilitating the SDF expanding its activities to the South China Sea. Japan also regards Vietnam as another key country in Southeast Asia that can help it contain China. Japan has decided to provide six second-hand patrol ships to help Vietnam train its maritime patrol force, and is considering providing brand-new patrol ships to Vietnam for earlywarning and surveillance. The two countries have also started consultations on defense equipment and technology transfer. And Japan has agreed to help Vietnam launch two earth observation satellites in 2017 for the purpose ofimproving Vietnamese real-time surveillance capabilities in the South China Sea.

On April 16, 2015, two ships of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force arrived in Da Nang, Vietnam, to participate in a co-training session at sea with the Vietnamese navy.

To elevate ASEAN countries’ maritime defense capabilities, Japan will integrate its official development assistance (ODA), capability training courses given by SDF, defense equipment cooperation and other assistance projects, so as to ensure uninterrupted assistance to ASEAN countries. The Abe government carries forward the projects of “capacity-building assistance”practiced by the previous Democratic Party government with the current focus on Southeast Asian countries, because these projects are “effective means to strengthen relations through exchanges among military organizations.”

On the other hand, by conducting joint military exercises and training with ASEAN countries, Japan is trying to enhance the military capacities of the countries concerned. What is more, it uses these opportunities to familiarize Japan’s SDF with conditions in the South China Sea and to test the waters for the SDF’s future surveillance in the South China Sea. In May and June of 2015, Japan’s SDF conducted several joint exercises withthe Philippines navy in the Philippines waters. In August, Japan, the United States and the Philippines conducted humanitarian exercise in Subic Bay. In May 2015, two Japanese SDF P-3C patrol aircraft landed for the first time at Da Nang Port, Vietnam. In November, Japan and Vietnam reached a consensus for JMSDF’s port visit to the Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.

Challenging China’s legitimacy of safeguarding its rights and interests in the South China Sea

Japan’s “National Security Strategy”clearly states that China has forward sea and air positions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea which “contradicts”the existing rules of international law, and that it is attempting to change the status quo by force. The Abe government advocates so-called maritime rule of law and questions China’s just and legal safeguarding of its rights and interests in the South China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea as a “maritime public property,”Japan claims that “the only means of safeguarding security and peace of an irreplaceable international public property is to maintain the unshakable order through the law.”Abe has accused China, without naming it, of taking repeated actions, based on a unilateral position, to increase tensions among countries in the region. At the Asian Security Summit in 2014, Abe proposed three principles of maritime rule of law, namely: national propositions must abide by the law, no use of force or threat of force shall be resorted to on the grounds of national propositions, and the resolution of disputes must be peaceful.

In July 2015, Japan’s Defense Ministry issued a report entitled “China’s Actions in the South China Sea,”which wantonly creates a “China threat”and opposes China’s territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea and China’s policy positions in a comprehensive way. This is the first time the Japanese Ministry of Defense has publicly issued a report specifically on the South China Sea issue. By using graphics, the report describes and interprets actions taken by China since the 1950s to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests in the region in a distorted manner, identifies China’s island construction in the Nansha Islands as “militarization”of the waters,and exaggerates the military intentions and impacts of China’s island construction. The report makes no mention of the historical facts of China’s management and jurisdiction of Islands in the South China Sea and remains silent about the provocative actions taken by some Southeast Asian claimants to occupy Chinese territories and the fact that these actions occurred first.

Seeking to align with the US strategy concerning the South China Sea

Japan takes its military alliance with the United States as the legal institutional framework to justify its military intervention in the South China Sea. Japan’s “National Security Strategy”points out that as countries relying on open ocean and having a global network of trade, Japan and the United States stress the importance of maintaining maritime order on the basis of compliance with international law, including the freedom of navigation and overflights. The Abe administration has worked hard to seek legal support for SDF actions to follow in the footsteps of the United States in the South China Sea. In April 2015, the two countries reached an agreement on a new version of the “Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines”and decided to extend their cooperation worldwide and take joint actions to defend islands. In September 2015, a new security bill was passed by the Japanese Diet, which allows Japan to give “timely rear assistance”to the US military and armed forces of other closely-related countries on a global scale when required, including in “grey zone situations”(events between peacetime and conflicts), “armed attacks,”“scenarios with important impacts,”a “crisis of survival,”and “joint response to protect international peace.”

The South China Sea is defined by Abe as an important part of the maritime lifeline from the Middle East to Japanese coastal waters so that a worsening of the South China Sea situation would constitute a crisis for Japan’s survival. Hence, using the alliance with the United States, Japan’s military intervention in the South China Sea becomes possible. By the end of October 2015, Japan and the United States had conducted joint exercises inthe South China Sea, to the north of Kalimantan Island, for communication training and personal transfers. This was the first time joint military exercises were staged by the two countries in the South China Sea. During the G20 summit in November, Japan reiterated its support for Washington’s dispatching of warships within 12 nautical miles of Chinese islands, where reconstruction work was underway. Japan-US coordination and cooperation in the South China Sea was also demonstrated in capacity-building support to claimant parties in the South China Sea. For instance, in order to help the Philippines improve its ability to counter China in the South China Sea, Japan and the United States have a clear division of labor, with Washington being responsible for providing weapons and equipment to the Philippines armed forces while Tokyo is responsible for providing equipment to the Philippines coast guard.

Japan’s Strategic Considerations for Its Involvement in the South China Sea Issue

Under the pretext of “freedom of navigation”and “securing safe passage,”Japan’s high-profile involvement in the South China Sea is superficially out of consideration of maintaining its maritime “economic lifeline.”However, in doing so, Japan harbors ulterior strategic motives.

Overturning Japan’s “postwar Constitution”and finding excuses for the SDF to operate overseas and for its military build-up

Japan’s South China Sea policy, which is centered on China, constitutes part of its strategic planning to get rid of the “postwar system.”The Abe government has made it its political program to amend Japan’s Constitution, strengthen its military capacity, and free Japan of the system “imposed’ on it after World War II. Making use of the tense situation in the East China Sea, which was single-handedly created by Japan’s “purchase”of the Diaoyu Islands, the Abe administration has worked hard to lift the ban on collective self-defense, push through new security laws, strengthen the SDF andaccelerate steps to militarize its outlying islands.

However, in reality, the “nationalization”of the Diaoyu Islands has not expanded the SDF’s room for maneuver. Therefore, the Abe government has become proactive in meddling in the South China Sea issue. The purpose is to intensify the situation in the region so as to create the impression that Japan faces a deteriorating security situation in its periphery, and thus an excuse for amendments to the Constitution, military build-up and freeing Japan from the postwar political system. Former Japanese SDF fleet commander Kouta Yoji has stated in clear-cut terms that what Japan should do on the South China Sea issue is to upgrade SDF’s national defense capabilities to deal effectively with China’s military forces and improve Japan’s combat capability to secure the West Pacific passage.

By seeking direct military interference in the South China Sea, Japan intends to expand the geographical scope of the SDF’s surveillance and to improve its operational capacity. In 2015, the “Japan-US defense Cooperation Guidelines”removed the geographical limits on SDF activities, thus making it possible to normalize the SDF operating in the South China Sea. Japan is also trying to boost the SDF’s operational capabilities and expand the scope of its activities by providing logistical support to other countries, the United States in particular.

Containing China on multiple levels

The main target of Abe’s diplomacy and strategy has always been China. Japan’s meddling in the South China Sea is driven by two considerations: first of all, to contain China’s activities aimed at safeguarding its rights and interests in the East China Sea. Since Japan’s “nationalization”of the Diaoyu Islands, China has normalized its patrols in waters adjacent to the Diaoyu Islands to safeguard its territorial sovereignty in the East China Sea. In order to contain China, Japan has wantonly strengthened its military force and conducted military training and exercises for capturing islands under the pretext of the defense of its Southwest islands. At the same time, Japan has supported the Philippines, Vietnam and other claimant parties in theirbids to provoke trouble, aggravate disputes and strengthen their maritime alert and surveillance capabilities, so as to check China’s actions and divert China’s attention from the East China Sea dispute. Japan’s wishful thinking is to get a free ride on the “internationalization”of the South China Sea disputes, and to highlight Japan’s concerns and interests in the South China Sea in exchange for concessions from China on the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea issue. Meanwhile, Japan is also trying to make its support to South China Sea claimants a bargaining chip in exchange for their support for Japan in the East China Sea dispute, so that Japan and Southeast Asian countries work hand in hand in coordination on both the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, and put China in the predicament of facing threats on two fronts.

Secondly, to curb China’s rise at both the regional and international levels. By making use of certain ASEAN claimants’ efforts to secure foreign assistance to counterbalance China, Japan has increased its economic and military assistance to these countries in order to further enhance Japan’s influence in the region; it is also gradually cultivating the strategic reliance of the claimants on Japan, so as to build a Japan-led maritime strategic alliance against China.

As Chinese scholar Zhang Wenmu has pointed out, Japan’s current main diplomatic task is to get out of the diplomatic crisis caused by its purchase of the Diaoyu Islands. The way it has designed to do this is to make trouble everywhere and exacerbate China’s clashes (at best wars) with its neighbors, in an attempt to expand anti-China sentiment and push these countries toward the United States and Japan as they face conflict with China.1Zhang Wenmu, “Xitaipingyang Maodun Fenxi yu Zhongguo Xuanze”[An Analysis of the Conflicts in West Pacific and China’s Choice], Dangdai Shijie уи Shehиi Zhиуi [Contemporary World and Socialism], issue 1, 2015, p.115.Japanese strategist Montani Suutyou and others have claimed that the South China Sea is like a giant black hole that would suck in all the strength China has, and the tougher actions China takes, the more bogged-down China will be in the South China Sea, Even if China wins inthe disputes, they argue, China will find its strength worn down, so Japan’s most important interest lies in keeping the South China Sea turbulent. At the international level, Japan is attempting to create a false image that China is violating international law through its efforts to safeguard its rights and interests in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and seeking to undermine China’s international image as a defender of peaceful development, while at the same time portraying itself as a law-abiding country that maintains law and order, in an attempt to outbid China for the support of other countries.

Supporting America’s “rebalancing to Asia”strategy and consolidating the Japan-US alliance

The “rebalancing to Asia”strategy of the United States, with China as the main target, is intended to incite ASEAN claimants to adopt radical policies to realize their territorial claims, because they believe that they will get support from the United States.2Barry Desker, “South China Sea tensions unlikely to lead to war,”RSIS Commentary, No.233, November 3, 2015.This has made the already complicated situation in the South China Sea more turbulent, and provided an opportunity for Japan’s further meddling in the region. One of the tactics for Washington’s rebalancing strategy is to depend on its military alliances in the Asia-Pacific. Under the pressure of automatic spending cuts, the United States wants its allies to shoulder more responsibilities for Asia-Pacific “security.”The United States welcomes and looks forward strongly to the Japanese SDF’s participation in “freedom of navigation”operations in the South China Sea.

Japan has responded actively to the US’ requests on the grounds of “making regional peace and stability more solidly based.”The Japan-US alliance constitutes the basic component in Japan’s postwar diplomacy and security activities, and also serves as an accelerator or speed brake in Japan’s diplomacy and security matters. Abe is attempting to accommodate Japan’s strategic intents with the US’ global strategy so as to achieve part of hisstrategic objectives, in particular on issues concerning the South China Sea. In support of the US’ “upholding”so-called freedom of navigation, Japan has returned to the South China Sea 70 years after the end of the WWII, striving for a qualitative leap in its regional leadership by accumulating Japan’s quantitative presence. Japan might make its support of the United States as a bargaining chip to propose joint surveillance in the East China Sea, and by supporting the US’ rebalancing strategy, Japan might entice the United States into the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea, so as to gain the upper hand in containing China.

Main Factors Restraining Japan’s Involvement in the South China Sea Issue

In meddling in the South China Sea issue, the Abe administration has been challenged by many factors both at home and abroad. This will make it unlikely that Japan’s policy concerning the South China Sea will evolve in a leap-forward way; rather it will be pushed forward in an increasing spiral.

Domestic political and legal restrictions

At the political level, the Abe administration’s South China Sea policy results from political maneuvering among political parties, and therefore, this policy is affected by political developments in Japan. The ruling party, as well as public opinion in Japan, holds divergent views on Japan’s involvement in the South China Sea issue, which will restrain Japan’s further involvement. LDP Diet Member Noda Seiko pointed out that the South China Sea issue has no direct link with Japan, and Japan should pursue an independent China policy no matter what happens with the Nansha Islands. Some of the Japanese public have also question Abe’s policy, saying that even the Philippines, as a claimant and an important ally of the United States in Asia, fails to participate in the US’ “freedom of navigation”actions in the South China Sea, so why should Japan do so?

Divergent positions at home have suspended Japan’s direct militaryinvolvement in the South China Sea: on the one hand, senior government officials keep on signaling that Japan will send the SDF to the South China Sea to participate in and support US “freedom of navigation”operations. On the other hand, the government has constantly toned down its assertive rhetoric on the South China Sea issue. In the near future, the Abe government’s political objective is to ensure its continued governance, this will, to a certain extent, restrain Japan’s involvement in the South China Sea from going too far.

At the legal level, Japan’s direct military involvement in the South China Sea issue will be subject to a series of domestic laws. According to Japan’s new security law, the SDF can exercise collective self-defense rights, including giving rear assistance to other armed forces in a state of war, rescuing other countries’ armed forces involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations in faraway places, and protecting the US ships in peacetime. To cope with above-mentioned situation, appropriate “guidelines for troop movements”are required, which should specify provisions including the use of weapons by the SDF forces in detail. In line with the new security law, the Japanese Ministry of Defense, in late September 2015, set up a “preparatory and review committee on the enactment of security laws”headed by the defense minister, and the committee is responsible for drawing up appropriate guidelines. The process will affect the timetable for Japan’s military involvement in the South China Sea.

Uncertainties of relations between countries both inside and outside of the region

The interactions among China, the United States and Japan will affect Japan’s policy toward the South China Sea. Japan and the United States have different perspectives on China. Tokyo’s policy toward China is regional-oriented with the focus on containing China’s rise and preventing China from becoming a competitor for regional dominance, while Washington designs its China strategy from a global perspective, focusing on incorporating China into the US-led world order.

In the Asia Pacific region, the effectiveness of the Japan-US alliance depends on the future development of Sino-US relations. Sino-US relations are global in nature, and the contest between China and the United States in the South China Sea is the product of regional and phased competition at a time when the two countries are constructing a new-type of major-country relationship.

China and the United States have broad cooperation in non-traditional security fields such as climate change and anti-terrorism, and have a high degree of interdependence in their economic and trade relations. Although the contest between China and the United States will continue, there is a smooth communication channel between the two militaries, hence the low possibility of any miscalculation. Japan can get involved in the South China Sea by taking advantage of its alliance with the United States, however, the degree and the way it gets involved is subject to the strategic needs of the United States, as well as the interactions between China and the United States.

The development of Sino-Japanese relations will also check, to some extent, Japan’s involvement in the South China Sea. Abe acknowledges that “China is an important neighbor of Japan,”and “sound Japan-China relations are undoubtedly good for the national interests of both countries.”Although Japan intends to contain China by making use of the South China Sea issue, Japan still has to, from time to time, take into account the impact of doing so on Sino-Japanese relations.

Relations between China and ASEAN countries will also affect Japan’s involvement in the South China Sea issue. Generally speaking, the mainstream of the China policy of the countries that have maritime disputes with China is a combination of “engagement and counter-balance.”The Philippines and Vietnam, which rely more on Japan, tend to seek a counterbalance to China in their diplomacy. Even so, because of geopolitical factors and their national interests, the Philippines and Vietnam are reluctant to make an enemy of China. After a series of twists and turns from 2013 to 2014, China-Vietnam relations started to warm at the end of 2014. The twocountries signed a joint statement in November 2015 and reached important consensuses on maritime issues. The new government of Vietnam will continue to pursue a foreign policy of independence, and the diversification and multilateralization of international relations, trying to maintain a balance between major powers and maintain consistency in its China policy when engaging with the competition between major countries in the region.

Japan and the Philippines are developing closer relations. However, there have always been voices in the Philippines asking for government reflection on and readjustment of its current China policy. Former Philippine foreign secretary Alberto Romulo proposed promoting relations with China instead of totally relying on the United States and Japan.3Joel M. SY Egco, “Romulo: PH Actions Fuel Chinese Nationalism,”The Manila Times, October 30, 2014, http://www.manilatimes.net/romulo-ph-actions-fuel-chinese-nationalism/138136.Deputy Chief of Staff of the Philippines Major General Raul del Rosario acknowledged that despite some disputes between China and the Philippines, bilateral relations are not confined to just maritime disputes. “We want to cooperate with China, which is good for us. The Philippine army also fully supports strengthening the cooperative ties with the PLA. ”4“Fei Fuzongcanmouzhang: Haishang Zhengduan Bushi Zhongfei Guanxi Quanbu”[Deputy Chief of Staff of the Philippines: The maritime disputes are not all of the China-Philippines relations], people.cn, November 23, 2014, http://xj.people.com.cn/n/2014/1123/c188514-22984548.html.With the forthcoming change of government in the Philippines, the country might reassess its relations with China out of its own national interests, and relations might return to the track of cooperation and dispute control. A stable and improved relationship between China and the ASEAN claimants will reduce Japan’s room to maneuver on South China Sea issue.

Impact of Japan’s Meddling in the South China Sea Issue

Japan’s meddling in the South China Sea is not aimed for a proper settlement of the disputes, rather to make more troubles for China in the South China Sea and prolong dispute settlement in the region so as to achieve its strategic objectives. Japan’s obstruction to China’s attempts to safeguard its rightsand interests in the South China Sea and to China’s policy implementation should be taken seriously.

Undermining China’s diplomatic efforts to resolve the maritime disputes through a “dual-track”approach

Maritime disputes are one of the problems affecting political trust between China and some ASEAN countries. A fair and reasonable solution to the South China Sea disputes will play a key role in enhancing mutual political trust and promoting security cooperation between China and ASEAN under the framework of a “China-ASEAN community of shared destiny.”China proposed a “dual-track”approach in 2014 to seek a peaceful resolution to the disputes in the South China Sea and to guard against outside forces meddling in the disputes. The approach makes it very clear that “relevant specific disputes should be solved through negotiations and consultations by countries directly concerned on the basis of respecting historical reality and international law, and peace and stability in the region should be jointly upheld by China and ASEAN countries.”It reflects China’s sincerity in solving the South China Sea disputes, and it is a creative approach for the settlement of the disputes. In initiating the approach, China, while taking into account the balance between history and reality, strives for win-win cooperation and accommodates the “comfort”of the disputing parties concerned. The “dual-track”approach helps shatter outside forces’ self-serving attempts.

However, Japan is intensifying its military and security cooperation with ASEAN countries by promoting a “China threat,”and taking measures to gradually transform, in line with the new Japan-US defense cooperation guidelines, Japan-US military ties from a bilateral alliance to “Japan+US+X”alliance, in an attempt to secure Japan’s sub-axis position, second only to the United States, in the Asia-Pacific geo-security pattern. Such a zero-sum game by Cold-War-minded Japan intends to hedge the efforts of China and all other claimant parties to build mutual trust, and will undermine “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable Asian Security Concept”initiated by China, as well as the actions taken by China to establish a newtype of security relations with the countries in the region, and put obstacles in the way of building a “China-ASEAN community of shared destiny.”

Exerting more security pressure on China’s eastern part

In recent years, Japan’s military spending has shown successive growth. In the fiscal year of 2015, Japan’s defense budget was 4.9 trillion yen, an increase of 2.4 percent and 115.5 billion yen more than 2014. In the fiscal year of 2016, the proposed defense-related budget totals 4.93 trillion yen, an increase of 2.2 percent, and 107.7 billion yen more than 2015. At present, Japan is focusing on building an islands defense system in the East China Sea, in particular enhancing its surveillance and monitoring capabilities on its southwestern islands. Japan, as a world technological power and a maritime power in Asia, is also providing military equipment and related technologies to the Philippines and Vietnam, and conducting joint military drills and training to boost their military capabilities. This will undoubtedly promote an arms race in Southeast Asia, and intensify militarization in the South China Sea, and has the purpose of exerting greater military and security pressures on China.

Japan’s “National Security Strategy”stipulates that Japan will pursue a strategy of “proactive pacifism”based on international coordination and utilize its defense equipment to actively participate in and contribute to peace and international cooperation. The “three principles guiding defense equipment and technology transfer”which replaced the previous “three principles on arms exports”has opened the door for Japan to enhance its military presence through utilization of weapons and equipment, so that Japan can more easily export military equipment to the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia.5Lionel Pierre Fatton, “Japan’s New Defense Posture,”The Diplomat, July 10, 2014, http://thediplomat. com/2014/07/japans-new-defense-posture.This will escalate an arms race in the South China Sea region and increase the possibility of a miscalculation.

At the same time, China is the largest trading nation in the world, andthe South China Sea is of irreplaceable strategic importance to the maritime trade of China. Japan’s policy orientation and policy implementation concerning the South China Sea have posed threats to the security of China’s maritime passage in the region.

Restraining China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative

Japan’s strategic considerations of meddling in the South China Sea issue serve the purpose of containing China’s rise. A successful implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative relates to China’s indepth reform and opening-up. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road goes through Southeast Asia, making the region important to the successful realization of the initiative. Japan regards China as an adversary, and is looking to form a clique on China’s periphery, especially to the Southeast. This will undermine stability in China’s surrounding region and impede the in-depth and extended implementation of the Belt and Road initiative.

Together with certain countries, Japan is seeking to spread the notion that China’s South China Sea policy is inconsistent with China’s peaceful rise and is looking to cultivate in ASEAN countries the belief in a “China threat,”in order to harm the trust-building between China and ASEAN. This will have negative impacts on the development of a China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership.

Meanwhile, the closer military cooperation between Japan and other South China Sea claimants makes it possible to form a maritime strategic alliance against China. This will also encourage negative evaluations by the countries concerned of the Belt and Road Initiative, making it more difficult for China to advance them.

Hurting China’s voice on the South China Sea issue

Japan is making concerted efforts along with some other countries to multilateralize and internationalize the South China Sea disputes. At both the bilateral and multilateral level, Japan is attacking China through the media, officials’ public speeches, various diplomatic channels, internationalconferences and academic forums, so as to agitate opinion unfavorable to China’ efforts to build up its soft power. It wants to discredit China as an overbearing power trying to change the status quo by force, bullying the small to carry out expansionism, and portray Japan as indispensable defender of the regional order and international law.6Hugh White, “South China Sea not the place to get all bolshie,”The Age, June 9, 2015, http://www. theage.com.au/comment/south-china-sea-not-the-place-to-get-all-bolshie-20150607-ghipzt.html.Japan’s negative publicity about China’s safeguarding of its legitimate rights and interests confuses to a great extent the correct understanding in the world about the South China Sea disputes, and vilifies China’s image in the world.

Conclusion

Japan’s domestic politics keep shifting to the right. The Abe government is continuously intensifying policies and their implementation to free Japan from the “postwar system.”Structural contradictions between China and Japan have become increasingly prominent because of China’s rapid growth. Under such circumstance, it is expected that Japan will not stop its meddling in the South China Sea, and in certain cases Japan might intensify its interference. On the one hand, this will further complicate the situation in the region and harm regional peace and stability. On the other, it will make a full recovery from the current low ebb in Sino-Japanese relations more difficult. Japan’s deliberate meddling on the South China Sea issue is seriously damaging Sino-Japanese mutual trust in the political and security fields.7“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on June 12, 2015,”http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1272736.shtml.On this issue, it is necessary for China to remind Japan to refrain from making trouble in the South China Sea at the cost of overall bilateral relations. What is more, China should be prepared to counter Japanese moves which are harmful to China’s interests, and deter any intent cherished by Japan to contain China by making use of the South China Sea issue.