Russia’s Middle East Strategy: Features, Background and Prospects

Feng Shaolei



Russia’s Middle East Strategy: Features, Background and Prospects

Feng Shaolei

Feng Shaolei is dean of the School of Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal University. This article was translated from the Chinese-language Contemporarу World, Issue 3, 2016.

A t the end of the first decade of the 21st century, changes took place in the international strategic landscape, with the ability of the West to dominate world affairs widely questioned in the wake of the global financial crisis. And following the series of regime changes that the United States and some European countries pushed in the name of “revolutions”in the Middle East, North Africa and members of the former Soviet Union, negative effects have continuously emerged. It was against this background that Russia started comprehensively adjusting its Middle East strategy after years of reflection and planning. Russia’s new proactive strategy aims to break the dominance of the United States and some European countries in Middle East affairs and win itself strategic maneuverability. A scrutiny of Russia’s decision-making and the evolution, experience and lessons of its diplomatic strategy in this region helps illuminate the development of Russia’s relations with other major powers, as well as the ongoing transformation of the international structure.

Preemptive Strikes in Syria

In the initial phase of the civil war in Syria, which broke out in 2011, Russia remained mostly an onlooker and had limited involvement. The critical point came after the autumn of 2013, when Russia first proposedthe internationally-endorsed idea of “chemical weapons for peace,”which forestalled in time an offensive by the West against the Syrian army and won Syria a moment of peace. Two years later, when the Bashar al-Assad regime was again in grave crisis, Russia, by thoroughly deploying its air and marine forces, landed a heavy blow on the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group and turned the tide on the Syrian battlefield, which garnered international attention.

The preemptive move was a critical characteristic of Russia’s strategic adjustment in this region under President Vladimir Putin.

A year or so had passed since the United States had formed its anti-IS coalition, but the IS-occupied area was expanding rather than shrinking, and terrorist activities were rampant in Syria, Iraq and beyond. The situation became even more severe during the spring and summer of 2015. One year before, Martin Dempsey, then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that the United States would invest $500 million in the training of 15,000 armed personnel for the Syrian opposition. But according to BBC reports, not only did the training program allow large amounts of weapons to be acquired by the IS, but the scale of “moderate rebels,”which received training from the United States to fight within the Syrian border, had been reduced to four to five persons. US President Barack Obama admitted in a CBS interview that he was skeptical about the idea of establishing a paramilitary force in Syria from the very beginning. The predicament of the US’ counterterrorism deployment in Syria reflected the Obama administration’s attempt, on the one hand, to maintain the United States’influence in the Middle East, while on the other, its desire to withdraw from the mess as quickly as possible. Consequently, it was reasonable and timely for Russia to intervene militarily at a time when both the Assad regime and the United States could not prevent the situation from deteriorating further.

By participating in the Valdai International Discussion Club in recent years, I have had several opportunities to hear Putin’s views on the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the “Arab Spring.”The usually-restrained Putin has seemed very emotional when talking about this. He once pointed out that irrespective of whether Muammar Gaddafiwas a dictator or not, it was US airstrikes under a broad interpretation of the United Nations Security Council resolution that destroyed the Gaddafi regime. In the 2015 Valdai meeting, Putin further acrimoniously criticized the dual standards of the US-led counter-terrorism coalition. “We do not need wordplay here. We should not break down the terrorists into moderate and immoderate ones. It is impossible to combat terrorism in general if some terrorists are used as a battering ram to overthrow the regimes that are not to one’s liking. It is only an illusion to think you can get rid of them later, take power away from them or reach some agreement with them. The situation in Libya is the best example here.”1President of Russia, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,”October 22, 2015, http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548.It can be seen therefore that the tumultuous regional situation brought about by the “revolutions”in MENA and the “decapitation”of dictators is the background for Putin’s determination to conduct a preemptive strike against the terrorists in Syria.

A critical purpose of Russia’s operation was to crack down on the terrorists within Syria as soon as possible. Both the Western media and Russia’s domestic liberals have since speculated that Russia’s actions against the IS are aimed at directing the extremists at home and in Central Asia toward the Syrian battlefield. But Putin’s explanation is more straightforward. “There are more than 2,000 militants in Syria from the former Soviet Union. So instead of waiting for them to return back home we should help President Assad fight them there, in Syria.”2Roland Oliphant, “Russian troops will not fight in Syria ‘for now’, says Putin,”The Telegraph, September 28, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11895845/Russian-troopswill-not-fight-in-Syria-for-now-says-Putin.html.Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s Chief of the Presidential Administration, has expressed a similar opinion: “The number of citizens of Russia and nationals of CIS member states who, to our great regret, join the IS terrorist group is growing hourly rather than daily. Some of them have already returned to Russia. Thus it is expedient to take preventive actions at distant frontiers rather than facing this problem (in Russia).”3“Number of citizens of Russia, CIS states joining ISIS grows hourly, there are thousands of them –Kremlin,”Interfax, September 30, 2015, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=12367.Three weeks after Russia conducted its first airstrikes in Syria, Putinelaborated the reasons at the Valdai meeting. “If they occupied Damascus, the terrorist gangs would create a stronghold for global expansion. It is better for us to fight them there, rather than await them here.”Putin said frankly, “Fifty years ago, I learnt one rule in the streets of Leningrad: if the fight is inevitable, be the first to strike.”4President of Russia, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at the media conference, Dec.17, 2015.

It is noteworthy there was neither ex ante information exchanges nor political negotiations before Russia’s preemptive strike. Not until after September 2015 did the Western media reveal that Russia was preparing for a military operation in Syria. In a significant development, the Russia-US hotline, which had been suspended after the Ukraine Crisis, was resumed, and military intelligence agents and even the defense ministers from both sides continuously exchanged views on the situation in Syria. US Secretaryof State Kerry and Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov spoke by telephone many times. While the United States was worried about Moscow’s military buildup in Syria, Russia justified its operation on the basis that it was against the IS. Putin indicated on Sept 4, 2015, that Assad was ready to share power. In response, Secretary Kerry on the one hand insisted on Assad’s resignation as a necessary condition to end the civil war in Syria, on the other hand, he suggested that the timing of his resignation was negotiable. Kerry even said: “If Russia’s recent actions and those now ongoing reflect a genuine commitment to defeat that organization, then we are prepared to welcome those efforts. But we must not and will not be confused in our fight against the IS with support for Assad.”5Nataliya Vasilyeva and Jim Heintz, “Russia begins airstrikes in Syria, but West disputes targets,”Assoсiated Press, October 1, 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1a98b981b4b941809168324300274980/ russian-lawmakers-consider-giving-ok-use-troops-abroad.Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, gave a meaningful interpretation of this. According to Trenin, the United States was not sure what Russia’s plan in Syria was at first, and they were worried that Moscow might help Assad suppress the rebels, some of whom were backed by the United States. Even after receiving notice from Russia hours before it started its airstrikes, the US was still unsatisfied. However, the Americans became more impartial when Russia reassured the United States that its operation in Syria was aimed at countering terrorism. It can be seen, therefore, that Russia did not eschew clarifying its position to the involved parties despite its preemptive nature. Of course, such clarification did not mean notifying the US of its military schedule and details of its actions.

By the end of 2015, Russian fighter jets had conducted more than 2,000 operations, eliminated hundreds of armed personnel, and demolished nearly 3,000 facilities, accounting for 40 percent of the infrastructure of the IS. These achievements greatly frustrated the IS offensive and turned the tide for counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East. It also heralded further adjustments in future relations among major powers.

Comprehensive and Multi-layered Partnerships and Alliances

Two days before it began its air offensive against IS forces on Sept 29, 2015, Russia, together with Iran, Iraq and Syria, began sharing “intelligence and security”information in order to combat the advances of IS forces. The cooperation among the four countries (to some degree “4+1”cooperation, as it included the Lebanese Hezbollah), despite not being a military alliance, was naturally interpreted by the international community as a wartime coalition. The announcement not only caught the United States off guard, it also rendered meaningless the US-led counter-terrorism coalition comprising 64 countries.

The key to the wartime quadrilateral cooperation was the coordination between Russia and Iran. There are several major powers that are influencing the situation in Syria, but the three countries with greatest leverage are the United States, Russia and Iran, and the bilateral relationship most likely to achieve cooperation among the three is between Moscow and Tehran. Although Russia and Iran did not officially declare a formal strategic partnership, the two countries, which have undergone substantial economic cooperation since the 1990s, have much in common: they recognize a “sphere of influence”in regional politics, pursue a governance system focused on domestic politics, and view the Assad regime as a close partner in Syria. The Iran nuclear deal in October 2015 opened the door for further bilateral cooperation. Besides Russia-Syria collaboration, Iraq, resisting pressure from the US, opened its territorial airspace to transiting Russian warplanes and established the quadrilateral intelligence exchange headquarters within its borders.

Some think that the quadrilateral cooperation among Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria is an alliance between Moscow and the Shia of the Middle East, but Putin, who explicitly announced Russia did not treat the Shia and the Sunni differently, has strongly expressed his opposition to taking sides in regional sectarian conflicts. Moreover, it is one of Russia’s important principles to go beyond sectarian conflicts and establish partnerships in its Middle Eastdiplomacy, for which Russia’s relations with Sunni-led Egypt can serve as an example. Not only did Russia view Egypt as a critical regional partner long before the civil war commenced in Syria, but the personal relationship between Putin and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the close economic and military cooperation between the two countries, and common pursuit of regional stability have all laid a solid foundation for the bilateral relationship.

If the quadrilateral cooperation is considered at the core of Russia’s Middle East strategy, Moscow’s active engagement in the broader MENA area serves its advances on the Syrian battlefield. Not only did the traditional Russia-friendly countries such as Greece and Cyprus show political support during the dispute between Russia and Turkey over Turkish jets shooting down a Russian warplane, even Israel, a geopolitically sensitive regional country, supported Russia. Considering Israel’s interests in maintaining stability on Israel-Syria border, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s urgent need to break Israel’s isolation after a deal was reached on the Iran nuclear issue, Russia kept engaging with Israel on multiple levels, and Israel officially expressed its understanding of Russia’s accidental intrusion into its territory. According to Angela Stein, a US expert on Russia, in the second half of 2015, the leaders of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates all visited Moscow, with several of them signing agreements to purchase weapons. Saudi Arabia announced it would invest $10 billion in Russia to develop bilateral agricultural cooperation.

Also noteworthy, there was a change in the West’s attitude after Russia began its airstrikes in Syria. First, the terrorist attacks in Paris and the bringing down of a Russian airplane over the Sinai Peninsula quickly triggered cooperation between Russia and France. On Nov 17, 2015, Putin ordered the Russian navy in the Mediterranean to establish contact with its French counterparts and work together “as allies.”“Russia is shifting …Maybe today this grand coalition with Russia is possible.”French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said when interviewed on the same day.6“France launches third night of air strikes on Islamic State in Raqqa,”Reuters, November 17, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-raqqa-strikes-idUSKCN0T62GV20151117.Asthe first achievement between Moscow and Paris, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced on November 27 that Paris was considering cooperating with the Syrian government to combat extremist groups. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed Russia’s engagement in finding a political solution to the Syrian Crisis, its negotiations with other countries, and a more constructive role in Syria. The West’s change from isolating Russia to having to confirm cooperation with Russia on Syria indicates that Russia’s efforts in the Middle East made sense.

Attacking the Besieger to Relieve the Besieged

Geographically, Russia’s air offensive against the IS in Syria aimed in part to settle the Ukraine Crisis. It was also a manifestation of Moscow’s determination to defend its strategic sphere.

Even though Russia’s overall strength is inferior to that of the West, the various new weapons and the formidable strategic capability Moscow displayed on the Syrian battlefield deeply impressed the West. During the airstrikes, Russia’s intermediate-range cruise missiles, launched from the Caspian Sea, precisely hit IS targets and effectively curbed the advance of IS forces.

As with the Ukraine issue, after the ceasefire between the government army and regional militants in eastern Ukraine and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from both sides in September 2015, tensions in the region subsided, although with continuous repercussions. After all, moderation of the confrontation on the battlefield does not equate to an overall improvement in the situation in Ukraine, let alone the trajectory of the political predicament, which has become more confusing. In an interview with Germany’s Bild on January 11, 2016, Putin said: “Constitutional reform that was supposed to give autonomy to eastern Ukraine was to be adopted by the end of 2015. This has not happened, and the year is over. That’s not Russia’s fault.”7“BILD Interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin,”Bild, January 11, 2016, http://www.bild.de/ politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.htmlWhen challenged that the constitutional reform wassupposed to be carried out once the separatists supported by Russia and the central government’s troops in eastern Ukraine had stopped shooting at each other, Putin responded: “No. It does not say so here. First, the Constitution has to be reformed. Only then can confidence building and border security follow.”8Ibid.He then passed an English version of the Minsk Agreement, where this point was contained, to the Bild interviewers.

Considering the complexity of the situation in Ukraine and that the support for Ukraine by the Western powers is unlikely to be withdrawn in a short time, the lifting of sanctions against Russia in 2016 is uncertain. On the other hand, Russia’s protection and support for the militants as well as pro-Russia inhabitants in eastern Ukraine will also likely continue. Therefore, there is still a long way to go before a solution to the Ukraine Crisis is found, and in the meantime any scale of conflict could break out. Russia, rather than be trapped in a stalemate with the West over Ukraine, sought to open a new front in Syria, a place where its influence and especially military advantages could be fully exploited, both to promote its own interests and to defend its allies.

Generally speaking, despite the above-mentioned achievements, quite a few unexpected changes have also ensued from Russia’s Middle East strategy, bringing serious risks to Russia’s policymakers. First, while it was predicted earlier by Putin it would take three or four months to combat the IS through airstrikes, that has proved far from adequate to overturn the standoff on the Syrian battleground. If the IS is to be completely eliminated, a ground war is inevitable. It remains to be seen whether Russia would participate in a ground offensive or instead mobilize local forces in the war. Second, since its new Middle East strategy was implemented, especially since it wielded a scale of force uncommonly seen after the Cold War, Russia has broken the predominance of the West in the Middle East and manifested its capability and determination to fight. However, this may also trigger the resolve of several forces within the West to counter it. Both sides are therefore considering their next moves.