New Trends in US Asia-Pacific Alliance Relations

Liu Qing



New Trends in US Asia-Pacific Alliance Relations

Liu Qing

Liu Qing is Acting Director of the Department for Asia-Pacific Security and Cooperation, CIIS.

A n essential part of the United States’ strategy to maintain its leadership in the Asia-Pacific is its regional alliances. In recent years, the most significant factor prompting the United States to strengthen and deepen its Asia-Pacific alliances has been the rise of China. Strengthening the cooperation among its regional allies has been a core element of the United States rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.

Trends in the US’ Deepening of Its Asia-Pacific Alliances

The United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance system is an important strategic asset that is a legacy of the Cold War. After the Cold War, successive administrations in the United States have sought to maintain and strengthen its Asia-Pacific alliances in order to adapt to the changing international and regional situations. The alliances serve both the United States’ regional and global strategies. At the end of the Cold War, the legitimacy of the United States’ alliances in the Asia-Pacific region was challenged. Due to the disappearance of the threat of the former Soviet Union, the existence of the US military in this region was questioned by the countries in the region, including its allies. Moreover, the rise of nationalism in countries such as the Philippines and Japan led to the exile of US troops from its military base in the Philippines and a bottleneck in the US-Japan alliance. The platform where the United States showed its leadership in the Asia-Pacific region

was shaking. However, the nuclear program of the DPRK and the Taiwan crisis provided the United States with a chance to maintain its alliances. The Clinton administration updated the alliance treaties, including revising the “Japan-US Cooperative Defense Guidelines”and signing the “Strategic Partnership Agreement of the 21st Century”with Australia. Entering the 21st century, the United States and its allies have encountered unprecedented threats from terrorism. In the name of anti-terrorism, the George W. Bush administration gave new tasks to its allies in the Asia-Pacific: the US-Japan, US-ROK and US-Australia alliances all went beyond the limits of their security responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region, reaching into the Middle-East and Central Asia. But because the fight against terrorism was too prolonged and overstretched, the attention and input of the United States into the Asia-Pacific region was relatively inadequate. Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific region was experiencing fast development. The progress in regional integration and the changes taking place in the regional power structure revealed the limitations of the United States’ leadership in the region. When the Obama administration came to power, it accelerated the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and shifted the strategic focus of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region with proposals to “pivot to Asia”and a military “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.”As part of this new focus it sought to rebuild the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliances. In recent years, with the completion of the troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and the Middle East, the United States has accelerated the adjustment of its Asia-Pacific alliances. As a result, these alliances have experienced profound changes and the following trends.

U.S. President Barack Obama watches as President of the ROK Park Geun-hye (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe shake hands at the end of their trilateral meeting in Washington March 31, 2016.

First, the scope of cooperation has expanded as “hard power alliances”are also developing into “soft power alliances.”Based on the readjustment of the allocation of US military bases in the Asia-Pacific region by the Bush administration, the Obama administration has continued to reinforce the “core”of its traditional “hard”military alliances, enriched the content of its traditional security cooperation with its allies and consolidated the framework of the Asia-Pacific order “under US administration.”In recent years, the relations between the United States and Japan, the United States and the ROK, the United States and Australia, and the United States and the Philippines have all been deepened to some degree. Actions include revising the “US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines,”the delay in handing over wartime military command to the ROK, the right to deploy troops in Darwin, Australia, and the return of the US military to the Philippines, etc.1Bob Work, ”The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies,”January 28, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategyand-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies.However, the alliance policies of the Obama administration are not confined to traditional military cooperation, they extend to new areas aimed at opening up a flexible space via “soft alliances.”In the field of cyber security, the United States has proposed strengthening its relationships with its international partners and has propelled its allies to reach consensus on sharing cyber intelligence and undertaking cyber training, etc. The United States has reached cyber agreements with countries such as Australia and Japan, aiming to build twin engines for an Asia-Pacific cyber alliance andestablish a regional order for the virtual world.2The Whitehouse, Cyberspace Policy Review, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/ Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf.In the field of trade, the United States has signed a free trade agreement with the ROK, accelerated its free trade negotiations with Japan, and at the same time pushed through the completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiations, intending to establish a “trade alliance”with high standards that can set the “trading rules of the 21st century.”It is also imposing pressure on other allies such as the ROK and Thailand to join the TPP. Besides, the United States, Japan, Australia, and others are expediting the making of a value chain of “democracy”and “freedom,”permeating “democracy”into Southeast Asia countries such as Myanmar and Vietnam. The expansion of “soft”cooperation also provides fresh momentum for the United States to further deepen its military security cooperation with its allies.

Second, the alliance structure has been reorganized, changing from “overt alliances”to “shadow alliances.”By expanding the boundaries of the alliance relationships based on the current bilateral alliance relations, the Obama administration has reorganized relations among the United States’ allies and established “shadow alliances”so as to redefine the Asia-Pacific order.3Purnendra Jain and John Bruni, Japan, Aиstralia and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Allianсe? Oxford University Press and the Japan Association of International Relations, 2004.This means based on the basic framework of bilateral alliance relations, via a series of bilateral or trilateral non-treaty institutional arrangements, allies are integrated into a system where there is division of responsibilities and coordination, which also selectively incorporates other partners in the region. Within such a system, the United States and its allies seek close political, diplomatic and security cooperation through political negotiations, diplomatic coordination, intelligence exchanges, military drills and capacity construction, etc., not only between the United States and its alliance partners, but also between the partners themselves. Collaboration among US allies does not rely on formal alliance treaties but non-treaty institutional arrangements. With the vigorous promotionof the United States and Japan, Australia and the ROK have established a “2+2”mechanism for close diplomatic and security cooperation, especially for military personnel exchanges and equipment construction and so on. Moreover, the United States has sought to establish trilateral relationship frameworks centered on itself through measures including: a) dismantling the political fences impeding the trilateral security cooperation between the US, Japan and the ROK by urging Japan to solve the historical issue of comfort women; b) persuading Australia and Japan to cooperate on submarine technologies, so that they can learn from each other’s advantages and the equipment interoperability among the three countries increases. These trilateral frameworks partially remedy the limitations of bilateral relations in the past.4Bob Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies.”It is worth noting that based on the current bilateral and trilateral security cooperation arrangements, the United States and its allies are seeking to forge an open and seemingly nonexclusive combinations with their partner nations and trying to absorb “players at large”through “independent choice”so as to push forward a series of overlapping shadow alliance relations. The United States has propelled the expansion of regional security cooperation among its allies and the networking of its partners. Such arrangements do not involve formal agreements. Thus though it seems the United States is not engaged, actually every arrangement has the United States behind it. Examples include the 2+2 conference mechanism at the level of foreign minister and defense minister between Japan and Indonesia, and the proposal for a new trilateral combination between Japan, Australia and India.5Harsh V Pant, “Trilateral Approach Comes to the Fore in Asia,”The Japan Times, August 20, 2015.In addition, the United States itself is also participating in such trilateral approaches: It is propelling the establishment of a trilateral dialogue mechanism between the United States, Japan and India. Such a mechanism would bypass the non-alignment policy of India and help the United States expand its defense cooperation with India. Through more multilateral institutions and small multilateral institutions, the United States is strengthening the security cooperation mechanism with its allies and partnersto offer strategic reassurance.6Van Jackson, “The Rise and Persistence of Strategic Hedging across Asia: A System-Level Analysis,”Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Greg Chaffin, eds. , Strategiс Asia 2014–15: U.S. Allianсes and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power, December 2014, http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue. aspx?id=307.

Third, the power distribution is changing from “centralization”to “decentralization.”The Obama administration has adjusted the internal power distribution of the Asia-Pacific alliance system by yielding power to and sharing power with the United States’ allies in order to reduce the hierarchical relationship in the alliance and build up a relatively “flat”alliance system.7Hugh White, The China Choice: Whу Ameriсa shoиld Share Power, Oxford University Press, 2013.Therefore, the Asia-Pacific allies are encouraged to shoulder more responsibilities and play a more active role in terms of regional security and diplomacy and so on. The allies are placed in a prioritized position in the regional cooperation arrangement and have certain amount of leeway to choose with whom to cooperate. In recent years, countries such as Japan and Australia have gained more space to act, greater discretion to act and increased autonomy in many fields including strategic dialogues, intelligence exchanges, and the agenda setting for forums. The process by which the United States transfers power to its allies is one whereby its allies shoulder more responsibilities for the United States. For instance, pressed by the United States, the alliance between the United States and the ROK has developed a more strategic horizon and the two countries are negotiating a plan to deploy an antimissile system in the ROK. Also, Japan is now playing a more active role in US military intervention in other countries.8Gregory Elich, “The US-ROK Military Alliance: South Korea Caught in NATO’s Web,”Global Researсh, February 16, 2015.The United States has increased the weight of Japan and Australia in its alliance system, making them “double anchors.”The power distribution among allies has also been adjusted. In the past, Japan outweighed Australia. Now both are priorities. Consequently the importance of Australia to the United States has increased. Such an adjustment has remedied the long-term defect that the alliances lacked cohesion. In addition, the United States has also transferred power to partners like India. For example, the United States has toleratedIndia in a certain way on the issue of nuclear cooperation and has supported India’s change from “look east”to “act east.”9Jayanth Jacob, “‘Look East’ Policy is Now ‘Act East’, ”Hindиstan Times, October 5, 2014; Rahul Mishra, “From Look East to Act East: Transitions in India’s Eastward Engagement,”December 1, 2014,http://www.theasanforum.org/from-look-east-to-act-east-transitions-in-indias-eastward-engagement/.

Strategic Considerations of the US’ New Thinking on Deepening Alliances

The new thinking of the United States on deepening its Asia-Pacific alliances can be seen from its efforts to maintain its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region by pursuing “balance,”“influence accumulation”and “allround preparation”against the backdrop of the change in the regional power structure, the diversification of the interests of its allies and the rise of regionalism.

To begin with, the United States is seeking to mobilize the strategic resources of its allies. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the United States has experienced two regional wars and one financial crisis. As a result, the strategic resources of the United States have been unprecedentedly overdrawn and its influence and prestige have been weakened. More importantly, the United States’ ability to control the regional order of the Asia-Pacific which is relevant to the destiny of its hegemony is decreasing. On the contrary, the emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific are rising in groups and the US is becoming increasingly sensitive about its hegemony. In his first State of the Union Address, Obama stated that the United States would maintain the status of the world’s only superpower forever, and would never be No. 2. Meanwhile he showed concern that such superpower status was being challenged and the authority of the United States was facing a crisis.10The White House, “Remarks of President Barack Obama -Address to Joint Session of Congress,”February 24, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-addressjoint-session-congress.The 2015 US National Security Strategy report stated that: “On all these fronts, America leads from a position of strength. But,this does not mean we can or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the world. As powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite. And in a complex world, many of the security problems we face do not lend themselves to quick and easy fixes.”11The White House, National Seсиritу Strategу, February 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.The United States has realized that it is unable to continuously afford the high cost of maintaining its hegemony and the gap between its foreign policy capabilities and the ability to protect the national interests of the countries which are crucial to its alliance system keeps on widening. Even simply maintaining the internal operation of the alliance system has made the United States feel burdened. Therefore, both the governing Democrats and the Republicans who control the US Congress are highly consistent on the strategy of deepening the alliances and leveraging the United States’ allies to maintain its hegemony. In order to save on the costs of maintaining its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, the United States is trying to use the resources of its allies by reinforcing the management of the alliances through structural adjustment and a change of methods. It is also trying to accelerate the development of its allies’ resources by promoting direct cooperation between its allies and partners. Via revision of the alliance treaties and construction of new rules, the United States has not only gathered the power and interests of different countries to make use of them, it has also reduced its own burden and lowered the strategic risks it faces. On the one hand, to transfer power is to avoid “free riding”and better encourage allies and partners to shoulder responsibilities. Some countries have been taking advantage of the protection of the United States, and some have even “abducted”the United States’power for their own interests. On the other hand, transferring power is not the same as letting go of it. The United States has been yielding power to its allies according to their ability to maintain their own alliance of different parties. Such methods mean the United States has more flexibility in its control of the alliances.

What is more, the United States has strengthened the awareness ofcollectivism. At the start of President Obama’s administration, there were signs of centrifugation between the United States and its allies which could be seen from two perspectives. First, the national interests of its allies are diverse. Thus the United States has become increasingly worried about the development direction and communication of its allies in various fields. To differing extents, the allies have shown a sense of estrangement on issues including regional interests and financial governance. Even Japan and Australia who play the role of anchors in the North and South cannot see to it that their national interests are consistent with that of the United States. For example, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) aims to build an “East Asia Community”to strengthen the diplomacy of Asia. Thus the DPJ pursued the approach of getting close to China so as to lead Asian countries to change the US-led regional security mode.12Hiroyuki Hoshiro, “Building an ‘East Asian Community’ in Vain: Japan’s Power Shift and Regionalism in the New Millennium,”ISS Discussion Paper Series F-172, http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/publishments/ dpf/pdf/f-172.pdf.Besides, the selfidentification of Australia is changing from a white Western nation to an Asian country. Australia also believes that the slackening of its relationship with the United States has been the basis for its stability and prosperity.13Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, October 2012, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/ docs/australia_in_the_asian_century_white_paper.pdf.The decrease in its allies’ sense of approval has made the United States increasingly concerned that its position in the Asia-Pacific region might be confronted with a sudden crisis, prompting the United States to reassess and deepen its alliances. Second, as the common threats have become blurred, the feelings of the United States and its allies on their bonds have become increasingly divergent. Its allies keep speaking in “inharmonious voices”which has made the United States ever more anxious. For instance, the ROK and the Philippines hold totally different perspectives on the DPRK nuclear issue. When dealing with China, there is also disparity between Japan and countries such as the ROK, Australia and Thailand. Japan treats China as a direct threat, while the latter countries regard China as an important trade partner rather than a direct threat. Without a clear common enemy or actualsecurity threats, the control of the United States over its allies is very limited, to the extent that anticipated effects cannot be fulfilled and the sense of crisis has increased.14Jaechun Kim, “Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War Era: Convergence of Strategic Perceptions and Revitalization of the ROK–US Alliance,”Paсifiс Foсиs, Vol.30, No.1, April 2015, pp.33–58.Thus, strengthening the collective identification of China as a threat has been a key task for the United States. And to keep its allies subject to the alliance rules, the United States has accelerated the renewal and strengthening of the alliances and has included more affairs and countries into the system via formal or informal institutional arrangements. Under the guidance of such strategic and political thinking, the United States has been able to take advantage of regional crises so as to create a consensus of a common threat and increase cohesion within its alliance system.

Last but not least, the United States is seeking to postpone the process of regional integration in East Asia. In recent years, East Asia has become the focus of many propositions and proposals aimed at fulfilling certain regional prospects. It is worth noting that many of these propositions, going beyond the traditional geographic concept, cover a broader area than East Asia. With more regional proposals being implemented and promoted, the regional cooperation mechanisms at all levels are booming, propelling the rise of an Asia vision and faster completion of an endogenous order of Asia. US allies such as Japan and the ROK are all deeply involved in the rise of regionalism in East Asia, which also has an influence on other US allies, such as Australia, which are on the periphery of Asia.15Malcolm Cook, “Japan’s East Asia Community,”The Interpreter, September 25, 2009; Motoshige Itoh, “Thinking about an East Asian Community,”November, 2010, http://www.nira.or.jp/1001english_summary. pdf.The allies have to balance the process of regionalism with their cooperation with the United States. They have even given up some alliance interests for the overall interests of the region.16Toru Oga, Mike Mochizuki, and James Przystup, “The U.S.-Japan Role in Building an East Asian Community,”February 28, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/28/u-s-japan-role-in-building-eastasian-community/fg6v.To handle such a situation, the Obama administration has actively participated in some of the regional cooperation mechanisms and interfered in issues such as agenda setting and direction choosing. In addition, theObama administration has drawn countries such as Japan and the ROK back to its side from the regional cooperation process of East Asia by strengthening its alliances with them. First, the United States has transferred more power to its allies in order to expand the flexible cooperation space and further fix the security pattern of East Asia. The United States is also seeking to consolidate the contradictions in the relations between the DPRK and the ROK, China and Japan, China and the Philippines, and China and Vietnam by taking advantage of weaknesses in East Asian geopolitics. The United States also intends to implant the alliance culture via measures such as reinforcement of military training in order to make Australia, the ROK and others that are swaying between the United States and China lean toward alliance with the United States. Second, by exchanging interests the United States has reintegrated the geo-economic resources of its allies and regional partners into the US-led rules. After agreement was reached on the TPP, Obama declared that the US would not let countries like China stipulate the economic rules but would do it itself.17Jackie Calmes, “Trans-Pacific Partnership is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in Congress,”The New York Times, October 5, 2015.Currently the TPP includes four ASEAN countries, namely Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. And the ROK and some other ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Cambodia have shown willingness to join the TPP. The completion of the TPP negotiations and participation of more East Asian countries will definitely weaken and dilute regionalism in East Asia.

Constraints on Deepening the Asia-Pacific Alliance

Its Asia-Pacific alliances are a vested interest in the Asia-Pacific strategy of the United States. To maintain these alliances is an indispensable part of the Asia-Pacific strategy of the United States and will play a role in the process of by which the United States tries to maintain its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. In the future, no matter whether the Democrats or the Republicans are in power, and no matter who becomes president, the next administration willreview the gains and losses of the Asia-Pacific alliance policy of the Obama administration and seek for faster upgrading of the alliances. However, whether the United States can achieve its policy goals mainly depends on the handling of the following restraints.

Constraints from ASEAN on the US’ Asia-Pacific alliance policy

First, the policy of ASEAN hedges against the alliance policy of the United States. ASEAN countries pursue a long-term policy of striking a balance between powers in order to gain more bargaining chips. On the one hand, ASEAN wants the United States to keep its military presence in East Asia to respond to the rise of China and add a bargaining chip in its dialogues with other strategic powers. On the other hand, ASEAN is worried that the United States wants to be the leader of regional military cooperation and thus involve more military factors in the region which could worsen the strained relations between China and the United States. ASEAN countries hope to boost their economic relations with China and for this they need a stable regional environment. If the competition between China and the United States is exacerbated, especially military competition, these countries will have to choose sides and their trade relations with China will be stricken. ASEAN countries hope China and the United States will interact positively. They hope to see basic trust between the two based on accumulated cooperation experiences instead of the emergence of a Cold War in the region.18Kishore Mahbubani, “The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World,”Pиbliс Affairs, March 4, 2014, p.145.ASEAN advocates cooperative regional security and adheres to a strategy of hedging big powers. That is to say, ASEAN seeks security cooperation with the United States while also trying to keep a distance. The two trends are being developed together. The United States should choose a moderate guiding principle for its alliance policy in response to such a trend, especially on issues concerning its ASEAN allies such as the Philippines; otherwise its relations with the other members of ASEAN could be hurt.

Second, ASEAN centrality is abreast of US centrality. ASEAN has beenstriving to make itself a “topic advocator,”“process designer”and “norm provider”in the cooperation process of East Asia, emphasizing “ASEAN centrality”in regional integration.19Vikram Nehru, Donald Weatherbee, “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality,”February 20, 2014, http:// carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/20/myth-of-asean-centrality/h07b.The United States intends to make a “mixed type”of Asia-Pacific alliance system based on bilateral alliances and partner relations, with the aim of further enhancing the central function of the United States and weakening the function of non-allies and nonpartners in regional affairs. ASEAN centrality is therefore competing with US centrality and shows a tendency of polarization. The announcement of the founding of the ASEAN community indicates the integration of ASEAN is on a new start line and its members are approaching integrated economic and security policies. With the United States’ deepening its alliance cooperation, especially its strategic binding with some ASEAN members, such as the Philippines, the construction of an ASEAN security community is being impeded. Supported by the United States, countries such as the Philippines are prone to abducting ASEAN in line with the Asia-Pacific strategies of the United States. The United States is using the Philippines like a Trojan horse to constrain ASEAN on some sensitive issues and reduce the “independence”of ASEAN in handling regional affairs. Consequently, this has elicited a policy rebound from ASEAN. In the first US-ASEAN Informal Summit held by the United States, ASEAN withstood pressure from the United States and refused to obediently follow its instruction to incorporate the South China Sea into the joint statement.20Prashanth Parameswaran, “A US-ASEAN South China Sea Failure at Sunnylands?”The Diplomat, February 19, 2016.The status of ASEAN has been lowered by US policy, which has stimulated ASEAN to urgently reconstruct is central status and to constrain the inordinate ambitions of the United States.

Third, the openness of ASEAN hedges the group collectivism of the United States. The success of ASEAN is attributed to its spirit of openness, tolerance and cooperation. The formation of the 10+1, 10+3 and 10+6 mechanisms of ASEAN have taken in both regional powers and globalpowers to the largest extent. Openness is the source of vitality and power of ASEAN. Based on the 10+X mechanisms, ASEAN is also dedicated to the promotion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which is a continuation of its spirit of openness. Nevertheless, the United States strengthening of its free trade agreements and military security coordination with its regional allies forms quite a few closed small groups which are in opposition to ASEAN’s process of openness. The United States has forced through the TPP and has drawn some countries to its side through the TPP’s so-called high standards while estranging others. This has caused divergence in the internal cooperation of ASEAN countries.21Shohib Masykur, “How TPP can Disrupt ASEAN Economic Integration,”Jakarta Post, January 6, 2016; Jingyang Chen, “TPP and RCEP: Boon or Bane for ASEAN?”September 9, 2015, http://asiafoundation.org/ in-asia/2015/09/09/tpp-and-rcep-boon-or-bane-for-asean./.The selective adoption of ASEAN countries by the United States has made the status of ASEAN countries unequal in the dialogue with the United States. What is more, in order to deepen its alliance relations, the United States has distinguished between different Asia-Pacific countries in many cooperation fields such as security and trade. This has also added to the suspicion between countries in the region and hindered the interactive relations between ASEAN and other countries in the region.

Domestic disputes in the US about its alliance policy

For a long time, there have been domestic disputes in the United States over the pros and cons of its Asia-Pacific alliances. Some argue that alliance cooperation should be listed as the top priority in the United States’ Asia-Pacific policy, and the United States should take the alliances as the basis of its Asia-Pacific policy. They believe the alliances are an important support and safety shield for the United States’ strategy in the region. At the same time, they argue the alliance relations help maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific region and provide an important guarantee for the economic development and democratic transition of countries in theregion.22Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, Mark F. Cancian, John Schaus, Zack Cooper, “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025,”http://csis.org/publications/browse/all/all/all?page=8.However, others argue that the value of the alliances should not be over-estimated. They believe it is the alliances that will get the United States into trouble in the Asia-Pacific region.23Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Japan Dilemma: Asia’s Next Geopolitical Nightmare?”The National Interest, April 26, 2015.They argue there is a divergence of interests between the United States and its allies. There even exist risks that the United States will be “kidnapped”by other countries in pursuit of their own interests. For example, the United States and Japan are allies. But what Japan has done is not necessarily in accordance with the interests of the United States. However, if the United States does not support Japan as its ally, its reputation will decline and be harmed. From the perspective of alliance agreements, the enemy of one’s ally is the enemy of oneself. Nevertheless, the reality is not such a dichotomy. There is antagonism between China and Japan due to historical issues and Japan’s unilateral breaking of the two countries agreement on their territorial dispute in the East China Sea. But there is no direct geopolitical conflict between China and the United States. Thus the root of the problem does not lie between China and the United States, rather between China and an ally of the United States. Some people are also worried about the loyalty of the United States’ allies. The designer of the Cold War George Kennan described the alliance between Japan and the United States as “unnatural intimacy”and suggested not to push the relationship, which he said was “born of conflict and much agony,”too far and too fast. The United States should keep a watchful eye on Japan.24Kenneth B. Pyle, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century,”The National Bureau of Asian Research, November 13, 2012, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=296#footnote1.The wrong understanding on history and war held by the Abe administration has exposed the unfailing and complex “American perspective”of Japan, verifying the political vision of Kennan that Japan is far from a simple pro-American actor. The motivation of Abe is, to a large extent, to use the deepening of the US-Japan alliance to recover “the glory”of Japan, as well as harness its power to raise Japan’s voice in the discourse onsecurity issues.25Peter Ennis, “Obama and Abe: US Taken for A Ride?”Dispatсh Japan, May 6, 2014.To summarize, its alliances in the Asia-Pacific are both a tool for the United States to strengthen and use its power, but also a burden on it.

There is an innate defect in the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance policy which forces the United States to look for balance in the China-US relations. Strategists represented by Henry Kissinger think of the China-US relationship as the most important bilateral relationship and the United States’ policy in the Asia-Pacific should start from this relationship. China has pledged not to become a regional hegemon and not to challenge the current US-led international order. China believes the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States. China has offered the proposal of a new type of relationship between great powers, intending to convey goodwill to the United States instead of confronting it. China is not the former Soviet Union; neither is the China-US relationship a zero-sum game. The United States’ China policy should consider the two sides of the whole—both engagement and precaution. The terrible predictions mentioned before would come true if the United States tries to draw in its allies to contain the rise of China.26Jeffrey A. Bader, “Changing China Policy: Are We in Search of Enemies?”Brookings China Strategy Paper, No. 1, June 2015; Marvin Kalb, “China Is Not the Soviet Union,”January 10, 2012, http://www. brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/01/10-china-kalb.There is no such thing as a “lenient hegemony.”As the United States and its allies have established a formidable and intimidating power which is focused on one country, it is hard for that country not to react strongly. China is not a greedy expansionist who must be contained. At most, its strategic intentions can be called nontransparent.27Johan Glaser, “Avoiding War With China: Revisited,”The National Interest, December 31, 2015.It is of high cost and risk to try and contain the strategies of China, which is unnecessary for the protection of the major national interests of the United States. As a result, the United States should be careful in trying to contain China. The purpose of deepening cooperation with its allies is to reassure its allies and partners, and to demonstrate the United States’commitment to the promises it has made them. However, the United States has to avoid giving China the impression that the United States is carryingout a containment strategy to damage the regional interests of China. Some people are worried that an alliance strategy aimed at containing China will bring the United States economic risks. It could also make it more difficult for the United States to win China’s cooperation on key issues, such as the DPRK nuclear issue. A lot of signs have shown that there are already significant changes in China’s response to the US deepening its Asia-Pacific alliance network. Thus the US should avoid the strategic mistake of “robbing Peter to pay Paul.”

There is an innate defect in the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance policy which forces the United States to look for balance in the China-US relations.

The United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance network will not exist forever in its current form. To preserve the interests in the Asia-Pacific, the United States needs to build up not only a new type of relations between great powers with China as a supplementary, but also a regional framework which includes the United States while reflecting the interests of other countries in this region. The future Asia-Pacific order will partially preserve the old one, such as the intimacy between the United States and its allies. But new connotations from China-US cooperation should be added as well. The regional structure is undertaking profound changes; if the United States and its allies could realize the complexity of such changes, a peaceful way of development could be found. Both China and the United States will not collapse, neither can they quit from Asia. The United States should accept a rising China which has more privileges and a higher status and which shoulders more responsibilities in Asia. Meanwhile, China should also admit the deep strategic interests of the United States in East Asia, including the security relations between the United States and its Asian allies. The current key challenge is to construct a regional mechanism which can effectively end the security dilemma, control and manage various crises and regulate the competition in the region.28John Ikenberry, “It would be a kind of bargaining: China-US relations in the future,”International Herald Leader, December 21, 2010.Therefore, the US needs to find a compromising institutional arrangement between its allies and China.

Allies’ rebalance to the US alliance policy

The United States is striving to maximize the interests of its alliance network and minimize the risks from it. However, this is hard to achieve in reality. The preferences of the allies for their own interests have discounted the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance policy.

First, there exist differences between the allies’ interests with China and the interests of the United States. The ROK, Australia and Thailand and some other allies have close economic relationships with China. Their need for the Chinese market exceeds their need for the US market in terms of trade, investment and personnel communications, etc. These countries have established comprehensive strategic partnerships with China and regard China as an opportunity instead of a direct threat. To them, it is far from acceptable to have diplomatic frictions with China on some issues. On the whole, their bilateral relations with China are healthy and stable, and are deepening every year. China has always held a positive and constructive attitude to developing relations with these countries in an effort to gain more trust and expand bilateral security cooperation and military communication. These countries understand US behavior of imposing pressure on their China policies. At the same time, they try to explain to the United States the inconsistency between its own national interests and their interests, and the reason why on some issues they have to hold firm their own stance regardless of the objections of the United States. In the preparations for the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), relations between the United States and its allies were tense due to their conflicts of interests. The ROK and Australia and others believe that the AIIB will create opportunities for common investment and growth for Asia. Thus they wanted to join at the earliest stage. Nevertheless, the United States imposed pressure on them over and over again stating that its allies should not accommodate themselves to China, for it is not the best way torespond to an emerging big power.29Jamie Smyth, “Australia to Join China-led Bank Despite US Opposition,”Finanсial Times, March 28, 2015.Some Western media said with much emotion that the allies have “abandoned the US for China”for their own national interests.30Mike Bird, “China’s New Development Bank is becoming a Massive Embarrassment for Obama,”Bиsiness Insider, March 31, 2015.In China’s application to add the renminbi to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights currencies, in spite of the frequent warnings from US Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, some key allies such as Australia and the ROK still chose to stand by China’s side.

Second, the regional interests of the allies and the United States are inconsistent. The Asia-Pacific is where allies such as the ROK and Australia are located and pursue development. Thus their geopolitical and geoeconomic interests are not the same as those of the United States. On the issue of the choice of direction for regional economic integration, Australia and others are glad to see the US-led TPP play a connecting role in the promotion of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. However, the US has over-emphasized the value of the geopolitics differentiated by the TPP. Australia and others believe that the TPP will finally merge with the RCEP and together propel the construction of a bigger regional trade system in the Asia-Pacific. Thus they propose to involve China in the TPP process. Both Australia and the ROK have the ambition to be a “medium power.”They are striving to get rid of their dependence on the United States in regional affairs, have “independent”foreign policies and play “independent”roles.31Tanguy Struye de Swielande, Bruno Hellendorff and Alexia Honoré, “Australia: A New Strategy for a Medium-Size Power,”Politique étrangère, 2015/1 (Spring); Carl Ungerer, Simon Smith, “Australia and South Korea: middle power cooperation and Asian security,”Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategic Insights, October 29, 2010.These countries are keeping a certain distance from the United States when dealing with regional conflicts instead of totally following its lead. Also the United States’ abducting of its allies for its own interests on regional issues arouses resentment among its allies.32Malcolm Fraser, “America: Australia’s Dangerous Ally,”The National Interest, December 16, 2014.The formation of the allies’ regional interests, which is becoming increasingly mature, will lead to greater momentum intheir “de-Americanization”policy.

Conclusion

The alliance policy is deeply rooted in the minds of decision-makers in the United States and is already an important part of the US political culture. In recent years, the global strategic center has sped up its moving eastward. Thus the status and function of the Asia-Pacific alliances in the United States’ global strategy have further increased, giving new momentum to the deepening of the cooperation between the allies.

But the basic direction of thinking about the deepening of the Asia-Pacific alliance of the Obama administration is different from that of the previous government. First, it has enriched the content of its cooperation with its allies, especially cooperation in “soft”fields. And cooperation in both the soft and hard fields has expanded the flexible space for alliance cooperation. Second, the United States has reinforced the intimacy in the alliance system. It has considered the horizontal cooperation between its allies as a priority. Meanwhile, the United States has also expanded the boundaries of the alliance system, absorbed more partners and formed an invisible alliance relationship though double multilateral arrangements both by the allies and itself. Third, the United States is building up a relatively “flat”alliance system by transferring power to its allies and allowing its allies to participate more actively in regional affairs, so as to reduce the cost of the operation of the alliance. The new thinking of the Obama administration on the United States’ alliance policy shows the increasing eclecticism in the diplomatic philosophy of the United States and the fading of multilateralism and unilateralism.33Van Jackson, “The Rise and Persistence of Strategic Hedging across Asia: A System-Level Analysis,”Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Greg Chaffin, eds., Strategic Asia 2014–15: U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power, Strategic Asia annual edited volume by The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 2014.The United States has learned from the strength of others, gathered the power of its allies and partners and mobilized theresources that can be used. The United States has struck a good balance between “taking”and “giving”and has taken good advantage of its alliance network.

However, there are many constraints on the United States’ policy goal of deepening its Asia-Pacific alliance network, and it is difficult for such a goal to be fulfilled. The constraints include domestic political disagreements on an alliance-centered Asia-Pacific policy, the increasing diversification of the national interests of the allies and other countries in this region, and the constraint of ASEAN which plays the role of balancer. The innate defects of the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance policy, including the risk of it being abducted by its allies, will definitely cause the United States to “rob Peter to pay Paul”when handling relations with others.

The United States’ deepening of its Asia-Pacific alliance relations is based on theories of international relations that are highly ideological and a legacy of the Cold War. Such relations are divided by alignments and thus are not open. Explicitly or implicitly, this will bring about estrangement among the countries in the Asia-Pacific. To respond to a US alliance strategy which does not revise all those defects, China should hold firm its own strategic stance and be well prepared to deal with the challenges from the United States deepening its regional alliances. China should continue to enhance mutual trust with the United States, and push for jointly constructing a new type of relations between great powers, properly handle the impact of the US alliances on China-US relations, and forcefully oppose the United States’attempts to suppress China’s reasonable and legitimate national interests and security space using its Asia-Pacific alliances. China should also continue to deepen its friendly cooperation with neighboring countries, especially its relations with ASEAN countries, so as to jointly propel the United States to participate in the building of a more open, inclusive and constructive regional security mechanism and economic integration framework.