The Myth of the “Aging Society”“老龄化社会”之迷思

安德鲁·J.斯科特/文　崔佳艳/译

Economic doomsayers have long warned that the aging populations of industrial and post-industrial countries represent a “demographic time bomb.” Societal aging is bad news for the economy， they say， because it means that fewer people work and contribute to economic growth， and more people collect pensions and demand health care.

经济悲观论者早就提醒说，老龄化是工业化和后工业化国家的人口定时炸弹。他们称社会老龄化于经济不利，因其意味着劳动人口减少以及养老金领取人数和医疗保健需求人数增加。

The United Nations estimates that between now and 2050， the share of the population aged 60 and older will increase in every country. Though life expectancy tends to be highest in advanced economies， it is growing fastest in emerging markets. The number of people aged 60 and over in developing countries is currently twice that of the developed world. And the UN expects a three-to-one ratio by 2030， and a four-to-one ratio by 2050.

据联合国估计，从目前到2050年，所有国家的60岁及以上人口占比都会有所上升。虽然发达国家人口的预期寿命往往最长，但新兴市场国家人口的预期寿命增长最快。目前，发展中国家60岁及以上人口数量是发达国家的两倍，联合国认为到2030年将增长为3倍，到2050年为4倍。

Within many countries， increased life expectancy and declining birth rates are pushing up the average age of the population. In Japan， the median age has risen from 26 in 1952 to 49 today. In China， it has risen from 24 to 39 over the same period， and is expected to reach 48 by 2050.

在许多国家，预期寿命延长和出生率不断降低正推动着人口平均年龄不断攀升。比如日本的中位数年龄已从1952年的26岁增长到如今的49岁。同期，中国的中位数年龄也从24岁增长到39岁，到2050年预计会增长到48岁。

The argument that aging will weaken these countries economies stems from what economists call the old-age dependency ratio （OADR）—the proportion of the population over 64， relative to the working-age population （those aged 15 to 64）. If one assumes that old people are unproductive consumers of government benefits， then a rising OADR implies slower economic growth and mounting pressure on public budgets.

老龄化会削弱国家经济这一论点源于经济学家口中的老年抚养比，即64岁以上人口与劳动年龄（15—64岁）人口之比。假设老年人不具备生产能力，只是政府福利的消费者，那么老年抚养比的增长意味着经济发展变缓以及公共预算压力逐渐增加。

But what if this assumption is mistaken？ Governments are concerned about your age not because they want to know how many candles to buy for your birthday cake， but because it affects productivity and health-related spending. And if those are the factors that really matter， then the changing conditions of aging are far more rele-vant than the share of the population that has reached some arbitrary1 threshold2 of years on the planet.

但倘若這一假设是错的，会是什么样？政府关心你的年龄，原因不在于想了解要为你的生日蛋糕买多少根蜡烛，而是因为年龄会对生产力和医疗支出产生影响。如果这些因素确实重要，那么，比起地球上达到任意某个年龄值的人口占比，老龄化的变动状况更有意义。

Measuring aging gracefully

老龄化的细致判定

The concept of “aging” is not as straightforward as it seems. Obviously， aging has a chronological component， expressed in the straightforward question： “How old are you？” But it can also be viewed in terms that are biological （“You look good for your age”）， subjective （“You are as old as you feel”）， and sociological （“You shouldnt be doing that at your age”）. Policymakers sole focus on chronological age3 is a 200-year-old artifact from the era when governments first started keeping reliable birth records.

“老龄化”概念看似直白，其实不然。它含有明显的时间要素，体现在简单的问句中，如“您多大了？”。但还可以从其他角度来看待这个概念，包括生理学（“您看着显年轻”）、主观意义（“您觉着自己多大年纪就多大年纪”）和社会学（“您这个年纪不应该这么做了”）。政府对出生记录最早可靠的记载就只关注实际年龄，至今已有200年传统。

If the various dimensions of aging could be embodied in a single immutable4 concept， focusing on a benchmark such as chronological age would not be a problem. Yet the biological， subjective， and sociological components of aging are not immutable. On the contrary， their relationships with one another have shifted over time.

如果不同层面的老龄化可以体现在单一恒定的概念中，那么只以实际年龄为基准是不存在什么问题的。然而，生物、主观和社会意义上的老龄化并非一成不变的，彼此间的关系会随时间的推移而改变。

The average age of the US population has steadily increased since 1950， but the average mortality rate has trended down. In other words， the average US citizen has become chronologically older but biologically younger. And the same trends can be found in other advanced economies， including the United Kingdom， Sweden， France， and Germany.

自1950年以来，美國人口平均年龄持续稳定上升，平均死亡率却呈下降趋势。换言之，美国普通民众的实际年龄变大，生理年龄却更小了。英国、瑞典、法国和德国在内的其他发达国家也存在类似趋势。

Given the decline in average mortality， one cannot say unambiguously5 that these societies have aged. Average mortality rates are driven by two factors， only one of which could properly be called “aging.” As countries industrialize， they undergo a “demographic transition” from higher to lower birth rates. This shift implies that older cohorts of the population will increase in size， and that average overall mortality will rise， because mortality rates are higher for older people.

考虑到平均死亡率的下降，无法明确地说上述国家已老龄化。推动平均死亡率上升的因素有二，准确地说老龄化只是其中一个因素。随着国家工业化的发展，各国经历从高出生率到低出生率的“人口转型”。这意味着老年人口规模将会变大，且总体平均死亡率将上升，因为老年人中死亡率更高。

But over the past few decades， this aging effect has been offset by a “longevity effect”. Owing to medical advances and other factors （for example， lower rates of smoking）， mortality rates at all ages have fallen. In actuarial6 terms， this means that people are younger for longer. Whereas the aging effect captures changes in the age distribution， the longevity effect addresses how we are aging. And in a country like the US， where the average age has increased while average mortality rates have fallen， it is clear that the longevity effect has more than offset the aging effect.

然而，在过去的几十年内，老龄化效应已与“长寿效应”相抵消。医疗进步和吸烟率下降等因素降低了全年龄段的死亡率。用精算术语来说，这意味着人们年轻的时期延长了。老龄化效应反映了年龄分布的变化，而长寿效应解释的是变老的过程。在美国这样的国家，平均年龄的上升伴随着平均死亡率的下降，显然其长寿效应已远远抵消了老龄化效应。

The “New 65”

“新65岁”

The divergence7 between biological and chronological age points to a familiar problem in economics： the confusion between nominal and real variables. In the US， a 75-year-old today has the same mortality rate as a 65-year-old in 1952. Similarly， in Japan， 80 is the “new 65.” As an actuarial matter， then， todays 75-year-olds are not any older than the 65-year-olds of the 1950s.

生理年龄和实际年龄的差异指向了一个熟悉的经济学问题，即名义变量和实际变量的混淆。如今，美国75岁人口与1952年65岁人口的死亡率相同。同样，日本的80岁是“新65岁”。因而从精算角度讲，现在的75岁老人并不比上世纪50年代的65岁老人更老。

One can use changes in mortality rates to adjust for “age inflation” and determine an average real mortality age. In doing so， one finds essentially no increase in average “real” （mortality-adjusted） age in the UK， Sweden， or France， and barely any increase in the US.

人们可以根据死亡率的变化做出“年龄通胀”调整，确定平均实际死亡年龄。这样一来，不难发现英国、瑞典和法国这些国家在根据死亡率调整后的平均“实际”年龄实质上没有增长。美国也基本如此。

Mortality-adjusted indicators of aging provide a radically different perspective on what is happening to OADRs in advanced economies. When using chronological age， the OADRs in the US， the UK， France， and Sweden have all been increasing; but in mortality-adjusted terms， they have all actually declined.

根据死亡率调整后的老龄化指标为发达国家的“老年抚养比”情况提供了全然不同的角度。以实际年龄为依据时，美国、英国、法国和瑞典的老年抚养比都在不断上升，但根据死亡率调整后，老年抚养比其实都下降了。

A policy challenge for the ages

老年人口政策上的一項挑战

From this perspective， one can see the flawed assumptions underlying the conventional “demographic time bomb” narrative， which makes no distinction between aging and longevity effects. What is needed is a more nuanced8 approach that reflects the multidimensional aspects of aging. Although the average person now lives a longer， healthier life， that does not hold true for everyone. Behind the average health figures are noticeable differences based on income， education， genetics， lifestyle， and environment. And as more people advance in years， these dispar-ities will become increasingly obvious.

以此来看，“人口定时炸弹”这一传统叙事下的假说存在漏洞，没有区分老龄化效应和长寿效应。不同维度的老龄化需通过更细致的方式来体现。尽管普通民众已过上更长寿、健康的生活，但并非人人如此。平均健康数据的背后是收入、教育、基因、生活方式和环境方面的显著差异。随着越来越多人步入老年，这些差异也会愈加明显。

All countries still need programs to support those who are aging in a traditional sense; but there is also a growing need for more flexible policies to help older workers reap the benefits of longer， more productive lives. Increasing the official retirement age—one of the most common policy responses to the “aging society” problem—does not advance these other goals. And for those not benefiting from longer， healthier lives， it amounts to a cruel， retrograde intervention.

各国仍需出台计划供养传统意义上的老龄化人口，但灵活运用政策帮扶大龄劳动者享受更长寿、充实生活的需求也在日益增长。提高法定退休年龄常用于应对老龄化社会问题，但无助于以上各项目标的达成。对于享受不到健康长寿生活的人来说，这无异于一种残酷、适得其反的干预。

Governments need to develop pol-icies to help older， still-productive citizens find full-time employment or more flexible work arrangements. Unlike aging， longevity opens the door for policies that go well beyond end-of-life issues. Significantly longer lives， the twentieth-century historian Peter Laslett observed， invite us to draw up “a fresh map of life” itself.

政府需要制定政策帮助有余热的老年人实现全职上岗或灵活就业。不同于老龄化，长寿为超越生命终结问题的政策开启了大门。20世纪历史学家彼得·拉斯利特认为，寿命的显著延长要求我们为生命本身描绘一幅新地图。

To maximize the advantages of longevity， we will need to rethink both education and traditional career paths， while ensuring that todays younger generations live as long and as healthily as possible.

我們需要重新思考未来的教育和传统职业道路，从而最大限度利用长寿的优势，同时确保当今的年轻一代过上尽可能长寿健康的生活。

It is time to stop worrying about “aging societies” and start focusing on the type of demographic change that really matters. Governments should provide those in a position to reap the benefits of longer， healthier lives with opportunities to do so， while minimizing the number of people who are denied longevity. By investing in a longevity dividend， we can reduce the threat of an aging society.

当前，我们应停止对“老龄化社会”的担忧，着眼于真正事关重大的人口变化形式。政府要为能享受到健康长寿生活的老人提供这样的机会，同时尽量降低无法长寿的人口的数量。通过对长寿红利方面的投资，可以减少老龄化社会带来的威胁。

（译者为“《英语世界》杯”翻译大赛获奖者）

1 arbitrary任意的；武断的。  2 threshold起点。

3 chronological age实际年龄（相对于身体、智力或情感方面的发展而言）。  4 im-mutable永恒的；不可改变的。  5 unambiguously不含糊地，明确地。

6 actuarial保险精算的。  7 divergence偏离；背离。

8 nuanced有细微差別的。