Integrating and Inheriting Mencius and Xunzi through

Liu Yuedi

Abstract： This paper attempts to integrate and inherit Mencius and Xunzis theories through “the mind unifying and governing qing and human nature” （xin tong qing xing） rather than “the mind unifying and governing human nature and qing” （xin tong xing qing）. First， on the basis of the three divisions of the mind， namely the benevolent mind， intellectual mind， and habitual mind， it combines Mencius and Xunzis doctrines of the mind at the moral， trans-intellectual， intellectual， and perceptual levels. In terms of the auto-unification of the mind， it integrates Menciuss moral mind with Xunzis intellectual mind. On this basis， the mind is employed to “actually” govern qing， and Menciuss “positive qing” are integrated with Xunzis “negative qing.” In addition， the mind is employed to “virtually” govern human nature， integrating Menciuss idea of “human nature as innately good” with Xunzis idea of “human nature as tending toward badness.” Finally， it seeks to unify Menciuss “moral Heaven” with Xunzis “natural Heaven.” Thus， Menciuss theoretical mode of “Heaven–human nature–qing–mind” is comprehensively integrated with Xunzis “Heaven–qing–human nature–mind.” Menciuss top-down mode， centered on exhaustively expressing ones mind， knowing ones nature， and knowing Heaven， thus runs as follows： Heavenly human nature → good human nature → good qing → good mind; while Xunzis bottom-up mode， focused on indulging qing， transforming human nature， and forming a triad with Heaven， runs as follows： Heavenly qing → bad qing → bad human nature → good mind. 

Keywords： the mind unifying and governing qing and human nature， integrating and inheriting Mencius and Xunzi， moral mind， intellectual mind， positive qing， negative qing

“Mencius and Xunzi are unified in Confucius.” This common-sense statement by Li Zehou 李澤厚 is generally accepted. However， in the same article， Li emphasized “promoting Xunzi as the Confucian orthodoxy，” which caused much controversy. I believe that to integrate and inherit Mencius and Xunzi requires an integrated inheritance and a “third position”; otherwise， favoring either Mencius or Xunzi would be biased and deficient. Therefore， this paper proposes integrating and inheriting Mencius and Xunzi through “the mind unifying and governing qing and human nature” （xin tong qing xing 心统情性） rather than “the mind unifying and governing human nature and qing” （xin tong xing qing 心统性情）， in order to seek a holism that integrates Mencius and Xunzi from the levels of the mind （xin 心）， feeling or emotion （qing 情）， human nature （xing 性）， and Heaven （tian 天）.

The Classification of Mind： Benevolent Mind， Intellectual Mind， and Habitual Mind [Refer to page 15 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]

What does “mind” mean in Chinese philosophy？ In his article “The Nature and Realization of the Mind” [心的性質及其实现] published in 1983， Cai Renhou 蔡仁厚 （1930–2019） once divided the concept into three parts： the benevolent mind （renxin 仁心）， the intellectual mind （zhixin 智心）， and the habitual mind （xixin 习心）. Later， in The Philosophies of Confucius， Mencius， and Xunzi [孔孟荀哲学] published in 1984， he adopted a slightly more complex statement： “understanding the mind through benevolence，” “understanding the mind through wisdom，” and “the habitual mind.” In this authors opinion， the habitual mind means “to enter the mind through practice，” and such practice does not need “understanding.” The benevolent mind， intellectual mind， and habitual mind form a complete existence in Confucianism. Among these， the benevolent mind belongs to the moral level; the intellectual mind includes the trans-intellectual and intellectual levels; and the habitual mind belongs to the perceptual level， which together form a structure of three types and four levels， and this method of analysis is relatively fair. Based on Cai Renhous differentiation of the mind， this author has reclassified Menciuss and Xunzis general concepts as shown in the following table：

The Auto-Unification of the Mind： The Moral Mind and

the Intellectual Mind  [16]

To unify the mind of Mencius and Xunzi is precisely needed because of the different emphases of Mencius and Xunzi， hence Mencius and Xunzi can complement each other. However， this difference is not a radical separation from one another， but rather the mind of Xunzi opening up the path of the mind of Mencius. Since both Menciuss and Xunzis concepts of the mind aim toward the good， this lays a common foundation for the integration of the mind in Mencius and Xunzi. Therefore， the unity of Mencius and Xunzis similarity lies in the good mind; their difference lies in Menciuss tendency toward the moral mind and Xunzis tendency toward the intellectual mind， although this is only in terms of their general tendencies.

According to the classification of the mind， Mencius was the first to bear the brunt of the moral level. He believed that benevolence is the human mind， and that benevolence， righteousness， ritual propriety， and wisdom are also rooted in this mind. Menciuss thought on the mind was indeed internally interconnected and highly unified. Xunzis concept of the mind was more complex， was seen from low to high， and started from the perceptual level. Xunzi said， “When the mind is asleep， it dreams. When it relaxes， it moves of its own accord. When it is employed in a task， it plans.” （“Dispelling Blindness”） Although dreams， actions， and plans are all movements of the mind， there is a distinction between them. Dreams and actions belong to the perceptual state of mind， while plans are consciously separated from the perceptual state. However， there is no doubt that Xunzis mind had the most basic meaning of perception.

The intellectual level of mind was the core of Xunzis concept of the mind. He emphasized：

When knowledgeable， he understands the interconnections between phenomena and can assign them to their proper logical category. （“Nothing Indecorous” [不茍]）

[They are able to] state its guiding principle and proper category and can respond to them. （“The Teachings of the Ru” [儒效]）

Use the root of a thing to know its branches. （“The Great Compendium” [大略]）

Tang Junyi 唐君毅 （1909–1978） called this the “mind of unifying kinds，” as opposed to Menciuss “mind of human nature and qing， or moral mind.” Xunzis “mind of unifying kinds” meant that，

It can unify many kinds of things， dominate grand principle， and act as the master of the Way. The key to this lay in Xunzis mind， which was the mind that can understand according to categories， and the mind that is the highest void. Since ones mind can be void， it can know both the principle of one kind of thing， and also the principles of other kinds of things， so as to unify all. Thus， the mind becomes the unifier of all kinds.

The “mind of the highest void” here certainly concerns Xunzis “void， unity， and stillness” （xu yi er jing 虚壹而静）. I think that “void， unity， and stillness” were not only based on the intellectual level but also went beyond the intellectual level. Only when something reaches the trans-intellectual level can it integrate the intellectual level. The void leads to unification， and stillness leads to unity.

However， there are many misunderstandings about this “void， unity， and stillness”： on the one hand， it is often connected with the doctrines of Laozi and Zhuangzi or the Yellow Emperor and Laozi， because there were few resources concerning void and stillness that could be used for reference by Confucians of the same era. On the other hand， it is often totally separated from the doctrines of void and stillness in the Laozi， the Zhuangzi or the chapters “Techniques of the Mind （I）” [心术上]， “Inward Training” [内业]， and “The Purified Mind” [白心] of the Guanzi. Some people have equated “void， unity， and stillness” with “selecting oneness and unifying everything，” （ze yi er yi 择一而壹， “Dispelling Blindness”） and claimed that “oneness is a temporary choice， but stillness is a long-term persistence.” In this authors opinion， Xunzis void and stillness neither followed the metaphysical emptiness understood by Lao–Zhuang or Buddhism （which overemphasized the trans-intellectual level）， nor were they as practical as the Confucians （only limited to the intellectual level）， but rather had both connotations， so that they can not only unify kinds and know the Way， but also move toward the so-called “Great Pure Understanding” （ibid.）. Obviously， the plane of “Great Pure Understanding” cannot be explained as holding to oneness for constancy. Therefore， Xunzis “oneness for the Way” （ibid.） has both the meaning of cognitive distinction and the integrative connotation of void and stillness：

The mind from birth has awareness. With awareness， there is perception of difference. Perception of difference consists in awareness of two aspects of things at the same time. Awareness of two aspects of things all at the same time entails duality; nonetheless the mind has the quality called unity. Not allowing the one thing to interfere with the other is called unity. （ibid.）

This also means that the “integrated mind” is the “mind of void and stillness，” oneness leading to duality and duality leading to oneness. Xunzis mind thus has the meaning of the perceptual level （i.e.， the habitual mind）， the intellectual level and the trans-intellectual level （i.e.， the intellectual mind）， and also a certain internal meaning of the moral level （i.e.， the benevolent mind）.

Therefore， it is possible to integrate the mind of Mencius with the mind of Xunzi， but not the other way around， because the moral mind of Mencius only occupied one side of the whole mind， while Xunzi had a more complete vision when he looked at the mind of human beings， which is truly precious among the Confucians of all ages. Thus， the combination of Mencius and Xunzi on the level of the mind is not only the integration of Menciuss emphasis on the moral mind with Xunzis emphasis on the intellectual mind， but also a more comprehensive unity from the habitual mind and intellectual mind to the benevolent mind.

The Mind as Actually Unifying and Governing Qing：

‘Positive and ‘Negative Qing [18]

From Zhang Zai 張载 （1020–1077） to Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200）， “the mind unifying and governing human nature and qing” was expounded intensively. However， we will try our best to give it a new connotation. First of all， we should change “the mind unifying and governing human nature and qing” into “the mind unifying and governing qing and human nature.” We should affirm that， in this kind of unification of the mind， qing come first， not human nature， because we can only “actually” unify our qing with the mind， and “virtually” unify our inherent nature with the mind. It is more realistic to unify actually prior to unifying virtually. In his interpretation of Zhu Xis “mind unifying and governing human nature and qing，” Cai Renhou also found the following： “the function of unification is actual concerning qing but virtual concerning human nature， because the physical mind cannot unify the metaphysical human nature. Therefore， the unifying and governing of the mind is nothing more than a cognitive connection， which has no power.” This analysis indeed conforms to Zhu Xis logic： human nature follows metaphysical principle， while the mind and qing are physical qi， so it seems more logical for human nature to unify and govern the mind and qing.

What we call “the mind unifying and governing qing and human nature” is based on the original Confucian ideas， especially the thought of Mencius and Xunzi， and thus has no such division between the metaphysical dao and physical implements as defined by Zhu Xi and other Song Neo-Confucians. However， there is no problem with the mind actually unifying and governing qing and virtually unifying and governing human nature， since “for the mind to unify and govern human nature is for it to cognitively and relationally govern and manifest human nature，” while “for the mind to unify and govern qing is for it to govern qing in action and exert their function.” Since human nature is still and qing are active， human nature can be manifested through the awareness of the mind， and qing can be interpenetrated with the activity of the mind. According to Xunzi， the mind tends toward the good， but qing can be pulled down by desires （yu 欲）， so people depend on the mind to elevate the downward tendency of desires. This was Xunzis original thought of unifying and governing the badness of qing with the goodness of the mind， but this is an “actual unifying and governing.” At the same time， the badness of desires not only directly pulls down qing， but also indirectly pulls down human nature. Xunzis thought was focused on the badness of human nature， but the goodness of the mind elevates the badness of human nature through the intermediary of qing， and the mind cannot completely change human nature （although it can change qing）， so it is a “virtual unifying and governing.”

Since the mind can actually govern qing， how can Mencius and Xunzis concepts of qing be integrated under this theme？ This author wants to use positive qing （積极情） and negative qing （消极情） for this purpose. The Chinese concept of qing 情 can only be transliterated as qing， because in Chinese it has the meanings of genuineness （情实）， feeling or emotion （情感）， and temperament （情性）. Mencius and Xunzi used the word qing in different ways. While Mencius was more inclined to move from human nature to qing， Xunzi was more inclined to move from qing to human nature. At the same time， both Mencius and Xunzi utilized qings meaning of “genuineness.” However， the division between so-called positive and negative qing here mainly concerns emotions： Mencius advocated the positive side of qing while Xunzi advocated their negative side， which can complement each other.

According to the logic of Menciuss thought， the mind is good and thus human nature is good， while the core of the Four Sprouts is the mind， which is good， and thus human nature is good; according to the logic of Cheng Yis 程颐 （1033–1107） thought， human nature is good and thus the mind is good， which seems to turn Menciuss view upside down. From Cheng Yi to Zhu Xi， commentators over-explicated Menciuss thought. Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi [朱子语类] records： “Question： ‘Mencius said qing and talent are both good. What do you think？ Reply： ‘Qing is originally good and its origin has not been contaminated， so how can it be not good？ Talent is just aptitude， so it cannot be bad. For example， when things are white， they are only white before they are dyed.” According to Zhu Xis interpretation， human nature is good， qing are good， and talent is good too. Chen Li 陈澧 （1810–1882） of the Qing dynasty also had such an idea， but he focused on the issue of qing and desires： “To affirm the goodness of human nature but avoid the badness of qing is to observe Menciuss doctrine that qing can be good. Therefore， whenever desire is mentioned， it may be good or bad but cannot be all bad.” Thus， they considered Menciuss doctrine of qing being good as the final verdict， that desires can be good or bad， and that human desires and qing tend to be good in Mencius.

Menciuss qing of morality and compassion are typical positive qing. Although the qing of shame and dislike are negative qing， they can be transformed into positive moral motivations. Contrary to Menciuss view of qing as positive qing， Xunzis view of qing typically referred to negative qing. In Xunzis theoretical mode of human nature–qing–desire， qing are not only trapped by desire， but also pull down human nature. From the point of view of the relationship between qing and desire， “human qing are only desire”; from the point of view of the relationship between qing and human nature， “when each person follows his inborn nature and indulges his natural inclination， aggressiveness and greed are certain to develop. This is accompanied by violation of social class distinctions and throws the natural order into anarchy， resulting in a cruel tyranny” （Xunzi， “Mans Nature Is Bad” [性惡]）. As a result， one will become a villain who “indulges their nature and qing” and “violates ritual propriety and righteousness.” Xunzis theory of qing was not only different from Menciuss goodness of qing derived from the necessity of the goodness of human nature， but also from the “true qing” revealed in the “Human Nature Emerges from Endowment” [性自命出] passage of Guodian Chu Slips. Xunzi treated qing with a negative attitude. Of course， human nature cannot be generated from qing， but qing are generated from desire. Therefore， we can deduce （from desire and qing to human nature） the following. Since “the liking and disliking， delight and anger， and sorrow and joy of our nature are called qing” （“On the Correct Use of Names”）， then the fact that the view of human nature as bad has generally been considered as Xunzis own view has become a necessary inference.

Returning to the difference between Mencius and Xunzi， although Menciuss theory of qing was not explicated to the height of a priori feeling as for Song Confucians， but was good qing starting from positive qing， the goodness of qing can be derived from Menciuss goodness of human nature， which is the origin of positive qing. Since Xunzi focused on the framework of human nature–qing–desire， he deduced back from “desire is bad” to “qing are bad” and then to “human nature is bad，” which is the origin of negative qing. In fact， Mencius and Xunzi simply grasped the two sides of qing： Mencius stressed the greater body （positive qing） and emphasized peoples aspiration to attain benevolence and righteousness and thus sublimate qing; Xunzi focused on the lesser body （negative qing）， that is， on the desires of the appetite and the cultivation of the ears and eyes to understand qing. Inevitably， Xunzi also promoted qing with the mind. “Qing being so paired， the minds choosing between them is called thinking. The mind thinking something and the natural abilities acting on it is called conscious exertion.” （ibid.） In this way， “conscious exertion” could be promoted and human nature can be transformed.

In general， Mencius emphasized positive qing （human nature and qing）， so he employed an approach of human nature–qing–the mind that started from benevolence， extended love to benevolent government， and finally returned to inner benevolence; while Xunzi emphasized negative qing （desires）， employing an approach of qing–human nature–the mind， which was based on ritual propriety restraining qing， and turned toward the external ritual system in transforming human nature through conscious exertion. These two ideas can be properly integrated. As Bryan W. Van Norden states， “Mencius held that we must do that which will obtain for us what we most desire.” Everyone has an initial moral tendency， but Xunzi denies the human nature advocated by Mencius. “Humans do not， according to Xunzi， have to do what they most desire to do. . . . And to have our desires congruent with what we approve of.” Mencius and Xunzis views seem to be contrary， but they can be integrated.

The Mind as Virtually Unifying and Governing Human Nature： ‘Human Nature as Originally Good and ‘Human Nature as Tending toward the Bad  [19]

The difference between the good and the bad of Mencius and Xunzi is almost universally acknowledged. However， while it is appropriate to say that human nature in Menciuss view is purely good， it is questionable that Chen Dengyuan 陳登原 （1900–1975） argued Xunzi regarded human nature as purely good. In fact， regardless of the goodness or badness of human nature， both Mencius and Xunzi regarded the mind as good. Despite the fact that the inner logic of Xunzis thought lies more in transforming bad human nature with good mind， it has been demonstrated that Xunzis thought at least has an upward orientation of good in the mind. In this sense， the mind can govern human nature， even if only in a virtual sense， and the thought of Mencius and Xunzi can be integrated at the level of human nature.

There is a key question here. What is the meaning of good and bad in Mencius and Xunzis discussions？ The good that Mencius talked about first was not “completely good，” but rather focused on the sprouts of goodness， developing these and finally returning them to “pure goodness”; the bad that Xunzi talked about was not “completely bad，” but rather just focused on the source of badness as well as the exaltation of ritual propriety and the transformation of human nature. This kind of good and bad is not the same as the Western integral opposites of good and evil， which form a symmetrical relationship between good and evil. From the extant literature， Gaozi 告子 did not speak of badness， and even Mencius rarely spoke of it. What they spoke of was only “not good” （bushan 不善）. It was not until Xunzi and his followers that they spoke clearly of badness. The concept of the not good appeared earlier than that of badness. Good and not good are not mutually exclusive： either good or not good， A and not-A are quite different. In early Chinese thought， especially in the original Confucian school， from good to not good and then to bad， there was a gradual sequence of differences， but no clear demarcation line between good and bad. Mencius and Xunzis attitudes toward good and bad cannot be fully judged at the beginning： the “sprouts of goodness” are a positive part of the origin， while the “source of badness” is a negative part. Although Mencius tried to extend the sprouts of goodness to the whole， he did not deny the level of badness; otherwise why would he “promote goodness”？ Xunzi had a more comprehensive vision. Although he acknowledged the inevitability of the existence of the source of badness， he was ultimately guided by the pursuit of the good. It can be said that he saw not only the function of badness， but also the great side of the good. Therefore， Xunzis view seems to be better able to grasp the dimension and direction of human nature in all its complexity.

The difference between Mencius and Xunzis thought lay in their understanding of human nature and qing， as was stated in the following： “Confucian scholars differed in their views on human nature， not because they could not distinguish between good and bad， but because the Chinese character ‘xing 性 is so elusive.” This is true indeed. From this point of view， Ha Ryun （1347–1416， pen name Hojeong）， the Prime Minister to three Joseon kings， was more accurate in his view： “Menciuss view that human nature is good was concerned with the ultimate origin and source， and not the nature of material qi 氣. Xunzis view that human nature is bad， Yangzis view that good is mixed with bad， and Hanfeizis view that human nature has three qualities were all concerned with the nature of material qi， and not original nature.” The difference between Mencius and Xunzi in their views of human nature was precisely due to the difference in their theories of human nature. Mencius was concerned about original nature， while Xunzi was concerned about the nature of material qi， as was the doctrine of the mixture of good and bad that the later Confucian Yang Xiong 扬雄 （53 BCE–18 CE） proposed. Therefore， Xunzis so-called “transforming human nature through conscious exertion” referred to the nature of material qi， and not to original nature， because original nature cannot be changed.

In fact， human nature can contain both good and bad， and a variety of lineages and tendencies. From the perspective of yin 阴 and yang 阳， “human nature is like yin and yang， and the good is like the myriad things. It is not human nature to be good for its own sake. It was Confucius who said that human nature could be called good. If it can be called good， it can also be called bad， so Xunzis view of human nature as bad came from Mencius.” Here it was said that Xunzis view of human nature as bad came from Mencius， yet it would be better to say that it came from Confucius， because Confucius opened up both the two trends of thought on human nature as good and bad as proposed by Mencius and Xunzi. In retrospect， both Menciuss and Xunzis views can therefore be unified in Confucius. Confuciuss basic ideological orientation was as follows： First of all， he did not speak about human nature as being good or bad; second， he rarely spoke about human nature and endowment; third， he stressed human enculturation through practice. After Confucius laid the foundation， Mencius inherited the first dimension of goodness and made up for the second one in reverse， while Xunzi inherited the first dimension of badness and developed the third aspect.

Mencius sought to learn the higher and attain in the lower， with benevolent love as his starting point. Heaven and humanity are interlinked， and people have their “mind.” Xunzi insisted on the separation between Heaven and humanity， starting from groups and their divisions， with the regularity （chang 常） of nature and the “governance” of people. However， Xunzis Heaven was not only a natural one. According to Sinologist Antonio S. Cua （1932–2007）， “Tian in most of Xunzis uses， especially in our citation， is best rendered as ‘Nature （自然） or ‘nature （天性） in the sense of tian as ‘the objective . . . operation of certain processes and principles of Nature. . . . Tian as nature is regularity.” Cua further believed that human goodness is the result of conscious exertion， and becoming a sage is only the result of constructive human efforts. This was the result of Xunzis “nature” being molded into a form that is ethically acceptable and beautiful. Xunzis “nature” was regarded as “the basic and problematic motivational structure of humans.” On the other hand， Menciuss discussion of Heaven was not only about morality， but also had a secondary natural significance： “There is Heaven so high; there are the stars so distant. If we have investigated their phenomena， we may， while sitting in our places， go back to the solstice of a thousand years ago” （Mencius 4B：26）. Since Menciuss theory of Heaven had the meaning of nature and Xunzis theory of Heaven also had the meaning of natural inclinations， this opens up a channel for the integration of nature in Mencius and Xunzi.

Interestingly， Mencius and Xunzis theories of Heaven were closely integrated with their doctrines of human nature and qing respectively. Mencius emphasized the Heaven-endowed human nature while Xunzi stressed the Heaven-endowed qing. Mencius sought the Heaven-endowed human nature， as in the following： “Knowing his nature， he knows Heaven. To preserve ones mental constitution， and nourish ones nature， is the way to serve Heaven” （Mencius 7A：1）. Menciuss mind was also endowed by Heaven， as in the following： “To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking， it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think， it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us” （6A：15）. This Heaven may not have a completely moral meaning， since it also has an inborn natural meaning. Xunzi stressed Heaven-endowed qing：

When the work of Heaven has been established and its achievements perfected， the physical form becomes whole and the spirit is born. Love and hate， delight and anger， sorrow and joy， are stored within—these are described as “the qing given us by Heaven.” . . . The sage purifies his Heavenly lord， rectifies his Heavenly faculties， completes his Heavenly nourishment， is obedient to the Heavenly rule of order， and nourishes his Heavenly qing and thereby completes Heavens achievement. If this situation obtains， then he knows what is his to do and what is not his to do. Then Heaven and Earth perform the work of officers， and the myriad things serve him as foot soldiers. When his conduct is minutely controlled， his nourishment minutely moderated， and his life suffers no injury—this indeed is called “understanding Heaven.” （Xunzi， “Discourse on Nature”）

It can be seen that Xunzis “knowing Heaven” was different from that of Mencius. Mencius knew the Heaven through the “office of thinking，” while Xunzi took Heaven-endowed qing as the starting point， through the steps of the Heavenly faculties， Heavenly lord， Heavenly nourishment， and Heavenly rule of order， so as to achieve the whole realm of knowing Heaven.

In both “Heaven and humanity combining their virtue” or “Heaven produces and humanity completes，” this is ultimately a unity of Heaven and humanity. According to Takeuchi Yoshio （1886–1966），

There was something in common between Mencius and Xunzi， that is to say， they left the Heavenly Mandate or the Heavenly Way and tried to explain the root of morality through an analysis of human nature， which was the same between the two sages. Mencius analyzed Confuciuss Heavenly Mandate as the two concepts of endowment and nature， and advocated the theory of good nature in order to perceive the elements of morality in human nature， while Xunzi separated humanity from Heaven and attached great importance to artificial ritual propriety and law， resulting in the theory of bad nature.

However， Menciuss Heavenly Mandate and mind–human nature were smooth and internally connected， while Xunzi， though he discussed the difference between Heaven and humanity， still affirmed the integration of Heaven and humanity， and was thus not divorced from the Chinese tradition. Xunzi only emphasized the difference between Heaven and humanity on the basis of their unity. Thus， the Heaven of Mencius and Xunzi can be unified.

Conclusion： Unity in the Mode of ‘Heaven–

Human Nature–Mind–Qing [22]

The difference between Mencius and Xunzi is usually regarded as an internal division， with Mencius as internal and Xunzi as external. Confucius internalized ritual propriety into benevolence; Mencius developed the benevolent mind from this; and Xunzi externalized ritual propriety into laws， from which modern democracy could be developed. However， we need to break with the internal and external dichotomy， and strive to integrate and inherit Mencius and Xunzi from the serial lineage of Heaven–human nature–mind–qing， which is a kind of internal integration， so that Mencius and Xunzi can be interconnected， rather than simply embedding the interior in the exterior. Moreover， this author advocates an integration based on the mode of “the mind unifying and governing qing and human nature.” Since the mind has a comprehensive structure from the habitual mind and intellectual mind to the mind of goodness， it can govern both human nature and qing. Because the mind governs qing in an actual sense， but governs human nature in a virtual sense， it is logical to govern first emotion and then human nature. Of course， the integration of Menciuss “human nature–qing–mind” and Xunzis “qing–human nature–mind” has the dimension of Heaven， which is indispensable， yet while Mencius emphasized “Heavenly nature，” Xunzi stressed “natural qing.” That is， Menciuss theoretical mode was Heaven–human nature–qing–mind， while Xunzis was Heaven–qing–human nature–mind. For this reason， Heaven can be the starting point of integration， and the mind can be regarded as its end point.

To sum up， different from Menciuss top-down thinking mode of fulfilling ones mind， knowing ones nature， and knowing Heaven， Xunzi had a bottom-up mode of indulging qing， transforming human nature， and forming a triad with Heaven.

Bibliography of Cited Translations

Knoblock， John， trans. Xunzi [荀子]. Library of Chinese Classics [大中華文库]. Changsha： Human Peoples Publishing House; Beijing： Foreign Languages Press， 1999.

Legge， James， trans. The Works of Mencius. Vol. 2 of The Chinese Classics. Taipei： SMC Publishing Inc.， 1991.

Zhai， Jiangyue 翟江月， trans. Guanzi [管子]. 4 vols. Library of Chinese Classics. Guilin： Guangxi Normal University Press， 2005.

Translated by Zhu Yuan