NARRATING CHECKS AND BALANCES? THE SETUP OF FINANCERELATED ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS IN 5TH AND 4TH CENTURY BC ATHENS

Sven Günther

IHAC, NENU, Changchun

Athens in the 5th and 4th century was mainly a democracy, temporarily an empire, but all the time a state.1On Greek city-states and their formation, see now the surveys by Hansen 2013; Morris 2013.A state is always in need of administrative structures and procedures that keep the system running, particularly in such sensitive fields as finance and military organization, to mention only the two most important. However, unlike many states nowadays there was no clear border line between the political and administrative spheres since the Athenian democratic system normally demanded an annual change in many of the administrative posts,2However, see Ismard 2017, esp. Chapter 4 on public slaves as important elements of knowledge and, thus, continuity in administration within a society carefully observing outstanding experts among equal citizens.and a very special procedure of accountability, before, during and after any specific office was held. As many institutions were also involved in decisionmaking processes - checks, balances and separation of powers were the basic principles of the Athenian democracy - a clear division of functions as well as an assignment of tasks was required.3On the Athenian democracy and its modes of operation, see e.g. the surveys by Hansen 1991; Bleicken 1995.All this has, of course, been studied in detail, and need not be repeated here. However, the question of how these administrative structures and procedures, especially those concerning accounting and the accountability of financially involved officials,4On the financial organization, see Leppin 1995; Rhodes 2013, both with further literature.were presented to the public has been tackled far less. It has mainly been studied from the viewpoint of whether, and to what extent, the publication of accounts and the mentioning of accountabilities mirror the democratic regime and its responsibility to ensure participation, or was grounded in other necessities, from representation of magistrates via the information of particular groups and interested parties, religious and monumental considerations to the mere form that mattered more than the actual content.5For the former, see Harris 1994; for the latter, see Davies 1994. Summarized and nuanced now by Lambert 2018a. Kallet-Marx 1994 points to the role of orators and their financial knowledge, to “frame” debates.

In this paper, I anchor in this scholarly debate, and contribute a small piece to a New Public Economy of Athens, by examining the setup of some selected finance-related documents and institutions in terms of how they were narrated to the audience. Thereby, I hope to advance the understanding of the type and style of these finance-related documents as well as the places of their publication (not archiving).6On the archive-praxis, see Sickinger 1999; Faraguna 2015 (with comprehensive bibliography). On the selection of which decrees were published, see now Lambert 2018b with further bibliography; contra Osborne 2012.For this purpose, I draw heavily on the model of regulatory frameworks, based on the frame analysis-theory of Erving Goffman, which offers an approach of how communication works in a more complex way than only between a sender and receiver of information.7See Günther 2014; 2017 for details. Frame analysis: esp. Goffman 1974.In this model, ancient texts represent, contain, and address, the frames of experiences and expectations of both the composer and the targeted audience of the information. As we are used to integrate new information in our existing framework that consists of political, socio-economic, religious, legal, moral or other frames, expectations and experiences - thereby we often re-assure ourselves (even by a selective reading or even by converting the information to make it fit our frames), however we potentially can modify or even change our frames -, every detail and element of the information is important to examine. As research has up to now not put much emphasis on the setup or the narratives of administrative documents,8Collected papers edited by Irene Berti and Daniela Marchiandi, Inscribing Space. The Topography of Attic Inscriptions are in the process of publication. See also Lambert 2018a.an analysis might offer some new insights into the functioning of the financial administration of Athens in the 5th and 4th century.

Everything under Control? Narrating Public Finances in Literary Descriptions of the Athenian Constitution

To approach the inscriptions and their specific forms of describing public finances as well as their handling, one should take a brief look at the literary sources with regard to financial administration, as they also narrate their view of Athenian public finances. Among many references, particularly in the Attic orators with their employment of administrative structures and documents for the sake of their rhetorical-juridical argument, the two descriptions of the Athenian constitution and how it worked, one by the anonymous “Old Oligarch” in the last quarter of the 5th century, the other supposedly by a student of Aristotle in the last quarter of the 4th century stand out.9On the dates, see Rhodes 1992, 51-58.

In both cases, the Athenian democracy, its institutions as well as the cooperation between them are described as a self-referential system that exactly reflects the democratic idea. Very appropriate is thus the description by the “Old Oligarch” that, although the author disagrees with the democratic form, it is preserved in the best way by the assignment of (nearly all the important) tasks to the assembly and the council (boule). Among them he lists all relevant financial activities of the state like tributes and revenues, and also the financerelated G2P-cases and liturgy-cases, and describes the two acting bodies as so much burdened by all tasks that even by bribing the responsible institutions not all businesses could be conducted in one year.10Cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.1-10. For the details of the description, cf. the commentary of Kalinka 1913, 255-301.In conclusion, he can again only state that “[u]nder such circumstances, therefore, I deny that it is possible for affairs at Athens to be otherwise than as they now are, except insofar as it is possible to take away a bit here and add a bit there; a substantial change is impossible without removing some part of the democracy.”11[Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.8: τούτων τοίνυν τοιούτων ὄντων οὔ φημι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ἄλλως ἔχειν τὰ πράγματα Ἀθήνησιν ἢ ὥσπερ νῦν ἔχει, πλὴν ἢ κατὰ μικρόν τι οἷόν τε τὸ μὲν ἀφελεῖν τὸ δὲ προσθεῖναι: πολὺ δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε μετακινεῖν, ὥστε μὴ οὐχὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἀφαιρεῖν τι. Translation in Marchant and Bowersock 1968. Cf. also [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.9.

While the democratic constitution and system as narrated by the “Old Oligarch” is not perfectly balanced because all is ruled by the assembly and, mainly, the council - thus, the writer aims at undermining the authority of the democratic system by constantly repeating the exclusiveness that is a people-harming weakness in this rhetorical exercise-treatise - the pseudo-Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia stresses more the decision-making processes and the interaction of different institutions and bodies, especially regarding financial matters. The main passage ([Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47-49) reads, at first sight, like a perfectly balanced cooperation between the council and mostly financial magistrates, democratically drawn by lot. However, this “systematic” and “synchronic” view is only misleading about the complex diachronic development up to the composition of the Athenaion Politeia if one ignores the details in the narrative in respect of old rights, and checks and balances. For instance, the tamiai of Athena, responsible for the treasure of the Athena-sanctuary, were still chosen by lot from the highest Solonian class, the pentakosiomedimnoi, while the ten vendors (poletai) who farmed out all public contracts with private persons, were framed, not only by the council but also by the treasurer of military funds (stratiotikon) and those in charge of the spectacle fund (theorikon), both elected offices, perhaps even for four years, and not drawn by lot, like e.g. the military strategoi (see below);12Cf. [Aristot.]. Ath. Pol. 47.1-2. On the election of the magistrates for the stratiotikon and the theorikon, cf. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 43.1: τὰς δ᾽ ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον διοίκησιν ἁπάσας ποιοῦσι κληρωτάς, πλὴν ταμίου στρατιωτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν καὶ τοῦ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητοῦ. ταύτας δὲ χειροτονοῦσιν, καὶ οἱ χειροτονηθέντες ἄρχουσιν ἐκ Παναθηναίων εἰς Παναθήναια. χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἁπάσας. / “All the officials concerned with the regular administration are appointed by lot, except a Treasurer of Military Funds, the Controllers of the Spectacle Fund, and the Superintendent of Wells; these officers are elected by show of hands, and their term of office runs from one Panathenaic Festival to the next. All military officers also are elected by show of hands.” Translated by Rackham 1961. On the problem of the office-period, cf. the discussions in Chambers 1990, 338-339; Rhodes 1992, 517.and the archon basileus had still the responsibility for the farming out of contracts in sacred areas.13Cf. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.4.Additionally, the receivers (apodektai) who received and allocated the incoming revenues (by merismos, see below) were contained - not only by the presence of the council but also by the handing over of the necessary account tablets through a public slave who was responsible for the keeping of all tablets with let-out contracts.14Cf. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.5-48.1. On the demosioi, see Ismard 2017, esp. 38-42, 83-90.Finally, the ten logistai chosen by lot among the boule were a kind of pre-checkers of account (after every prytany) to the logistai drawn by lot from the people.15Cf. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 48.3 with 54.2. On the difference, cf. Chambers 1990, 366; Rhodes 1992, 560.

In the end, both accounts reflect the cautioness and mistrust in the democratic handling of financial matters: the “Old Oligarch” by letting every detail be conducted by the overstrained council and assembly, to show the perversity of the system; the Athenaion Politeia by letting important parts always be checked against the acting magistrates, by dividing up tasks in small packages so that no one could gain too much power, and by putting always long-term and/or (potentially) experienced “experts” (tamiai of Athena-treasury; treasurers of the stratiotikon and theorikon; public slaves) beside the “normal” magistrates.

Competence-allocation and Openness: The Decree on the Administration of Property of Kodros, Neleus and Basile

While the “handbook” of the Athenaion Politeia provides a rather systematic and comprehensive overview of how the financial administration in Athens might have worked perfectly, our evidence of what actually happened when different institutions were involved in respect of financial matters, is mainly based on inscriptions. An interesting example for the interplay, and perhaps conflict of competence, as well as the form and function of decree-publication we find in a decree from the year 418/417 BC regarding the lease of work (fencing-in) in a sanctuary (hieron) of Kodros and Neleus and Basile and of a sacred precinct (temenos) of Neleus and Basile attached to it, which both were probably located between the Phaleron and Itonian gates. It reads as follows:16IG I3 84; translated by S. Lambert, N. Papazarkadas and R. Osborne in “Attic Inscriptions Online,” see: https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGI3/84 (04.01.2018). See now also Osborne and Rhodes 2017, 398-403 (no. 167) with a comprehensive commentary.

Gods. The Council and the People decided. Pandionis was in prytany, Aristoxenos was secretary, Antiochides was chairman, Antiphon was archon; Adousios proposed: to fence in the sanctuary of Kodros and Neleus and Basile and to lease the sacred precinct according to the specifications. Let the official sellers make the contract for the fencing in. Let the king lease the sacred precinct according to the specifications, and let him despatch the boundarycommissioners to demarcate these sanctuaries so that they may be in the best and most pious condition. The money for the fencing in shall come from the sacred precinct. This Council shall carry out these provisions before it leaves office, otherwise each one (of the councillors) shall be liable to a fine of one thousand drachmas according to what has been proposed.

Adousios proposed: in other respects in accordance with the Council’s proposal, but let the king and the official sellers lease the sacred precinct of Neleus and Basile for twenty years according to the specifications. The lessee shall fence in the sanctuary of Kodros and Neleus and Basile at his own expense. Whatever rent the sacred precinct may produce in each year, let him deposit the money in the ninth prytany with the receivers, and let the receivers hand it over to the treasurers of the Other Gods according to the law. If the king, or anyone else of those instructed about these matters in the prytany of Aigeis, does not carry out the things decreed, let him be liable to a fine of 10,000 drachmas. The purchaser of the mud shall remove it from the ditch during this very Council after paying to Neleus the price at which he made the purchase. Let the king erase the name of the purchaser of the mud once he has paid the fee. Let the king write up instead on the wall the name of the lessee of the sacred precinct and for how much he has rented it and the names of the guarantors in accordance with the law that concerns the sacred precincts. So that anyone who wishes may be able to know, let the secretary of the Council inscribe this decree on a stone stele and place it in the Neleion next to the railings. Let the payment officers give the money to this end. The king shall lease the sacred precinct of Neleus and of Basile on the following terms: that the lessee fence in the sanctuary of Kodros and Neleus and Basile according to the specifications during the term of the Council that is about to enter office, and that he work the sacred precinct of Neleus and Basile on the following terms: that he plant young sprouts of olive trees, no fewer than 200, and more if he wishes; that the lessee have control of the ditch and the water from Zeus, as much as flows in between the Dionysion and the gates whence the initiates march out to the sea, and as much as flows in between the public building and the gates leading out to the bath of Isthmonikos; lease it for twenty years.

There are many things remarkable in this decree. First of all, the same Adousios who had proposed the leases that were carried through the council and the assembly (part I), made obviously an amendment in the assembly (part II). And this amendment is, in fact, totally changing the responsibilities and procedures of the proposed measures. Instead of dividing the tasks between the poletai who according to the original proposal should lease out the fencing-in of the hieron, and the archon basileus who would have been responsible to lease the temenos whereby the money for the fencing-in should come from the income (the capital stock?) of the temenos, the amendment seems to combine both measures by letting the lessee of the sacred precinct take care of the fencingin, and bring a cooperation of archon basileus and poletai. However, as later in the document only the archon basileus is mentioned, there seems to have been a conflict of competences, because the lease of the fencing-in touched upon the responsibilities of the archon basileus for the sacred lands, by partly putting the poletai in charge of it.17On the competences, cf. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.2-3: ἔπειθ᾽ οἱ πωληταὶ ι΄ μέν εἰσι, κληροῦται δ᾽ εἷς ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς. μισθοῦσι δὲ τὰ μισθώματα πάντα, καὶ τὰ μέταλλα πωλοῦσι καὶ τὰ τέλη μετὰ τοῦ ταμίου τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν ᾑρημένων ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ κυροῦσιν ὅτῳ ἂν ἡ βουλὴ χειροτονήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πραθέντα μέταλλα, τά τ᾽ ἐργάσιμα τὰ εἰς τρία ἔτη πεπραμένα, καὶ τὰ συγκεχωρημένα τὰ εἰς ... ἔτη πεπραμένα. καὶ τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φευγόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς πωλοῦσιν, κατακυροῦσι δ᾽ οἱ θ΄ ἄρχοντες. καὶ τὰ τέλη τὰ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν πεπραμένα, ἀναγράψαντες εἰς λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα τόν τε πριάμενον καὶ ὅσου ἂν πρίηται, τῇ βουλῇ παραδιδόασιν. (3) ἀναγράφουσιν δὲ χωρὶς μὲν οὓς δεῖ κατὰ πρυτανείαν ἑκάστην καταβάλλειν, εἰς δέκα γραμματεῖα, χωρὶς δὲ οὓς τρὶς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, γραμματεῖον κατὰ τὴν καταβολὴν ἑκάστην ποιήσαντες, χωρὶς δ᾽ οὓς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας. ἀναγράφουσι δὲ καὶ τὰ χωρία καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τἀπογραφέντα καὶ πραθέντα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ: καὶ γὰρ ταῦθ᾽ οὗτοι πωλοῦσιν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν μὲν οἰκιῶν ἐν ε΄ ἔτεσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν τιμὴν ἀποδοῦναι, τῶν δὲ χωρίων ἐν δέκα: καταβάλλουσιν δὲ ταῦτα ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας. / “Then there are the ten Vendors, elected by lot one from a tribe. They farm out all public contracts and sell the mines and the taxes, with the co-operation of the Treasurer of Military Funds and those elected to superintend the Spectacle Fund, in the presence of the Council, and ratify the purchase for the person for whom the Council votes, and the mines sold and the workings and sold in the jury-court; for these sales are also conducted by these officials. Payment must be made for purchases of houses within five years, and for farms within ten; and they make these payments in the ninth presidency.”On the scholarly discussion about the relation between poletai and basileus and the responsibilities in the leasing process, cf. Langdon 1991, 64-65; Walbank 1991, 149-151, 154-155, 166-167. See also Osborne and Rhodes 2017, 401 (with further literature). On sacred land in general, see Papazarkadas 2011, esp. 53, 62-63, 72-73, and 84-85 regarding our decree.that have been sold for three years and the concessions sold for ... years. And the estates of persons banished by the Areopagus and of the others they sell at a meeting of the Council, but the sale is ratified by the Nine Archons. And they draw up and furnish to the Council a list written on whitened tablets of the taxes sold for a year, showing the purchaser and the price that he is paying. (3) And they draw up ten separate lists of those who have to pay in each presidency, and separate lists of those who have to pay three times in the year, making a list for each date of payment, and a separate list of those who have to pay in the ninth presidency. They also draw up a list of the farms and houses written off

While the terms of lease and payment correspond mainly to the ones mentioned in the Athenaion Politeia18[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.4: εἰσφέρει δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὰς μισθώσεις τῶν τεμενῶν, ἀναγράψας ἐν γραμματείοις λελευκωμένοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἡ μὲν μίσθωσις εἰς ἔτη δέκα, καταβάλλεται δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς θ΄ πρυτανείας. διὸ καὶ πλεῖστα χρήματα ἐπὶ ταύτης συλλέγεται τῆς πρυτανείας. / “Also the King-archon introduces the letting of domains, having made a list of them on whitened tablets. These also are let for ten years, and the rent is paid in the ninth presidency; hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes in.”The twenty-year lease period may derive from the planting of olive trees. See Osborne and Rhodes 2017, 402.the double publication is worth mentioning. The lessee, the lease-price and the guarantors are to be written on the walls by the archon basileus according to the law regulating it, obviously for a “temporary” record-keeping. The “permanent” publication of the decree “[s]o that anyone who wishes may be able to know” (l. 26) “in the Neleion next to the railings” (ll. 27-28) is probably not for a mere publication-demand of democracy but for informing potentially interested or affected persons, however may also serve to represent the rescued responsibility of the archon basileus.19On possible reasons for disclosure-formulae, see Sickinger 2009, however mainly for honorific decrees, and he does not deal with our inscription here where it might give some different interpretation regarding the formula “for anyone who wants to read” (cf. ibid., 88-90). Generally, on disclosure-formulae see also Lasagni forthcoming; concerning IG I3 84, see ibid., 8, together with the final interpretation on p. 30, as a specific formula of “collective self-consciousness of the polis community” (p. 8).That a change in the record-keeping praxis could also provoke a publication (though without disclosure-formula) is attested in IG II2 1174 (368/367 BC). The decree of the deme Halai Aixonides orders the demarchs and the treasurers to put receipts and expenses into a box each month and to follow therewith the example of magistrates in office of that year, obviously for a safer accountability in the end (ll. 4-13). The inscribing on stone ordered thereafter is for the publication of the new procedure (ll. 13-15), together with oath-taking and only partly persevered threats of punishment to ensure the compliance with the regulation (ll. 15-20).Hence, the question of the function of other finance-related inscriptions arises.

Account Lists: A Sign of Transparency or Opacity?

Our main knowledge about Athenian finances derives from the various account lists published on stone. Hence, the question of the function of these lists arises, which has been foremost discussed in terms of whether these accounts reflect democratic principles of transparency or are caused by other incentives.20See above, with n. 4.

While there is no space here to unroll the debate and the arguments of both sides again one has clearly to state from a viewpoint of financial planning and budgetary accounting that the extant accounts are not sufficient to let everyone participate in the details of the budget. Inventory lists, usually without mentioning consumables, reflect a status quo but do not tell much about the income-expenditure-structure, investments, loans or commitment authorisations etc. Loans like the ones from the Sacred Treasury give more details. However even there one might miss a statement of profit and loss. Rarely, the source of a payment appears in the account list.21See e.g. IG I3 375.3 where the payments form the Treasury of Athena in 410/409 BC come from the annual income (epeteion).Thus, one does not get the impression that the accounts on stone really mirror the unfortunately non-preserved accounts that were written on other materials, like wood or papyrus, and kept in archives. Yet, this does not mean that they were published only for the sake of representation of the officials involved, the disclosure of correct record-keeping, the religious responsibility in case of accounts from sanctuaries or the praxis of following examples of predecessors. For in 353/352 BC, a decree orders a public slave named Eukles to conduct an inventory of objects in the Chalkotheke on the Acropolis, where bronze objects were kept, and then, after involvement of many other magistrates / secretaries, the council was to compare this account with the already published ones on different stelae, and then report potential differences to the people’s assembly.22IG II2 120; cf. Sickinger 1999, 125-126; Ismard 2017, 86-87 (on Eukles and his entire career). Lasagni forthcoming, 10, on the checking procedure.However, whether a supposed discrepancy between the records and the actual treasure was noticed due to these inscribed inventories or other documents, is unclear.

Given this (admittedly exceptional) Chalkotheke-decree, it is also insufficient to put the practice of account lists in the term of “Gestalt which mattered, not the minute and barely legible details,” like John Davies has done.23Davies 1994, 211.The impressive line of such regularly published inscriptions, particularly on the Acropolis and the Agora, published on non-perishable material and with unreadable facts was rather the monumental statement that “everything is in order” and “stable” in the Athenian state. And this repetitive confirmation was, of course, particularly necessary in a democratic system that was based on the fungibility of persons in office, where everyone was sometimes ruling and ruled, and affirmed the administrative procedures against any claims and challenges, from inside and outside. If once this public form of confidence was challenged everything had to be done to re-establish it.24On the functions of public accounts, particularly their placement within the (Hellenistic) polis, see Berti and Kató 2017. On the monumental aspect that mattered for erecting inscriptions on the Acropolis, see Lambert 2018a, 29-30. On the aspect of legal security with regard to the poletaiinscriptions, see Jördens et al. 2015, 459-460.

Authority vs. Formal Control? Merismos-procedure, Eubulus and Lycurgus

However, the real accountability and allocation of budget was happening elsewhere, within the procedure described in the Athenaion Politeia (Chapters 47-48, see above). Particularly interesting, and partly obscure, is the so-called merismos-procedure for the allocation of the revenues to the specific institutional budgets. It started in the 4th century and replaced the central treasury.25On the merismos, cf. Rhodes 2013, 217-223; Pritchard 2015, 23-24. First attested in IG II2 29.18-22 (386 BC). Cf. Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 80-83 (no. 19), esp. 82-83.According to the Athenaion Politeia, the procedure was conducted by the apodektai (receivers) as follows ([Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 48.1-2):

We only have very little evidence of how exactly the mediation between the different budgetary funds functioned - probably based on estimation of spending -, and how the detailed regulations regarding the allocation for the apodektai looked.26IG II2 29.21 suggests that there was not only one nomos but rather nomoi prescribing the procedure.However, we see in the surviving epigraphic material that amendment to this initial allocation was difficult to achieve, only by changing the specific nomos through the rather complicated nomothetai-procedure.27Cf. e.g. IG II/III3/1 452.41-46, with a threat of punishment (ibid., ll. 48-52). Further evidence in Rhodes 2013, 218; Pritchard 2015, 24. See also Meier 2012, 53-61. On the probable modification of the merismos-procedure in this time, the Lycurgan era, see below.The division between the decision of general financial patterns in the assembly, the budgetary law by the nomothetai, the concrete administration by the apodektai under supervision of the council, and then the application of funds in the specific institutions by the officials - all with specific checks and controlmechanisms - clearly reflect the separation of powers as well as mistrust of the democratic system. It further stated that a short-term, and maybe short-sighted, shift of (financial) policies was not intended.

While this speaks in favor of a more deliberate financial planning and organization, of course in democratic terms, the rise of special funds like the military fund (stratiotikon) and the spectacle fund (theorikon) in the course of the 4th century speak partially a different language. The officials of both institutions were elected not drawn by lot28Cf. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 43.1 (see above).and could receive surpluses from the total financial budget after the merismos - in times of war the stratiotikon, in times of peace the theorikon.29On both institutions, see Leppin 1995; Rhodes 2013, 219-221.It is very remarkable that the former appears frequently in our epigraphic sources while the latter is attested mainly in literary sources that deal with the power of the theorikon-officials, foremost the one of Eubulus.30The one time the theorikon appears in the epigraphic evidence (IG II/III3/1 306.C.38-39 (343/342 BC)) it replaces the usual, and later again attested, antigrapheus as signing, and controlling, official. Cf. Leppin 1995, 560-561; Rhodes 2013, 220 with n. 115 on the question of whether there was only one magistrate first, later a board. On Eubulus and the theorikon, see Cawkwell 1963; Rhodes 2013, 220, Günther 2016, 124-125 and now Rohde 2017 (2019), 293-297, all three with further literature.When we confront the enormous (though partly rhetorically exaggerated) influence and power ascribed to Eubulus in respect of financial, administrative and other matters with the hardly reconstructable responsibilities of the office by law, it becomes clear that Eubulus used other forms of rule besides those formal powers. Given his long-term control over the body of the theoric fund, his attested circle of friends, among them Xenophon with his financial advices in the Vectigalia, and the conducted measures, the tendency towards expertise and a technocratic elite that was able to connect, and use, the scattered financial information for their purposes becomes a considerable factor in the Athenian democracy from the middle of the 4th century on.31Cf. Günther 2016, esp. 124-125; Rohde 2017 (2019), 293-297. Contra a Eubulus-faction: Näf 1997.

Even more, this tendency came along with the influence rhetorically skilled elite-members could gain among the masses, and where many different expertises lay in the hands of one man, the formal structures of democratic decision and control procedures could be partly overruled.32Cf. Kallet-Marx 1994; Rohde 2017 (2019), esp. Chapter 5.1, 284-293. See also the picture Xenophon draws of the “ideal” Persian king in his Cyropaedia, and of other ideal rulers like Agesilaus. They rule by authority, not (only) via formal powers, and thus can supersede them. And in the Memorabilia, Xenophon shows how important it is to have excellent knowledge of all affairs for the young and ambitious Glaukon (Xen. Mem. 3.6.1-18).This is, of course, not to say that Athens became a one-man- or one-faction-rule at this time; the mutual control and competition between theorikon and stratiotikon, the regular checks and accountabilities of the offices within the democratic system as well as the many different factions and their skilled leaders prevented an overthrow of the democracy.33Cf. Leppin 1995, 553-556. An expression is the law to protect the democracy proposed by Eucrates in 337/336 BC, probably directed against Demosthenes and his “faction.” See Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 388-393 (no. 79).However, the appointment of Lycurgus to the exceptional office of overseer of the public revenues (ho epi toi dioikesei) for three quadrennial, his central position in Athenian politics of this period - attested both in literary and epigraphic documents and particularly in a honorific decree34On Lycurgus, his time and the Athenian finances, see Burke 2010; Rhodes 2013, 221-224; Rohde 2017 (2019), 297, all with further sources and literature. For the honorific decree, which is fragmentary preserved in the epigraphic material but can be restored from the literary record, cf. [Plut.] Vit. X orat. Lyc. (= Mor. 852 a-e) with IG II2 457 + 3207. On the title and terms of Lycurgus’ office, cf. Rhodes 2013, 221-222 with notes. Especially on the decree, cf. Meier 2012, 28-38; Lambert 2018c.- illustrates that the democratic decision over finances changed during this period. To what extent these developments also affected the merismos - in terms of direct control by the ho epi toi dioikesei cannot be reconstructed with certainty; however, a modification that gave this official more influence is very likely.35Cf. Rhodes 2013, 223-224.Nevertheless, a tendency toward a euergetistic, dignitary ruling class competing for honors becomes obvious.36See Lambert 2018c, 298-304, on the competition between Demades and Lycurgus. On the competitive exhortations in honorific decrees and the mentality they reflect in terms of transformation of the Athenian democracy, see Miller 2016.This class had to response to the demands of the masses via liturgies, conduct of public performances etc., and received, in return, honors as well as political influence and the confirmation to rule for the sake of the public commonwealth.37See Rohde 2017 (2019), passim. On the different Athenian “democracies” formed by this change in elite-people-relations, cf. Miller 2016, 420-422.

Conclusions

To conclude, the setup and narratives of finance-related administrative documents and powers tell the story and fate of the Athenian democracy. On the one hand, one can see the permanently repeated and impressive statement of stability that did not only astonish contemporaries, especially critics of the democratic system. It was mirrored in the frequent publication of financial accounts, which were more representative in various aspects than informative in the sense of a real transparent accountability. However, the many offices mentioned both in the literary and epigraphic documents also reflect the constant mistrust in, and restriction of, the accumulation of power, a standard feature and survival principle of Athenian democracy. On the other hand, these formalities and formulas do clearly not carry the whole story, and are superseded in the course of the 4th century by informal power-conglomerations. This becomes very obvious in the elected office to administer the theoric fund and, particularly, in the person of Eubulus who gathered much influence due to his expertise, political skills and reliable network of equally skilled peers. That this did not lead to a one-man-rule similar to the long-gone tyranny had many reasons - awareness of protecting the democratic system, basal functioning of the checks and balances, power-struggles among different factions, external affairs in the second half of the 4th century etc. - but did not hinder a change in the democratic system towards a political elite ruling through euergetism and popular confirmation.

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