TAX MORALE IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

Wolfgang Franzen1

Forschungsstelle für empirische Sozialökonomik e.V. (fores)(Office for Empirical Research on Social Economics, Cologne)

What is Tax Psychology?

As a quite unusual scientific area it might be useful to explain tax psychology in a nutshell. First of all, it is an interdisciplinary approach to explaining attitudes, emotions, motivations, and behavior of taxpayers towards taxation.

“Tax Psychology” as a major field of research in “Behavioral Economics”

In the 1950s, the German economist Günter Schmölders developed “tax psychology” as a major field of research into what he called sozialökonomische Verhaltensforschung (“the study of socio-economic behavior”), which - after the seminal work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in the 1970s - was transformed into “Behavioral Economics.”2Schmölders 1960; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 2000.Schmölders was convinced that economic decision-making is not only determinated by rationality; hence, he included results from financial psychology, social psychology, political science, and sociology into his research and shaped terms and concepts like “tax mentality,” “tax burden,” and “tax morale” - all of which can trigger “tax resistance.”

Under tax mentality, Schmölders summarized general attitudes towards the tax system, to tax liability, tax justice, tax fairness, etc. The perception of unfairness in taxation or impressions of the misuse of tax revenues can generate negative attitudes towards taxation and deteriorate the tax mentality.3Franzen 2008b, 98.It is connected to socio-cultural attitudes, individual traits of taxpayers, and nation-specific political conditions. Usually, tax mentality is deeply rooted and changes slowly.4Schmölders 1960, 79.

Regarding the taxpayer’s level, tax burden includes two different concepts: while the objective tax burden is the actual income loss after tax, the subjective tax burden refers to the individual perception of how the loss is sensed or felt, rather than recognized in a completely rational way.5Ibid., 70.It appears as a subjectively formed factor which is partially influenced by the actual tax burden but even more so by various psychological filters of perception, such as the visibility of taxes, the permanence (“old taxes are good taxes”) or the naming. For example, in Germany people are much more aware of income taxes than of consumption taxes which are often paid rather unconsciously, as an integrated part of the commodity price. Even the name varies in different cultures, as in German Steuer is a contribution, while the French impôt or the Italian imposta contain a rather oppressive connotation. Naming may imply framing: the choice of the name can evoke positive or negative associations and affect the attitudes towards taxes.6Kahneman and Tversky 2000. On framing in regard to taxation, see Lakoff 2003 and Wehling 2016.

The impression that one’s tax burden is overwhelmingly high can lead people to tax resistance - depending on, amongst other factors, the individual tax morale, operationalized by attitudes towards tax evasion.

In the late 1950s, Schmölders established the Office for Empirical Research on Social Economics (Forschungsstelle für empirische Sozialökonomik - fores) and started empirical studies on tax psychology, first in Germany and later in various European countries. Since then fores has conducted numerous taxpsychological studies and widened the research model. More recent studies focused on international comparisons of tax systems and tax culture in the USA, Australia and various European countries.7Franzen, Haarland and Niessen 2012 and 2013. For summaries and reviews on tax compliance, see Roth, Scholz and Dryden Witte 1989, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998, and Slemrod 2018.In this regard, tax culture includes the interacting institutions as a whole that shape the national tax system and its applied enforcement, embedded in the country-specific historical development.8Franzen, Haarland and Niessen 2013, 59.

Tax Psychology in Classical Athens: The Case of Apollodoros

The question of whether we can actually speak of taxes in classical Athens will be discussed later. For now, we will simply take liturgies as a special kind of taxation. This allows us to illustrate a few basic ideas of tax psychology in a quite popular oration: the speech of Apollodoros against Polykles.

Apollodoros was the son of Pasion, a former slave who became an Athenian citizen after making notable contributions to the polis. Apollodoros was obliged to perform several liturgies, amongst them a trierarchy which, as he claims in a law suit, caused him a lot of trouble because his successor, Polykles, failed to take over his duties.9[Dem.] Or. 50.The fact that Apollodoros was liable to liturgies shows that he was one of the wealthiest Athenians. It was a visible sign, a status symbol of the affiliation to the Athenians, and must have been very important for someone newly rich.10Rohde 2013.Even more so, since trierarchies were often rewarded with symbols of glory and victory. This can be described as an example of the principle of vertical tax fairness which demands that people should be taxed accordingly to their financial abilities - only the wealthiest men were obliged to make these contributions.

Throughout his speech, Apollodoros describes that he did much more than required. He equipped his trireme with own material instead of using the city’s. He decorated the warship better than any other trierarch, and he recruited only the best soldiers. Due to Polykles’ failure to take over the duty, Apollodoros had to extend his trierarchy. Though a wealthy man, he had to borrow money for crew and equipment. This can be seen as an appeal to horizontal tax fairness: people with the same financial ability are supposed to pay the same amount of taxes. Apollodoros, however, tried to show that he not only did as expected but even better.11In speeches of the 5th and 4th century, it was quite common to emphasize one’s own contributions to society, in order to receive privileges: Günther and Weise 2014, 70-71.

Finally, we may assume that Apollodoros expected some sort of juridical advantage due to his speech in which he described himself as a good citizen who spent and sacrificed large financial amounts for the community.12Ibid.This corresponds to equivalence fairness: people expect a fair and appropriate relationship between payment of taxes and governmental benefits. Nowadays we may expect some kind of infrastructure like streets, schools, or police in exchange for our taxes. In classical Athens, Apollodoros might have expected the court’s favor.13Fawcett 2016, 184.

These examples show how tax psychology can be applied to Athenian culture - by estimating the subjective fairness of taxation as well as tax burden, tax mentality, tax morale, and tax compliance in Athens. But what do we know about the Athenian culture?

Cultural Background

Regarding attitudes towards taxation, as in liturgies or the eisphorai, we actually do not know that much. There are individual remarks in several documents where Athenians refer to their duties and the burden they represent. Yet, it is not easy to say whether these sources, often speeches before court, tell the truth or might have been affected by attempts to impress jurors. However, from the political and cultural context we can assume certain preconditions which most likely shaped tax culture in classical Athens.

From Tyranny to Democracy

Compared to other contemporary communities, the polis of Athens made a remarkable transition from tyranny to democracy, with the latter arriving during a long process and with temporary backlashes. However, over the years, power had been gradually and increasingly shared among the citizens. Although the criteria for being a citizen differed from expectations in the Post-Modern West - only adult males with Athenian parents qualified -, the number of those able to participate in political decisions grew substantially from the sixth to the fourth century BC, with institutions such as the people’s council, the popular assembly, and - due to the introduction of democracy, mainly by isonomia - equal rights for all citizens. By the middle of the fifth century, the aristocracy had lost nearly all its political power, which now lay in the hands of all citizens. Even citizens from the lowest classes could take office, mostly chosen by lot.14Bleicken 1995, 312-314.Scholars often draw connections between the establishment of democracy and Athens’ outstanding intellectual achievements which led to the “preeminence among its city-state rivals.”15Ober 2008, 267; similar Herman 2006, 84.

Although equal rights applied only to citizens, the boundaries between citizens, metics, and slaves were not as strong as we might expect. Privileged slaves possessed property, could become bankers or captains of ships and had the chance of buying their own freedom (with approval of their owners through manumission).16Hansen 1995, 124-125; Adkins and Adkins 2005, 447; Fisher 2006, 338.Thus, Athenian society appears comparatively open.

The political and social cleavage among the citizens in the polis was probably much stronger between the few very wealthy families - the rich, mostly aristocratic elite -, and the poor masses.17Ober 1989, 202.Even though in Athens inequality in the distribution of wealth appears to have been at a low level, compared to other historical societies, the poor felt their poverty all the same.18Taylor 2017, 243.Aristotle saw “the dangers of a sharp division between the rich and the poor.”19Webster 1973, 120.Although, with democracy, the wealthy had lost direct political power, they still enjoyed luxury and privileges in military service, legal, and political matters.20Ober 1989, 204 and 219.

From Heroes to Citizens

We can assume that competitiveness, often expressed in games, such as the Panathenaic Games or the still famous Olympic Games, played an important role in Athenian culture.21Eich in this volume.It probably helped as a kind of valve in transforming heroic, individual fighters into law-abiding and civilized citizens.22Herman 2006, 258.In competition, it was important to enforce one’s own and group interests, to help friends and harm enemies (under the assumption of reciprocity), and to display status and power. Wealth represented the ability to live without working, while poverty brought with it the necessity of working for a living.

On the other hand, the important principle of being sōphrōn expected behavior guided by the concept of nothing in excess. It served as a discreet, wise, moderate, and law-abiding restraint. Law itself can be seen as another restraint: legal regulations and courts played a significant role in the polis. Athenians are generally regarded as law-abiding - sharing the belief that each citizen had the same right and duty to administer and to maintain laws. Aristotle defined citizens by sharing “in the administration of justice, and in offices.”23Aristot. Pol. 3.1 1275a 22-24.Equality of opportunities is reflected in technical measures like lots, payments, and rotation when it came to the appointment to a public office.

For a state, the territory inhabited by the Athenians was very small.24Herman 2006, 357.Similarity and familiarity were important for the inhabitants. Athenians saw themselves as autochthones, nurtured by the country as if it was their father or mother. This indicates a strong relationship to the fatherland, a sense of patriotism. “The Athenian’s love of his city ... was thus a motivational force that gave him the moral energy he needed.”25Ibid., 359.

Thus, in Athenian culture, competition and status appear as very important, as well as law and morale. However, a change can be sensed between fifth- and fourth-century law-court speeches, with a tendency to rely more on the speaker’s character and his input to society than on witnesses, oaths, and documents.26Webster 1973, 121; Karvounis 2008, 18.This corresponds with Aristophanes’ distinction in Clouds between Old Education with a strong emphasis on conventional and traditional morality and New Education which relies more on techniques of sophistic argument and on training for success in law-courts.27Webster 1973, 63-71; Obryk 2014, 108-109, offers a similar explanation, based on an analysis of Aristophanes’ Frogs.

Tax Morale in Athens

From authoritarian and militant rule, Athens developed into a democratic and segmented, yet relatively open community where slaves could be released and, in some cases, even become citizens. People appear at the same time competitive, law-abiding, and patriotic, with a love of the city. How did they think about liturgies and eisphorai? What kind of moral obligation did they feel with regard to taxes? Can we consider liturgies as taxes at all? And what can we assume about the tax compliance of the Athenians?

While there are several financial contributions from Athenians to the state that might be understood as taxes,28Fawcett 2016, 154-155. Many dues did not affect the people in general but concerned trade, business, or religious purposes; other so-called taxes, like epidoseis, were essentially voluntary donations.we will focus on the two most important dues: liturgies and eisphorai. We will then take a brief look at the theorikon as another example of redistribution.

Liturgies and Taxes: Similarities and Differences

Nowadays, taxes are mostly defined as coercive public dues without service in return, raised unilaterally by a polity.29Abgabenordnung (issued 16 March 1976, last amended 18 December 2013), §3 Abs. 1; Schmölders 1970, 304; Forschungsstelle für empirische Sozialökonomik e.V. 2014, 5.Usually, all members of the polity are taxpayers, and they have no further control over the purpose or use of the paid taxes.

In that sense, liturgies are no taxes. Of course, a similarity lies in the fact that liturgists were bound to make a contribution to the polis. Like taxes, liturgies were not voluntary contributions (and thus not gifts).30Reinstein 2014, 97.Disobedience could be subject to severe punishment by fines or imprisonment.31Gabrielsen 1994, 225.

However, the differences prevail. The most striking discrepancy is that liturgies were earmarked: the application of funds was linked to the production of a festival or a trierarchy.32Boeckh 1886, 533; Adkins and Adkins 2005, 204; Karvounis 2008, 18-20; Rohde 2012, 25.Unlike taxes, liturgies did not end with the payment of money: liturgists were responsible for the reasonable and efficient application of funds. Apollodoros tells us that trierarchies could cost a small fortune, at least in advance payments, and implied a year of military service, in his case even more.33[Dem.] Or. 50. In general, liturgies have been considered a substantial financial burden, Hansen 1995, 113; Rohde 2012, 26; Günther and Weise 2014, 67 and 83.Thus, liturgists, especially trierarchs, faced substantially higher burdens than today’s taxpayers, including physical danger. Then again, there was a transparency in application, as liturgists kept control over their financial contributions.34Reinstein 2014, 96.They decided how their money was spent, so they were still connected to it and were able to shape the outcome of what they had paid for. They even might have been rewarded for their efforts, with prizes and public gratitude.35Ober 1989, 228; Karvounis 2008, 20; Rohde 2012, 27.

Taxation, on the other hand, usually means a loss of control over earned money. This can lead to reactance, a psychological resistance, often causing tax avoidance or tax evasion.36Brehm 1966; Franzen 2008a, 78; Forschungsstelle für empirische Sozialökonomik e.V. 2014, 102.Reactance is less likely when citizens are enabled to influence the use of funds. While taxpayers find incentives to minimize their taxes, liturgies focus on the outcome: it is in the liturgist’s own interest to use his money in an efficient way that ensures the most convincing result. This again is important since tax resistance is often legitimated with an alleged waste of public funds.37Forschungsstelle für empirische Sozialökonomik e.V. 2014, 86.The suspicion that taxes are squandered can reduce perceived equivalence fairness and deteriorate tax compliance. This is less likely to happen when liturgists themselves are responsible for the application of funds. Nowadays, we find less tax resistance when taxes are raised on local rather than on federal level (which makes it easier for taxpayers to perceive how their taxes are spent) and when taxation is characterized by transparency rather than by fiscal secrecy - both qualities improve tax mentality in Sweden.38Franzen, Haarland and Niessen 2012, 65, 146.

Another important difference is who is subject to taxation. While taxes concern all (or at least most) members of a polity, only a small minority of Athenians was liable to liturgies, the 1,200 richest citizens, about three to five percent of the total.39Webster 1973, 43; Christ 2006, 2; Rohde 2019, 199.The actual number of liturgists was even smaller since one was subject to liturgies only every other year at most.40Boeckh 1886, 539; Karvounis 2008, 29.We may expect a high degree of transparency and social control among the liturgists who probably knew each other more or less.41Rohde 2019, 232.

Even the question of return service is not easy to answer. Liturgists had a good reputation in the polis and earned public gratitude (charis)42Ober 1989, 228; Rohde 2012, 27-28; Günther and Weise 2014, 84; Reinstein 2014, 89.which at times could be useful. In that sense, festivals can be regarded as less expensive, less risky and more visible to the public than trierarchies.43Christ 2006, 179.In law-court speeches liturgists tried to influence jurors and verdicts with impressive descriptions of their commitment to the state, counting on gratitude.44Rohde 2012, 28; Günther and Weise 2014, 69-83.In return for their contributions, members of the liturgy class were granted privileges which balanced the relationship between elite and masses; at the same time, the masses used the competitiveness of elites for the benefit of public interests.45Ober 1989, 333; Christ 2006, 157 and 180; Fawcett 2016, 184; Rohde 2019, 229.

Liturgies also acknowledged the affiliation to the wealthiest citizens which itself could improve subjective vertical fairness. On the other hand, the legal procedure of antidosis, by which a wealthy man could challenge another one either to exchange property or to take his place in liturgy,46Gabrielsen 1994, 91-94; Hansen 1995, 114; Christ 2006, 159.strengthened horizontal fairness among the rich Athenians. Finally, public approval for liturgies could result in a competitive advantage - a positive outcome under the aspect of equivalence fairness.

Thus, although liturgies served as a form of taxation they are very different from our present understanding of taxes. Their special circumstances make them very likely to generate less resistance and a much stronger compliance than taxes.

Eisphora - Progressive Taxation in Athens

The eisphora appears mainly as an annual emergency war tax on property, probably first levied near the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, 428 BC.47Thomsen 1964, 145; Hansen 1995, 114-117; Christ 2006, 161.Only rich citizens and metics, about 6,000 men, were liable.48Webster 1973, 43.It remains unclear whether it was a fixed amount or percentage of capital at first49Christ 2006, 148; Ober 1989, 199.or already depended on the affiliation to one of four property classes established under Solon.50Rohde 2019, 190.At least since 378 BC the eisphora was proportional to declared wealth,51Christ 2006, 170.thus highly progressive. According to August Boeckh, in the highest of four classes the taxable portion might have been two and a half times the one in the lowest class.52Boeckh 1886, 603. On the concept of progression, cf. also Fawcett 2016, 185.Beyond that, the 300 wealthiest individuals were subject to proeisphora, a tax-anticipation payment.53Hansen 1995, 115; Cohen 2011, 197; proeisphora is expressly mentioned for the first time in 359 BC, in Demosthenes’ speech Against Polykles (Thomsen 1964, 207); Rohde’s article in this volume.In later years, symmories determined the assets of the rich (1,200 men)54Rohde 2019, 193.to tax them correspondingly. In contrast to liturgies, eisphorai can be regarded as very similar to today’s property taxes, with the difference of the fixed application of funds which encourages compliance.

Boeckh estimates the eisphora as having been rather low.55Boeckh 1886, 604 and 607; similar Rohde 2012, 26.He notes that in the times of Nausinikos the tax burden was higher for metics (a sixth of their property) than for citizens.56Ibid., 626.Metics were also obliged to pay the metoikion, one drachma per month.57Bleicken 1995, 102; Hansen 1995, 119.However, the eisphora heightened pressures on the wealthy.58Christ 2006, 162.

Theorikon

Originally, the theorikon was an allowance paid to Athenian citizens out of surplus revenue so that they could attend festivals.59Bleicken 1995, 333; Hansen 1995, 100; Pritchard 2015, 15.While festivals were produced by liturgists - the upper class of society -, the theorikon enabled members of the lower classes to attend cultural events which provided a spread of culture in the Athenian society. Culture might improve the knowledge base of the people, and knowledge is regarded as an important factor for democracy.60Ober 2008, 2.

In classical Athens, liturgies and eisphorai affected only the rich men in society and allowed the polis to fulfill many military and cultural tasks. Liturgy, eisphorai, and theorikon acted as instruments of redistribution of wealth, taking money from the rich and giving it (indirectly) to the poor.61Id. 1989, 200. The concept of redistribution is also mentioned by Demosthenes and Aristotle; Fawcett 2016, 184.

Compliance and Noncompliance in Athens

Reasons to Comply

Today, contemporary Greece often is regarded as role model for noncompliance when it comes to taxes. In fact, revenues are small, tax authorities are inefficient, tax evasion is wide-spread, and tax morale is weak.62Franzen, Haarland and Niessen 2012, 94-96; 2013, 145-147.The main reason for today’s poor compliance is probably the lack of trust in institutions and politicians among taxpayers, caused particularly by the experience of living under foreign rule for centuries.

In classical Athens, the situation was totally different. The city-state was much smaller. Gabriel Herman argues that the small scale of political organization and the special code of behavior created a moral climate that led Athenians “to identify their own well-being with that of the city to an extent that would be inconceivable in a nation state built on a larger scale.”63Herman 2006, 393.Athens was selfdetermined and developed democracy, a political system where citizens themselves appointed their leaders and participated in political decisions at offices, assembly, and council. Thus, citizens were able to see a leader as one of them, as primus inter pares - not as an outsider or an enemy. The people were the state. Josiah Ober calls it the “ideological hegemony of the masses.”64Ober 1989, 332.

With high degrees of isonomia, sōphrōsyne, transparency, and equality of opportunities, ancient Athens resembles modern Greece less than today’s Sweden where tax culture and tax morale are much better, due to the belief of the people that they are represented well by their politicians.65Franzen, Haarland and Niessen 2013, 141.Athenians were not only satisfied with the polis: there are indicators of a very strong relationship to their city, of patriotism, and a wide-spread love of the polity among the people.

Liturgies appear as a civic duty.66Rohde 2012, 28; 2019, 231-237.“Good citizens” were expected to sacrifice, not only their person, but also their money and property. In court, contributions of money “were put in the same category as service entailing physical danger.”67Dover 1974, 175.Even if a citizen was allowed to express that liturgies or eisphorai might be a heavy burden, he did not adopt in public the pose of contemptuous hostility towards the state which nowadays has tended to make tax avoidance respectable. He boasted, if he could, of paying more than he was required to pay […], of being the first to give, and of giving with patriotic enthusiasm.68Ibid., 176; similar Fawcett 2016, 184 as well as Günther and Weise 2014, 70.

Though there is not much evidence on tax compliance in classical Athens, there is reason to believe that basically it was on a high level. All important characteristics of thriving tax culture and tax morale are at hand: a positive attitude towards the polis and democracy, patriotism, love of the city, law-abiding people, morality, transparency69See also Günther’s article in this volume.in assignment and application of funds, and thus the perceptibility of vertical fairness, horizontal fairness, equivalence fairness, and distributive justice, due to the high degree of progression in taxes. Of course, attitudes (towards taxation) among those who were not subject to taxes will not have been worse since they only benefited from the contributions of wealthy people. Generosity by the rich to the poor produced homonoia, harmony, which makes a community strong.70Dover 1974, 177.

Incentives for Noncompliance

However, some argue that imposing contributions only on the rich motivated wealthy people to mask their wealth and shift assets from visible (phanera) to invisible (aphanēs) property that could not be traced as easily as prominently displayed wealth.71Gabrielsen 1994, 54; Cohen 2011, 197; Fawcett 2016, 176.In antidosis-proceedings, visible wealth could prove to be unfavorable. To the polis, antidosis had no negative effect: tax avoidance by one individual was balanced by another one’s payment.

Nevertheless, the tax system created incentives to shift financial assets to less traceable deposits and loans - “the archetypes of unseen assets” which are “ultimately different from all other forms of property because they alone could not be physically seized.”72Cohen 2011, 201.The main motivation for this concealment of wealth was to avoid liturgical service.73Gabrielsen 1994, 54.Bankers offered opportunities for concealment but risked public condemnation for holding invisible wealth; tax dodgers risked reports about their actual property by neighbors and fellow deme members.74Ibid., 55-57; Fawcett 2006, 178.Even the growth of banks in Athens is regarded as partially related to the concealment of wealth.75Christ 2006, 192.

There are reports of bribery, corruption, and attempted noncompliance in Athens. Demosthenes refers to leading men in the symmories who tried to bribe him in order to avoid liturgies.76See Boeckh 1886, 664.While he prides himself of his own incorruptibility, Deinarchos accuses him of dishonorable and money-grubbing behavior.77Ibid., 665.Politicians were constantly accusing each other of bribery.78Ober 1989, 236.Boeckh suspects that the wealthiest men in the symmories shifted the burden to the less rich members.79Boeckh 1886, 623.

Some argue that scholars often overestimate the rich men’s love of honor and that, in fact, bad citizenship was common in Athens.80Christ 2006, 3 and 144.In a comedy of Aristophanes one character threatens another that he will get him registered among the rich so he can “squeeze” him with eisphorai.81Fawcett 2016, 183.Apart from greed and selfishness, the withholding of contributions could also be motivated by antidemocratic and revolutionary ambitions.82Ober 1989, 215.Increasing tensions between the rich and the polis might have induced reforms in the trierarchic system, and cumulative financial pressures on the liturgical class are regarded as relevant for the oligarchic coup in 411 BC; in the aftermath, the wealthy were allowed to share liturgies, for example in syntrierarchies.83Christ 2006, 164.

Liturgists were able to rent trierarchies to someone else who got paid for taking over. However, the severe criticism Demosthenes expressed against this behavior shows that he counted on a moral condemnation of this attitude towards citizenship and democracy.84Dem. Or. 51.7-8. Karvounis 2008, 46.

The decline of silver production, the defeat in the Peloponnesian War, and growing tribute payments put additional pressure on Athens’ financial situation and thus led to an increase in tax burden. At the same time, there was a cultural change from Old to New Education, from morality to sophistic argumentation in court. Above, while in earlier times there was little reason to doubt declarations of wealth since everyone wanted to be rich, around the time of the Peloponnesian War visible wealth led to huge losses, so some declared as little as possible.85Boeckh 1886, 594-595; Rohde 2019, 195 suggests a deterioration of payment morale and a diffusion of responsibility as probable reasons for increasing noncompliance.This all might have additionally encouraged noncompliance.

Conclusions

From a perspective of tax psychology, we can assume a quite positive tax morale in classical Athens, characterized by a relatively fair system of taxation and a high level of tax compliance.

Taxation was highly progressive. Only the rich were liable to liturgies and eisphorai, with the latter increasing with growing wealth. Thus, the duty to contribute to society very much followed the principle of capability which makes for strong vertical fairness. In the end, this should have strengthened the commitment to democracy for the vast majority of the Athenians. The elitist liturgical class was rewarded with esteem, status, and privileges. Patriotism, law, and morale were important in society and provided incentives for tax compliance. No system is equipped with a perfect solution, so there was noncompliance as well, especially in later times, but probably marginal.

This raises the question of whether we can learn from Athens and improve present-day taxation. If liturgies raised much less resistance, why not implement them into our contemporary systems? Of course, we must not forget that liturgies were only one part of an efficient system, and even if we could install it properly, it is not guaranteed that it would work in our systems as we might hope - without the conditions that existed in Athens, a small city-state with small scale administration, strong emotional commitment to the polis, face-to-face contact, high morale, harsh punishment, etc. Some “lessons from liturgies” already have been adopted, for example, a stronger connection to financial contributions in donations and foundations or a shift of taxes from federal to local levels to increase transparency in the use of funds with improvements in equivalence fairness. At the same time, subjective vertical fairness has been reduced by a global retreat from tax progression, while equivalence fairness suffers from widespread waste of public funds. Liturgies might be considered role models for donations of very wealthy individuals, as partially can be seen in the USA, with public gratitude and general approval as incentives; some even suggest it as an alternative to taxation of the rich. However, there are substantial differences between liturgies and donations or gift giving. Liturgies were not voluntary, and the purpose of liturgies was defined by the polis, not the liturgists - both facts are more likely to provide for a fair and reasonable distribution of public tasks and personal means.

Further research into Athenian tax psychology could be promising, both in our comprehension of Athens’ supremacy over its rivals and in improving today’s tax culture.

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