THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF PUBLIC SPENDING IN CLASSICAL ATHENS＊

David M. Pritchard

L’Université de Lyon / The University of Queensland

Lisa Kallet famously argued that public finance was beyond the grasp of the Athenian dēmos (“people”) in the Gedenkschrift for the great epigrapher David M. Lewis. In her view, non-elite Athenians knew next to nothing about what the state spent.1Kallet-Marx 1994b, 229-231; cf. Samons 2004, 98-99.Consequently, they gratefully accepted the financial advice that politicians gave them.2Kallet-Marx 1994b, 233-248.Kallet concluded that the preferences that public spending reflected were thus those of, not the dēmos, but their elite politicians.3Ibid., 249-251.Kallet’s argument was part of her larger claim that it was such politicians, not the dēmos, as Josiah Ober had argued, that dictated the content of the public culture that elite and non-elite Athenians shared.4E.g. Kallet-Marx 1994a, 324-331; 1994b, 227, 232-233, 237-238, 248-251. Ober 1989. In the last twenty five years, the majority view has shifted decisively towards Ober’s position (e.g. Pritchard 2018c; 2019, 110-117 with bibliography).This article suggests that her famous argument went too far. It makes the case that the dēmos had the necessary general knowledge and the necessary understanding of public finance in order to make sound independent decisions about the state’s budget. It thus argues that the sums that the state spent on different activities did bear out the general preferences of non-elite Athenians. In the assembly, it was these citizens who authorised the extraordinary activities of their states and the changes to its recurring activities. In doing so, the dēmos were always well informed of the financial implications of their votes. The council of five-hundred members monitored the revenues and the expenses of the polis closely. Hence this democratic council could advise the dēmos whether extra funds had to be raised for what they had previously voted for. In the assembly’s debates the politician who supported a proposal had to cost it accurately, and to show how this cost related to the polis’s overall fiscal position. If a rival politician convinced assembly-goers that his proposal was unaffordable, he would also have to advise how its cost could be reduced, or where new income or cash-reserves could be found to pay for it. In voting for such a proposal, assembly-goers were therefore making a decision not only on its merits but also on how much public income should be devoted to it.

Kallet simply failed to acknowledge that the dēmos acquired valuable general knowledge about public finance simply by participating in politics. Their constant adjudicating of the assembly’s debates about public finance taught them a great deal about what the state spent on its three major public activities. What they had learnt about budgeting in their demes and in their private lives also helped them to take such decisions. Therefore it is more than likely that the dēmos was able to judge whether a proposal in the assembly cost the same as what was normally spent on such things. This would have made it easier for them to change their pattern of spending and hence what they spent on one class of activities relative to others. Over time, such votes allowed assembly-goers to spend more on what they saw a priority and less on what they saw as less of a priority. As the classical period progressed, they also became much better at managing public income and setting budgets for public expenditure.

The three major public activities of classical Athens were staging festivals, fighting wars and running the government. By the 430s, the Athenian dēmos entirely controlled the financing of festivals. Consequently, a heortē (“festival”) could only be expanded or a new one added to the state’s program by an assembly-decree.5E.g. IG I3 82.25-30; II2 1672.261; Parker 1996, 124; 2005, 471-472; Rhodes 2009, 8-9.The Athenians had long appointed hieropoioi (“doers of sacred things”) and other magistrates to manage their festivals alongside the cult personnel who had traditionally done so.6E.g. IG I3 82.19-25; Aleshire 1994, esp. 14-15; Ostwald 1986, 137-174.The dēmos closely supervised the amount that was spent on each heortē.7Parker 1996, 125.They regularly set a festival’s budget in whole or part (e.g. RO 81.B.10-25, 27-31). The earliest surviving example of such budgeting is a decree of the 460s concerning the Eleusinian Mysteries.8IG I3 6; Clinton 2008, 41-42; Rhodes 2009, 2.In it, the dēmos set the fees that this cult’s priests and priestesses could charge initiates (IG I36.C.5-31). They also set how much of its funds could be spent on the Mysteries (C.14-20). When the dēmos judged that a deity did not have enough money for his or her rituals, they often voted for a proposal to introduce a new tax on those who appeared to benefit the most from his or her charis (“gratitude”). Consequently ship-owners, for example, were made to pay Poseidon and other maritime gods landing taxes (e.g. IG I38.15-25), while the soldiers who used Apollo’s athletics field for musters on the eve of campaigns paid him a poll tax.9For these landing taxes, see e.g. Parker 1996, 125; Rhodes 2009, 2. For this poll tax, see e.g. IG I3138.1-8; Jameson 1980; Pritchard 2013, 10

The Athenians manifestly saw the adequate funding of their festivals as essential.10E.g. Dem. Or. 24.26-28; RO 81.A.5-7; Lewis 1997, 261-262.But once a heortē had been paid for, they claimed the right to spend the sacred funds that remained on secular purposes.11Rhodes 2009, 9.This claim is also evident in the early decree on the Mysteries. It ordered the cult’s hieropoioi to move Demeter and Persephone’s funds to Athens (IG I3 6.C.36-38). Lines 32 to 36 state: “The Athenians will be permitted to use the sacred money of the fees for whatever they wish just as they do with Athena’s money on the Acropolis.”

In the 430s, the dēmos came to realise fully the value of such money for war. Consequently they re-organised the sacred treasuries in which it lay in order that it could be spent more easily on military campaigns.12E.g. Thuc. 2.13.2-3; IG I3 78.40-44; Clinton 2008, 54; Davies 2004, 504-505; Rhodes 2013, 213, 229; Samons 2000, 135-136, 294; cf. Dem. Or. 22.69-78.In a decree of 432/431 or a bit later they created a new board of five epistatai (“supervisors”) to take over responsibility for Demeter and Persephone’s funds on the Acropolis.13IG I3 32.9-11; Clinton 2008, 53-54; Rhodes 2009, 4. For the decree’s date, see now Clinton 2009, 53; Rhodes 2008, 501, 505.This decree ordered the collection of all debts that were owed to the Two Goddesses and an audit of what their worship cost (ll. 14-30). Earlier, in 434/433, the dēmos passed a decree which consolidated the funds of the other deities - with the exception of Athena’s - into one sacred treasury on the Acropolis.14IG I3 52A; Clinton 2008, 54; Linders 1975, 38-57; Rhodes 2013, 213-214.It created a board of tamiai (“treasurers”) to administer this new sacred treasury (IG I3 52A.A.13-15). Their first duty was to calculate how much they had by counting or, in the case of uncoined bullion, weighing what had been collected from Attica’s sanctuaries (A.22-25). For each year which followed, the tamiai were ordered to publish in stone the yearly income of these other gods, what had been spent on their worship and what cash was left over (A.25-27; cf. IG I3 383). It was this re-organisation of sacred treasuries in the lead-up to the Peloponnesian War that enabled Pericles to tell the dēmos how much money they could spend to fund the war (Thuc. 2.13.3-6). This war’s first decade used up these cash-reserves almost entirely (IG I3 369).15Pritchard 2019, 158-168.

The Athenian dēmos had no less control over public spending on the armed forces. From at least the later fifth century they likewise authorised what would be spent on war’s capital costs, fixed-operating costs and variable-operating costs. Whether warships would be built and, if so, how many, consequently came down to their vote.16E.g. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 46.1; Thuc. 8.1.3; Xen. Hell. 5.4.34-35; Gabrielsen 1994, 134-136.Assembly-decrees were also required for spending on the dockyards and other military capital (e.g. IG I352A.A.30-32). In the same vein, the dēmos set the misthos of the cavalry-corps (e.g. Lys. fr. 130.73-82 Carey), which was the army’s costliest recurring cost.17Pritchard 2018b, 445-446.The expedition that Athens sent to Sicily in 416/415 illustrates how assembly-goers sought to control the cost of each campaign. With this expedition they may have given their generals the power to work out its requirements (Thuc. 6.26.1), but they still passed a decree on its size and budget.18IG I3 93.7, 12-13, 47-49; Thuc. 6.43.1; Blamire 2001, 114; Samons 2000, 239.As this expedition went, unfortunately, from bad to worse, repeated votes were taken on committing extra resources (Thuc. 6.94.4; 7.16.2). In approving a campaign, the Athenian people sometimes stipulated which funds should be tapped for it (e.g. IG I393.10-17). In 407/406, for instance, a new fleet had to be raised quickly in order to rescue Conon’s warships, which the Spartans had trapped in Mytilene’s harbour (Xen. Hell. 1.6.15-24). In order to pay for it, the dēmos voted to coin the last of the bullion, including Athena’s statues, in the sacred treasuries.19E.g. Hellanicus FGrH 323a F26; Blamire 2001, 121.

Ancient writers made leading politicians of classical Athens responsible for introducing or increasing misthos for different types of political participation: Pericles, they wrote, introduced jury pay, and Cleon raised it, while assembly pay was introduced by Agyrrhius and raised by Heraclides and Agyrrhius again.20On Pericles, see e.g. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 27.1-4; Aristot. Pol. 1274a 8-9; Pl. Grg. 515e; Plut. Per. 9.1-3. On Cleon, see e.g. Pritchard 2015, 53-54. On Agyrrhius and Heraclides, see e.g. Aristoph. Eccl. 184-186, 300-301; [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 41.3.These payments would have affected quite significantly public finance and so would have required the assembly’s approval. Pericles and other politicians were presumably remembered for proposing, and arguing for, the decree or the law that authorised each change to the misthophoria (“receipt of pay”) for politics.21On the innovativeness of the introduction of misthophoria for political participation by fifthcentury Athens, see e.g. Pritchard 2015, 7-8.

The Athenian dēmos may have controlled public spending but the day-to-day oversight of it fell to their council of five-hundred members.22Migeotte 2014, 426; Ober 2015, 496; Pébarthe 2008, 66; Rhodes 1972, 88-113.In his famous treatise on the Athenian constitution, Aristotle’s pupil explains how this council “administers together with the other magistrates most financial matters.”23[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.1. In the Roman Republic the Senate had a comparable financial role (Pol. 6.31.1; Norena 2011, 250).In the 320s, when he wrote his treatise, the boulē (“council”) oversaw both income and expenditure. Consequently, Athena’s tamiai took over the money from their predecessors in the council’s presence ([Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.1; cf. 44.1). In classical Athens it was the pōlētai (“sellers”) who auctioned, among other items, the leases of public lands and silver-mines, the contracts for tax-collecting and the property of defendants that the law-courts had confiscated.24E.g. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.2; IG I3 84.14-18; Rhodes 2013, 209.In the later fourth century, these auctions were conducted before the boulē, which apparently chose the winning bids.25[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 47.2; Rhodes 1981, 553.The council also held the records of the instalments that the winners had to pay (47.5). Instalments were consequently paid to the apodektai (“receivers”), who were chiefly responsible for collecting the state’s income, in the bouleutērion or council-chamber.26For the apodektai, see e.g. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 48.1; Rhodes 2013, 210; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 82-83.The boulē of the 320s, finally, ensured that the revenue so raised was allocated to the magistrates in charge of the funds for different public activities and spent only on what the dēmos had authorised (45.2; 48.2-3).

This financial oversight by the democratic council clearly went back to the fifth century. The hieropoioi, for example, who managed the treasury of the Two Goddesses from the 460s, and the epistatai who replaced them in the 430s, worked under this council’s supervision.27IG I3 32.14-15, 27-29; 78.40-42; cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.2.The fifth-century boulē likewise supervised the treasurers of the other gods (IG I352A.A.9-12). Before this last board was created, the council even appointed some of its own members as the treasurers of various gods.28IG I3 82.19-25; 138.9-12; Rhodes 1972, 95.In the fifth century, the pōlētai similarly took bids from prospective tax-collectors before the boulē (And. 1.134). By the 430s, the council worked closely with the apodektai and the hellēnotamiai (“treasurers of Greece”), who administered the imperial treasury.29For the hellēnotamiai and the imperial treasury, see e.g. IG I3 52A.A.6-7, 9-12; Rhodes 1972, 102; 2013, 210, 213-214.At this time the kōlakretai (“ham-collectors”) were “the principal spending officers of the Athenian state” and usually drew their funds from the state’s secular treasury.30Kallet-Marx 1994b, 246-247; Rhodes 2013, 209, where they are so described.The council probably supervised this financial board as well.31Rhodes 1972, 104.The empire’s subjects handed over their annual tribute in the Athenian bouleutērion.32[Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.2; IG I3 34.5-11, 16-18.Likewise, the boulē of the 420s made sure that magistrates did not misappropriate public funds (e.g. Antiph. 6.12, 35, 45, 49).33This was part of the elaborate efforts of the Athenian dēmos to stop such wrongdoing (Pritchard 2014, 5-10).

The council of five hundred met on no less than 275 days per year.34Hansen 1991, 250-251.Public finance was apparently discussed in almost all of its meetings. In his Constitution of the Athenians, Pseudo-Xenophon made “provision of money” second only to the “the war” in his list of the matters on which the boulē always deliberated (3.2). In particular, it was responsible for making sure that there was always enough income to cover expenditure (e.g. Aristoph. Eq. 773-776; Lys. 30.22). What allowed it to fulfil this responsibility was its supervision of the state’s treasurers and other financial magistrates.35Rhodes 1972, 104-105.Each of these financial boards may have managed an important aspect of public finance. But the bouleutai (“councillors”) oversaw all aspects and so could form “a global view” of the state’s fiscal position.36Pébarthe 2006, 37.P. J. Rhodes writes: “Only the boulē had access to the information which would show whether the city could afford some new charge on its resources, and this must have been the reason for the boulē’s financial predominance.”37Rhodes 1972, 105.

In Athenian democracy, the council drafted the probouleumata (“preliminary proposals”) that the assembly debated and voted on.38E.g. [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 44.4; 45.4; Hansen 1991, 255-257; Rhodes 1981, 543-544.A probouleuma could range from a detailed policy-proposal to a simple order for the assembly to debate and to vote on a matter. The dēmos was free to accept, modify or reject such a proposal.39Davies 1978, 66-68.But it was “a fundamental principle of Athenian democracy” that they could consider only a matter for which there was a probouleuma.40E.g. Dem. Or. 22.5, 25; Hansen 1991, 138-140. Quotation from ibid., 138.This meant that if bouleutai were concerned about a funding shortfall they could bring it to the people’s attention and propose a way to meet it.41Kallet-Marx 1994b, 229.With the decree of 425/424 that trebled the phoros (“tribute”), they did just this (IG I371). This decree put the boulē at the centre of a rigorous new process for assessing the higher phoros that each of the empire’s subject states had to pay (e.g. ll. 8-9, 17-20). The council worked out this process itself (l. 51). It justified this change on the grounds that the tribute, which was paying for the Peloponnesian War (ll. 46-50), “had become too little” (ll. 16-17). Hence, the setting of the assembly’s agenda by the boulē guaranteed that its detailed knowledge of the state’s total income and expenditure fed into the assembly’s debates about public spending.

Athenian politicians also required a good knowledge of public finance.42Davies 2004, 508; Fawcett 2016, 182; Pébarthe 2006, 36, 44; Rhodes 2013, 203-204, n. 3; Welser 2011, 154-220; cf. Cook 1990, 70.Aristotle and Xenophon listed the five most important items of public business on which they had to be capable of speaking (Aristot. Rh. 1.4.7-13; Xen. Mem. 3.6.1-14). In each of their lists public finance was the topmost item. They also agreed on “the facts and figures related to public spending and revenue” which “a diligent would-be leader would have at his fingertips.”43Ober 2015, 505.The overarching goal that a politician should have was to make the state richer (Aristot. Rh. 1.4.8; Xen. Mem. 3.6.4-6). This required him to know its prosodoi (“income-streams”) and the total to which they came. He should be capable of suggesting new prosodoi and ways of increasing underperforming ones. For these fourth-century writers a competent politician also knew “all of the state’s dapanai or expenses” (Aristot. Rh. 1.4.8; cf. Xen. Mem. 3.6.6). As part of his effort to enrich it, he could tell the dēmos which of them were unnecessary and so dispensable, and how the cost of others could be reduced.

The requirement for politicians to have such detailed knowledge indicates that they also played a central role in the assembly’s public-spending debates. Certainly the boulē was primarily responsible for aggregating the disparate data on Athens’s fiscal position.44For the boulē’s general role in aggregating data for the decisions of the dēmos, see especially Ober 2008, 142-159.But it was the public speakers who communicated this financial information to the dēmos and argued the pros and cons of each proposal. Therefore, if a politician wanted to support a probouleuma, or to propose a modified version of it, he needed to be capable of both costing it accurately and relating this dapanē to total income and spending. In response to a rival politician’s branding of it as unaffordable, he would have to tell assemblygoers how its cost could be reduced, or where a new prosodos could be found to pay for it.

This financial expertise on the part of politicians manifestly went back to the 430s. Pericles for one told the assembly the cash-reserves and the otherwise uncommitted public income that Athens could spend on the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.13.3-5; cf. Plut. Per. 14.2). The politicians who followed him sought to win over the dēmos by producing “very much more money in the public treasury.”45Quotation from Aristoph. Eq. 773-776. Kallet-Marx 1994b, 236-237; Rhodes 1972, 88; Sommerstein 1981, 184-185.Indeed the tallying of the state’s prosodoi and the relating of this tally to a dapanē had become so commonplace in political debates that such calculations made it into contemporary comedies.46E.g. Aristoph. Vesp. 655-663, 701-711; Welser 2011, 22-23. Old comedy generally parodied contemporary political debates (e.g. Pritchard 2012, 16, 43-44; 2019, 111-112).In the wake, finally, of the Sicilian expedition’s destruction a politician convinced the dēmos to replace the phoros with a tax on the empire’s trade on the grounds that it would produce more income.47Thuc. 7.28.4; Blamire 2001, 114; Davies 2004, 503, n. 41.

The Athenian dēmos clearly understood the financial implications of their decisions.48Pébarthe 2006, 37-50; 2008, 66-68.Their council had carefully collected the data on their state’s fiscal position and their politicians had spoken to them about this in assembly-debates. When, therefore, they voted to create a festival, to start a war or to expand state pay, they had a good idea of what it would probably cost. Their politicians had told them which prosodos could be used, or whether it required a new incomestream or the tapping of cash-reserves. In voting on such a proposal, assemblygoers assessed whether it “integrated their concerns about the redistribution of [state] revenues.”49E.g. Pl. Plt. 298e-299a; Xen. Mem. 2.4.12. Quotation from Pébarthe 2006, 51.In other words, they were roughly deciding what portion of the state’s income it should use up.

What they had learnt outside the assembly made it easier for them to make such budgeting decisions.50Ibid., 39-45.Classical Attica had an economy with a strong market component in which coins were used to a high degree.51Flament 2007, esp. 297-298. Flament, in this issue, shows how Attica’s silver mining itself bore much responsibility for the monetisation of the local economy.Consequently non-elite Athenians simply had to budget in order to make their personal ends meet.52Descat 2016, esp. 196-200.They participated in their village’s or city-suburb’s assembly, whose overriding task, as surviving deme decrees make clear, was to balance the deme’s budget.53E.g. IG I3 258; Pébarthe 2006, 39-40; Georgoudi 2007; Whitehead 1986, 165-169, 374-393.These debates about deme finances were almost always couched in terms of coined money.54Davies 2001.Most Athenians, at least in the fourth century, also served once or twice on the boulē and so had direct experience of financial planning at the polislevel.55Mogens Herman Hansen makes a strong case that 60 percent of Athenians served on this boulē in the fourth century (1986, 51-64; 1991, 248-249). Because the Athenian elite only ever made up 5 percent of the citizen-body (ibid., 90-94, 109-115), fourth-century bouleutai thus included a large number of non-elite Athenians. In the age of Pericles, when the citizen population was twice as high, only 30 percent of Athenians would have had to have served. Nonetheless, at this time, it still seems likely that many non-elite citizens served as councillors; for bouleutic service, probably from the 440s onwards, attracted state pay ([Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 29.5; cf. 27.3; Pl. Grg. 515e; Pritchard 2015, 7), just as it did in the fourth century ([Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 62.2). In addition, non-elite citizens were no less committed to public service in the fifth than they were in the fourth century.

In constantly adjudicating assembly-debates about public spending, the dēmos also consolidated their general knowledge of what the state as a whole spent on major public activities.56For the general knowledge that the dēmos acquired by helping to run the government, see e.g. Finley 1973, 18-20, 30-31; Ober 2008, 166-167; Pritchard 2010, 33, 47-51.Christophe Pébarthe rightly states: “simply by their participation in the assembly the citizens progressively collected a certain amount of general [financial] information.”57Pébarthe 2006, 37.This allowed assembly-goers to sense if a proposal would cost the same as what they normally spent on such things. This made it easier for them to change their normal spending-pattern because they were aware of what they spent on one class of public activities relative to others. Such votes allowed the dēmos to spend more on what they saw as a priority and less on what they saw as less of a priority. Over time, the sums that they spent reflected the order of the priorities that they had set for their state.

In general, democratic institutions serve as the “transmission belts” of such priorities: they translate the majority’s preferences into public policies.58Brock, Geis and Müller 2006, 202.Two features of representative democracy impede this process.59Ober 2008, 96-97.The first is that in modern democracies citizens only vote and so formally express their preferences every few years. The second is that they usually cannot vote on any one item of public business. In elections they can choose only the party whose platform of policies accommodates their priorities better than others. The direct democracy of classical Athens had neither feature. Every year the Athenians could vote on the forty or more occasions when the assembly met.60Pritchard 2015, 62-63.In such a meeting items were not bundled together as they are in today’s elections: the dēmos heard politicians debate the options for one probouleuma only and voted on which option they wanted before they moved on to the next item on the assembly’s agenda. Without these features, Athenian dēmokratia was probably more successful than today’s democracies in turning preferences into public policies.61Tridamas 2017, 228.Consequently it is even more likely that the sums that the Athenian dēmos voted to spend on public activities were a clear reflection of their priorities.

The loss of the archē (“empire”) at the Peloponnesian War’s end reduced significantly the income of Athens and so necessitated greater planning of its income and expenditure.62Rohde, in this issue, explores this post-war financial planning in detail.The Athenians responded by setting the annual budgets for an increasing range of public activities. By the 320s, such budgets apparently covered most public spending.63Hansen 1991, 152, 157-158.Aristotle’s pupil details how the apodektai, after they had received each prytany’s “instalments,” allocated (merizousi) this income to the magistrates administering the funds for the various different public activities.64[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 48.1-2; Rhodes 2013, 217.In this merismos (“allocation”) what each official received was laid down by a nomos (“law”).65Rhodes 2013, 218.Consequently, the dēmos could change the permanent yearly budget for a particular activity only by beginning the long process of amending the relevant law.66E.g. IG II3 452.41-46; 327.15-23; 355.35-41. On the slower process for changing laws in fourthcentury Athens, see e.g. Hansen 1991, 161-177.“This new system shows Athens engaging in a budgeting exercise, deciding in advance how much money to make available for spending in different areas.”67Rhodes 2013, 218.

This system appears to have expanded slowly, since its separate funds were created one at a time. The first move was the stratiōtika or military fund, whose earliest attestation is a law of 374/373.68RO 26.53-55; cf. [Dem.] Or. 49.12, 19; 50.10. Cawkwell 1962 plausibly pushes the stratiōtika’s creation back to the 390s.Before 350, any surplus of public income at the year’s end was deposited into this fund.69Pritchard 2015, 15.The assembly’s fund for expenses is first attested in 368/367 (IG II2106.18-19), the warship-building fund in 356/355 (Dem. Or. 22.17) and the jury-pay fund in 349/348 (Dem. Or. 39.17). Nevertheless the merismos itself clearly predated these attestations because a decree of 386 had the apodektai perform the same duties as they had in the 320s: they received “instalments” and allocated (merizein) this money according to the nomoi or laws.70RO 19.18-22; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 82-83, pace Burke 2005, 31.Certainly, this was a more advanced system for planning public spending than the previous century’s ad hoc budgeting. It therefore allowed fourth-century Athenians to translate their order of priorities for the polis more efficiently into what they spent on the state’s three different major activities.

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