设计学博士教育中的历史、理论与批判

文/ Victor Margolin （University of Illinois, Chicago）译/刘 越 陈祥洁

设计学博士教育中的历史、理论与批判

文/ Victor Margolin （University of Illinois, Chicago）译/刘 越 陈祥洁

History, Theory, and Criticism in Doctoral Design Education

DOl编码：10.3969/J.lSSN.1674-4187.2017.01.012

一

自Herbert Simon三十年前在麻省理工学院的康普顿讲座首次提出“设计科学”这一概念，这一目标至今仍未达成。社会各界特别是设计教育工作者一直致力于在主要知识领域的基础上严格规范设计的定义，并希望这项努力被社会大众认可。然而，关于这一学科具体包含哪些内容至今没有达成一致。

Nigel Cross主编的英国杂志Design Studies是支持创立设计学科的力量之一。在1996年的一篇社论中，Cross回应了来自美国的一份报告，报告中表示几位设计的同事没有被各自的大学续聘任期，因为负责审核申请的人认为他们的设计研究缺乏严谨性和相关性，Cross在社论中指出：“我们一直认为，设计学科的合理性的认知度和接受度在不断提高，设计作为一门学科越来越多的为大众所知。让人失望的是，设计仍然不能作为一个学术与研究的合理学科被领先的学术机构认可。”

Cross进一步阐释了其对当下设计学科被科学或艺术等外来文化淹没的反对，尽管他意识到了在适当的时候借鉴这些文化的价值。合法性是他关注的基本问题。“我们必须能够证明，我们知识文化的严谨性和相关性标准至少要与其他知识文化标准相匹配”，他写道。

在寻求基于其他文化体系标准的合法性的过程中，尽管Cross没有详细介绍，但他呼应了Simon观点，即设计概念化的方式是值得大学研究的内容。事实上，Cross在他的社论中广泛引用了Simon的《设计科学》。

Cross把Simon的工作作为一个设计科学或学科的先例， 然而Simon的书中缺失的一个论点在于，Simon试图在设计过程中尽可能减少直观判断的影响，从而推动设计作为一门科学的合法化，而这也构成了他的书《The Science s of the Artificial》的其中一章。他写道：“在过去，我们所了解到的大部分设计和人工科学是智力参与薄弱、直观的、非正式的和菜谱式的”。相反地，他把设计学定义为“从智力层面而言有难度但可解析、有点形式化、有点经验主义、又具有教育意义的设计过程。”因此，可传递性和可验证性是设计思维得以实现合法性的前提。

我们知道，Simon在美国一所大学发表演讲时，用工程师群体更容易接受的术语重新定义了设计科学的标准和要求。因此，他在书中用大量篇幅介绍了从设计科学如何形成可以有效解决问题的逻辑方式。Simon认为一个受尊重的设计学科的基础是其逻辑的严谨性，然而这一点却往往被那些将他的学术成果引用为新设计学科先例的人所忽视。几乎没有其他设计教育工作者像Simon一样定义设计，寻求一种可以或者部分可以为电脑所替代的阐明设计过程要素的方式，他在《设计科学》一书中进一步阐释了这一目标。如果今天让他做类似的演讲，那他很可能会在歌颂人工智能和专家系统的进步。他反对所谓“食谱法”，因为这一方法把设计从工科课程体系中分离了出来，他否定了将判断或经验作为设计基础的说法，因为这些并不能够成为被工程师所能理解的语言。

而他所信奉的设计过程应该体现“运行中的计算机程序：优化算法、搜索程序、为设计汽车专用程序、平衡生产线、选择投资组合、定位仓库、设计公路、疾病的诊断和治疗，等等”。

Simon的设计理论是操作性。他对基于数学推导过程的决策策略比较感兴趣。他更注重方法而非结果。他避免把判断和经验作为设计决策的基础，而是准确运用这些特质来描述那些未经系统定义的设计目标，正如其他理论中同样未经系统定义的方法论。他定义了他的案例，将“城市、建筑物或是经济”等，都看做一个个复杂的系统，从而使他将他所提倡的的解决问题的特定方式定义为最合适的设计方式。Simon的设计项目只是一种假设而非实体，因此从其他角度来说可能有争议。

二

我把Simon的工作视为设计研究的起点。在康普顿讲座发表之后的几年里，他的书被多次再版，许多研究人员开始关注Simon关于构建可以组成设计学科的严谨领域知识主体的呼吁。现在鲜有围绕设计学的讨论，那些最关注学科性的人也没有被Simon对判断和经验的否定约束。但Simon文章中对设计活动看似广泛的定义（“人人参与设计，并提出可以改良现状的方法。”）成为推动设计研究更侧重于设计过程而不是发展一个批判性的实践理论的动力。

如果“设计科学”这一术语能够得到更广泛的传播的话，会将现今发生的许多设计研究和设计活动定义在设计之外。如果试图通过科学论述来验证设计实践的方法，将简单地创建一个基于逻辑严密性的层次结构，在我看来，将会成为论证设计作为一门学术学科合法性的反面佐证。

我更倾向于把设计活动看作设计研究方式这样更为开放的概念，而非那种把单一领域知识作为调查研究的主要对象的先入为主的想法。我承认领域知识的价值，但当用过于严格的方式来要求或者定义它时，我们往往会忽略其他有价值的观点。和Cross不同，我不担心“科学或艺术领域的外来文化会使我们的研究陷入困境”，相反，我很赞同那些无论是在实践层面还是理论层面有助于更好地理解设计的论述多样性。

多年以来，“设计研究”而不是“设计科学”被用来代表不同的设计研究领域。它起源于Nigel Cross主编的同名杂志，该杂志由英国的设计研究学会投资成立。《设计研究》致力于把设计发展成一门学科，并形成相关编辑政策以实现这一目的。

但“设计研究”也被用来代表更加多元化的事业项目。这也是我和来自《设计问题》的同事Richard Buchanan和Dennis Doordan采取的方法。我们更倾向于把设计研究视为一个开放的领域，不同的设计思想可以在这里相互碰撞。《设计问题》已经很多年没有发表过基于经验主义研究的文章了，但我们在改变立场以尽可能多地包容设计思想的多样性。

三

到目前为止，关于设计究竟应该被视为一门科学、一门学科还是一种具有包容性的实践的问题，已经对学士和硕士个人的设计项目造成了一定的影响，但仍未成为整个设计界的核心问题。随着博士课程在设计学科的出现，更深入地反映设计的本质以便更好地评估新的教育举措显得尤为重要。学士和硕士的课程主要是实践导向的，即使这些课程也经常包含研究的成分，但设计博士学位更有可能成为设计被社会理解的决定因素，因为它更侧重设计研究。为了使一个研究群体得到别人的尊重，无论是研究人员和外行人，相关产业必须知道如何评估以及利用这些研究的产物。因此，开展一场关于设计活动本质的讨论显得极其重要，这样可以让教育工作者对什么类型的设计研究将被视为有价值的有更广泛的理解，即使这些研究倾向是相互矛盾的。我这里讲的不是追求统一单一方式或研究目标的学术领域，而是承认并重视那些涉及其他产业共享的多元化的研究方法和目标。

我认为，历史、理论和批判主义应该在设计研究的不同领域发挥核心作用，并应该成为设计博士教育项目课程的一部分。在这三个科目里，理论还是最难描述的一个，因为它有很多不同的解释方式。Simon认为理论应具备操作性，包括效用理论、统计决策理论、层次系统理论和理论逻辑。设计理论，正如他所定义的，补充了自然科学课程“在培训专业工程师或任何以解决问题为目的的专业人士的过程中，起到选择、合成和决定的作用”。Simon把理论加入设计科学课程的做法让人把历史和批判主义与之产生关联的同时，不由得不质疑他未交待清楚的设计定义的依据。虽然Simon很谨慎地区分设计科学与自然科学，他已经吸收了这些设计方法并嵌入到设计的技术框架。这种框架优先把系统思维作为一种生成设计项目的方式，并以效率作为衡量设计设想有效性的一种方法。

Simon定义的设计实践和理论属于已故的哲学家Herbert Marcuse所说的“技术理性”，Marcuse说，“在单一维度的思想和行为模式里，想法、愿望和目标这些术语因其内容超出了现有的语言和行为描述而被排斥甚至删除。给定系统的合理性和定量的拓展对他们重新进行了定义”，“显然Simon拒绝把判断和经验作为非量化和不可转化的设计思想的来源与Marcuse的主张一致。

Marcuse进而认为，封闭的理性系统将人人居住的宇宙定义为受制于那些掌握权力的人。虽然在这一点上，我不希望采用Marcuse政治辩论的全部力量，但我确实想指出他的批判与历史、理论和批判主义在博士课程中的地位的相关性。设计教育中常见的情况是，这些学科的课程是从属于实践训练的逻辑的。他们提供某种形式的学术合法性并适度提高设计学生的意识，但他们不会质疑或者挑战其他课程。总之，他们被纳入一个理性的教学系统中。

历史、理论和批判主义在设计教育中的从属地位，是伴随着大多数设计师在构想设计实践方式的过程中遇到的困难出现的，而不是文化带来的困难。然而，正如Richard Buchanan所说：

“假设是，将一个固定的或确定的设计主题交付给设计师，同时以同样的方式将明确的自然主题交付给科学家。然而，设计是没有给定的主题的。它是在发明和规划的活动中或是那些设计师认为能够有助于其描述工作特性的方法和过程中产生的。”

虽然Buchanan没有像Marcuse那样强调政治议程，但他对设计不定性的描述与Marcuse对如何创造及延续社会实践的批判性反思的关注是一致的。尽管有人会认为，设计师的任务服从于文化结构尤其是工商企业活动，也有人会说，我们还不知道设计内容的界限。正如Marcuse所说：

“每一个既定的社会为了使得在体制框架中运作，都有预先判断潜在项目合理性的趋势。同时，每一个既定的社会都面临着性质不同的历史实践的现实或可能性的质变，甚至可能会破坏现有的制度框架。”

如果我们承认设计的不确定性并接受Marcuse关于既定社会如何排除其他可能性的解释，我们也需要认识到，设计理论最基本的是其社会功效理论而不是简单的技术理论。Marcuse对技术理性的批判为把设计思想嵌入更大范围的社会思想活动提供了基础，而不是把设计想法从它的社会现状中孤立起来或将设计发明的过程单独理论化。如果我们将设计作为一种社会实践，那就不得不考虑和评估它会在哪些情况下发生，而不能像Simon那样将其视为一种自然而然的过程。

当我们承认我们与社会的关系是我们设计的关系的一部分，我们可以发现Marcuse关于把历史、理论、批判作为所有设计教育不仅仅是博士培养的核心地位的想法是非常有说服力的。Marcuse为把历史、理论和批评融入一个完整的设计反思项目提供了正当的理由，这同时也为实践和教学提供了批判性的解释。

作为对抗单一纬度的技术理性主义的手段，他提出了一种独立于思想和实践的主导系统以外的辩证逻辑。历史使得辩证逻辑具体化。辩证逻辑“将其真理性解释为，将其自身从掩盖事实真相背后的欺骗性对象中脱离出来，即，如果它能够将其自身世界理解为历史的宇宙，则其中的已确立的事实即为人类历史实践之产物”。

存在于当前的环境之外历史事件，也标志着人类经验的连续性。过去的斗争也可以成为现在的斗争。历史经验可以为现状提供其他选择，并为固有逻辑之外评估现状提供依据。二维思想对Marcuse而言就是被主流文化抵制的批判性思维。

既定的现实有一套特定的矛盾逻辑，它有利于保持既定的生活方式和那些复制并改良这种思维方式的行为模式。既定的现实有其自身的发展规律和真理；试图努力去理解他们或者超越他们意味着与之不同的逻辑和真理。

Marcuse肯定地指出，这些不同的逻辑不具有可操作性，在面对主导体系的标准时可能会显得苍白无力。这一事实被一些科学家对软硬科学的区分而证实，这些区别经常在学术推广和授予之类的政治活动中得以体现。这也是我们联想到， Nigel Cross在他的《设计研究》社论中所说的那些设计研究的同事被所在单位拒绝续聘，因为他们的工作被认为是不够严谨的。这也使得我们用逻辑的严密性来看待Simon所专注的事，并以此作为评价设计思想的主要标准。

这并不是说辩证思维就不严密。但是，相较于“硬”科学逻辑，历史和理论更容易被看作是“软”思想。与一个体系的主导价值观相一致的思想，总是比那些体系以外的思想看起来更合理。然而，历史可以为我们批判当下提供有说服力的例证。

William Morris的实践，向我们展示了辩证逻辑的强大。Morris以工业革命之前的手工生产实践为例，通过其劳动分工与机械化反驳了工业化的逻辑。他还试图在他的各种企业的工作中使用这种做法。虽然他没有成功改变工业体系也没有使其他选择长久制度化，他的思想依然是对许多被认为是工业化带来的非人性面的批判。Morris的想法经由诸如Herman Muthesius ，Walter Gropius， Ivan Illich 以及E.F. Schumacher等设计界的杰出思想家、教育工作者和从业者的沿袭一直流传到现在。作为一个思想家，Morris对后来的设计师、教育工作者和理论家的影响是巨大的，因为他曾强烈表达对他那个时代技术理性的反对。他的论点仍有说服力，如同我们试图理解当前的技术动荡。当历史、理论、批评处于设计课程的边缘化时，社会条件对设计实践的重要性就会衰退。一些教育家把领域知识仅称作可操作的知识而不是扩展和细化设计师的自我意识的知识，能够使他或她做出对价值观和目标作出更明智的判断。然而，仅仅把判断和经验重新纳入设计想象的领域是不够的，这些素质必须被视为自身权利的主体来分析和培养。

历史是我们共同的经验。我们知道的越多，我们就越能用它来质疑社会的普遍价值。对历史一无所知就意味着放弃在体系之外寻求其他可能以及改变的权利。如果我们确实认识到设计的偶然性，那么我们应该通过承认社会系统的偶然性来强化这一概念。谈论设计的不确定性与将它局限在既定情境的实践中是相互矛盾的。如果设计师想要实现设计思维的全部潜力，那么这种思维必须扩展到考虑设计发生的情景本身是如何被设计的。

四

设计作为一种社会空间内发生的活动，它的偶然性受特定项目的价值和局限性影响。设计是充分复杂的，因其分析往往聚焦于特定实践的必要性，而其焦点研究则受研究整体框架的影响。

设计理论需要承认可操作性活动的技术和他们的文化影响和接受度之间的相互作用。但是目前，设计理论家的群体是支离破碎的。一些人只在社会科学或技术框架内创建理论，而另一些人不管过程只考虑设计对文化的影响。也许在更广泛的设计研究领域内，最有组织的学者群体是被称作设计思维研究小组的一群人。这个小组自1991年以来一直定期举行会议，主要由来自工程、建筑、工业设计、计算机科学和心理学的研究人员组成。他们已经撰写了一系列文章和著作发表。但他们并未尝试把他们的工作与那些从不同角度看设计的理论家联系起来。这种缺乏沟通要求更多地参与到关于设计的偶然性以及产生这种偶然性的社会情境中去。我们不需要一个设计实践的整体模型，事实上我们也不应该寻求这样的模型。如果理论家们更多地尝试以不同的方式和关注点，至少承认彼此的活动甚至是把它们与自己的工作相联系，设计研究将推进理论的前沿性。直到目前为止，这样的尝试还几乎没有，但是当我们讨论博士教育问题时，这就显得很必要，正如之前所说，为了解更清楚研究群体的概要，在此之内规划不同的活动并揭示它们之间的关系。

历史、理论和批评应该是这个群体的核心，不仅是为了促成新的活动，也是为了保持对研究过程的持续性质疑。一个成熟的领域需要一个持续的功能性言语来反馈关于其如何运作的评估。评论对一个多元化的研究群体来说必不可少。它的功能是批判、验证和形成差异与争论。评论承认研究事业本身的偶然性。对研究事业而言，不服从于将其发散性方法置于边缘位置的、支配性的实践理论，是很重要的。

Marcuse指出，“特定的历史实践可以用相应的历史替代品来衡量”，这需要一种历史、理论和批评培养出来的批判意识。把这些科目置于博士教育的核心位置就是承认他们在发展自觉意识与社会意识的设计实践，以及创造一个具有相似性质的研究群体中的重要性。

原文

I

Since Herbert Simon first proposed a “science of design” in his Compton Lectures at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology thirty years ago, this goal has remained elusive. There have been continuous efforts, particularly among design educators, to rigorously ground design in a body of domain knowledge that they believe will insure its social acceptance as a serious endeavor. However, there has been no agreement as to what this knowledge consists of.

Among those who have actively pursued the task of creating a discipline of design is the British journal Design Studies, edited by Nigel Cross. In an editorial of 1996, Cross, responding to a report from the United States that several colleagues had not been granted tenure at their respective universities because those who judged their applications may have believed design research to be lacking in rigor or relevance, noted that We had assumed that there had been a growing acceptance of the academic legitimacy of design, and a growing acknowledgment of design as a discipline. It is very disappointing if design is still not accepted as a legitimate discipline of scholarship and research in some of the leading academic institutions.

Cross then went on to speak against innundating design with alien cultures from either science or art although he recognized the value of borrowing from these cultures where appropriate. His basic concern was with legitimacy. “We have to be able to demonstrate that standards of rigor and relevance in our intellectual culture at least match those of the others,”he wrote.

In seeking legitimacy based on standards that exist within other research cultures, although he did not mention any of these specifically, Cross echoed a concern of Simon’s that design be conceptualized in such a way as to be worthy of university study. In fact, Cross quoted extensively from Simon’s essay, “The Science of Design” in his editorial.

Despite frequent citations of Simon’s work as a precedent for a design science or discipline, what is frequently missed in Simon’s essay, which constitutes a chapter of his book The Science s of the Artificial, is that Simon seeks to legitimate design as a science by reducing the role of intuitive judgment in the design process as much as possible. “In the past,” he writes,“much if not most of what we knew about design and about the artificial sciences was intellectually soft, intuitive, informal, and cookbooky”. Instead, he defines a science of design as “a body of intellectuallytough, analytic, partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process.” Thus, design thinking has to be transferable and verifiable in order to be legitimate.

Let us remember that Simon presented his lectures at one of America’s leading technical universities and he defined his standards and criteria for a new science of design in terms that would be acceptable to a community of engineers. He therefore devoted considerable attention in his chapter on the science of design to forms of logic that would lead to efficient methods of problem solving. Simon’s bias towards a logical rigor that he believes is fundamental to a respectable design science is often overlooked by those who cite his work as a precedent for a new design discipline. Few design educators have sought, as Simon did, to articulate the elements of the design process in such a way that it or parts of it might be replicated by a computer, a goal that Simon advanced in “The Science of Design.” Were he giving a similar lecture today he would likely be celebrating advances in artificial intelligence and expert systems. He denigrates what he calls “cookbook methods” which he believes drove design from the engineering curriculum and he negates judgment or experience as the bases for design because these cannot be articulated in a language that makes sense to engineers.

Instead he espouses design processes that have been embodied in “running computer programs: optimizing algorithms, search procedures, and special-purpose programs for designing motors, balancing assembly lines, selecting investment portfolios, locating warehouses, designing highways, diagnosing and treating diseases, and so forth.”

Simon’s theory of design is an operational one. He is interested in strategies of decision-making that are based on mathematically-derived procedures. His focus is on method rather than outcome. While he eschews judgment or experience as the basis for design decision-making, he uses precisely these qualities to characterize the aims of design which are just as unsystematically defined in his theory as he might claim methodology to be in someone else’s. He defines his examples, whether “ cities, or buildings, or economies,” as complex systems, thus enabling him to privilege the particular methods of problemsolving he has been espousing as the appropriate ones for designing them. Simon’s design projects are simply given and not presented as entities that might be contested from other perspectives.

II

I present Simon’s work as one starting point that has led to the current state of design research. In the years since the Compton lectures were first published, and several further editions of Simon’s book have appeared, a number of researchers have heeded Simon’s call to establish a body of rigorous domain knowledge that would constitute a discipline of design. There has been little discussion about a science of design nor have those most concerned with issues of disciplinarity felt constrained by Simon’s rejection of judgment and experience. But Simon’s essay with its deceptively catholic definition of design activity ( “Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones.”) became the impetus for a direction in research activity that has focused more on the design process than on developing a critical theory of practice.

If the term ‘design science’ had achieved wider currency it would have excluded much of the design research and design activity that occur today. Attempting to validate the methods of design practice according to the discourse of science would simply create a hierarchy of activities based on logical rigor that would become, in my view, an unwelcome reference point for the legitimation of design as an academic subject.

I prefer a much more open conception of design activity as well as an approach to design research that is not preoccupied with justifying a separate sphere of domain knowledge as the primary subject of investigation. . I recognize the value of domain knowledge but when it is sought or defined in too strict a manner, one tends to exclude other valuable perspectives. Unlike Cross, I do not fear “swamping our research with different cultures imported either from science or art” but instead welcome the multiplicity of discourses that can contribute to a greater understanding of design, both in its practical as well as its theoretical sense.

For a number of years, the term ‘design studies,’ rather than ‘design science’ has been used to designate the diverse field of design research. It may have originated in the eponymous title of the journal currently edited by NigelCross, that developed from the founding of the Design Research Society in Great Britain. Design Studies has committed itself to developing design as a discipline and has shaped its editorial policy towards achieving that end.

But the term “design studies” has also been used to designate an enterprise that is constituted more pluralistically. This has been the approach that I and my fellow editors of Design Issues, Richard Buchanan and Dennis Doordan, have taken. We prefer to think of design studies as an open field where different ways of thinking about design can be brought into relation with each other. For many years Design Issues did not publish articles that were grounded in empirical research but we have changed our position in order to embrace as fully as possible the current diversity of design thought.

III

Until now, questions of whether or not design should be considered a science, a discipline, or a more openlyconceived practice have made some impact on individual design programs around the world at the Bachelor’s or Master’s level but they have not become central to the entire design community. With the advent of doctoral programs in design, it becomes important to reflect more deeply on the nature of design so as to better evaluate new educational initiatives, particularly at the doctoral level. Whereas programs at the Bachelor’s or Master’s level are primarily practiceoriented, even though they frequently contain research components, the design doctorate is more likely to set the parameters for the social understanding of design because of its emphasis on research. In order for a research community to be respected by others, both researchers and lay people, there must be some sense that the profession to which it is attached understands how to value and use the types of knowledge the research community produces. It is therefore extremely important to frame a debate on the nature of design activity that can eventually lead to a greater understanding among educators of what types of design research will be deemed valuable even if these research tendencies are at odds with each other. I am not speaking here of an academic field that must agree on a single method or goal of research but instead one that recognizes and values a plurality of research methods and goals that bear some shared relation to the larger profession to which they relate.

I want to argue here that history, theory, and criticism should play a central role within the diverse field of design research and should be part of the curriculum in every program of doctoral education in design. Of the three subjects, theory has remained the most difficult to characterize and the most open to different interpretations of what it is. Theory for Simon is a theory of operations that includes utility theory, statistical decision theory, theories of hierarchic systems, and theories of logic. Design theory, as he defines it, complements the natural science curriculum “in the total training of a professional engineer – or of any professional whose task is to solve problems, to choose, to synthesize, to decide.” The way that Simon has positioned theory in his curriculum for a science of design makes it impossible to bring this subject into relation with history or criticism without challenging the unspoken justification for his own definition of design. Although Simon is careful to distinguish design science from natural science, he has naturalized the methods of design and embedded them in a technical framework of designing. This framework privileges systems thinking as a means of generating design projects, and efficiency as a way of judging the efficacy of design thought.

Simon’s definitions of design practice and theory fall within what the late philosopher Herbert Marcuse has called “technological rationality.” This, Marcuse says is “a pattern of onedimensional thought and behavior in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms of this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension.” Clearly Simon’s rejection of judgment and experience as non-quantifiable and non-transferable sources of design thought fit Marcuse’s assertion.

Marcuse goes on to argue that closed systems of rationality define the universe in which everyone lives according to the terms of those in control. Although at this point I don’t wish to take on the full force of Marcuse’s political argument, I do want to note the relevance of his critique to the way we position history, theory, and criticism in a doctoralprogram. What frequently happens in design education is that courses in these subjects are subordinated to the logic of practical training. They provide some form of academic legitimation and modest consciousness-raising for design students but they are not expected to interrogate or challenge the rest of the curriculum. In short, they are incorporated within a system of pedagogical rationality.

The subordinate place of history, theory, and criticism in design education is concomitant with the difficulty most designers have in envisioning forms of practice other than those that are already given by the culture. And yet, as Richard Buchanan has argued The assumption is that design has a fixed or determinate subject matter that is given to the designer in the same way that the subject matter of nature is given to the scientist. However, the subject matter of design is not given. It is created through the activities of invention and planning, or through whatever other methodology or procedures a designer finds helpful in characterizing his own work.

Though Buchanan does not foreground a political agenda as Marcuse does, his characterization of design as indeterminate does coincide with Marcuse’s concern for critical reflection on the way we create and perpetuate social practices. Although some would argue that the task of the designer is given by the structure of the culture, notably the activity of business enterprises, others would say that we don’t yet know the limits of what might be designed. As Marcuse states Every established society....tends to prejudge the rationality of possible projects to keep them within its framework. At the same time, every established society is confronted with the actuality or possibility of a qualitatively different historical practice which might destroy the existing institutional framework.

If we acknowledge design’s indeterminacy and accept Marcuse’s explanation of how established society can close out alternative possibilities, we need to then recognize that design theory is at its most fundamental a theory of how design functions in society rather than simply a theory of techniques. Marcuse’s critique of technological rationalism provides a basis for embedding design thought within the larger activity of social thought rather than isolating design from its social situation and theorizing independently about its processes of invention. By holding design in our vision as a social practice, we are always obliged to consider and evaluate the situations in which it occurs rather than naturalizing them as Simon does.

When we acknowledge our relation to the social as part of our relation to design, we can find in Marcuse’s thought a cogent argument for making history, theory, and criticism central to all design education, not only to doctoral training. Marcuse provides the justification for joining history, theory, and criticism in an integral project of design reflection, which can offer a critical understanding of practice and of pedagogy as well.

As an antidote to the one-dimensionality of technological rationalism, he proposes a dialectical logic that arises from a space outside the dominant system of thought and practice. What gives dialectical logic embodiment is history. Dialectical logic“attains its truth if it has freed itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind the facts – that is, if it understands its world as a historical universe, in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice of man.”

Historical events exist outside current circumstances yet mark the continuity of human experience. Struggles from the past can also become struggles for the present. Historical experience can offer alternatives to current situations and provide the substance for evaluating the present from a position outside its logic. Two-dimensional thought for Marcuse is critical thought which is resisted by the dominant culture.

The given reality has its own logic of contradictions – it favors the modes of thought which sustain the established forms of life and the modes of behavior which reproduce and improve them. The given reality has its own logic and its own truth; the effort to comprehend them as such and to transcend them presupposes a different logic, a contradicting truth.

Marcuse rightly notes that these different logics are non-operational and may appear weak according to the criteria of the dominant system. This fact is exemplified by the distinctions that some scientists make between hard and soft science which frequently get played out in the politics of academic promotion and grant getting. It refers us also to the concern Nigel Cross expressed in his Design Studies editorial regarding design research colleagues who may have been denied tenure because their work was not seen to be sufficiently rigorous. It points us as well to Simon’s preoccupation with logical rigor as dominant criteria forevaluating design thought.

This is not to say that dialectical thought is unrigorous. But history, and theory too, can easily be seen as “soft”forms of thought compared to the “hard”logic of science. Thought which conforms to the dominant values of a system will always appear more legitimate than that which arises outside those values. And yet, history can provide us with examples that offer persuasive grounds for a critique of the present.

The practice of William Morris, shows us how powerful dialectical logic can be. Morris countered the logic of industrialization, exemplified by the division and mechanization of labor, with the preindustrial practice of craft production. He also sought to employ this practice in the work of his various enterprises. Although he did not succeed in changing the industrial system nor in institutionalizing an enduring alternative, his thought kept alive an oppositional critique of what many perceived to be the dehumanizing aspects of industrialization. Morris’s ideas have been kept alive until now through a distinguished lineage of design thinkers, educators, and practitioners ranging from Herman Muthesius and Walter Gropius to Ivan Illich and E.F. Schumacher. As a thinker Morris has had a tremendous influence on later designers, educators, and theorists because he so strongly articulated an opposition to the technical rationality of his day. His arguments are still persuasive as we struggle to make sense out of the current turbulence of technological innovation.When history, theory, and criticism are marginalized within the design curriculum, the social conditions of design practice recede in importance. What some educators want to call domain knowledge is only operational knowledge rather than knowledge that expands and refines the designer’s self-awareness, thus enabling him or her to make more informed judgments about values and goals. However, it is not enough to simply readmit judgment and experience to the realm of design imagination. These qualities must be treated as subjects in their own right which require analysis and cultivation.

History is our collective experience. The more we know of it, the more we can use it to question the prevailing values of society. To be without a knowledge of history is to give up a space outside the system where one can find alternatives and also empowerment for change. If indeed we are to recognize the contingency of design then we should reinforce that concept by acknowledging as well the contingency of social systems. It is paradoxical to speak about design’s indeterminacy and then frame it in a determined situation of practice. If designers are going to realize the full potential of design thinking, then this thinking must be extended to consider how the situations in which design occurs are themselves designed.

IV

Design as an activity occurs within a social space and its very contingency is guided by the values and limits that inform a particular project. Design is sufficiently complex for its analysis to focus of necessity on specific aspects of practice but focused research is always informed by the framework of the whole.

Design theory needs to acknowledge the interplay between the techniques of operational activity and their cultural impact and reception. At present, however, the community of design theorists is fragmented. Some theorize within a social science or technical framework exclusively while others exclude process and only consider design’s impact in and on culture. Perhaps the best organized community of scholars within the wider field of design studies is a group engaged in what some are calling Design Thinking Research. This group, which has been meeting regularly since 1991, consists primarily of researchers from engineering, architecture, industrial design, computer science, and psychology. They have generated a body of writing which has been published in journals and books. But they have not sought to bring their work into relation with other theorists who look at design from different perspectives. This lack of communication calls for more engagement with questions of design contingency and the social situations in which it gets played out. We do not need a tight holistic model of design practice, and in fact, we should not seek one. Design research would advance on the theory front if there were more attempts by theorists with different approaches and concerns to at least acknowledge each others activities and at best bring them in to relation with their own work. Until recently, there has been little impulse for this engagement but as we discuss issues of doctoral education, it becomes imperative, as I have already argued, to apprehend more clearly the contours of a research community, map the different activities within it, and reflecton the relationships between these activities.

History, theory, and criticism should be at the core of this community, not only to foster new activity but also to sustain a continuous interrogation of the research process. A mature field needs a sustained metadiscourse that feeds back assessments on how it is operating. Commentary is essential to a pluralistic research community. Its function is to critique, validate, and frame differences and debates. Commentary recognizes the contingency of the research enterprise itself. It is central to the enterprise and not subordinate to a hegemonic theory of practice that relegates its discursive methods to a marginal position.

Marcuse notes that “a specific historical practice is measured against its own historical alternatives.” This requires a critical awareness that history, theory, and criticism can foster. To position these subjects at the center of doctoral education is to recognize their importance to the development of a self-consciousness and social aware design practice as well as to the creation of a research community with similar qualities.

（责任编辑 童永生）

Victor Margolin， Professor Emeritus of Design History at the University of Illinois, Chicago.