Difficulties Facing the Arctic Council Reform and Domainal Governance

DONG Limin

The Arctic Council celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2016. During the last two decades, the Council played a significant role in Arctic governance. With the change of world situation and the increasing of global attention, defects and problems of the Council appeared one by one. Against this backdrop, more voices call for the reform of the Council. What predicaments does the Council face in its development? What does the reform of the Council that attracts the international attention cover? What difficulties does the Council face in its reform? Which direction should the Council reform moves towards? The questions will be explored in the following pages.

I. Strong Demands for the Reform of the Council

The Ottawa Declaration executed in 1996 by eight Arctic States, including the United States, Russia and Canada, established the Arctic Council as a high-level intergovernmental forum for promoting sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic region.1In the two decades after the creation of the Council,the international situation changed dramatically, and global warming became increasingly strong. Against this backdrop, the Arctic region displayed its rising strategic significances, and the Arctic affairs became more global in nature, which provoked great concerns among the international community about the governance of the region, and the growing requirements on governance mechanisms. After two decades of development, sustainable development and environmental protection is no longer the sole focus of Arctic governance, since other issues emerged continuously, such as those related to resources exploration, high seas fisheries management, traditional security, shipping, tourism, and the protection of Arctic indigenous peoples. In such a rapidly changing scene, the Council gradually shows its incompetence to address these new challenges, given that it is merely mandated to coordinate issues relating to environmental protection and sustainable development. The Council, as a forum, is not able to make decisions; it can only influence decision-shaping. Without an implementation body, the Council is weak in policy or decision enforcement. Upon the establishment of the Council, in order to ensure that all member States have an opportunity to make their own priority areas and key projects undertaken by the organization, and reasonably share the expenses incurred, the Council specially devised a regime for each member State to take turns to chair the organization every two years. The chair State may suggest the programs it concerns for the organization to undertake during its leadership.2Douglas C. Nord, The Arctic Council: Governance within the Far North, New York:Routledge, 2016, pp. 41～43.However, this regime also makes the Council “project-oriented” and short of longterm strategy, which further leads to the lack of a consistent plan for its future development accepted by all the member States. At the current stage, the Arctic is increasingly viewed through its global nature, and the Arctic matters tend to proliferate in scope, which garnered much greater attention from non-Arctic stakeholders and NGOs. In that case, adopting a more inclusive and open model of regional governance is the future trend. Nevertheless, the “member State/observer”mechanism of the Council substantially restricts the functions of observers, which makes the Council under-representative in Arctic governance and invites discontent from observers. In addition, the fund of the Council is primarily contributed by the member States on a voluntary basis, which means that its funding is not guaranteed under many circumstances. To put it differently, the organization faces problems of fund shortage due to the lack of a stable source of funding.3Arctic Council Secretariat, Arctic Council Funding: An Overview, 16 March 2016, pp. 1～16;Timo Koivurova, Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance, Polar Record, Vol. 46, No. 237, 2010, p. 148; Heather Exner-Pirot, The Arctic Council’s Capacity Challenge, Alaska Dispatch News, at https://www.adn.com/arctic/article/blog-arctic-council-s-capacity-challenge/2015/10/16/, 20 July 2017.In the words of Professor Oran R. Young at University of California, Santa Barbara, the Arctic Council is currently confronting the following challenges: (a) the difficulty in developing a long-term development plan under the existing regime, (b) the pressure requiring the transformation of the Council into a real international organization, and (c) the incompetence to address issues beyond matters associated with environmental protection and sustainable development, given its limited mandate.4Oran R. Young, The Arctic Council at Twenty: How to Remain Effective in a Rapidly Changing Environment, UC Irvine Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016, p. 119.

Facing such new situations, demands for reform of the Council appeared continuously. The reform proposals that have been raised so far are generally described as follows. Canada’s former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, and senior fellow at the Arctic Institute Seth Andre Myers, et al., argue that, since traditional security issues become increasingly prominent in the Arctic region, the limits imposed by the Ottawa Declaration on the Council should be loosened so that the Council could broaden its scope to include security issues, or alternatively,the development of a new forum in which such issues could be addressed should be explored.5Elyse Skura, On 20th Anniversary, Experts Say It’s Time to Review Arctic Council Mandate, CBC, at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-council-20-anniversarylloyd-axworthy-1.3784144, 5 October 2016; Peter Taksøe-Jensen, A Review of Denmark’s Foreign and Security Policy, at http://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/danish-defence-anddiplomacy-in-times-of-change, 5 October 2016; Seth Andre Myers, With Strategic Spillover Rising, Now Is the Time for an Arctic Security Forum, World Politics Review, at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19259/with-strategic-spillover-rising-now-is-thetime-for-an-arctic-security-forum, 5 October 2016.Professor Douglas C. Nord of Umeå University says that the sustainable development issues focused by the Council at present mainly cover health,education, culture and other human dimension relating to needs of the local people,and the Council should simultaneously pay more attention to the issues concerning the social and economic dimensions of sustainable development.6Douglas C. Nord, The Arctic Council: Governance within the Far North, New York:Routledge, 2016, pp. 66～67.David Balton,U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and former Chair of Senior Arctic Officials argues that the Council should reform in the areas such as fund raising, alleviation of burden on the indigenous peoples and elevation of the engagement of observers.720 Years of the Arctic Council: What Are the ‘Big Questions’ Ahead?, at http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/418-20-years-balton-2, 10 October 2016.The Vision for the Arctic released by the Council asserts that the role of the Council should move from policy shaping to policy making.8Arctic Council Secretariat, Vision for the Arctic, 15 May 2013, p. 3.Professor Timo Koivurova,director of the Arctic Centre (University of Lapland) contends that reform should be made so that all the projects that are being developed in the various working groups and task forces do not overlap and all the relevant resources do not be wasted.9Timo Koivurova, The Arctic Council at 20-View from Finland, Radio Canada International,at http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2016/09/23/the-arctic-council-at-20-view-from-finland/, 3 November 2016.Professor Koivurova believes that the Council should also do something with respect to its operating fund so as to set up a more stable funding mechanism.1020 Years of the Arctic Council: What Are the ‘Big Questions’ Ahead?, at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/418-20-years-balton-2, 4 November 2016; Timo Koivurova, The Arctic Council at 20 – View from Finland, Radio Canada International, at http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2016/09/23/the-arctic-council-at-20-viewfrom- finland/, 4 November 2016.In addition, how to avoid the participation rights of the Arctic indigenous peoples being diluted during reforms also draws much attention. All these show that the reform of the Council involves multiple aspects.

In 2017, under the commission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland– the chair State of the Council, the Center for Strategic and International Studies studied the issue regarding the reform of the Council and released a report entitled“An Arctic Redesign: Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Arctic Council”. The report carefully examines the existing problems of the Council, and proposes four possible strategies for the Council reform according to different levels of ambition and different goals: (a) deferred governance maintenance, (b) focusing on the most essential governance repairs, (c) subdividing responsibilities with the Council in the role of coordinator, and (d) designing a new institution called“Arctic Security and Cooperation Organization” (ASCO).11Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, An Arctic Redesign: Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Arctic Council, pp. 10～18, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/160302_Conley_ArcticRedesign_Web.pdf, 14 September 2017.This move shows that the Finland government intends to accelerate the Council reform process during its chairmanship.

II. Reform of the Arctic Council: A Mission Beset with Difficulties

Global warming and the rapidly changing international situation have brought Arctic governance into the forefront of international attention. How to create a reasonable and effective governance mechanism in the region has become a global concern. The Council, in view of its positive role in regional governance, has naturally attracted much attention. Some States and scholars hope that the Council,after a comprehensive reform, may expand its mandate, develop into a central body in the Arctic and further shoulder the mission to dominate the governance of the region. In recent years, the Council strived to transform from a forum into an official organization by taking a couple of initiatives, such as creating the Arctic Council Secretariat, however, there are still immense hurdles to a comprehensive reform of the Council, due to its indefinite goal, lack of momentum and structural deficiencies.

A. Lack of Consensus on the Reform Goal

Currently, calls for the reform of the Council are quite loud. However, there is no consensus over the contents of the Council reform. Because of the lack of a consistent vision for the Council since its creation, the member States have yet to reach an agreement on the ultimate development direction of the Council.Five northern European member States of the Council have always supported the Council to reform, hoping to shape the Council’s centrality in Arctic governance,and further to seek a greater voice with respect to Arctic issues. In contrast,the United States insists that the Council should only serve as a high level intergovernmental forum for coordinating environmental protection and sustainable development. In a word, the controversy between the member States over the development direction of the Council leads to the absence of a clear direction for its reform.

With regards to traditional security, some scholars and officials assert that it is appropriate to include traditional security issues into the discussion of the Council or to create a special organization to address security matters right before such issues turn into fierce conflicts, which would help create a security architecture ahead of time and reduce the possibility of conflicts.12Elyse Skura, On 20th Anniversary, Experts Say It’s Time to Review Arctic Council Mandate, CBC, at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-council-20-anniversarylloyd-axworthy-1.3784144, 5 October 2016; Seth Andre Myers, With Strategic Spillover Rising, Now Is the Time for an Arctic Security Forum, World Politics Review, at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19259/with-strategic-spillover-rising-now-is-thetime-for-an-arctic-security-forum, 5 October 2016.One strategy devised by the Center for Strategic and International Studies is a complete redesign, which calls for the creation of an ASCO designed along the lines of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Three bodies under the ASCO will be in charge of economic, human, and security issues respectively.13Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, An Arctic Redesign: Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Arctic Council, pp. 17～19, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/160302_Conley_ArcticRedesign_Web.pdf, 14 September 2017.This strategy has drawn harsh criticism. The opponents are not only against the idea to let the Council include traditional security issues, but also unsupportive to the establishment of any security forum in the Arctic region. Such scholars generally argue that the intergovernmental cooperation conducted through the platform of the Council has functioned very well until now, largely because traditional security issues were excluded from the mandate of the Council upon its creation.14Kathrin Keil, An Arctic Security Forum? Please, No!, at http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/an-arctic-security-forum-please-dont/, 1 December 2016; Ragnhild Groenning, Why Military Security Should Be Kept Out of the Arctic Council, at http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/why-military-security-should-be-kept-out-of-the-arctic-council/, 1 December 2016.In other words, if we say States have maintained good relations in other spheres, it is because the Council has tried its out most to exclude security matters. Once traditional security issues are involved, or discussed under the framework of the Council, conflicts between nonregional great powers would necessarily be brought to Arctic governance, which will not contribute to strengthening cooperation, but instead may jeopardize current relations. Despite of the relatively smooth regional cooperation in the current stage,whether the region remains a venue for multilateral cooperation and sustainable development or becomes an arena for great-power competition is highly uncertain in the long run.15Jeremy Maxie and David Slayton, Russia’s Arctic Dreams Have Chinese Characteristics, at http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=713, 15 September 2017.Consequently, the proposal to include traditional security matters into the discussion of the Council should be dealt with prudently. Additionally, due to the United States’ fear of its dominant role in the Arctic being impaired, and its reluctance to see its military authority being restricted, the United States insisted, as early as discussing the creation of the Council, that it did not envision the Council becoming a decision-making organization, instead it suggested the Council should be no more than an intergovernmental forum; the United States made it clear that the chief contribution of the Council should be in the area of environmental protection and it declared its complete opposition to the inclusion of any security or military related issues being discussed within the Council.16Douglas C. Nord, The Arctic Council: Governance within the Far North, New York:Routledge, 2016, pp. 21～22.These facts show that it is difficult for the proponents and opponents to reach an agreement on this proposal in a short time. However, if the member States cannot reach a consensus on the inclusion of traditional security matters into the discussion of the Council,the reform of the Council in this aspect would not be able to start from the outset.

The observer regime of the Council has also invited great criticism. When China was granted the observer status in 2013, some voiced the concern that the observer regime of the Council contains serious defects, since its criteria for admitting new States as observers are very rigid, and the observer status is subject to numerous restrictions.17GUO Peiqing and SUN Kai, “Nuuk Criteria” of the Arctic Council and China’s Road to the Arctic, World Economics and Politics, No. 12, 2013, pp. 119～127. (in Chinese)The existing observers are, generally, not satisfied with their status in the Council, and they wish to change the current situation and seek a greater voice at the Council table.18Piotr Graczyk, Observers in the Arctic Council – Evolution and Prospects, in Gudmundur Alfredsson and Timo Koivurova eds., The Yearbook of Polar Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp. 575～633.In addition to that, many States and international organizations (like the EU) have, in recent years, applied for the observer status to the Council for multiple times; however, their applications have not been approved yet. These organizations and States hope that the Council will adopt a more open attitude towards the adding of new observers. In accordance with the rules of procedure of the Council, the reform of the observer regime should be agreed unanimously by all the member States. Nevertheless, affected by their respective interests, eight member States adopted different attitude towards the issue, and it is hard for them to reach a consensus in a short period. The United States is relatively open to this issue. Julie Gourley, the Senior Arctic Official representing the United States said that non-Arctic countries were encouraged to contribute to the work of the Council – the scientific work, the technical work, and economic work.19Arctic Council – 20 Years in A Warming World, Deutsche Welle, at http://blogs.dw.com/ice/?p=17545, 17 December 2016.David Balton also expressed that the Council should welcome its observers to be more engaged in its work.2020 Years of the Arctic Council: What Are the ‘Big Questions’ Ahead?, at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/418-20-years-balton-2, 12 November 2016.Scandinavian countries (Finland,Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) take a more open position to the increase of observers.21Nadezhda Filimonova, Prospects for Russian–Indian Cooperation in the High North: Actors,Interests, Obstacles, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2015, p. 100.They hope this move will enhance the Council’s importance in Arctic governance. However, fearing that more engagement of outside States would threaten its influence in the region, Russia not only adopts a negative attitude to the admittance of new observers, but also opposes to the expansion of the observer’s authority. A perfect example in this case is Russia’s resistance to India’s proposal to expand the authority of observers.22Nadezhda Filimonova, Prospects for Russian–Indian Cooperation in the High North: Actors,Interests, Obstacles, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2015, p. 106.Canada values the cooperation between Arctic States. During its two-year chairmanship, it adopted a relatively conservative attitude towards the participation of non-Arctic stakeholders.23GUO Peiqing and DONG Limin, Arctic Economic Council: An Uncertain Future,International Studies, No. 1, 2015, pp. 100～113. (in Chinese)

The analysis above indicates that the member States of the Council have not come to an agreement on the reform regarding the admittance of new observers and expansion of the observer’s authority. Given that the member States and the observers also have conflicting views over the observers’ status and their voices in the Council, the reform of Council, if it touches the sensitive aspects of this issue,would not contribute to the resolution of relevant problems, but instead, would be very likely to exacerbate the conflicts between them and, further undermine the current cooperation.

In addition to the problems listed above, the Council still faces other problems and challenges, such as the overlapping of the projects that are being developed in the various working groups and task forces, how to guarantee the effective participation of indigenous peoples, and how to find a more stable source of funding. These problems should be resolved through reforms. Unfortunately, the members have not figured out a feasible and unanimously accepted plan to cope with these challenges.

To sum up, the voices calling for the reform of the Council are loud, however,it is difficult to reach a consensus on the contents and goals of the reform. Without clear contents and goals, to develop a consistent plan of reform becomes a tough job for the Council. In this situation, one cannot but raise concerns over the prospect for the Council reform. As noted in the report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “There are benefits and costs to each approach. The most likely political outcome unfortunately is simply muddling through: study the matter and potentially adopt inconsequential reforms out of fear that long-term comprehensive reforms will reorder the preferred status quo”.24Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, An Arctic Redesign: Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Arctic Council, p. 19, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/160302_Conley_ArcticRedesign_Web.pdf, 14 September 2017.However, this status quo is just what the States prefer at the present moment.

B. Shortage of Momentum to Reform the Council Due to the Lack of Support from Important States

In addition to the unclear contents and goals of reform, the Council is also,obviously, short of the momentum to reform itself. In line with the Ottawa Declaration and the rules of procedure of the Council, each resolution of the Council should be agreed unanimously by the eight Arctic States.25Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y, 5 July 2016; Senior Arctic Officials Report to Ministers, p. 80, at https://www.arcticobserving.org/images/pdf/Board_meetings/5th_tromso/sao_report_to_ministers_-_nuuk_ministerial_meeting_may_2011.pdf, 15 September 2017.Therefore, it is very difficult to start the reform process, if the eight States fail to reach a consensus.Unfortunately, both the United States and Russia, two of the most important Arctic States, are currently unwilling to support any significant reform of the Council.

Here, we will start from the United States. The U.S. government highlighted the need to reform the Council, and the Arctic officials representing the United States also expressed support for such reforms.2620 Years of the Arctic Council: How Has the Council Changed?, at http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/417-20-years-balton-1, 13 October 2016.Nevertheless, the United States has hardly changed its position to the role of the Council: it has always insisted that the Council is established as a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. Robert Papp, U.S. special representative to the Arctic, underscores that“Washington remains committed to supporting the Arctic Council as the primary forum for Arctic States and indigenous peoples to discuss matters of mutual concern,”27Kevin McGwin, Arctic Council Mr Consistency, The Arctic Journal, at http://arcticjournal.com/politics/2605/mr-consistency, 14 October 2016.and the United States has not considered the Council as a central organization for Arctic governance. In recent years, issues such as climate change,environmental protection, resource exploration, management of high seas fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean, Arctic scientific research cooperation, shipping and tourism, have attracted general concerns of both Arctic and non-Arctic States.Some States attempted to take the changing scene of the Arctic to their benefits,and showed their willingness and abilities to engage in Arctic governance through many ways. The United States adopted an open attitude to the engagement of such States. The awareness of the global nature of various Arctic affairs makes it necessary to set up other forums independent from the Council to discuss Arctic issues, which, as Mr. Rapp says, is a way to enhance cooperation with non-regional States.28Kevin McGwin, Arctic Council Mr Consistency, The Arctic Journal, at http://arcticjournal.com/politics/2605/mr-consistency, 13 December 2016.In that case, non-Arctic States, which have been affected by Arctic changes and are willing to participate in Arctic governance, could be included in the Arctic governance mechanism. During its chairmanship of the Council, the United States intended to exclude the Arctic affairs of a global nature from the mandate of the Council, and welcome more engagement of outside States in such areas. In the negotiations over an agreement on high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean,which was actively promoted by the United States, David Balton made it clear that the agreement would not be discussed under the framework of the Council.29David Balton made such a statement at the Roundtable on Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Issues hosted by Tongji University in Shanghai in January 2015.It implies that the EU, China, South Korea, Japan and other outside international organizations or States may have the chance to participate in the formulation of the agreement on high seas fishing in the Arctic Ocean.

In 2015, representatives of States like the United States, Canada, Russia and China met in Shanghai, China, to talk about the agreement on high seas fishing in the Arctic Ocean.30Arctic Fisheries Management Meeting Took Place in Shanghai, at http://www.oceanol.com/shouye/yaowen/2015-01-15/39386.html, 14 October 2016. (in Chinese)The United States has also held such meetings with South Korea, Japan, and other States. In order to conclude a commercial agreement concerning the prevention of unregulated high seas fishing in central Arctic Ocean, ten parties, including Canada, China, Denmark, the EU, Iceland,Japan, South Korea, Norway, Russia and the United States, have convened for multiple times to discuss the relevant issues. Sponsored by the United States, the Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic took place on 31 August 2015.Scholars and officials from China, the EU, South Korea and other stakeholders were invited to attend the conference, which addressed topics such as climate change, emergency response, unregulated Arctic high seas fisheries, black carbon and air quality, renewable energy, science cooperation, observation network, and household innovations that promote economic efficiency and community health.This conference is not a Council sponsored event. The U.S. special representative to the Arctic is only required to forward the contents of meeting to the Council.31Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic, at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/glacier/index.htm, 9 December 2016.In September 2016, the U.S. Administration hosted the First Arctic Science Ministerial Meeting, convening high-level delegations from 25 countries or regions around the world, including the eight Arctic States and key non-Arctic States in Arctic research(China, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, Korea, etc.). And the Joint Statement of Ministers was released in this meeting.32United States Arctic Research Commission and Arctic Executive Steering Committee,Support Arctic Science: A Summary of White House Arctic Science Ministerial Meeting, 28 September 2016.As an accidental result of such moves,the Council is facing the threat of being marginalized. Under the leadership of the United States during its two-year chairmanship, the Council’s role in Arctic governance, as observed by some Chinese scholars, was being marginalized; in that case, the succeeding chair State Finland may possibly encounter a malfunctioned and awkward Council in 2017, and hopes for transforming the Council into an official international organization look even more bleak.33ZHAO Ningning and OU Kaifei, Iceland and Arctic Governance: Strategic Considerations and Policy Practice, Chinese Journal of European Studies, No. 4, 2015, p. 124. (in Chinese)All these are signs that the United States is not supportive to the turning of the Council into a central organization in charge of Arctic governance. Northern European States must put greater efforts if they want to reverse the trend.

Notably, upon assuming the office of U.S. president, Donald Trump immediately adjusted America’s domestic and foreign policies. Although U.S.Arctic policies have not been affected yet, a series of statements of Trump and the recent initiatives of the federal government suggest that these policies may possibly face significant changes. On the whole, climate change may not be taken as seriously as by the Obama administration; the Arctic policies of the Trump administration may likely put more emphasis on resource exploration. However,resource exploration in the region faces numerous predicaments, where the most critical problem lies in the high exploration costs and low oil price. Under this circumstance, the importance that the United States Federal Government attaches on Arctic affairs will likely decrease. As noted by some scholars, the new administration would return to a policy framework that is significantly more oriented toward unilateralism and domestic affairs, and more passive toward global governance, which will directly influence the United States’ attitude to the Council.34WU Xinbo, Prospects for China-US Relations under the Trump Administration, International Studies, No. 2, 2017, p. 19 (in Chinese); ZHAO Minghao, “America First” and the Asia-Pacific Policy Orientation of the Trump Administration, Foreign Affairs Review, No.4, 2017, p. 114 (in Chinese); Rob Huebert, What Donald Trump’s Presidency Might Mean for the Arctic, News Deeply, at https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2016/12/14/what-donald-trumps-presidency-might-mean-for-the-arctic, 3 February 2017.Since the United States has stepped aside from the chairmanship of the Council, its support to the Council may possibly decrease, and it is uncertain whether the United States is willing to accelerate the reform process of the Council.

Adopting a passive attitude, Russia does not want to promote any significant reform of the Council either. Arctic development occupies a crucial role in the national strategy of Russia. And the two pillars of Russia’s strategy for Arctic development are: (a) exploitation of resources; and (b) development and utilization of sea routes in the region.35Northern Sea Route Information Office, Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Future Perspective, at http://www.arctic-lio.com/docs/nsr/legislation/Policy_of_the_RF_in_the_Arctic.pdf, 3 October 2016.Influenced by the Ukraine crisis, the relations between Russia and the Western States cannot be ameliorated in a short time. No signs show that the Western States, led by the United States, will relax the sanctions on Russia. Against this backdrop, Russia has to rely on Asian States including China,Japan and South Korea to support its economic initiatives in the Arctic region.Russia’s export of hydrocarbon resources exploited in the Arctic would contribute to the implementation of the strategy of energy import diversification for these Asian States. Furthermore, in view of the huge potentials in the development and utilization of the Northern Sea Route, these States are willing to engage in Russia’s Arctic development. Due to the restrictions imposed by the Ottawa Declaration,the Council still lacks sufficient abilities to promote economic development in the Arctic, which decreases Russia’s willingness to cooperate with non-regional States in economic issues through the platform of the Council. Consequently, the importance of the Council to Russia also declines. Also, Russia does not want to see that greater voices of the observers will be heard in the Council through reforms, out of fear that it may be detrimental to Russia’s influence in Arctic affairs.Under this circumstance, Russia is obviously unwilling to support any form of significant Council reform.

C. The Structure of the Council Hindered Its Transformation into a Central Organization for Regional Governance

The structure of the Council covers Arctic States and indigenous communities,and also non-regional States as observers. Despite of the observers’ insufficient right to speak in the Council, their participation is representative in structure.Since some Arctic States intend to maintain the Council’s centrality in addressing Arctic matters, the Council was misunderstood for a while by the outside world as the central organization for Arctic governance. As a matter of fact, the Ottawa Declaration issued upon the creation of the Council has articulated that,

The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issue, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.36Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y, 3 October 2016.

The concrete work of the Council is primarily carried out by its work groups and task forces. Up until now, the Council has six working groups, two task forces and two expert groups. The six working groups include: Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme(AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention,Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment(PAM), and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). The two task forces refer to the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC) and the Task Force on Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic (TFTIA). As for the two expert groups, one is in support of implementation of the framework for action on black carbon and methane, and the other is a ecosystem-based management expert group.

Ever since its creation, the Council has always focused on promoting the sustainable development and environmental protection in the region,37Oran R. Young, The Arctic Council at Twenty: How to Remain Effective in a Rapidly Changing Environment, UC Irvine Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016, pp. 109～110.and has achieved remarkable success in this area. Excluding security matters is the exact reason, as claimed by some scholars, why the Council has attained so much achievement today.38Kathrin Keil, An Arctic Security Forum? Please, No!”, at http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/an-arctic-security-forum-please-dont/, 13 October 2016.In other words, the current criticisms on the Council are caused by its failure to meet the global expectation of its governance function as the central organization for Arctic governance, as which the Council is misunderstood by the international community. Professor Rob Huebert of University of Calgary,Canada, argues that the Council was established as a forum whose formal mandate was limited to environment-oriented issues and, therefore it is unfair to criticize the Council for something it was never designed to address, such as traditional security issues.39Rob Huebert, Evaluating the Arctic Council at 20 (Or 27!), World Policy, at http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/09/19/evaluating-arctic-council-20-or-27, 8 November 2016.In order to become a central organization for Arctic governance,the Council cannot exclude issues relating to security, economy and other subjects.Nevertheless, once traditional security issues are included into the mandate of the Council, the conflicts of some States in other regions would possibly extend to the Arctic, which will bring hostilities between these States into the Council. As such, this measure would not contribute to the work of the Council, but instead,it may undermine the existing cooperation. With the original purpose and work focus of the Council in mind, we may raise concerns about whether a high level intergovernmental forum has the potential to become a central organization for regional governance. It seems to be too “ambitious” to transform the Council into a core entity responsible for Arctic governance.

The observer regime of the Council is another important element impeding the transformation of the Council into a central organization in the Arctic. Since Arctic affairs are both global and regional in nature, Arctic governance will necessarily possess this particular nature too. In that case, from the global perspective, China,the EU, Japan, South Korea and other non-Arctic stakeholders, if they are willing and competent enough to participate, may be entitled to ask for the right to speak with regards to the governance of Arctic issues involving their interests. Therefore,if the Council intends to become a central organization for Arctic governance,it has to address the following questions: How to deal with the demand of nonregional stakeholders for sufficient engagement in Arctic governance? Should the Council reform its current structure and decision-making procedure, by granting the above non-Arctic States formal membership, and the equal right to speak and make decision as the existing member States? How to ensure this reform will not jeopardize the right of engagement and speech enjoyed by the indigenous peoples?The member States of the Council differ in views to these questions, and it is difficult for them to reach a consensus. Some States, for the sake of maintaining their regional influence, are unwilling to allow non-Arctic States to raise their voices in the Council, let alone to grant them decision-making right. Nevertheless,non-regional States are related to Arctic matters in multiple ways, and the Council is not the sole platform through which they may engage in Arctic governance.40SUN Kai, Mechanism Change, Multi-Layered Governance and the Future of Arctic Governance, Foreign Affairs Review, No. 3, 2017, p. 128. (in Chinese)Hence, the non-Arctic stakeholders may involve in Arctic governance through other means, if the Council, after reforms, still fails to give these States appropriate status or role. Apparently, the Council can hardly be treated as a central organization for Arctic governance, if it is neither sufficiently representative, nor widely supported.

III. Domainal Governance: A New Perspective to the Council Reform

As Arctic governance becomes increasingly important, the international community has to face one reality: the region has yet to shape an order, which however plays a critical role in the governance of the region. The voices demanding the reform of the Council raised a lot in recent years; nonetheless,the different points of views on the contents and goals of the reform gave rise to various controversies, which actually reflect different views regarding the building of the Arctic regional order. Some States and scholars hope that a comprehensive governance mechanism, with the Council as the core, can be created in the region.This mechanism is expected to finish its mission to achieve good governance of the Arctic. However, this expectation faces many challenges arising from the problems inherent in the Council and the development status quo of the regional order. On the other hand, the recent years witnessed a tendency of domainal governance in the Arctic, which provides the international community with a new perspective to devising a plan for building regional order.

A. An Obvious Tendency of “Domainal Governance” in the Arctic Region

The tendency of domainal governance gradually emerged in the Arctic region,which has drawn the attention of Chinese scholars. YANG Jian, a researcher of Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, carefully studied, in his book New Theories of Arctic Governance, domainal governance by taking the governance of shipping, climate change, nuclear pollution, fishery issues and the green exploration of oil and gas resources as examples.41YANG Jian et al., New Theories of Arctic Governance, Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2014,pp. 313～465. (in Chinese)Professor GUO Peiqing from Ocean University of China also asserts that there is a tendency that Arctic governance will shift from “regional” to “domainal”, and domainal governance will be more effective than the former in the Arctic, and contribute more to the smooth implementation of international cooperation.42GUO Peiqing and LU Yao, International Discussion on the Mode of Arctic Governance and New Developments in the Practices of Arctic Governance, International Review, No. 5,2015, pp. 69～70. (in Chinese)Notably, these scholars only mentioned the concept of domainal governance, without clearly defining it. Based on the analysis of these scholars, we can draw a preliminary conclusion that Arctic governance covers such domains as climate change, environmental protection,sustainable development, fisheries (particularly management of fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean), resource exploration, shipping, tourism and protection of indigenous peoples. The so-called “domainal governance” means no more than to set up a relatively independent forum or body to negotiate and address issues in each domain. It is greatly different from the governance model which addresses all issues under the same comprehensive framework.

Currently, domainal governance has become an apparent trend in areas like economic development, fisheries, scientific cooperation, shipping, environmental protection and sustainable development. In order to boost economic development and cooperation in the Arctic, the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) was established under the leadership of Canada during its two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2013–2015). Notwithstanding that the creation of the AEC is an initiative during Canada’s Arctic Council chairmanship, the “Founding Meeting of the Arctic Economic Council Scheduled” issued by the Arctic Council declares that “The AEC will be an independent body”; and the AEC also states that it is “an independent circumpolar body”, independent from the Arctic Council in structure and finance,and that it determines its own structure and the admittance of new members, as well as the role of other States in the council.43Scandinavian, Russian, Alaskan Business Reps to Meet in Iqaluit Next Week, Nunatsiaq News, at http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674scandinavian_russian_alaskan_business_reps_to_meet_in_iqaluit_next_wee/, 1 December 2016.

After succeeding to the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, the United States, utilizing its discursive power and influence, diverted the international focus on Arctic issues from economic development to climate change, security, and management. During the U.S. leadership, the tendency of domainal governance in the Arctic grows stronger. The United States has expressed on many occasions that the agreement on high seas fisheries in the Arctic Ocean would not be negotiated within the framework of the Arctic Council. In July 2015, the United States,together with Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia released the Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. At the meantime, with respect to high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean, the United States has also discussed and negotiated many times with experts and scholars from States like China, South Korea and Japan. The “ten-party meetings” mentioned previously are good examples. In November 2015, the eight Arctic States set up the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, aiming to strengthen cooperation between the coast guards of the Arctic States, and improve maritime security and management in the region. The forum explicitly states that it acts as an independent body making its own work plans.44Levon Sevunts, Arctic Nations Agree on Coast Guard Cooperation, Alaska Dispatch News,at http://www.adn.com/article/20151029/arctic-nations-agree-coast-guard-cooperation, 7 December 2016.In order to foster scientific cooperation in the Arctic, the United States hosted the First Arctic Science Ministerial Meeting. At the end of its term of Council chair, the United States signed the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation with other Arctic States.Notably, the United States intends to separate some meetings and issues from the Arctic Council and welcome the participation from all stakeholders. Being cognizant of the global nature of some Arctic matters, as Robert Papp says, the United States strives to set up other independent forums where other countries affected by changes of the Arctic can take part.45Kevin McGwin, Arctic Council Mr Consistency, The Arctic Journal, at http://arcticjournal.com/politics/2605/mr-consistency, 4 October 2016.These initiatives of the United States, on the one hand, greatly increased the willingness of Arctic and non-Arctic States to cooperate in relevant areas, and further contributed to the realization of good governance in the Arctic; on the other hand, they accelerated the tendency of domainal governance in the Arctic.

In the domain of shipping, the International Maritime Organization plays a significant role, and the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters came into effect on 1 January 2017.

Since its creation, the Arctic Council has primarily focused on promoting environmental protection and sustainable development in the region. In May 2017,Finland began to hold the chairmanship of the Council. Finland set four priorities for its chairmanship’s two years, namely, environmental protection, connectivity,meteorological cooperation, and education. It asserts that “Environmental protection lies at the core of Arctic cooperation”. The Council, under Finnish leadership, continues to carry out concrete tasks mainly in environmental protection and sustainable development.46Exploring Common Solutions-Finland’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2017-2019, at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-andevents/451-fairbanks-04, 24 May 2017.The tendency of domainal governance in the Arctic grows further. A governance network formed by domainal governance gradually emerged in the Arctic region. Such domainal governance mechanisms played an important role in pushing States to enhance cooperation to address relevant Arctic issues, and did a good job in this area. Additionally, when it comes to the effectiveness of Arctic governance, a network formed by domainal governance is not necessarily worse than a comprehensive governance mechanism. In other words, a comprehensive mechanism may not be indispensible in the Arctic region.

B. “Domainal Governance” Gives New Insight into the Reform of the Arctic Council

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Council, when examining the Council in the network formed by domainal governance in the Arctic, we will find,with the original purpose and development process of the Council in mind, that it seems increasingly unnecessary to reform the Council into a central body for Arctic governance. Therefore, the author suggests treating the Council as a part of the domainal governance network in the Arctic, so that the Council may work with other domainal governance mechanisms to push Arctic governance to move in a better direction. The work of the Council should continue to be limited to promoting sustainable development and environmental protection in the region.The Council should act as a high level forum where Arctic States, indigenous organizations, and observer States may negotiate over the topics of sustainable development and environmental protection in the region. However, in domains such as tourism, resource exploration, high seas fisheries management, traditional security, shipping and protection of indigenous peoples, it is better to implement domainal governance, namely, to set up a particular forum or body for each pertinent domain where all stakeholders are included. Domainal governance may remove or reduce the compliant against the Council for its limited mandate and under-representativeness in Arctic governance, and also provide the non-regional States affected by Arctic changes with adequate chances to take part in relevant issues. As such, the demands raised by non-Arctic States for reforming the observer regime of the Council would also be lowered.

Under the framework of domainal governance, the Council still needs to be reformed internally. For example, its working groups and task forces must be reorganized to avoid unnecessary redundant work and resource waste. The report prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommends that one potential working group reorganization should be to reduce the number of working groups from six to four, with work focus on Arctic marine environment,monitoring and assessment, sustainable development, Arctic inhabitants and other dimensions. And the relations between working groups and senior Arctic officials meetings should be disentangled.47Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, An Arctic Redesign: Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Arctic Council, pp. 12～13, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/160302_Conley_ArcticRedesign_Web.pdf, 14 September 2017.The Council should appropriately increase the participation from the observers. In fact, the Council has already made some efforts in this respect. The Addendum of Arctic Council Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies, which was finally approved at the Meetings of the Senior Arctic Officials held in October 2015 and October 2016, specifies the rights and obligations of observers with respect to intersessional communication, meeting participation and project contributions when attending the meetings of subsidiary bodies.48Addendum of Arctic Council Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/939/EDOCS-3020-v1B-Observer-manual-withaddendum- finalized_Oct2016.PDF?sequence=8, 3 May 2017. The subsidiary bodies of the Arctic Council are: 1) Working Groups; 2) Task Forces; 3) Expert Groups; and 4) such other subsidiary bodies the Arctic Council may create.This addendum improves, to some extent, the opportunities and abilities of observers to engage in the work of the Council. However, it should be noted that this addendum solely specifies the participation of observers under the existing rules, without expanding their participation right. In this connection, the addendum is in the interests of the member States. Additionally, the Council should find more stable sources of funding, and protect the participation of indigenous peoples. Certainly,these reforms ultimately pursue to drive the Council to improve its capability to reach the target of environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic.

IV. Conclusion

A look into the development process of the Council reveals that it is easier for the Council, if it focuses merely on sustainable development and environmental protection in the region, to get supports from regional and non-regional States and the indigenous peoples, and to carry out its work and attain long-term development.Hence, while a great number of scholars and officials propose to reform the Council into a central body for regional governance, the paper examines the difficulties facing such reforms and the tendency of domainal governance emerging in the Arctic. Based on the examination, the paper hopes the Council, being consistent with its original purpose, will orient itself towards sustainable development and environmental protection in the region, and contribute to good governance of the Arctic in its own domain. Additionally, an order is being shaped in the Arctic,but the development direction is still uncertain; it remains to be seen whether the further order in this region is regulated by a comprehensive governance mechanism or a domainal governance network. The current tendency of domainal governance in the Arctic does not imply that this governance mode will not face any difficulties or challenges. Compared with a comprehensive governance mechanism, domainal governance also has shortcomings. For instance, numerous Arctic affairs are interconnected or intertwined, too much emphasis on governance by domains may make every mechanism work in its own way, without coordination or communication with others, which would not contribute to good governance in the region. How to solve this problem is well worth considering. Keeping a close watch on the updates of the Council reform will help us be well-informed of the tendency of Arctic governance, and provide China with talent supports to engage in the work of the Council as well as Arctic governance.

Translator: XIE Hongyue