古希腊神话的诗歌语用学：指涉性虚构和仪式表演[1]

克洛德·伽拉姆

（法国社会科学高等研究院，巴黎）

古希腊神话的诗歌语用学：指涉性虚构和仪式表演[1]

克洛德·伽拉姆

（法国社会科学高等研究院，巴黎）

何为“神话”？它是一种非指涉性的虚构么？在古希腊，“神话”通常借助诗歌形式，特别是史诗、歌唱诗和悲剧来呈现，本文以“诗歌语用学”为理论框架，来探讨这些诗歌形式赋予英雄时代叙事的表演价值以及诗歌表演如何融入仪式实践当中。通过诗歌表演这一媒介，过去的英雄世界与当下的仪式实践相关联，于是英雄世界被转变为具有指涉性的虚构。这一世界既不是现代意义上的神话，也不是历史，而是以象征以及实践的形式对在场的公民共同体发挥直接的作用。

语用学；虚构；神话；诗歌表演

在安东尼王朝统治末期的第二次智术师运动中，怀疑论哲学家塞克斯都·恩披里可（Sextus Empiricus）似乎给神话下了一个现代的定义：历史（historía）是对已经发生的事情（gegonóta）即真实事件的展示（ékthesis），与之相对的是神话（mûthos），后者所展示出的行动并非已经发生，而是“虚假的”（pragmáton agenéton kaì pseudôn ékthesis）。实际上，历史与神话在结构类型上显而易见的对立，以及由此形成的事实叙事与虚构叙事之间的对立，引出了第三个术语：plásma；词源学意义上的虚构，即拉丁语的f ingere，意为“加工、制作”，这个词在字义上确切对应于古希腊词pláttein，即“塑造”之意。因此，在“历史”与“神话”之间，“虚构”所对应的叙事，与并未发生的行动联系在一起，但这些行动却像是已经发生过的，并通过模仿的方式得以呈现。这种似真/逼真（le vraisemble）来源于虚构/加工（f iction/façon）中的“好似”（comme si），它将会与（历史的）真实性联合起来，以此来对抗谎言一般的神话。[2]参见Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 263—264；关于拉丁语的类似情况，可以参见B. Cassin, L’Effet Sophistique (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 481—484，有关拉丁语中“fabula”（寓言）、“argumentum”（法律证据）与“historia”之间在叙述层面上的区别，尤请参见Quintilien, Institution Oratoire 1, 8, 18—21。甚至，“好似”在我们有关人文学科领域的知识的构建中也产生了影响，即图形构建中的“好似”，以及表现性加工与话语性加工中的“好似”，这方面内容请特别参见S. Borutti,“Fiction et construction de l’objet en Anthropologie”, in F. Affergan, S. Boruti, C. Calame, U. Fabietti, M. Kilani, F. Remotti, Figures de l’humain. Les Représentations de l’anthropologie (Paris: Éditions de l’ehess, 2003), 88—99。

1. 作为表现式文学创作的虚构[3]原文使用“po(i)étique”一词，一语双关，“poétique”指诗学、文学创作，“poïétique”又暗指柏拉图《会饮》中所指的导向创作的内在动因。—译注

然而，就算此后虚构被“plásma”和“mûthos”所共享，实际上这种叙事性的创作，其概念本身，从根本上讲符合了亚里士多德的诗学概念。诗的技艺“tékhne poietiké”被他定义为“mímesis”，是用韵文即悲剧或者英雄叙述诗，来展现戏剧行动的艺术；与柏拉图将“mímesis”定义为模拟或幻影（simulacres）所不同的是，他认为悲剧和喜剧建立在“mûthos”之上；这个在古风时代被理解为“灵验的话语”（discours eff icace）的概念，在《诗学》中则被认为是“各种行动的聚合” （súnthesis ou sústasis tôn pragmáton），也就是“情节”。[4]Aristote, Poétique 6, 1449b 24—27（“悲剧所表现的是高贵的行为，并通过高雅的语言来呈现”）以及23, 1459a 17—21（“叙述艺术”，作为一种韵文形式的模仿艺术，在于“如同像悲剧中那样来组织戏剧性的故事情节”）；关于《诗学》对“mûthos”（神话传说）的接受，参见：Aristote, Poétique 6, 1450a 22—23以及29—34；试比较：P. Ricœur, Temps et Récit. Tome I (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1983), 55—84，他十分细致地对作为诗歌组织架构的“mímesis”中的神话传说的嵌套做出了分析，同时也分析了柏拉图作品中的伪装叙事，参见J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la Fiction? (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999), 42—60。因此，叙述里的虚构/加工被认为是通过词语来进行的表现。

1.1 在诗歌与历史之间

不过，在古希腊的诗歌形式中，排除了所有音乐性表演的维度，排除了mélos（它包含了与仪式实践有关的各种诗歌形式）之后，亚里士多德概念里的诗歌艺术便是纯叙事性的了。[5]参见F. Dupont, Aristote ou le vampire du Théâtre Occidental (Paris: Aubier, 2007), 39—77。而历史也在其中有着一席之地，但却是作为反题！众所周知，这个将两者对立的观点，历来被援引与评注甚多：“诗人的工作，不是述说将要发生的事情（tà ginómena），而是那些根据逼真性或者必然性会发生的事情（katà tò eikòs è tò anagkaîon）。实际上，历史学家和诗人是不同的（……）前者述说已经发生的事情，后者述说可能发生的事情。这就是为什么诗歌与历史相比，是一种更哲学更崇高的技艺。诗歌叙述的是普遍的事情，历史讲述的则是个别事件。”[6]Aristote, Poétique 9, 1451a36—b11以及1451b27—32，可以同时阅读笔者所做的评论，C. Calame, Pratiques Poétiques de la Mémoire. Représentations de l’espace-temps en Grèce Ancienne (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 61—64；另参见B. Boulay, “Histoire et Narrativité. Autour des Chapitres 9 et 23 de la Poétique d’Aristote”, Lallies 26 (2006): 171—179；有关“pláttein”与“mímesis”的关系，参见A. Ford, The Origins of Criticism. Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece (Princeton —Oxford: Princeton Unversity Press, 2002), 229—233。因此这将又是一个明确无疑的二元对立？一方面是事实的叙事，另一方面则是虚构的叙事？历史由特殊（事件）构成，它述说的是一个个事件，而诗歌则述说神话的/想象的创造（la création mythique），因此诗歌是一种虚构。

事实上，两者的区别要微妙得多；叙事真正的价值并没有被揭示出来。事实与捏造并不矛盾，事实与似真/逼真（le vraisemblable）相对，或者说与必然以及模仿性的加工技艺相对。然而，正如笔者在别处所示，人们绝口不提亚里士多德之于诗（戏剧）与历史之典型差异所做出的评论：如果韵文与散文这两种聚合（composition，或译为“创作”）形式之间固有的差别无法区分诗人与史家，那么诗人也可以表现已经发生的行动（genómena），而这本来是史家的任务。如果诗人的技艺真的是模仿性的，如果诗人的任务是对行动加以聚合（composer［poieîn］），那么没有什么能阻止他将（已经发生的）事件嵌入其叙事中，只要这些事件处于似真的、可能发生的层面。一旦被叙述的行动符合叙事的模仿技艺的两个方面，诗人与史家的角色就要重新分配了。因此，归根结底，在古典时代的希腊诗学家看来，诗歌的功能具有两方面：聚合与加工，这种功能将虚构叙事与事实叙事之间的差别变得含糊不清并易受影响，而我们则一直想要区分这种差别。在古典时代的希腊人看来，借助文学创作（po(i)étique）的加工，将捏造变为真实的任务，正属于逼真性或可能性，以及潜在性；这是一种并非经验论与事实性的真实，这种真实是所有“神话”叙事中的真实：从荷马史诗到英雄史诗的最终形式即阿提卡悲剧。

1.2 从似真/逼真到政治功用

诗歌与模仿对上述转变的操作，恰恰存在于手艺人的加工技艺当中；在亚里士多德限制性的叙事视角中，正是代表性的“poieîn”造就了行动的聚合与安排（súnthesis et sústasis tôn pragmáton），并赋予了“mûthos”叙事意义上的“情节”这一含义。然而，尽管这种叙事逻辑的观点似乎并不意味着叙事层面的“pláttein”（塑造），但由该动词引出的名词（plasma—译按）早已被挽歌诗人色诺芬尼（Xénophane）所使用。这位来自科勒丰（Colophon）的充满批判性的诗人被誉为“前苏格拉底”哲人，这位诗人对诗歌的批评先于柏拉图一个多世纪；事实上，他还揭示出，荷马与赫西奥德这两位神学诗人所做的，是将那些受到谴责的行为归属于神。但他也谴责在会饮上吟诵那些包含泰坦、巨人和人马故事的史诗叙事，这位哲人—诗人所指责的“古人的虚构”（plásmata tôn protéron），并非因为它们出现在奥林坡斯众神时代之前，具有残暴特征而不真实，而是因为在那些叙事中“没什么有用的（“rien d’utile”）。[7]Xénophane frr. 15与13—24 Gentili-Prato；对于叙述加工与诗歌的“poieîn”之间的亲属关系，参见C. Calame, Mythe et Histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie (Lausanne: Payot, 1996), 29—30,以及C. Calame, Poétique des Mythes dans la Grèce Antique (Paris: Hachette, 2000), 38—42。在宴饮的时候，人们应该在纯粹的叙事或是歌颂的话语（mûthoi）中歌唱神以及有福之人（即英雄），以此来宣扬神与英雄各自的美名。“mûthos”这一术语在此便具有其经典的含义，即具有观点的（有时也是叙事性的）话语，这具有强烈的语用学特质，动词“humneîn”（歌唱）的用法涉及宗教仪式上歌颂性叙事严格的诗歌与歌唱形式。[8]相关参考书目见拙著C. Calame, Mythe et Histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie, 29 n. 33。笔者将在下文提到，正是通过其诗歌形式，“虚构”的叙事获得了其语用学效力，一种既是政治的又是社会的功用。

然而，面对表达观点的叙事，在这一选择中，似真性的标准和功用性的标准结合在一起，无论在哲学中，还是在整个修辞传统中都是决定性的，这种情况一直持续到第二次智术师时代。修辞技艺的传授，有赖于一系列准备活动，埃里乌斯·特翁（Aelius Théon）便留给我们的一本名为《准备活动》（Progymnasmata，直译“热身练习”，是专门为学习修辞设计的—译注）的教科书。这位亚历山大里亚的修辞学家，仅用“mûthos”这一术语指称动物类的寓言，而直接将“叙事”（diégema）等同于讲述神与英雄人物的故事。为了使修辞练习恰如其分，寓言将是年轻演讲者创作（plásai）的主题；这位修辞学家所编订的练习，要么受到古人集体创作的寓言集的启发，要么就是受到那些口耳相传的寓言故事的启发。尽管寓言有时是捏造的、不可能的，它们却能够令人信服并因此而有用（pithanà kaì ophélima）。对于那些“神话性质的叙事”（muthikaì diegéseis）以及在我们看来好像是“神话”（“mythes”）的叙事也是如此。如果它们显得像是捏造的或是不可能的，那么就需要批评性地审视叙述的主角、主角的行为、发生的地点、所处的时间、表达方式以及原因。如若美迪亚杀害她自己的孩子的叙事不能让人信服，那便是因为上述各方面都显得不逼真（ouk eikós）。在这位修辞学家看来，希罗多德便是如此操作，神话叙事把多多纳神谕的起源归于埃及的鸽子，而希罗多德则认为这些鸽子其实是忒拜的少女，即那些女祭司；柏拉图在《费德若篇》的开头也是如此，他借苏格拉底之口，把伯瑞阿斯（北风之神—译按）追求奥莱推亚（雅典早期国王厄瑞特乌斯之女—译按）的故事归结为是北风呼啸，这北风刮倒了一位正在和同伴玩耍的少女。[9]Aelius Théon, Progymnasmata 75, 9—76,16与93, 5—96, 10；提及的另外两个例子参见Hérodote 2, 52—57以及Platon, Phèdre 229c：一个被认为是“真实”（alethés）的“神话故事”（muthológema）！

用似真性来赋予英雄传说的主角们及其行为某种语用学含义的下一位古人是公元前4世纪的历史学家埃佛鲁斯（Éphore）。例如，这位历史编纂者认为盘踞在德尔菲神庙的大蛇皮同是具有动物般狂暴的人物形象，再比如他把巨人提提俄斯看成一位古老君主的不公正的暴力。[10]Éphore, FgrHist. 70 F 31以及34（= Aelius Théon, Progymnasmata 95, 23—96,4）。几个世纪之后，普鲁塔克在关于传说中的忒修斯—雅典民主制度的创设英雄的传记开头如此提示：悲剧诗人和神话书写让我们了解过往那遥远的空间，当我们论及它们的时候，我们应当“用理性的话语（lógos），通过净化的方式，来解释虚构（tò muthôdes），并用历史调查（historía）的方式来理解这一虚构”。《希腊罗马名人平行列传》的作者放声宣告了他的编纂方式，其意图再明显不过了：通过似真/逼真的话语（eikòs lógos）的迂回方式来考察行为，以此来穿越时间；似真/逼真是为了叙述和政治功用，从古希腊人的宽泛意义上来讲，就是为了提供英雄的样板。

1.3 神话与真实的价值

特翁在他所编写的教科书里，给那些学习修辞术的学生们提供了很多传奇故事作为素材，在把它们作为范例之前，它们被用在演说中进行讨论，不过这些故事本身的真实性，或者说其真实的价值从未被怀疑过；像美迪亚、皮同或者提提俄斯这类形象，尽管他们面目可怖、行为残忍，但从来没有人怀疑过他们的历史真实性。毕竟对修昔底德而言已经如此，而他还被现代人看作是“事件史之父”，甚至还是“实证史学之父”。米诺斯、伯罗普斯、阿伽门农、海伦，他们是希腊世界形成之际最早的主人公，是最早的航海家，他们意欲将希腊人的影响力伸向爱琴海及其东海岸。的确，我们对这些基本知识的了解都来源于一个史诗传统，这是一个口头传统，通常我们将其归名于荷马。但是，这种传统既提供了知识与见证（tekméria）的痕迹，同时也提供了诸多迹象（semeîa），它们植根于过去那些被摧毁的城邦之中。历史学家的职责（这一点人们往往忽视），仍然是要对这些痕迹与迹象进行考察（skopeîn），这有助于使他们所言更令人信服。

这一历史空间，并不等同于神话领域，也与英雄传奇的世界不同，但却类似于“archaîon”或者“tò pálai”，即一个“遥远的过去”、一个“往昔的时光”。一位修昔底德著作的古代评注家曾给其中这一序言性质的篇章命名为“远古学”（archéologie），正是这一部分，引领我们从古希腊青铜时代的发端直到希波战争的前夜。诗人们与古希腊最早的散文作家们将这一原初时代留给了其广大听众（比如希罗多德），通过他们之口流传后世，在他们的笔下，以及在那些“súggrama”（专论）的作者批判的文笔下，palaiá与archaîa摆脱了那些可能被称为“虚构”（muthôdes）的内容，成为关乎一种历史的、事实的真实，但也与一种被似真/逼真性所重塑的历史的真实联系在了一起。修昔底德的结论众所周知：“或许，在聆听的时候，由于虚构（muthôdes）的缺席，那些已经发生的事情（tà genómena）少了一丝吸引力……但倘若人们认为它们是有用的，这已足够；这些已经发生的事情，在我的笔下将为千秋万代所拥有，远甚那些一时的听众所喜欢的即兴表演。”[11]特别参见：Thucydide 1, 1, 2; 3, 3; 9, 3—10, 3; 20, 1; 21, 1—2，以及那个著名的段落：22, 4，同时请参见笔者的相关评论C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie, 38—46, 46—57，以及萨义德的即将出版的论文：S. Saïd, “Muthodes chez Thucydide”, forthcoming。尽管这将使得人们在以后越来越依赖书写传统，但所表达的内容再一次变得有说服力。如果修昔底德从没对特洛伊战争的历史真实性和那些著名的主角们提出质疑，那并不是仅仅因为英雄时代的行为属于一个共同体的历史，更是因为他们便是当下历史的奠基与缘由：正如米诺斯在克里特海上所做的一样，特洛伊战争宣告了雅典在爱琴海上的相同作为；在当下的历史书写中，这提前宣告了伯罗奔尼撒战争的直接起因。这种过去与现在之间的起源学与语用学的关系，正如我们将看到的，遍布所有希腊人的神话。对于我们现代人而言，由于我们的信仰体系与古人并不相同，我们会把这些神话归入虚构叙事这个现代范畴。

要知道，在公元前4世纪，修辞学大师伊索克拉底曾大量运用当时有关希腊起源的英雄叙事，来为雅典的霸权进行合理性辩护：赫拉克勒斯的时代与赫拉克勒斯后裔的时代，自然包括特洛伊战争，随着时间的推移，还包括父辈所谓的“palaiá”所处的希波战争。在《泛雅典娜节颂词》（Panégyrique）这部有关历史上雅典美德的作品中，演讲家甚至提到了众神时代。实际上，这篇针对雅典这座“最古老的”（arkhaiotáte）希腊城邦的颂词不啻为对于起源的种种暗示；伴随着泛希腊的追求，雅典文明正好吻合了农神德墨忒尔的出现。德墨忒尔出现在阿提卡并被接受，是由于寻找女儿珀尔塞福涅的缘故，这位谷物农事之神不仅答应教会雅典人农耕，更是教会了他们厄琉息斯秘仪，以此期盼一种更美好的生活，以及在此之上的幸福。[12]Isocrate, Panégyrique 26—33；雅典演说家们关于“神话传说”的用法，请参见笔者在1998年所汇集的大量例证和评论，C. Calame, “Mûthos, Lógos et Histoire. Usages du Passé Héroïque dans la Rhétorique Grecque”, L’Homme 147 (1998): 134—142。我们能质疑这一叙事吗？我们能怀疑它吗？伴随着对德墨忒尔之福的记忆，荣耀归于雅典人，并被注入了一个有关“arkhaîa”的神圣传统之中；人们对德尔菲神谕的赞同，只能更加肯定这种叙述过去之言与展现当下之行之间的融合。而归根到底具有决定性意义的，则是厄琉息斯秘仪每年所要重复的仪式实践：在城邦事务的实际操作、有效性以及功能性方面，一个“仍然是当下的现在”被呈现了出来。因此，正是通过仪式实践，明显是虚构的叙事（muthódes lógos）在其有效性与社会功用方面，找寻到了真实。

众所周知，柏拉图本人也毫不犹豫地通过其笔下的主要人物之口，来吐露他对神话叙事的偏爱。他借苏格拉底之口，充满悖论地告诉我们像亚特兰蒂斯这样的叙事，并不仅仅是一个加工而成的神话（plastheìs mûthos），它还预示着一个真实的话语（alethinòs lógos）；准确地说，它预示的应当是雅典人将荣耀献给他们的保护女神之日。[13]Platon, Timée 26e；同时请特别参见：Platon, Gorgias 523a（米诺斯和宙斯之子拉德曼托斯有关灵魂审判的叙事）或者Protagoras 320c（普罗米修斯为人类带来文明的叙事）；有关柏拉图的“神话”创作及其所起到的论辩功能，参见：G. Cerri, La Poetica di Platone: Una Teoria Della Comunicazione, 3eéd (Lecce: Argo, 2007)以及C. Calame, Mythe et Histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie, 27—29, 166—169，该书同时附有大量有关柏拉图“神话”的参考书目。我们将会注意到，表述所处的语境，不经意间，将话语加工这一概念与当下的情景联系起来，赋予了一种强烈的语用学上的关联。

捏造出来的虚构故事，同时也导向了一种似—真（vrai-semblable），但不管是这类故事，还是那些由功利的语用学所支配的所有似真/逼真叙事（récit vraisemblable），它们都在希腊诗歌中打下了深深的烙印。难道还需要重申一遍，正是赫西奥德本人借奥林坡斯的缪斯女神之口说出了以下著名的话语：“我们知道如何叙述（légein）那些捏造的故事，把它们叙述得像真的一样（etúmoisin homoîa）；如果我们愿意的话，我们还知道如何歌唱（gerúsasthai）真实。”这些话是对第一人称的诗人“我”所说的，他在赫利孔山放牧他的绵羊，刚刚自称“赫西奥德”，这些神圣的话语带来了及时而双重的影响：一方面，作为诗歌的创造者（artiépeiai），缪斯女神将她们用诗歌许下的诺言与月桂树枝的仪式性馈赠联系在了一起，这树枝确保了诗人此后能受到祝福；另一方面，作为序曲，行吟诗人“我”，通过对缪斯女神本身的赞歌，的的确确开始了他的神谱赞歌。[14]Hésiode, Théogonie 22—39；这一段落引发了大量的评注，其中请参见B. Lincoln, Theorizing Myth. Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3—18。该书注释2提供了其他参考论著，另见拙著C. Calame, Poétique des Mythes en Grèce Antique (Paris: Hachette, 2000), 165 n. 23。受到了缪斯的启发，神谱性叙事，即在我们看来虚构的叙事，其真实既建立在那神圣的起源上，又建立在表述之中。通过谱系学，我们追溯了众神的世界，这一世界与史诗的语境之间在语用学上的关系，则由诗歌加工来构建，就如同手艺人灵感迸发的手工作品。[15]参见拙著C. Calame, Poétique des Mythes en Grèce Antique, 38—42，笔者试图给出既受神灵感应而创作又因诗人的手工操作来完成的作品中那些充满悖论的术语。

2.（后）现代虚构

古希腊罗马世界给予了我们一种遥远的诗歌（但非文学的）文化，然而这种文化所具有的历史人类学视角，却用一种批判的方式让我们回过头来，审视我们所依赖的范式。有的虚构无法识别某种内在参数，这种参数是能区分虚构话语和事实话语的。对于这类虚构，种种迹象表明，话语的语用性是我们唯一能确认的标准。如果在虚构与事实之间的语言渗透性也无能为力，即任何表述的时间化的、空间化的逻辑推论都无法给虚构性定出一个明确的标准，果真如此，那么正如塞尔（John Searle）所言，“没有一种文本属性、句法属性或是语义属性可以认定某一文本是虚构作品”，因此虚构叙述便是一种纯粹的伪装，甚至是一种“伪装游戏”（feintise ludique）。[16]J. R. Searle, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 65—66 (= trad. fr. par J. Proust, Sens et Expression. Etudes de théorie des Actes de Langage [Paris: Minuit, 1982],143—109)；这一问题请参见G. Genette, Fiction et diction (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 87 (Repris dans Fiction et Diction, Précédé de Introduction à l’architexte [Paris: Seuil, 2004], 143)，以及Shusterman很有见地的观点：R. Shusterman, “Fiction, réel, référence”, Littérature 123 (2001): 44—55。但是，在这样的语言游戏中，言语的虚构或者视觉的虚构，将简化为一种调整心态的简单能力（une simple capacité de modélisation mentale）？通过其表现性成分，这种虚构还能激起接受者的审美体验吗？还能满足感性的注意力吗？即它还符合虚构的浸入能力（capacité d’immersion f ictionnelle）吗？这种虚构应该被重新导向一种表现层面上的模仿式浸入能力（une capacité d’immersion mimétique de l’ordre de la représentation）吗？或许既来自虚构话语的产生者也来自其接受者？[17]在这里通过问题的形式所表达的观点，请参见J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la fi ction?, 327—335，该书书名便用了疑问句。是否可以如此认为：存在一种虚构性（f ictionnalité）的能力（compétence），它由创造者与大众共同分享，即虚构同时具有创造与接收两方面的能力？

如此说来，“在表现活动的游戏性使用里”，虚构故事仅拥有一种内在功能，一种审美满足的功能。即便如此断言，我也不得不再次提及《诗学》的开头。在亚里士多德看来，诗歌创作的艺术，在人的摹仿天性里找到源头；同样也正是因为这一摹仿能力使得人区别于其他动物，而这种能力从人诞生之初便显露出来了，并伴随着作为人类的我们在摹仿中所得到的快感（khaírein）。[18]Aristote, Poétique 4, 1448b 4—19；引文出自J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la fiction?, 329。或许我们应该承认，具有艺术性的虚构故事，并不等同于一个基于思维经验的假想宇宙。相反，不管从修辞学角度，还是从语用学角度，虚构都不能绝对地和其他种类的话语形式所区分，而这些其他的话语形式也借助于叙述的、图像说明的、比喻对想象力的煽动以及图解概括之类的话语手段，正如人类学或历史学所为。不管它如何地具有游戏特征，虚构的“好像是”（comme si）从内而外又从外而内地暗示了似真性/逼真性（la vraisemblance）：构建出的可能世界的逻辑中的似真性/逼真性（这同时也是一个想象中的世界），同时也是在被给出的文化范式的接受之中的似真性/逼真性。实际上，至少从美学角度与娱乐角度而言，正是通过似真性/逼真性，富有艺术性的虚构故事才能具有其有效性。

但是简单地归结为似真性/逼真性是不够的。实际上，“富有艺术性的虚构故事总是通过一个刻意模仿的媒介来体现”，果真如此，那说明通过词汇与图像，那个在言语与图像中被创造出来的潜在世界，与指涉性世界（le monde de référence）之间是存在关联的。对于所有形式的话语的语义学能力而言，也同样如此：通过符号学载体，在转换指涉性图像的时候，令人产生联想。在这种情况下，伪装游戏的手法并不能让我们“脱离那些它用背后的信仰网络所框定的表现（représentations），这些表现限制了我们的亲眼所见，并构建了一个自身封闭的虚构世界”；从这一层面而言，虚构的表现并不能通过简单的伪装游戏，而被看作“内生的与内里的”（endogènes et endotéliques）。[19]J.-M. Schaeffer, “Quelles vérités pour quelles fi ctions?”, L’Homme 175/176 (2005): 33, 35.正是由于言语与视觉载体的使用，虚构故事强烈地指涉了那些不存在之物，并必须以表现的形式呈现，不论感知与理解的神经元过程如何（而这一过程正是语用学效果得以实现的途径）。依靠言语或者图像的加工，虚构故事深刻的语义学烙印充斥着指涉性，既在产生过程中又在接受过程中体现。

当我们将富有艺术性的虚构故事简化为一种接受的约定与伪装游戏，我们很可能重回丰特奈尔（Fontenelle）对古希腊虚构故事看法的老路：“我们的宗教和常识让我们从希腊人的奇闻异事（fables）中清醒过来；但这些故事仍然因为诗歌与绘画的形式而留存在我们心中，仿佛正是通过这些艺术形式，希腊人的奇闻异事找到了成为必需的秘诀。尽管与那些好心发明奇闻异事的粗俗思想的拥有者相比，我们是无与伦比的经验丰富，但我们很容易重蹈覆辙，同样把奇闻异事看得如此有趣；他们陶醉其中，因为他们相信那些故事，而我们虽然不相信但仍然陶醉其中；这是说明想象力可以与理性并存的最佳例证。”[20]B. Le Bovier De Fontenelle, De l’origine des Fables (Paris: Desjonquères, 1724),109 (cité dans l’édition par A. Niderist Sous le Titre Rêveries Diverses. Opuscules Littéraires et Philosophiques［Paris: Desjonquères, 1994］, 97—111)；将他的研究与耶稣会士Joseph-François Laf itau的历史比较研究进行比较，请参见M. Detienne, L’invention de la mythologie (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), 19—25。因此，丰特奈尔似乎已经提出，将虚构故事简化为一种“伪装游戏”，即毫无理性的想象。但是，除去其原始进化论的思想，他意识到这种简化仅仅对我们现代人是可能的，我们正面对那些奇闻异事，它们今后将被它们自身所处的信仰世界所割裂。此外，那个被我们看作诋毁神话传说的“罪魁祸首”的丰特奈尔也重新认识到了，正是那些奇闻异事的语义学载体，无论诗歌还是绘画，确保了传统及其有效性，甚至确保了某种审美有效性。

3. 希腊的虚构故事与语用学

一种激进的文化与社会人类学的基础人尽皆知，这在某种程度上便是向伪装游戏让步，而非接近另一种在时间和空间上都很遥远的文化，如果我们避免用一种偏离中心的、指向我们自身现实的目光：从偏离的视角来考察我们所依赖的后现代范式，在不同之中甚至通过不同来进行考量。对于虚构故事（以及文学）的现代概念而言，偏离中心的目光将通过那些除了由沟通交流所承担的诗歌或视觉形式来展现外，并没有被现实性与有效性的神话取得，正是诗歌或视觉形式让这些神话置身于其所植根的那个表现世界（l’univers représentationnel）。

3.1 神话的修辞与政治用途（吕库尔戈斯）

深厚的传统把希腊神话当作最典型的叙述性虚构，为其语用学意义提供了例证，我们尤其需要考察不同体裁的各自要求。具有程式的可塑性极强的诗歌语言，有着极具韵律的措辞，它在语言学意义上具有一惯性，而作品产生与接受的语境，也有与其相关的社会习惯。这两者之间所共有的规则性，是在仪式“表演”中所体现的希腊诗歌的语用学的一个重要的载体。

公元前338年，就在马其顿的菲利普二世战胜希腊人的喀罗尼亚战役打响之际，雅典公民莱奥克拉托斯（Léocrate）逃到了罗德岛。当他重回雅典时，吕库尔戈斯（Lycurgue）控告他背叛城邦。吕库尔戈斯给雅典人列举了一系列公民的英雄行为，以此来反衬莱奥克拉托斯的懦弱。他先讲述了一个匿名的（légetai）故事，这个故事显得有点虚构（muthôdésteron），但对年轻人而言，并不妨碍他们很好地“接受”这个故事：功能性再一次胜过了外表的非似真/逼真性。当然在此人的生平中，也存在一些很可能是不真实的故事，比如在埃特纳火山喷发之际，当所有人面对源源不断的炽热岩浆而逃跑的时候，他却在照料身患残疾的父亲；人们被燃起的火焰所包围，但最后只有他和他的父亲完好无损并被诸神救下，因为他们美好的人性引起了有福的众神的注意。在演说家吕库尔戈斯的演说中，他最终使用了追根溯源的方法来确保叙事的似真/逼真性：此地（指西西里—译按）“现在仍然”（éti kaì nûn）属于那些虔信之人。通过地名，叙事的真实在某种程度上被植根于西西里的地貌之中并被其所证明。[21]Lycurgue, Contre Léocrate 95—97.

但是，为了能更好地追忆“palaiá”（往昔的时光），这一对我们而言对应于“神话”的英雄过往，必须要从西西里回到雅典。吕库尔戈斯仍旧用了一个匿名的叙事，该叙事讲述了（phasi）波塞冬之子色雷斯国王欧墨尔普斯（Eumolpe）对阿提卡的入侵。面对危险，雅典国王厄瑞克特乌斯（Érechthée）求得德尔菲神谕，神谕嘱咐他献祭自己的女儿以获得对欧墨尔普斯的胜利。这一起源性叙事之所以为我们所熟知，主要是因为欧里庇得斯所写的悲剧，而吕库尔戈斯在他的演说中也大段引用了欧里庇得斯的作品。厄瑞克特乌斯的妻子（即普拉柯西苔娅—译按）被恳请同意祭献自己的女儿，轮到她发言来表明自己的态度：通过对她的言说的引用，演说家赋予其观点一个诗化的表达方式。由此，通过悲剧的话语，吕库尔戈斯追述了传奇而又诗意的人物普拉柯西苔娅（Praxithéa），她正是伟大的灵魂与高贵公民之榜样。为了城邦，她准备好了要祭献自己的“家庭与居所”（oîkos）。她同时采用了女性视角与男性视角，以此激发公民，让他们能够去保家卫国。在缺少男性子嗣的情况下，以雅典人所自夸的本土血统（autochtone，土著的，亦指大地的，引申为由“大地所生”—译注）之名，王后同意祭献自己的女儿。在悲剧的叙事中，她将是唯一幸存下来的。那位祭坛上死去的女孩的两位姐妹，为了和她患难与共，也一同牺牲，而在战争取得胜利并结束后，由于欧墨尔普斯之子被杀，波塞冬为了报仇，用三叉戟击中厄瑞克特乌斯：这位阿提卡国王便如此身赴黄泉，重归尘土，回到大地的深处，那个他出生的地方，正如其祖父埃里克托尼奥斯（Érichthonios）那样，后者是因为赫淮斯托斯与贞洁的雅典娜交合不成，精液溅到了肥沃的土地上而生。

从活人献祭到字面意义上的 “土生土长”（naissance autochtone），经历了把出于某位神的意志而赴死之人埋葬在大地深处的过程，演说家口中的这一起源性叙事并没有因此而泄露其非似/逼真性（invraisemblances）。在阿提卡的舞台上所上演的“神话传说”，在与当下的双重关系中找到了自己的历史真实与语用学效果：它的主角是雅典人的祖先，他们的父辈正是在这样一种传统中长大的，我们要归功于一位诗人，他的例子说明了对祖国的爱要优于对自己孩子的爱。演说家的结论是不可动摇的：“如果女人也能做出这样的行为，那么男人必须忠于他们的祖国，永远不放弃家园而叛逃，也不能像莱奥克拉托斯那样在所有希腊人面前做出有损祖国名誉的事情。”[22]Lycurgue, Contre Léocrate 98—101，这里引用了：Euripide, Érechthée fr. 360 Kannicht (= 14 Jouan-Van Looy)；这一双重角色被Praxithéa所接受，她既是母亲，又是公民，Sebillotte-Cuchet对此有着很好的论述，参见V. Sebillotte Cuchet, “La Place de la Maternité dans la Rhétorique Patriotique de l’Athènes classique (Ve—IVeSiècles Avant Notre ère): Autour de Praxithéa”, éd. L. Fournier-Finocchiaro, Les Mères de la Patrie: Représentations et Constructions d’une Figure Nationale Cahiers de la MRSH 45 (2006): 237—250；同时参见G. Sissa & M. Detienne, La vie quotidienne des dieux grecs (Paris: Hachette, 1989), 238—245。

3.2 神话的虚构性及其仪式有效性（欧里庇得斯）

然而在公元前5世纪末，欧里庇得斯的某出悲剧在狄奥尼索斯剧院的舞台上所上演的“神话故事”（mûthos）与雅典的观众们所践行的文化实践之间建立了一种很强的联系。实际上，这出悲剧的情节以挽歌的诗句告终，它哀叹厄瑞克特乌斯一家以及城邦的命运，他们遭受了着魔般的波塞冬那毁灭性的疯狂之苦。之后雅典娜亲自出面干预；在“解围之神”（dea ex machina）的光辉之中，伴随着城邦的守护女神那具有权威的声音。从欧里庇得斯悲剧往往以之为剧终的起源性视角，女神将戏剧中的所有雅典主角变作享有仪式荣誉的受益者。[23]欧里庇得斯悲剧的起源学结尾，远非诗人自己的发明，通常与仍旧存在的崇拜仪式有关。关于这一饱受争议的问题，尤见：Ch. Sourvinou-Inwood, Tragedy and Athenian Religion (Lanham —Boulder — New York — Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), 414—422。首先是雅典国王夫妇的三位女儿，在她们那不能靠近的墓地—圣殿周围，她们将定期受到由年轻女孩所组成的合唱团舞者的音乐供奉，并享受每次城邦作战前的祭献供奉；接着，她们的父亲厄瑞克特乌斯将在卫城上的神殿里享用牛牲，这一牺牲同时也献给波塞冬，他与这位神和解了，并被指定为城邦的次要守护神；最后，普拉柯西苔娅成为雅典娜的首位女祭司，后者会在卫城的祭坛上接受雅典的善男信女们的献祭。[24]Euripide, Érechthée fr. 370, 55—100 Kannicht (= fr. 22, 55—100 Jouan-Van Looy)；对波塞冬—厄瑞克特乌斯这个形象的界定以及两者不同的功能，参见S. Darthou, “Retour à la terre: la f in de la Geste d’Érecthée”, Kernos 18 (2005): 69—83。

通过雅典娜在舞台上的显现这一干预，针对传说中的国王厄瑞克特乌斯及其女儿们那富有传奇色彩而又充满悲剧性的死亡所做的戏剧化叙事，不仅导向了仪式行为的制定，以此来荣耀城邦的保护神，更导向了仪式实践的展示，这种仪式实践正是当时还在卫城边的狄奥尼索斯剧院—神庙所上演的：观众聚集在那里展示了这种仪式实践。语用学层面上，雅典的舞台上所表演的起源性神话故事与“此时此地”（hic et nunc）在文化与社会关联中所体现的戏剧性表现之间的关系，被赋予了一层更重要的关联，表演的行为为所有悲剧作品所构建的仪式性的音乐表演的历史由来提供了一种双重关联：一方面，借助色雷斯国王欧墨尔普斯的军队对“神话/虚构故事（mythe）”的追忆，让人们想到了斯巴达军队的入侵，以及在公元前422年悲剧上演之时的伯罗奔尼撒战争的第一阶段；另一方面，这种仪式化的戏剧处理，很可能与“厄瑞克特翁神庙”（Érechthéion）的建造相吻合，这座神庙被用来取代在萨拉米战役之前波斯人烧毁的老雅典娜神庙；需要重申的是，这座混合式建筑的神庙，是注定要汇集所有阿提卡与雅典的最初起源历史相关的珍贵纪念品，从卫城的岩石上那被波塞冬的三叉戟所激起的爱琴海水—海神三叉戟所留下的痕迹，到雅典娜的橄榄树—在薛西斯的军队烧毁卫城后立刻重生。这座建筑矗立在城邦空间之中，与其定期举行的仪式一起，关联起展现阿提卡经济繁荣与土壤肥沃的叙事，在献给狄奥尼索斯的音乐与文化方面的重大竞技活动召开之际，它们相得益彰。通过欧里庇得斯所重塑的悲剧形式的强烈审美旨趣，不真实的叙事找到了它自身宗教与社会意义上的有效性，它成了创制者；若非是在团体的音乐表演中，它就无法具有这种指涉性与语用学意义上的真实。

就如同欧里庇得斯的悲剧所设想的那样，这位雅典女性具有公民精神，同时出于女性的本能不背弃自己的母性与对孩子的爱，但这样一个例子，显然不能完全让演说家吕库尔戈斯的听众信服。需要继续往前追溯历史。就像在歌唱诗诗人（les poètes méliques）那里，必须要参考泛希腊传统，那是荷马史诗所表现的传统，它叙述了男性战士的伟大功绩，正是在那片土地上，人们讲述着特洛亚战争那个虚构故事。在这特殊的情况下，对无条件爱国进行补充并具有说服力的例子，出自赫克托尔勉励特洛亚人保家卫国的那个情节：战死沙场，为荣耀而死，并不仅仅是为了拯救父辈的土地，更是为了它的女人、孩子和家园。吕库尔戈斯并没有选择赫克托尔之死这个例子，而是选择了这位英雄对他的战士们所作的战前致辞，这样一来，他便能将他的修辞观念等同于这位特洛亚的英雄。通过这一策略，他不仅让他的演说内容变得有效，还在表演中让他自己的致辞本身变得有效。很有可能这便是他之所以追忆祖先的律法的原因，因为每隔四年，那些荷马以及其他诗人的史诗都会在游吟诗人比赛中吟诵，作为泛雅典娜节的庆祝，以此来向保护女神雅典娜表达敬意。如果希腊人最动人的英雄举动并没有在仪式性的“展示”（epídeixis）中体现出来，那么这些举动便毫无意义。[25]Lycurgue, Contre Léocrate 102—104，这段引用了：Homère, Iliade 15, 494—499。“荷马”作为对古代雅典的战士美德描述的模板，参见：Aristophane, Grenouilles 1036，作为古典修辞术的模板，参见：Isocrate, Panégyrique 159。在Latacz最近出版的论著中，他十分严谨地讨论了有关特洛亚战争真实性的最具争议的问题：J. Latacz, Troy and Homer Towards a Solution of an Old Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)。正是在这样一个庆祝雅典娜女神的重大的宗教与城邦庆典上，荷马的虚构故事获得了其有效性。正是通过荷马诗句之美及其在仪式上的引用，特洛亚战争的那些英雄们的动人举动变得有效，就在“此时此地”（hic et nunc）。

3.3 诗歌中的礼仪语用学（忒奥克里托斯）

但当希腊诗歌那伟大传统的中心转移到了亚历山大里亚时，在那里，这些诗歌为一种君主制度服务，而这种制度又受到了马其顿君主制度与法老等级制度的双重影响，此时又发生了什么呢？当实用性的诗歌形式变成了文本，并成为新建立的图书馆中那些需要研究的本文的时候，在那些如同诗歌加工般的虚构故事以及英雄叙述身上，又发生了什么呢？当那些知识渊博的学者们称呼自己为“诗人兼批评家”（poietaì háma kaì kritikoí）的时候，在现代意义下的文学领域里，诗的虚构的创作又发生了什么呢？

在归为田园诗歌的奠基者—忒奥克里托斯的作品里，有一篇《海伦的婚礼颂诗》（Épithalame d’Hélène），其中诗人为一种面向书面文学的文化指明了实用而仪式性的诗歌的发展方向。这部作品按体裁分类，被称为是一首“牧歌”（idylle），但这种分类仅仅反映了一个“无关紧要的形式”（诗歌的）；虽然这部作品和史诗一样也用了六音步长短短格，但却以婚礼赞歌（hyménée）的形式出现：这个在希腊举行的婚礼庆典的过渡仪式上，有三个重要场景，由一群年轻女孩所组成的合唱队载歌载舞，来表现婚礼之歌—首先是在新娘的父亲家中所举行的宴会上，其次是在把新娘带到她未来丈夫的家中的仪式队列里，最后则是新婚之夜在这对年轻夫妇家中。萨福（Sappho）创作过一部名为婚礼颂诗（épithalames）的诗歌集，在传统意义上，她所创作的婚礼赞歌（hyménée），先赞美新郎，然后再赞美新娘，并用表述行为的方式，竭力完成为年轻姑娘所准备的婚礼过渡仪式。因此，在最符合传统的形式里，忒奥克里托斯的《海伦的婚礼颂诗》首先要说出的便是诗的赞美：先用那些对熟睡中的年轻新郎梅内劳斯所提出的问题来引出，再用来自符合“祝福”（macarismos）形式的赞美来引出：“幸运的新郎啊！”他娶了一位神的女儿，并将要亲自成为宙斯的女婿。[26]Théocrite, Idylle 18，同时参阅R. Hunter, Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149—161的评注。

从表述的观点来看，同时参照本维尼斯特（Émile Benveniste）有关“表述的形式装置”（appareil formel de l’énonciation）的操作分类，有两个步骤需要指出：一方面，整个文本都保持了第二人称“你”的称呼，这恢复了“话语”的地位，对梅内劳斯的提及把我们引入了希腊的传奇历史以及由此引出的神话所构建的“古事”（arkhaîa）之中；从时空角度而言，过去的时间与在斯巴达的那个行为发生地，共同塑造了“历史/叙事”（histoire/récit）。[27]有关“历史/叙事”与“话语”之间的分别，以及多种多样的用途（我们也可以在古希腊诗学的语用学研究中对此进行研究），笔者已多次论述，尤请参见Calame 2005: 14—40。另一方面，根据婚礼赞歌这一文学形式的传统，宙斯之名让故事一下子聚焦到了新娘的身上。因此，海伦持续被提到，并从那些正在歌唱婚礼赞歌的年轻女孩中脱颖而出：“我们这里所有的女孩，在欧罗塔斯（Eurotas）河边奔跑，如同男子一般涂上圣油，有六十的四倍那么多人，是女子的童子军；我们谁都不能和海伦的无懈可击相比。”（第22—25行）就在“叙事”与“话语”相融合并达到新境界的同时，神话叙述与对仪式的描述合为一体。

由此，婚礼颂诗便能直接歌唱海伦了，并用呼格“美丽而动人的姑娘”（第38行），而她也就这样变成了家庭主母（maîtresse de maison）。从亚历山大里亚的诗人们所青睐的起源解释观点出发，这一颂歌从最近的过去过渡到不久的将来，对于这种起源解释的观点，我们打算在另一项研究里探讨。[28]有关希腊神话运用于起源解释的诸多例子，参见Ch. Delattre, Manuel de Mythologie Grecque (Paris: Bréal, 2005), 185—222。实际上，美丽的海伦从少女到少妇的这一神话里的转变，使得诗人有机会来描述一个仪式，这个仪式是合唱队的年轻姑娘们为了流传美丽而神圣的少女—作为“处女”（parthénos）—的记忆正在创设的：用一顶王冠和奠酒仪式来供奉，供奉的场所是在一棵布满树荫的梧桐树旁，从今往后这棵树将被称作“海伦之树”（第57行）。

整首诗歌以婚礼赞歌结束，在对年轻新娘及新郎的祝愿中画上了句号。养儿育女的勒托（Létô courotrophe）将会祝福他们子孙满堂，阿佛罗狄忒祝福他们夫妻恩爱，而宙斯则祝福他们永福永贵。在第一人称复数“我们”的许诺之后，诗人回到传统的苏醒之歌，接着，诗人以叠句来结束，强调了婚礼赞歌的仪式程式：“司掌婚姻的女神啊（Hymen ô Hyménée）”，用口头“证明”（deixis）的方式，召唤一位英雄，邀请他来见证婚礼，这种口头证明，成为歌唱诗的标志，在其仪式性过程中出现，即在歌唱中。[29]关于构成了希腊仪式诗歌的多种形式的指示系统（deixis）的语用学，参见笔者的研究：Calame 2005b。是否可以这样认为，在神话传说的虚构故事中，讲述本身与海伦和梅内劳斯那婚姻典范的英雄式场景一起，在诗歌歌唱的“此时此地”（hic et nunc），通向了婚姻仪式的庆典？如果答案是肯定的，那么我们便忽略了在忒奥克里托斯诗歌开头所写的那几行。诗歌借金发的梅内劳斯之口，通过“曾几何时”这样的表述，将场景定在了斯巴达，并用歌唱着的年轻女孩，来与她们所组成的合唱队之间产生时间上与叙述上的距离，这个合唱队由十二位优秀的斯巴达女孩组成，她们齐心协力歌唱着，并用一种巧妙的交叉节奏拍打地面，让婚姻赞歌的歌声久久回荡。在这样一个叙述性的开篇场景里（柏拉图对话录那里也是如此），第一人称“我们”确保了“叙事”所要体现的“她们”；此后，“叙事”模式将阐明赞歌的具体表述情境，以此来置身于叙述的场景当中，那便是宙斯之女海伦与她幸福的丈夫梅内劳斯，以及特洛亚战争的英雄们。那么，这能否说明诗歌将我们带入了一个纯虚构的世界中呢（用现代术语来讲，一种伪装游戏的纯虚构）？

一方面，如果比较一下忒奥克里托斯的其他颂诗，以及标志着诗歌首句的指示性连接词“ára”，我们可以看到宫廷诗歌表述的具体情况，这种诗歌伴随着亚历山大里亚图书馆的建立及其献给缪斯的神庙的设立而不断发展。我们不难想到，对身处斯巴达英雄时代的海伦与梅内劳斯这对模范夫妇在新婚之夜的赞扬，影射了公元前3世纪统治亚历山大里亚的那对国王夫妇：托勒密一世（Ptolémée I Sôter） 和他的第三任妻子白瑞尼丝（Bérénice），这位妻子后来被神化并被纳入阿佛罗狄忒的崇拜仪式当中。[30]对于这一观点，参见R. Hunter, Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry, 163—166所给出的多种推论，以及笔者待刊的论文。关于忒奥克里托斯的田园诗歌中被构建并戏剧化的虚构世界，参见M. Payne, Theocritus and the Invention of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 49—91。另一方面，第二次智术师运动中所盛行的小说这一体裁告诉我们，对于越来越多依靠写作传统的叙述形式而言，“伪装游戏”并非明智之举；这些依靠写作的叙述形式如此之多，在虚构叙事中，它们涉及了构建整个传统希腊文化的诗歌人类学（anthropopoiétique）维度的各种要素：空间、价值以及实践。当然，在希腊的那些小说里，就像在忒奥克里托斯的诗歌里一样，表述的策略与写作的策略是丰富而巧妙的，这种策略能够让那个叙述沉浸在自己的世界之中。同样，比如《达芙妮斯与克罗埃》（Daphnis et Chloé）这部小说，在开场白的时候便加入了第一人称的叙述：“我”。在莱斯波斯岛（Lesbos）上的一次狩猎活动中，就在那将要上演浪漫爱情故事的空间里，叙述者发现自己正面对一幅献给宁芙神女（Nymphes）的画作。通过“图像化再现”（ekphrasis）的方式，亲子之爱与情欲之爱的场景被表现了出来，预示着叙事者受此启发而要讲述的故事情节。这一表述性的场景，清楚地解释了虚构叙述的语用学，年轻的牧羊人达芙妮斯和清纯而天真的克罗埃的故事由此上演：“我创作了四卷书，献给厄洛斯（Éros）、宁芙神女（Nymphes）以及潘神（Pan），对所有男子而言，拥有这部书既赏心又悦目：它将会治愈疾病、慰藉忧伤、唤醒爱情并教导那些尚未沐浴爱河的人们。”[31]Longus, Daphnis et Chloé, Proème；参见Cassin, L’Effet Sophistique, 507—512，以及A. Bierl,“Der Griechische Roman — ein Mythos? Gedanken zur Mythischen Dimension von Longos’ Daphnis und Chloe”, eds. U. Dill & Ch. Walde, Antike Mythen. Medien, Transformationen und Konstruktionen (Berlin — New York: de Gruyter, 2009), 718—733（关于“神话传说”在这部小说里起到的作用）。

4. 虚构故事：与后现代的本文主义保持距离

我们可以再次回到塞克斯都·恩披里可那里，这位希腊哲学家并不满足于粉碎历史与神话之间那种现代意义上的对立，他在“似—真”（vrai-semblable）的层面上引入了叙述加工的“好似”（comme si）概念；但是这位怀疑论哲学家最后却把“神话”（mûthos）加入了“捏造”（plásma）之中，由此将两者都作为历史的补充。但实际上，在“神话”（mûthos）和“捏造”（plásma）的时空框架中，历史不仅包括著名人物的行为，也同样包括英雄的伟业以及众神的介入；比如，阿斯克莱比奥斯（Asclépios—古希腊医师之祖），他让从忒拜城墙上跌下的英雄们起死回生，救治了受赫拉之惩罚而发疯的普罗伊托斯（Proitos）的女儿们，或者医治了从特类增（Trézène） 出逃的希波吕特斯（Hippolyte）；塞克斯都·恩披里可给出了他的史料：比如像斯忒西克鲁斯（Stésichore）这样的诗人，或者像库勒涅的波吕安托斯（Polyanthos de Cyrène）和瑙克拉提斯的斯塔福洛斯（Staphylos de Naucratis）这样的地方史家。因此，从荷马史诗当中清除出去的只是那些英雄变为动物的荒诞故事，比如赫库蓓（Hécube）变成了狗，奥德修斯变成了马。[32]Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 260—262 及264—265，分别引用了Stésichore fr. 194 (IV) Page-Davies, Polyanthos FGrHist. 37 F 1，以及Staphylos de Naucratis FGrHist. 269 F 3。从此以后，既没有诗歌，也没有散文会关涉仪式化的表演；被采纳的叙述方式再也不包含那些表述的策略，正是这些策略塑造了那些讲述英雄叙事的诗歌，是那些英雄叙事更清楚地表明了颂诗的行为，和由此而来的崇拜行为。相反，语用学关联则一直根深蒂固，并构建了我们通过似真性/逼真性所感知为神话的虚构故事的东西，这种似真性/逼真性，在一种文化范畴中找寻到了自己的基础，这种文化范畴由一种非常丰富的英雄传统所支撑，并被富有生命力的多神教形象化。希腊神话那出色的可塑性，见证了口述的虚构故事与不断变化的多样化文化语境之间那始终如一的契合。[33]对于希腊神话的持续不断地再创作，参见笔者所编论著C. Calame (éd.), Métamorphoses du Mythe dans la Grèce Antique (Genève: Labor & Fides, 1988)，以及一本非常实用的著作：R. Buxton, Imaginary Greece. The Contexts of Mythology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9—66 (trad. fr. par M. Wechsler-Bruderlein: La Grèce de l’imaginaire: les Contextes de la Mythologie ［Paris: La Découverte, 1996］)。在那里，没有什么出于纯粹的想象。

作为结论，我们再次文不对题，批判性地简单讨论一下当下所存在的问题。试问，那些对科技的有效性深信不疑的电子游戏玩家们，相信他们所见到并由此而被操纵的真实吗？他们不正如此这般地对这些游戏着迷而又一往情深吗？这另一种文化的人类学视角能够把我们带回那批判而又偏离中心的情境中，在这样一种回归之中，从一种纯语用学的角度来讲，依赖于“伪装游戏”这样的解释，并不能令人满意。在后现代主义的时代，仍然强烈地受到新自由主义具有竞争性和个人主义色彩的意识形态影响，这种意识形态引出了相对主义的文本主义，是时候抛弃它了。虚构故事所带来的审美作用及感情作用，既要在叙述的虚构所构建的世界中，又要在以言语或视觉的方式加工而成的世界中去寻找。一方面，这个世界是可能的，也是想象的，被一种文化范式所引导，以此来被某一使用群体接受；另一方面，这个世界所接受的文学创作（po(i)étique）形式，既确保了句法上与语义学上的一致性，又确保了一种语用学作用。为了有效，虚构故事只可能是指涉性的！在隐藏于富有艺术性的创作之下的诗学与文学批评的研究方式之间经常的互动中，当代人对于虚构故事具有自身指涉性（l’autoréférentialité）的断言，实质上不过是后现代文本主义的一个结果。

如果这些不同形式的希腊诗歌既非虚构，亦非文学，那么这些诗歌所教会我们的，便是从语用学意义上—指涉性并且是文化性的语用学意义上—去思考话语的创制（“poieîn”）所要表现的内容。

（周之桓 译，张巍 校）

部分重要概念译名对照表：

comme si 好似

le vraisemble 似真/逼真

la vraisemblance 似真性/逼真性

le «vrai-semblable» “似—真”

la «vrai-semblablance» “似—真性”

invraisemblances 非似真/逼真性

mûthos 可以指话语、神话、传说、虚构故事、情节，等等。

—译按

Notes on Author:Claude Calame is Director of studies emeritus at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris (Centre AnHiMA: Anthropologie et Histoire des Mondes Antiques); he was Professor of Greek language and literature at the University of Lausanne. He taught also at the Universities of Urbino and Siena in Italy, and at Yale University in the US. In English he publishedThe Craft of Poetic Speech in Ancient Greece(Cornell University Press 1995),The Poetics of Eros in Ancient Greece(Princeton University Press 1999),Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece(Rowman & Littlef ield, 2001, 2nded.),Masks of Authority. Fiction and Pragmatics in Ancient Greek Poetics(Cornell University Press 2005),Poetic and Performative Memory in Ancient Greece(CHS — Harvard University Press 2009),Greek Mythology. Poetics, Pragmatics and Fiction(Cambridge University Press 2009).

[34] A f irst French version of this paper has been published in F. Lavocat & A. Duprat (edd.), Fiction et cultures (Paris: SFLGC, 2010), 33—56.

In the movement of the second sophistic, at the close of Antonine rule, the sceptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus offers a seemingly modern def inition of myth. As a presentation (ékthesis) of completed (gegónota) and therefore real actions, history (hístoría) is seemingly opposed to myth (mûthos), which refers to events that have not occurred (agéneta) and are therefore “mendacious”, If truth be told, the apparent structural opposition between history and myth, and by extensionbetween factual and f ictitious accounts, is immediately complemented by a third term:plásma; that is, f iction in its etymological sense: from the Latinf ingere, “to make/fashion”, which corresponds exactly in its literal sense to the Greekpláttein,“to mould/shape”. By way of mimesis, “f iction” stands between “history” and“myth” in that it refers not to an account of events that have not taken place, but to an account of events that resemble those that have taken place. Originating from the“as if” of f iction/fashion, the plausible would thus be associated with the truth (of history) and sharply separated from myth, which is false.[35]Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 263—264; for latin parallels, cf. B. Cassin, L’Effet sophistique (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 481—484, on the distinction between fabula (tragedies and poems), argumentum (false, but similar to the truth), and historia as it occurs in narration, especially in Quintilian, Instituto Oratoria 1, 8, 18—21. The impact of the “as if” of schematization and of representational and discursive fabrication on the very establishment of our knowledge in the domain of human sciences has been shown most notably by S. Borutti, “Fiction et construction de l’objet en anthropologie”, in F. Affergan, S. Boruti, C. Calame, U. Fabietti, M. Kilani, F. Remotti, Figures de l’humain. Les représentations de l’anthropologie (Paris: Éditions de l’Ehess, 2003), 88—99.

1. Fiction as Representational Po(i)etics

Yet, despite the new placement of its constituents betweenplásmaandmûthos, the notion of narrative fabrication is fundamentally equivalent to the Aristotelian concept of the art of poetry. Thetékhne poietikéis styled asmímesis, as the art of representing dramatic actions in verse, be it in tragedy or epic poetry. Here, in contrast to Plato’s forms, which in his own conceptual interpretation ofmimesisthe philosopher decries as facsimiles, tragedy and comedy are based on amûthos; that which is perceived in the classical period as “effective discourse” is understood in thePoetics asa “conf iguration of actions” (súnthesisorsústasis tôn pragmáton), or “intrigue”, “plot”.[36]Aristotle, Poetics 6, 1449b 24—27 (“tragedy is the representation of an action that is noble and completed by means of language enriched ...”) and 23, 1459a 17—21 (“narrative art”, mimetic art in meter, consists in “creating dramatic intrigues like in tragedy”); on the specif ic meaning of mûthos in the Poetics, see 6, 1450a 22—23 and 29—34; cf. P. Ricœur, Temps et récit. Tome I (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1983), 55—84, who analyzes in detail the interweaving of mûthos with mimesis as poetic conf iguration, as well as J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la f iction? (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999), 42—60, on narrative feint in Plato.Narrative f iction/fabrication is thus conceived of as verbal representation.

1.1 Between Poetry and History

Still, this Aristotelian conception of the art of poetry is purely narrative, for itexplicitly excludes not only all the aspects of Greek poetics that relate to musical performance, but also themélos, which encompasses all forms of poetry associated with ritual practice.[37]Cf. F. Dupont, Aristote ou le vampire du théâtre occidental (Paris: Aubier, 2007), 39—77.In this model however, history still has its place, albeit antithetically! We are all familiar with the juxtaposed words of that sentence by Aristotle, so many times asserted and commented upon: “The poet’s task is not to relate what has happened (tà ginómena), but that which could happen either likely or inevitably (katà tò eikòs è tò anagkaîon). Indeed, the historian and the poet differ (...) in that one tells what has happened, the other that which might happen. For this reason poetry is a more philosophical and noble pursuit than history. Poetry speaks more of the general, and history the particular”.[38]Aristotle, Poetics 9, 1451a 36—b 11 and 1451b27—32, which can be read in combination with my commentary, C. Calame, Pratiques poétiques de la mémoire. Représentations de l’espace-temps en Grèce ancienne (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 61—64; see also B. Boulay, “Histoire et narrativité. Autour des chapitres 9 et 23 de la Poétique d’Aristote”, Lallies 26 (2006): 171—179; on the relationships between pláttein and mímesis, cf. A. Ford, The Origins of Criticism. Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece (Princeton — Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 229—233.Have we thus returned to that reassuring binary opposition? Factual accounts on one side, f ictitious ones on the other? From this perspective then, history would convey the facts, characterized as it is by the particular, whereas poetry, because it stands on mythic foundations, would f ind itself placed alongside f iction.

In reality, the distinguishing criterion is more subtle, and is not based on the account’s measure of truth. Fact does not stand in opposition to falsehood. Rather, it is contrasted with that which is likely (verisimilar) or inevitable, along with everything that the art of mimetic fabrication entails. And yet, as I have argued elsewhere, the now canonical distinction between (dramatic) poetry and history that Aristotle contributes to the subject, is never mentioned. While the traditional distinction between rhythmic composition and prose might not differentiate the poet from the historian, the former can nevertheless describe events that have happened (genómena) and are the latter’s purview. If it is true that the poet’s art is mimetic, if his role is in fact to produce (poieîn) actions, nothing prevents him from including within his narrative any happenings (genómena) that are of a verisimilar (or likely) or possible nature. If the retold events comply with the two criteria of the mimetic art of narration, then the poet and historian’s relative spheres can intersect. As such, it is the very process of poetic composition and creation that would render the distinction we try to draw between factual and f ictitious accounts blurred and permeable inthe eyes of the Greek poeticians of the Classical period. From the Classical Greek perspective, it is the role of the verisimilar or likely and of the possible, if not the necessary, to transform fallacy into truth by means of poetic fabrication; a truth that is not necessarily of an empirical and factual nature; rather, it is a truth that attends every “mythical” narrative, from Homer’s epics to Athenian tragedy, where heroic epic achieves its f inal form.

1.2 From the Plausible to the Politically Useful

It is f iction as craft that is the agent of poetic and mimetic transformation. In Aristotle’s restrictive narrative perspective, it is the representationalpoieînthat takes the shape of the conf iguration and organization of events (súnthesisandsústasis tôn pragmáton), of themûthosas narrative intrigue. Yet, although this understanding of narrative logic does not appear to imply theplátteinof the narrative process, the noun extracted from the verb is already used by the elegiac poet Xenophanes. Critic of Colophon, sage regarded as “pre-Socratic”, the poet anticipates Plato by a good century and not only in regard to poetry; indeed, he denounces the theologian poets Homer and Hesiod for attributing reprehensible acts to the gods. Yet he also condemns the telling in symposia of epic tales featuring Titans, Giants, and Centaurs. What allows the wise poet to condemn the “fabrications of our progenitors” (plásmata tôn protéron) is not the monstrous, and therefore unreal character of these pre-Olympian beings, but rather the fact that these accounts contain “nothing of use”.[39]Xenophanes frr. 15 and 13—24 Gentili-Prato; on the aff inities between narrative modeling and the poetic poein, cf. C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012), 47—49 as well as C. Calame, Poétique des mythes dans la Grèce antique (Paris: Hachette, 2000), 38—42.At a banquet then, divinity and joyful men (heroes implied) should be sung of in wholesome tales (lógoi) and praise speeches (mûthoi) that will thus uphold their good name. While the termmûthosis here used in its conventional sense as argued (and sometimes narrative) discourse with a strong pragmatic dimension, the use of the verbhumneînrefers to the poetic and sung quality of laudatory tales that are a requisite of ritual banquets[40]Bibliographic references available in C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie, 48 n. 44—45.. As we will see, it is through poetic means that the “f ictional” account acquires its pragmatic strength, in a function that is both political and social.

Yet, when choosing a narrative meant to illustrate an argument, verisimilitudetogether with usefulness as a criterion has also had a determining role in philosophy and all forms of rhetoric up until the second Sophistic. The teaching of rhetoric relied on it for preparative exercises, and it is theseProgymnasmatathat Aelius Theon presents in his manual. Reserving the termmûthosas a designation for a fable of the animal type, the Alexandrian rhetor simply identif ies traditional stories featuring gods and heroic f igures astales(diégema). In order for the fable to be suitable for rhetorical discussion, it must be the object of the young orator’s creation (plásai); he will draw from stories collected in the written accounts of the ancients, or from those transmitted through oral tradition. Even if they are sometimes false or impossible, they may still prove convincing and therefore useful (pithanà kaì ophélima). The same is true of stories that aremuthikaì diegéseisand seem to us to be “myths”. If they appear to be false and impossible, they are nonetheless subject to criticism as regards the protagonist of the narrated event, the event itself, its location, its time period, its outcome and its cause. If the account of Medea sacrif icing her children is not convincing it is because of its implausibility and unlikely character (ouk eikós) in regard to the different parameters indicated above. According to the rhetor, thus does Herodotus proceed, as indeed he does when he interprets the Egyptian doves that the mythic story presents as the origin of the oracle of Dodona as young Theban women; so too Plato, who at the beginning of thePhaedrusconnects the f igure of Boreas pursuing Oreithyia to the north wind that pushed the young girl over the cliff as she was playing with her friend.[41]Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata 75, 9—76, 16 and 93, 5—96, 10, by reference in particular to Herodotus 2, 52—57 and Plato, Phaedra 229c (a muthológema conceived as alethés!).

The procedure for restoring the pragmatic dimension of the protagonists and events of heroic legends through verisimilitude is ultimately offered by the historian Ephorus as early as the fourth century BCE. For example, the historiographer associates Python, the serpent said to guard the original site of Delphi, with the brutal animalistic nature of the individual, and the giant Tityos with the unjust violence of a primitive sovereign.[42]Ephorus, FgrHist. 70 F 31 and 34 cited by Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata 95, 23—96,4.Several centuries later, Plutarch makes it very clear at the beginning of his biography of the legendary Theseus, founding hero of Athenian democracy: when approaching the distant worlds of the heroic past, worlds that are known to us only through the writings of tragedians and mythographers, it is necessary to “purify that which is f ictional (tò muthôdes) by subjecting it toa discourse that is rational (lógos) and by conferring upon it the characteristics of historical inquiry (historía)”. The author of theParallel Livesleaves no ambiguity in the approach he profers: one must travel through time performing an inquiry that will approach past events through the medium of likely discourse (eikòs lógos); verisimilitude for the narrative, and political usefulness, in the larger and Greek sense of the word, for the propounded heroic model.

1.3 Myth and Truth Value

In Aelius Theon’s manual, among all the legends presented to the student of rhetoric as materials to be discussed in discourse prior to their use as examples, the measure of truth of the account itself is never doubted. The historical reality of cruel beings such as Medea, Python, or Tityos is never questioned, despite their monstrous traits and actions. In fact the same was already true for Thucydides, who in modern eyes is nevertheless perceived as the founder ofl’histoire événementielle, or at the very least of positive history. Minos, Pelops, Agamemnon, and Helen are the very f irst protagonists in the Hellenization of Greece and the maritime expeditions that sought to extend Greek power over the Aegean Sea and its oriental coast. Admittedly, we owe our knowledge of these foundational events to an epic tradition, to an oral tradition that often bears the name of Homer. Yet it is a tradition that provides cues for identif ication and proof (tekméria), as do the signs (semeîa) that are written into the landscape of cities now in ruins. The role of the (unaware) historian is to then submit them to an examination (skopeîn) that allows him to add conf idence to his discourse.

This historical space is not characterized as a realm of myth, nor even as that of heroic legend. Rather, it belongs to the sphere of thearchaîonor of thetò pálai, the “distant past”, the “times of old”. For that matter, an ancient commentator of Thucydides did not miss the opportunity to label the prelude that leads us from the incipient origins of Hellas to the eve of the Persian wars as the “archaeology”. Transmitted through the poet’s songs or through the discourse of logographers (such as Herodotus) who intend their work for a public audience, subjected to the critical eye of an author composing asúggrama(a simple treatise), stripped of any“f ictional” (muthôdes) content, thesepalaiáandarchaîaare associated with an historical and factual reality; but this historical reality is refashioned according to the principle of verisimilitude. We all know the conclusion: “Perhaps when rehearsed, in the absence of f iction (muthôdes), the events (tà genómena) will be less pleasing (...), but it will suff ice that they be useful; they are rather compiled as a possessionfor all time than to be recited before an ephemeral audience.”[43]See in particular Thucydides 1, 1, 2; 3, 3; 9, 3—10, 3; 20, 1; 21, 1—2 and lastly, the famous passage in 22, 4, in conjunction with a few of my comments on the subject, presented in C. Calame, Pratiques poétiques de la mémoire. Représentations de l’espace-temps en Grèce ancienne, 46—57 and in C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie, 49—57, as well as S. Saïd, “La condamnation du muthôdes par Thucydide et sa postérité dans l’historiographie grecque”, in V. Fromentin, S. Gotteland, P. Payen (edd.), Ombres de Thucydide. La réception de l’historien depuis l’Antiquité jusqu’au début du XXe siècle (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010).Although it now belongs to written composition, once again the persuasive begets the useful. If the historical reality of the Trojan War and its illustrious protagonists is never questioned by Thucydides, it is not only because the deeds of heroic times belong to the community’s history, but even more so because they constitute the origin of, and the explanation for the present. Like Minos’ f irst expedition in Cretan waters, the Trojan War signals the future Athenian control over the Aegean Sea; it thus preempts the direct cause of the Peloponnesian war, in the present moment of historical writing. As we will see, this etiological and pragmatic relationship with the present applies to the entire cohort of Hellenic myths which, in our adherence to an entirely different belief system, we associate with the modern category of f iction.

Let us remember that in the fourth century, the master rhetorician Isocrates resorts heavily to the great heroic epics that are the foundation of Greece as he knows it to legitimize claims for a new Athenian hegemony: the time of Heracles and his descendants the Heraclidae, the Trojan war naturally, but also the Persian wars, which with the passing of time now belong to thepalaiáof the forefathers’tradition. In hisPanegyric, a work that praises the historical virtues of Athens, the orator even goes so far as to posit an incursion into the ages of the gods. Indeed, the oratorical praise of the most ancient (arkhaiotáte) city of Greece proceeds from an allusion to its origins; in its claim to panhellenism, the foundation of Athenian civilization coincides with the f irst intervention of Demeter. Welcomed in Attica as a result of her search for her daughter Persephone, the goddess of the milled wheat harvest bestows upon the Athenians not only agriculture, but also the hope of a better life and the promise of happiness in the hereafter via the initiation rites of Eleusis.[44]Isocrates, Panegyricus 26—33; on the use of “myths” by Attic orators, see the many references and commentaries assembled in my study in C. Calame, “Mûthos, lógos et histoire. Usages du passé héroïque dans la rhétorique grecque”, L’Homme 147 (1998): 134—142.Can we question this account? Should we challenge it? This tradition, very much alive in regard to thesearkhaîa, is supplemented by the honors that other cities continue to bestow upon Athens in memory of Demeter’s benevolence. TheDelphic oracle’s sanction but conf irms the convergence between the words that describe the past and the actions that take place in the present. Ultimately, the crucial element is ritual practice and its yearly reiteration: “still now” these objects are shown in the use and eff icacious function imparted by the city. It is therefore by way of ritual practice that the seemingly f ictional account (muthódes lógos) f inds its truth in its social eff icacy and function.

Plato himself — as we well know — does not hesitate to endow the protagonists of his dialogues with a verbal preference for mythical tales. Such, for example, is the case of Socrates who, paradoxically, envisions a tale such as Atlantis as not just a fashioned “myth” (plastheìs mûthos), but as a prelude to truthful discourse (alethinòs lógos); this precisely on the day when Athenians bestow cultic honors upon the tutelary goddess.[45]Plato, Timaeus 26e; specif ically, see also Gorgias 523a (the account of the establishment of the adjudication of souls by Minos and Rhadamanthys, daughter of Zeus), or Protagoras 320c (the account of Prometheus’ establishment of human civilization); on the creation and argumentative role of “myths” in Plato, cf. G. Cerri, La poetica di Platone: una teoria della comunicazione (Lecce: Argo, 2007), 39—58, as well as C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie, 42—49, 256—260, with references to the abundant bibliography generated by Plato’s“myths”.It is worth noting that in passing, we have returned to the notion of a fabricated discourse which has acquired a strong pragmatic relationship with the present situation via its enunciative circumstances.

The awareness of the pragmatic function of any plausible story, and the notion of f iction as untruthful, but leaning towards versimilitude, are both profoundly anchored in the realm of Greek poetics. Must we remind ourselves that it is Hesiod himself who made the Olympian Muses voice these famous words: “We know how to tell (légein) many lies that resemble true things (etúmoisin homoîa); and we know, if we wish it, how to sing (gerúsasthai) the truth”. These words are presented to theI-poet who, grazing his ewes on Helicon, has just identif ied himself asHesiod. These divine utterances are followed by an immediate and dual outcome: on the one hand the Muses, artisans of poetry (artiépeiai), supplement their poetic vow with the ritual gift of the laurel branch, thus validating the inspiration which is now bestowed upon the poet; by way of a prelude, on the other hand, theI-bard does indeed begin his theogonic song with a poetic praise of the Muses themselves.[46]Hesiod, Theogony 22—39; this passage has been the subject of countless commentaries, among which B. Lincoln, Theorizing Myth. Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3—18 (see other references in note 2 and in C. Calame, Poétique des mythes dans la Grèce antique, 165 n.23).Inspired by theMuses, the theogonic tale that we would label as f iction, bases its veracity as much on its divine origin as on the context of its articulation. The pragmatic relationship between the genealogically modeled story of the gods and the circumstances of its song is established through poetic fabrication, in the sense of an inspired work of art.[47]In C. Calame, Poétique des mythes dans la Grèce antique, 38—42, I aimed to outline the terms of the paradox presented by poems that are conceived as being the products of both divine inspiration and the poet’s artistic ability.

2. (Post) modern Fiction

Yet, as we glance upon this distant poetic (not literary) culture through the eyes of historical anthropology, upon a culture which the Greco-Roman world has presented to us in writing, we are compelled in turn to critically examine the paradigm on which we depend. As relates to f iction, since we cannot identify an internal parameter that might distinguish f ictitious discourse from factual discourse, it seems henceforth conceded that the only possible criterion falls under the aegis of the pragmatics of discourse. If the verbal permeability between the factual and the f ictitious is such that none of the discursive methods of enunciation, temporalization, and spatialization can constitute a determining criterion for f ictitiousness, if thus, as John Searle had stated, “there is no textual, syntactic or semantic property that might allow the identif ication of a text as a work of f iction”, then the f ictitious account is but a simple matter of make-believe perhaps even “playful make-believe” (“feintise ludique”).[48]J. R. Searle, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 65—66; on this subject see G. Genette, Fiction et diction (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 87 (repris dans Fiction et diction, précédé de Introduction à l’architexte [Paris: Seuil, 2004], 143) and the valuable critical comments of R. Shusterman, “Fiction, réel, référence”, Littérature 123 (2001).Yet, can verbal or visual f iction now be reduced to a mere task of mental shaping, for in an often playful use? Through its representational component, does f iction correspond to the ability to f ictionally immerse by appealing to the recipient’s aesthetic sense, and by satisfying his sensitive interest? Must we then go back to understanding f iction as mimetic immersion in its representational sense, probably enacted as much by the one who creates the f ictitious discourse as by those who perceive it?[49]That in order to take over in form of questions the proposals made in the study of J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la f iction?, 327—335, the title of his book itself takes on an interrogative form.Does this mean that f ictitiousness is a skill shared between thecreator and the public, or in other words, that the production and reception of f iction constitute a specif ic competence?

In this scenario, f iction has only an intrinsic function, that of aesthetic satisfaction, “as a playful use of the representational endeavor”. Such a statement certainly evokes the beginning of thePoetics. For Aristotle, poetic composition springs from its natural tendency toward representation; from his perspective, it is also on account of this mimetic faculty that man distinguishes himself from other animals. Manifested as early as in childhood, this capacity for imitation is complemented by the pleasure (khaírein) that, as human beings, we draw from imitations (mimémata).[50]Aristotle, Poetics 4, 1448b 4—19; cf. J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la f iction?, 329, for the citation.Admittedly, artistic f iction cannot be assimilated with a suppositional universe founded on the experience of thought. On the other hand, from neither a rhetorical nor pragmatic point of view, we cannot entirely differentiate it from other types of discourse which, like in anthropology or history, also resort to verbal processes of narration, of illustration by image, of induced imagination through metaphor, of patterning via schematization. As playful as it may be, the “as if” of the make-believe implies internal and external verisimilitude: verisimilitude in the logic of the conceivable world that has been created, no matter how imaginary it may be, but also in its acceptability within a given cultural paradigm. In fact, plausibility allows artistic f iction to be effective, even if only from the point of view of aesthetics and entertainment.

However, a simple recourse to verisimilitude is not suff icient. Indeed, if it is true that “artistic f iction is always embodied in a medium that in itself has a simulating component”, the implication is that the conceivable world that has been created by way of this verbal or pictorial medium is related to the referent world. The same goes for the semantic capacity of any form of discourse which, by way of semiotic support, evokes but also transforms referential images; in this respect, f ictional representations could not be considered as “endogenousandendotelic”.[51]Pace J.-M. Schaeffer, “Quelles vérités pour quelles f ictions?”, L’Homme 175/176 (2005): 33 and 35.The use of a verbal or a visual medium is the reason why f iction necessarily refers to something that it is not, that its representational nature is inevitable, independent of any neuronal process of perception and interpretation from which its pragmatic effects are achieved. Since it depends on verbal or visual composition, its semanticdepth sustains itself through reference, in production as in reception.

In reducing the condition of artistic f iction to its contract of reception and to a playful make-believe, one runs the risk of reverting to the position held by Fontenelle on the subject of Greek myths. “Religion and common sense have disabused us of the Greek legends; yet they endure among us in the form of poetry and painting, in which they seem to have discovered the secret for making themselves necessary. Although we are considerably more enlightened than those whose crude spirit invented the myths in good faith, we easily take up the same logic that made the myths so enjoyable for them; they indulged themselves of them because they believed them, and we indulge ourselves of them with equal pleasure without believing them; there is no better proof that imagination and reason have no business in common ...”.[52]B. Le Bovier de Fontenelle, De l’origine des fables (Paris: Desjonquères, 1724), 109 (cité dans l’édition par A. Niderist sous le titre Rêveries diverses. Opuscules littéraires et philosophiques [Paris: Desjonquères, 1994],109); in conf lict with the Jesuit father Joseph-Francois Laf itau’s undertaking in historical comparison, see M. Detienne, L’invention de la mythologie (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), 19—25.Thus does Fontenelle seem to already suggest the reduction of f iction to a kind of “playful make-believe”: imagination without reason? Yet, evolutionist primitivism aside, he is conscious that this act of relegation can only be performed by us, as modern selves confronted with legends now detached from the belief system wherein they existed. Moreover, despite being a front-runner in the denigration of myth, he acknowledges that it is their semiotic form, poetry or painting, which safeguards their tradition and consequently their effectiveness, even if it is but aesthetic.

3. Greek and Pragmatic Fictions

The basic principle of a militant cultural and social anthropology is well known. To approach a culture that is distant in both time and space without applying a counterbalanced assessment for our own time would be in a certain sense to give in to playful make-believe: an oblique perspective on the postmodern paradigm on which we rely, in and through its very differences. In regard to modern conceptions of f iction (and of literature), an oblique approach will therefore be stimulated by myths whose reality and effectiveness exist only in the poetic and visual form that their communication assumes, and within the representational universe into which they are implanted.

3.1 Rhetorical and Political Uses of Myths (Lycurgus)

In order to ensure the pragmatic impact of Greek myths, which an extensive illuminist tradition often uses as examples of narrative f iction par excellence, it is particularly necessary to pay attention to genre rules. Their regularities are one of the essential pillars of the Greek poem’s pragmatic function as envisioned in its ritualized “performance”, divided as they are between the linguistic regularities born from the rhythmic articulation of a poetic language that is formulaically highly f lexible, and the social conventions related to the circumstances of its production and reception.

In 338 BCE, in the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea that marks the victory of Philip II of Macedon over the Athenians, a citizen named Leocrates f lees the city and seeks refuge in Rhodes. Upon his return to Athens, he is brought to justice by Lycurgus, a great orator who indicts him with treason. Addressing himself to the Athenians, Lycurgus does not hold back from putting forward a series of examples of civic courage, the very antitheses of Leocrates’ cowardly behavior. He begins with an anonymous account (légetai) which, although it may appear to be more or less f ictional (muthôdésteron), is no less “suited” to the youngest: once again, effectiveness takes precedence over implausible appearance. There is certainly some lack of verisimilitude in this account of a man who, during an eruption of Mount Etna, took care of his helpless father when all others f led from the burning torrents; surrounded by f laming lava, the two men alone were spared and saved by the gods, whose benevolent attentions are aimed at good men. In this speech by Lycurgus, it is the etiological process that ultimately guarantees the account’s plausibility: “still now” (éti kaì nûn), this site is the one “of the pious men”. By means of a toponym, the veracity of the account is in a certain sense inscribed onto, and corroborated by the Sicilian landscape.[53]Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 95—97.

Yet, to conjure thesepalaia, the heroic past that in our eyes corresponds to myth, one must travel from Sicily to Athens. Here again, it is an anonymous account that relates (phasi) the story of the incursion in Attica of the Thracian king Eumolpus, a son of Poseidon. Faced with danger, Erechteus consults the Delphic oracle who instructs the king of Athens to sacrif ice his daughter to secure victory over Eumolpus. The king obeys the oracle, sacrif ices his daughter, and succeeds in repelling the country’s invaders. This foundation story is known to us primarilythrough a tragedy by Euripides, from which Lycurgus cites a long excerpt. The f loor is given to Erechtheus’ wife, who has been called forth to approve her daughter’s sacrif ice; with this citation, the orator gives his argument a poetic spin. Thus through the language of tragedy does he evoke the legendary and poetic f igure of Praxithea, who he presents as an example of graciousness and civic nobility. Prepared to sacrif ice heroîkos, her family and her home for her city, turn by turn Praxithea adopts feminine and masculine perspectives: she sings the praises of female maternity, through which male citizens capable of defending their fatherland are given life. In the absence of male progeny, and in the name of the autochthonous origin claimed by the Athenians, the king’s wife consents to her daughter’s sacrif ice. By the end of the tragedy, she will be the sole survivor. The two sisters of the young maiden who died upon the altar have sacrif iced themselves in solidarity, and at the outcome of a nevertheless victorious battle, Erechtheus is killed by Poseidon’s trident, struck in revenge for the death of his son Eumolpus: the king of Athens thus returns to the bowels of the earth, whence he was born as Erichthonios from Hephaistos’ sperm, dispersed across fertile soil in his vein attempt to have sex with the virgin goddess Athena.

From a literally autochthonous birth to human sacrif ice and to divinely willed death as burial within the bowels of the earth, the implausibilities of this foundation story are not even addressed by the orator. The “myth” represented on the Attic stage acquires its historical reality and its pragmatic impact through its dual relationship with the present. On the one hand, its protagonists are the ancestors of the Athenians whose forefathers have been shaped by its tradition; on the other hand its use as an example of the priority of love for one’s fatherland over that of one’s own children is the poet’s doing. The orator’s conclusion is incontrovertible:“If women are capable of such an act, then men must give absolute priority to their homeland and never abandon it, nor dishonor it before all Greeks as Leocrates did.”[54]Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 98—101, citing Euripides, Erechtheus fr. 360 Kannicht (= 14 Jouan-Van Looy); the dual role assumed by Praxithea as mother and citizen is well def ined by V. SEBILLOTTE. CUCHET, “La place de la maternité dans la rhétorique patriotique de l’Athènes classique (Ve—IVesiècles avant notre ère): autour de Praxithéa”, in L. Fournier-Finocchiaro (ed.), Les mères de la patrie: Représentations et constructions d’une f igure nationale, Cahiers de la MRSH 45 (2006): 237—250; see also G. Sissa & M. Detienne, La vie quotidienne des dieux grecs (Paris: Hachette, 1989), 238—245.

3.2 The Fiction of Myths and its Cultic Utility (Euripides)

Yet, at the end of the f ifth century, Euripides’ tragedy itself establishes a particularly strong relationship between themûthosthat is represented on the stage of Dionysian theater and the cultic practices of its Athenian spectators. Indeed, the tragic scenario leads to a threnodic song that concludes the tragedy by lamenting the destiny of Erechtheus’ family and of the city fallen prey to the destructive folly of Poseidon’s wrath. Then follows the intervention of Athena herself; in all the glory of adea ex machina, and with the authoritative voice of a patron goddess of the city. With the etiological prospect that often concludes Euripides’ tragedies, the goddess bestows cultic honors upon all the Athenian protagonists of the dramatic events that have just unfolded.[55]The etiological conclusions of Euripides’ tragedies, far from being the poet’s inventions, generally correspond to practiced cults; on this controversial question, see in particular Ch. Sourvinou-Inwood, Tragedy and Athenian Religion (Lanham — Boulder — New York — Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), 414—422.First for the three young girls of the royal Athenian couple, who will regularly benef it from musical devotions in the form of choral dances performed by young girls around an inaccessible sanctuary-tomb, but also from sacrif icial offerings on the eve of battles fought by the city; then for Erechtheus, who will be jointly honored with Poseidon by the sacrif ice of oxen in a sanctuary located atop the Acropolis; and f inally for Praxithea, who becomes the f irst priestess of Athena to be celebrated with sacrif ices offered by both the men and women of Athens to her altar on the Acropolis.[56]Euripides, Erechtheus fr. 370, 55—100 Kannicht (= fr. 22, 55—100 Jouan-Van Looy); the f igure of Poseidon-Erechtheus is well characterized in all his different functions by S. Darthou, “Retour à la terre: la f in de la Geste d’Érecthée”, Kernos 18 (2005).

By way of Athena’s intervention via her staged epiphany, the dramatic narrative of the spectacular and tragic death of the legendary king Erechtheus and his daughters results in a ritual: not only in the foundation of cultic acts honoring the two patron deities of the city, Athena and Poseidon, but especially in the staging of the very ritual practices that are annually undertaken by the spectators who are gathered together in the sanctuary-theater of Dionysus built at the southern foot of the Acropolis. The pragmatic nature of the relationship between the foundation myth represented on the Attic stage, and thehicet nuncof dramatic representation with all its cultic and social implications, is all the more pronounced that the action has a double relationship with the historical conjuncture of the tragic representation as ritual musical performance. On the one hand, the recollection of the “myth” of theinvasion of Attica by the Thracian king’s troops evokes the incursions of the Spartan army that marked the f irst phase of the Peloponnesian war; it ends at the time of the tragedy’s performance around 422. On the other hand, this ritualized dramatization very likely coincides with the actual construction of the Erechtheion, meant to replace the old temple of Athena, destroyed by the Persians before the battle of Salamis; let us remember that this architecturally composite sanctuary is intended to assemble all the relics of Athens and Attica’s primordial and foundational history, from the mark of Poseidon’s trident that sprang water from the Aegean sea into the rocks of the Acropolis, to the olive tree of Athena, reborn immediately after the burning of the Acropolis by the army of Xerxes.[57]On this subject, cf. C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012) (on the Erechtheion, see references given in notes 7 and 42).Inscribed onto the space of the city and within its ritual calendar, the sanctuary becomes an architectural reference to the various narratives that unravel the economic and civic fertility of the land of Attica on the occasion of the great musical and ritual competitions devoted to Dionysios Eleuthereus. In its foundational character, the legendary tale assumes its religious and social effectiveness through the aesthetic power of the revisited dramatic form that Euripides gives it. The “myth” obtains its referential and pragmatic authenticity through communal musical performance, without which it would not exist.

Nevertheless, the example of an Athenian woman embracing the values of male citizenship without renouncing maternity and her love of children (qualities which the tragedian Euripides considers intrinsic to feminine nature), is apparently not suff icient to convince the audience of the rhetor Lycurgus. One must go even further into the past. Like all melic poets, the requisite reference must be made to the panhellenic tradition that Homeric poetry represents; the reference has to be made to the great deeds performed by male warriors on the great stage of narrative f iction that is the battlef ield of Troy. In this particular case, the complementary and cogent example of unconditional love for one’s country is supplied by Hector when he exhorts the Trojans to defend it: to die in battle is to die with glory, safeguarding not only the fatherland but also one’s wife, children, and home. In choosing the example of Hector’s sermon to his troops rather than the hero’s death, Lycurgus can liken his rhetorical standpoint to that of the great Trojan hero. By using this enunciativestrategy, the Athenian orator confers effectiveness to the substance of his own discourse, but also to the performance of the harangue itself. This is undoubtedly the reason why he reminds his audience of the ancestral law which dictates that every four years, the epic verses of Homer and other poets must be recited during the rhapsodic competition that marks the celebration of the Great Panatheneia in honor of the patron goddess Athena. The most glorious heroic deeds of the Greeks are nothing if they are not given life by ritual “demonstration” (epídeixis).[58]Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 102—104, citing Homer, Iliad 15, 494—499. For the model provided by “Homer” for values of warfare in Classical Athens, see for example Aristophanes, Frogs 1036 and, for classical rhetoric, Isocrates, Panegyricus 159. One of the most controversial, the question of the historicity of the Trojan war has recently been reexamined in an raher conf ident study by J. Latacz, Troy and Homer Towards a Solution of an Old Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).It is on the occasion of the great religious and civic celebration of the patron goddess Athena that Homer’s f ictions assume their effectiveness. And it is through the beauty of Homer’s verses and their ritual performance that the good deeds of the heroes of the Trojan War thrive as civic examples,hic et nunc.

3.3 Ritual Pragmatism in Poetry (Theocritus)

What happens, then, when the center that disseminates the great traditions of Greek poetry relocates to Alexandria, where they are made to benef it a monarchic system inf luenced partly by Macedonian monarchy and partly by pharaonic political hierarchy? How do f iction as poetic composition and the heroic narrative fare when the various forms of pragmatic poetry are reduced to text and transferred into the new library to be studied in that very state? What becomes of poetic and f ictional creation in the hands of erudite scholars who identify themselves aspoietaì háma kaì kritikoí, in a literary f ield in the modern sense of the term?

A perfect example of what becomes of ritual and pragmatic poetry within a culture inclining toward literature is a composition attributed to Theocritus, the founder of bucolic poetry. Classif ied as “idyll” in a generic designation that refers only to its “short (poetic) form”, theEpithalamion of Helenis written in dactylic hexameters as would an epic poem, but it is presented in the form of a hymenaeus: a wedding chant that is sung and danced to by a choral group of young girls on the occasion of three cardinal moments in the rite of passage that is the Greek marriage ceremony — at the banquet in the home of the bride’s father, during the ritual procession that escorts the f iancée to the home of her future husband, and f inally within the home of the married couple on their wedding night. The hymenaeus, ofwhich Sappho f illed an entire book of songs published as epithalamia, traditionally sings the praises of the groom and then the bride, while at the same time fulf illing in a performative manner the nuptial rite of passage on behalf of the young bride. Thus, in a manner that conforms to tradition more than any other, poetic praise takes pride of place: f irst as ironic questions directed at the young husband Menelaus on the subject of heavy sleeping, then as praise with a derivative of the customary form of the macarismos: “Happy husband!”, he who has wedded the daughter of a god and will have Zeus himself as father in law.[59]Theocritus, Idyll 18, with the commentary by R. Hunter. Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149—161.

From an enunciative point of view, and borrowing the operational categories elaborated by Émile Benveniste for the “système formel de l’énonciation”, two processes are worth noting. On the one hand, while maintaining the second personyou, which belongs to the realm of “discours”, the reference to Menelaus ushers us into thearkhaîaof which the legendary history of Greece (for us the myths) are composed; from a spatial and temporal point of view, the bygone age and the setting of events in Sparta are what characterizes the “histoire/récit”.[60]On the subject of the distinction between “histoire/récit” and “discours” and the productive uses one can make of it in the study of the pragmatics of ancient Greek poetry, I have discussed on several occasions and especially in Calame 2005: 14—40.On the other hand, the allusion to Zeus immediately focuses the praise onto the bride, in accordance with the tradition of the hymanaeus as a poetic genre. Helen is then spoken of at length, radiant as she was among the young girls that are in the very midst of singing the hymenaeus: “All of us here, participants in the race alongside the waves of the Eurotas, covered in oil in the manner of men, four times sixty young girls, a young band of women; not one of us entirely faultless if compared to Helen” (lines 22—25). At the very moment when the respective planes of the “récit” and the “discours”intersect once again, mythic narration is superimposed onto ritual description.

Henceforth, the nuptial praise is directly addressed to Helen, who is invoked in the vocative form as “beautiful and charming young woman” (line 38) and is now envisioned in her role as household mistress. Come from the near past, her tribute now turns to the immediate future, in an etiological prospect dear to Alexandrian poets.[61]The numerous etiological uses of Greek myths are presented by Ch. Delattre, Manuel de mythologie grecque (Paris: Bréal, 2005), 185—222.Indeed, the beautiful Helen’s (mythic) journey from adolescent to young bride provides the opportunity to describe the ritual which the choir of young girlssinging the poem are about to establish in order to perpetuate the memory of the beautiful and divine young woman as theparthénosshe was: an offering of libations and a crown, set under the shade of plane tree, henceforth referred to as “the tree of Helen” (line 57).

The poem concludes like any hymenaeus, with well wishes directed at both thenumphéthat is the young bride, and at her husband. It will be the prerogative of Leto Kourotrophos to grant them beautiful offspring, that of Athena reciprocal love, and that of Zeus everlasting prosperity. After thewewho perform the poem promise to return in order to sing the traditional morning chant, the poem ends on the same refrain that accompanies the ritual form of the marriage chant: “Hymen ô Hymenaeus”. The hero is summoned and invited to take part in the present wedding, through the use of verbal deixis that characterizes the melic poem which, through it ritual quality, has now become a sung performance.[62]On the pragmatics of the verbal uses of deixis that characterize different forms of ritual Greek poetry, see my study in Calame: 2005b.

In its mythically f ictional context, does the narration and heroic staging of the exemplary marriage between Helen and Menelaus result in the celebration of a nuptial ritual in thehic et nuncof the poem’s chanted performance? To say so would be to ignore the introductory verses of Theocritus’ poem. In using the “once upon a time” corresponding to the time in Sparta with blond Menelaus, the young girls who are singing set the choir they represent at a temporal and narrative distance —twelve young Lacedaemonians of excellent character, singing in unison and striking the ground with an interlacing of subtle rhythms to sound out the hymenaic song. In this initial narrative staging (as in Plato’s dialogues), the enunciativeweassumes the position of the (feminine)-theyreferring to the level of the “récit”. Henceforth, the enunciative conditions of the song are expounded in the shape of the “récit” in order to be included in the narrated scene, in the mythical past where the lives of Helen the daughter of Zeus, and her contented husband Menelaus, hero of the Trojan War, unfold. Is this to say that the poem guides us into a world that is pure f iction, or playful make-believe in the modern sense of the term?

A comparison with other poems of praise by Theocritus, and the presence of the referential shifterarain the initial verse of the poem points towards an enunciative situation that involves the court poetry that develops in the context of the creation of the Alexandrian library and its sanctuary devoted to the Muses. Thereis every reason to believe that the tribute to the exemplary couple that are Helen and Menelaus on the occasion of their nuptials in Sparta in the time of heroes, is meant to evoke the royal couple reigning over the city of Alexandria that was founded at the beginning of the third century BCE: Ptolemy I Soter and his third wife Berenice, who will be deif ied in order to be associated with Aphrodite’s cult.[63]On this subject, see the different hypotheses presented by R. Hunter. Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry, 163—166, and C. Calame, “Les f igures d’Hélène et de Ménélas dans le poème XVIII de Théocrite: entre f iction poétique, pratique rituelle et éloge du pouvoir royal”, in Ch. Cusset, N. Le Meur-Weisman, F. Levin (edd.), Mythe et pouvoir à l’époque hellénistique (Leuven — Paris — Walpole MA: Peeters, 2013). On the pragmatics of the f ictional worlds elaborated and dramatized in the pastoral Idylls of Theocritus, see M. Payne, Theocritus and the Invention of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 49—91.

4. Fiction Outside of Postmodern Textualism

We may now return to Sextus Empiricus, who does not settle for simply shattering the modern distinction between history and myth by introducing the “as if” of narrative creation into the realm of “very-similitude”; the sceptic philosopher eventually associatesmûthoswithplásma, making them both into complements of history. Indeed, from a spatial and temporal point of view, history includes not only the acts of illustrious men, but also the great deeds of heroes and interventions of the gods; thus does Asclepios resurrect certain heroes fallen beneath the walls of Thebes, cure the daughters of Proitos from Hera’s inf licted folly, or heal Hippolytus during his escape from Troezen. And Sextus Empiricus mentions his sources: poets like Stesichorus, or local historians such as Polyanthos of Cyrene or Staphylos of Naucratis. Ultimately, the only stories that would be excluded from the Homeric saga are those of heroes metamorphosing into animals, such as Hecuba was into a bitch, or Ulysses into a horse.[64]Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 260—262 and 264—265, citing, one after the other, Stesichorus fr. 194 (IV) Page-Davies, Polyanthos FGrHist. 37 F 1 and Staphylos FGrHist. 267 F 3.

Henceforth, whether in poetry or prose, we are no longer dealing with stories destined for ritualized performance; the adopted narrative form is no longer comprised of the enunciative strategies that turn a poem that narrates a reformulated heroic account into a sung performance, and thus also into a cultic act. On the other hand, the pragmatic relationship is still powerfully able to formulate that which we perceive as f iction of a mythical nature according to a measure of verisimilitude andplausibility that is founded on a cultural paradigm sustained by a very rich heroic tradition and stimulated by vibrant polytheism. The extraordinary plasticity of Greek myths bears witness to the continuous adaptations of these narrative f ictions to a cultural context that is diverse and constantly shifting.[65]On the constant remaking of Greek myths, see different studies collected in C. Calame (éd.), Métamorphoses du mythe dans la Grèce antique (Genève: Labor & Fides,1988), as well as the useful comments by R. Buxton, Imaginary Greece. The contexts of mythology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9—66.Not a thing within it could ever be purely imaginary.

In conclusion, and in another brief foray into the modern world from a critically oblique perspective, one might wonder whether, permeated by the paradigm of technological eff iciency, video game users do not believe in the virtual reality that they are called to manipulate? Do they not participate in it aesthetically, emotionally, and intellectually? With the critical and decentered reconsideration which the anthropological approach to another culture allows us to make, an explanation that resorts from a purely pragmatic perspective to “playful make-believe” as an answer, will simply not be satisfactory. At a stage when postmodernism is fading, but that is still strongly animated by the competitive and individualistic ideology of neoliberalism, it is time to abandon the relativist textualism that stems from it in literary criticism. The aesthetic effect and emotional impact of f iction must be investigated as much in the world that narrative f iction creates as in the verbal and visual media that allow it to be built. On the one hand, no matter how imaginary it may be, the plausible world is inf luenced by a cultural paradigm within which it will be accepted by a community of users; on the other hand, the po(i)etic form it assumes insures its syntactic and semantic coherence but also its pragmatic impact. In order to be useful, f iction can only be referential! By the frequent interaction between the underlying poetics, artistic creation, and the approach of literary criticism, contemporary f iction’s claim to self-referentiality is ultimately but the effect of postmodernist textualism.

If Greek poetry, in all its various forms, is neither f iction, nor literature, it teaches us yet to ref lect on the manifestations of the verbal poieîn in terms of pragmatics, in terms of referential and cultural pragmatics. We would then speak, in a rather sophistic oxymoron, of “referential f iction”.

(Translated by Amanda Iacobelli)

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The Poetic Pragmatics of Greek Myths: Referential Fiction and Ritual Performance[34]

Claude Calame
(École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris)

In ancient Greece as in other traditional cultures, narratives about the heroic past we are used to call “myths” would not exist without ritual forms of delivery. From Homeric poetry to tragedy, the Greeks knew and sang generally in a choral way different forms of poetry. The performative aspect of their enunciation and the metrical rhythm of their delivery made of them not only collective acts of language, but also cult acts. On the base of a few examples, the aim of this article is to explore the pragmatics, through emotional and esthetic effects, of such narrative and ritual forms of heroic past, and to defend, between factual and f ictive, the notion of “referential f iction.”

Pragmatics; Fiction; Myth; Poetic Performance

克劳德·伽拉姆目前为法国“社会科学高等研究院”（EHESS）所属“古代世界人类学和历史学研究中心”（AnHiMA）的荣休教授。他曾担任瑞士洛桑大学古希腊语言与文学教授。此外，他还在意大利乌尔比诺和锡耶纳大学以及美国耶鲁大学等多所高校任客座教授。在他众多的法语著作中，已译成英语出版的有《古希腊诗歌语言的技艺》（康奈尔大学出版社，1995年）、《古希腊“爱欲”的诗学》（普林斯顿大学出版社，1999年）、《古希腊的少女歌队》（罗曼和利特尔菲尔德出版公司，2001年第二版）、《权威的面具—古希腊诗学中的虚构性与语用学》（康奈尔大学出版社，2005年）、《古希腊的诗性记忆与表演性记忆》（哈佛大学“希腊研究中心”—哈佛大学出版社，2009年）以及《希腊神话学—诗学、语用学与虚构性》（剑桥大学出版社，2009年）。

[1] 本文译自法文原文，与后文所刊的英译文或有个别出入，请读者注意。—译注