The Prospects of the United States’Asia-Pacific Alliance System

Sun Ru

The U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system is often described as a“hub and spoke system,”with the U.S. at the center of the wheel and its allies at the end of the spokes. The main feature of this system is that although the U.S. has established a series of bilateral alliances with countries in the region, there is a lack of cooperation between those countries themselves. Since the end of the Cold War, a trend of networking has emerged in the U.S.Asia-Pacific bilateral alliance system. Networking refers to the establishment of security cooperation mechanisms between the U.S. and its allies and it has substantially strengthened their relations. Small-scale multilateral cooperation between the U.S.and its allies and between the allies themselves has turned the“hub and spoke system”into a complex interwoven network.

The progress of the networking of the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system features some trilateral cooperation, such as the U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation and the U.S.-Japan-Australia cooperation. Since the Obama administration proclaimed its“return”to the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. has pushed forward small-scale multilateral cooperation and launched the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue. Although India has a strong“non-alignment”complex and is not an ally of the U.S., it has been regarded as an indispensable member of the“mini NATO in the Asia-Pacific.”Both the U.S. and its allies have made great efforts to woo India out of security concerns. Trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan and India, known as the“shadow alliance,”can be regarded as a breakthrough to a certain extent in the networking of the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system. In light of their importance to Asia-Pacific security, the U.S., Japan and India will be included in this research.

Recently, the U.S.-led trilateral cooperation has been very active. The U.S.-Japan-Australia and the U.S.-Japan-ROK military exercises were carried out with great fanfare, and the second U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue was held less than six months after the previous one. Now, trilateral cooperation has developed into a new phase: cooperation is no longer a superposition of three sets of bilateral cooperation, but tripartite coordinated action following certain norms, which has become an organic whole. Why has the trilateral cooperation developed so extensively at the same time and so rapidly with such momentum? For China, the greatest concern is whether China has become the target of the trilateral cooperation and whether such cooperation will evolve into a“mini NATO”in the Asia-Pacific. This paper attempts to analyze these issues.

I. The“Cluster Effect”of the U.S. Networking

With the U.S.-Japan-ROK, U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-Japan-India trilateral cooperation platforms serving as important features, the networking of the U.S. Asia-Pacific bilateral alliance system has gained considerable momentum, resulting in a“cluster effect”which helps to transform the original hub-andspoke structure to the network structure. The“cluster effect”of the trilateral cooperation has two characteristics.

The first is the establishment of cooperation mechanisms.Dialogue mechanisms have been set up for U.S.-Japan-ROK, U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-Japan-India trilateral cooperation, one after another. Their policy consultations have become increasingly frequent and showed a trend of progress.The U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation started during the first DPRK nuclear crisis and continued in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the four-party talks on the peace mechanism of the peninsula. In June 1999,the United States, Japan and the R.O.K. formally established a coordination mechanism on their policies towards the DPRK,i.e. the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group. Regular consultations have been held under this framework. After the outbreak of the second DPRK nuclear crisis, there were constant frictions between the U.S., Japan and the ROK, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group mechanism came to a standstill. After the DPRK’s nuclear test in October 2006, the U.S., Japan and the ROK resumed consultations,but no longer under the name of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group. After the Lee Myung-bak administration took office, the ROK moved to reinforce the U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation and carried out trilateral consultations at the director-general level, the vice-ministerial level, the ministerial level and the summit level. In 2009, the first U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral defense ministers meeting was held at the Shangri-La Dialogue. In 2012, they agreed to hold trilateral defense minister meetings on a regular basis.

The U.S., Japan and Australia launched the Trilateral Senior Officials’Meeting at the vice foreign ministerial level in 2002 and officially launched the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) at the foreign ministerial level in March 2006 while retaining the Trilateral Senior Officials’Meeting. In 2007, the U.S., Japan and Australia held their first trilateral defense ministerial meetings and the first trilateral summit respectively at the Shangri-La Dialogue and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. At present, regular trilateral consultations under the framework of the TSD are carried out at the foreign ministerial level, the vice foreign ministerial level, and the director-general level. At the former two levels, regional and global issues of common concern are discussed while at the director-general level consultations focus on counter-terrorism issues.

The U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue started late, and currently consultations are at the director-general level. Previously, the U.S., Japan, Australia and India had attempted to establish a four-party dialogue mechanism. In response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, the U.S.,Japan, Australia and India created the“Group of Four”for relief efforts. After that, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe started emphasizing“values-oriented diplomacy”in an attempt to promote the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India dialogue. In May 2007, the U.S., Japan, Australia and India held a four-party consultation at the director-general level during the Senior Officials’Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For various reasons, the four-party dialogue did not continue.However, during the Bush administration, the role of India in Asia-Pacific security got increasing attention from U.S. strategic circles. For example, the second Armitage report called on the U.S. government to attach more importance to the role of India and proposed strengthening the U.S.-Japan-India cooperation,claiming that India would play a greater role in the strategic balance of East Asia. The Obama administration put India into Greater Asia-Pacific perspective and pushed mechanisms for the U.S.-Japan-India cooperation forward.

The second characteristic is deepened security cooperation.On the one hand, these countries’positions on regional and global issues have been coordinated. The U.S.-Japan-ROK, U.S.-Japan-Australia, and U.S.-Japan-India trilateral cooperation platforms enable them to exchange views on medium- and longterm issues influencing the Asia-Pacific region so as to reduce differences and promote mutual trust. At the same time, they can also respond to emergencies by having emergency consultations to support each other and work out effective measures. The scope of the U.S.-Japan-Australia and the U.S.-Japan-India consultations overlap in general, with the same general focus on Asia-Pacific security. The U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral strategic dialogue stresses that“our three countries have a common cause in working to maintain stability and security globally with a particular focus on the Asia Pacific region.”The U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue states that the three countries have“frank and comprehensive”discussions on Asia-Pacific and global issues of mutual interest. The U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation tends to expand from the Korean Peninsula to the Asia-Pacific and the whole world because they claim to have“a common cause and responsibility”to maintain Asia-Pacific and global stability and security. The three countries not only closely follow the development of the situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Iran and the Middle East, but also tried to strengthen cooperation on various issues such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief capacity-building, freedom of navigation, maritime security, counter-terrorism, fighting piracy, drugs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,climate change, development assistance, and epidemic control.The extensiveness of their cooperation on the above issues is comparable to that between the U.S., Japan and Australia.

On the other hand, security cooperation in various fields has been advanced. Trilateral security cooperation encompasses traditional and non-traditional security fields. The U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation is targeted against the threat of the DPRK, but they also began to conduct joint military exercises in the name of disaster relief. The U.S., Japan and Australia focus on promoting non-traditional security, but traditional military cooperation is on the increase. They have established an information exchange mechanism on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to ensure the best use of all resources in case of natural disasters and humanitarian crises. The three countries decided to carry out disaster relief training together and to hold consultations between humanitarian assistance and disaster relief officials at the technical level. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises have been held between the U.S., Japan and Australia and between the U.S., Japan and India as well. The U.S., Japan, Australia, the ROK and India have all included maritime security in the scope of their trilateral cooperations. During the 2011 East Asia Summit (EAS), these countries raised the South China Sea issue on the grounds of discussing maritime security. On counter-terrorism and nonproliferation issues, the U.S., Japan and Australia held regular consultations, stepped up intelligence sharing, and assisted countries such as the Philippines in fighting against terrorism.To prevent the proliferation of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile technology, the U.S., Japan and the ROK introduced new measures of financial sanctions against the DPRK and intensified surveillance on the DPRK’s exports of goods. Concerning missile defense cooperation and intelligence exchanges, substantial trilateral military cooperation has come to the fore. Japan,Australia, India and the ROK are all Asia-Pacific countries that support the development of the U.S. missile defense system,and they have carried out bilateral missile defense cooperation to varying degrees with the United States. Specifically, the most in-depth missile defense cooperation is carried out between the U.S. and Japan; the U.S. and Australia signed a missile defense agreement; missile defense consultations were held between the U.S. and the ROK and between the U.S. and India. After nearly 10 years of development, the U.S., Japan and Australia have been capable of weaving a missile defense network. Since 2011, Japan once again relaxed the“three principles of arms export,”allowing the U.S. to sell to a third country the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missiles jointly developed by the U.S. and Japan under the principle of guaranteeing Japan’s security,which gave the green light for the U.S. to export such missiles to Australia and the ROK. In March 2012, the U.S. announced that it would build a missile defense system in Asia similar to that in Europe through trilateral talks between the U.S., Japan and the ROK and between the U.S., Japan and Australia. The U.S.,Japan and Australia have intelligence exchanges in counterterrorism and nonproliferation. If they promote trilateral antimissile cooperation, then higher requirements will be put on the sharing of intelligence such as missile warning systems, which is bound to promote trilateral military integration. In terms of joint military exercises, trilateral military exercises have become regular. In April and October 2007, trilateral joint military exercises between the U.S., Japan and India and between the U.S., Japan and Australia were held for the first time respectively.In July 2011, with the escalation of the situation in the South China Sea, the U.S., Japan and Australia held joint military exercises in waters near Brunei. The U.S., Japan and the ROK have been quietly holding trilateral joint military exercises since 2008. After the sinking of the Cheonan, a ROK Navy ship, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, Japan sent observers for the first time to the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise code-named“Indomitable Will.”The ROK also sent observers for the first time to the U.S.-Japan joint military exercise named“Sword.”In June 2012, the U.S., Japan and the ROK publicly held a tripartite joint military exercise. Member countries of the trilateral cooperation have actively participated in the Asia-Pacific multilateral military exercises in recent years. The U.S., Japan, Australia and India are principal members of the“Malabar”multinational joint military exercise. Japan, the ROK, Australia and India all participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise hosted by the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Command. Japan, the ROK and Australia are members of the“Proliferation Security Initiative”(PSI) and they all hosted the PSI multinational joint exercise. In recent years, Japan and the ROK joined the U.S.-Thai“Cobra Gold”joint military exercise. In April 2012, during the standoff between China and the Philippines over Huangyan Island, Japan,the ROK and Australia sent observers for the first time to the U.S.-Philippine Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) joint military exercise. Some of these military exercises are over humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping and other issues,but objectively speaking, they all contribute to enhancing the military coordination capabilities of these countries. Many of the military exercises were on a large scale with high standards. The U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed and advanced weapons and equipment made their debut in those joint operations against imaginary enemies. The choice of location and timing of some military exercises was to send political signals or to strengthen military deterrence. Through these joint military exercises, the U.S. showed its presence and improved its military capabilities to get involved in Asia-Pacific affairs.

China-related discussions in those trilateral dialogues have always been the focus of media attention, but those countries regard them as highly secret and they all deny that such discussions are against China. Some of the trilateral statements welcomed China to play a“constructive”role in the Asia-Pacific,while some simply made no mention of China. However, Chinarelated consultations of bilateral alliances were more open.For example, the U.S.-Japan joint statement called on China to increase military transparency. Whether such trilateral security cooperation is targeted against China is always the focus of attention. The U.S. and Canada are stepping up the construction of a missile defense network. The U.S., Japan and Australia held a joint military exercise of anti-submarine warfare. The U.S., Japan, Australia, the ROK and India have been enthusiastic about maritime security discussions. Judging from these developments, it is increasingly clear that these countries are uniting together against China.

II.The Networking Is Derived from the Changes of the Asia-Pacific Security Situation

The networking of the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system originated from the profound changes in the Asia-Pacific security situation over the past 20 years. The development of the cluster effect can be analyzed from three perspectives: national policies,bilateral relations, and regional multilateral mechanisms. Among these three perspectives, the changes of national policies of relevant countries are closely related to the fluctuating balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

From the perspective of national policies, the principal reason for the networking is that the U.S. and its allies have shifted to close cooperation by“holding together.”The U.S. is the main variable influencing the U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation, and it is also the key factor in promoting the U.S.-Japan-Australia and the U.S.-Japan-India cooperations. Faced with the rise of China, regional territorial disputes and non-traditional security challenges, the U.S. realizes that bilateral alliances alone are not sufficient to deal with all those challenges, and trilateral and multilateral cooperation are also necessary to add to alliance flexibility. Since the Clinton administration, the U.S. Asia-Pacific policy has taken trilateral cooperation and regional multilateral cooperation as a useful supplement to compensate for the inadequacy of bilateral alliances. The Bush administration and the Obama administration followed this policy by taking bilateral alliances as the basis and multilateral cooperation as supplementary, though the two administrations have differed in their attitude towards multilateral cooperation. The Bush administration attached more importance to the effectiveness of cooperation and made less effort on regional multilateral cooperation, which involves a large number of member countries.Although the U.S. did not join the East Asia Summit, it started the U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and it initiated the six-party talks to solve the DPRK nuclear issue. The Obama administration attaches importance to both participation and efficiency. It pushed forward multilateral and trilateral cooperation at the same time by joining the East Asia Summit,promoting the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiations and initiating the Lower Mekong Cooperation Initiative to quell the Southeast Asian countries’dissatisfaction with America’s neglectful attitude towards Asia.American power suffered relative decline thanks to the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the international financial crisis. In contrast, China’s economy maintained momentum of rapid development, and surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in 2010 with expanding international influence. The change of economic power between China and the U.S. caused concern in the U.S. about its dominant status in the Asia-Pacific region, and China’s development of aircraft carrier and other military capabilities further exacerbated American concerns. The Obama government realized that in order to maintain Asia-Pacific stability and peace, it must rely more on its key allies and partners. After the DPRK’s second nuclear test in May 2009, both the U.S. government and the American public generally recognized that the DPRK would not abandon its nuclear program and if the DPRK continued to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, it would constitute a“direct threat”to the U.S. in approximately five years. The Obama administration had a greater sense of urgency to contain the DPRK’s capability to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and believed that China was not putting enough pressure on the DPRK. So it turned to the U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation to deal with the DPRK’s growing“threat.”Therefore, it can be concluded that the Obama administration’s focus on trilateral cooperation to a large extent was determined by the situation and its purpose was to have more room for policy maneuvering.

The three sets of trilateral cooperation are sometimes referred to as the“U.S.-Japan +1”mechanism, which shows Japan’s important role in the trilateral cooperation. Besides the U.S.,Japan is also extremely active in the trilateral cooperation.Due to historical, territorial, maritime and other disputes between China and Japan, Japan is even more worried about the changing balance of power in the region and its reaction is more intense. In addition to stepping up its self-defense capabilities and strengthening its bilateral alliances, Japan also relies on trilateral cooperation to increase its bargaining power in dealing with China. Meanwhile, through bilateral and trilateral cooperation, Japan took the opportunity to expand the range of military operations of its Self-Defense Forces overseas,advancing toward its goal of becoming a political power.

From the perspective of bilateral relations, the strengthened bilateral security cooperations have laid a foundation for trilateral cooperations. The U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-Australia alliance were“redefined”in the 1990s and the scope of cooperation was extended from“national defense”to“international security”by focusing on regional and global issues, which laid the foundation for the establishment of the trilateral strategic dialogue (TSD). The progress of these trilateral cooperations in recent years has depended on the strengthening of bilateral alliances over the past 10 years. With regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces exceeded the constitutional limit and sent troops overseas. The Koizumi government intended to build a“World League”by sending warships overseas. The U.S.-Japan alliance underwent a new round of restructuring with accelerated military integration. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power, the U.S.-Japan relationship suffered setbacks due to the relocation issue of the Futenma base, but affairs soon returned to normal. As for the U.S.-ROK alliance, since Lee Myung-bak came to power, the U.S. and the ROK have been actively engaged in building a“comprehensive strategic alliance”and kept in step with each other in their policies towards the DPRK. The U.S.for the first time stipulated in its official documents to provide“extended deterrence,”including the nuclear umbrella to the ROK. It also upgraded arms sales to the ROK to the same level with“NATO + 3”(Japan, Australia and New Zealand) countries.The ROK joined the PSI and participated in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The U.S.-ROK joint military exercises against the DPRK became more and more frequent and they revised the OPLAN 5029 in order to deal with the DPRK’s potential“collapse.”The U.S. and the ROK started a“2+2”dialogue mechanism at the level of foreign ministers and defense ministers, and their cooperation extended to Asia-Pacific and global issues. U.S.-ROK relations experienced constant frictions during the Roh Moohyun administration, but shifted to close cooperation during the Lee Myung-bak administration and revitalized the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation. As for the U.S.-Australia alliance,the Howard government collaborated with the U.S. in the war on terror and sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty signed by the U.S. and Australia in September 2007 allowed most of the defense trade possible between the two countries without the U.S. government’s prior approval. Previously, among U.S. allies, only the United Kingdom had received this privilege. In April 2012, the U.S.stationed troops in Darwin, Australia, which marks a major step forward for U.S.-Australia military relations. In addition,the U.S.-India strategic relationship has been strengthened. The U.S. and India signed a nuclear agreement, which shows that the U.S. has acquiesced and accepted India’s status as a nuclear power, clearing the biggest obstacle in their bilateral relations.During the Obama administration, the U.S. and India deepened their“global strategic partnership”and strengthened military cooperation. In June 2010, the U.S. and India established the annual Strategic Dialogue mechanism to consolidate the basis of their partnership.

The progress of the trilateral cooperation also depends on strengthened ties between U.S. allies and partners. The most typical example is Japan’s strengthened security cooperation with Australia, the ROK and India, which can be demonstrated in the following aspects. First, Japan’s relations with Australia and India are moving towards a“quasi-alliance.”Japan signed Joint Declarations on Security Cooperation with Australia and India respectively, which was the first time that Japan had signed such security agreements with countries other than the U.S., marking a turning point in its foreign and security policy. Second, high-level bilateral dialogue mechanisms have been established. Modeling the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-Australia“2+2”mechanism, Japan and Australia also established a“2+2”mechanism. The mechanisms of cooperation between Japan and India developed rapidly since 2007 with the establishment of the foreign ministerial level strategic dialogue mechanism, the vice-ministerial“2+2”mechanism and the viceministerial level dialogue on defense policy. High-level exchanges of visits between Japan and the ROK got increasingly regular and top leaders and foreign ministers exchanged visits almost annually. Third, security cooperation has deepened. Japan has strengthened cooperation with Australia, the ROK and India in counter-terrorism, maritime security, peacekeeping,humanitarian relief, intelligence exchange and warship visits.The Japan-Australia cooperation in East Timor peacekeeping and Iraq reconstruction has also promoted closer military relations. Japan and India held their first maritime joint military exercises in June 2012, marking a step forward in their military exchanges. What is noteworthy is that Japan strengthened military and intelligence cooperation with Australia, the ROK and India. After the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements(ACSA) were signed between the U.S. and Japan and between the U.S. and Australia, Japan and Australia also signed the ACSA.According to this agreement, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defense Forces agreed to provide logistical support such as food, fuel, transport, shelter, health care to each other as they engage in operations such as peacekeeping,disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Japan and the ROK have also reached an agreement on the ACSA and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).Once signed, they will be the first military agreements between Japan and the ROK since World War II. ACSA will enable Japan and the ROK to provide logistical support to each other in joint operations, while the GSOMIA will enable the two countries to play complementary roles for each other in order to better exchange intelligence concerning the DPRK.

From the perspective of regional multilateral mechanisms,the defects of regional mechanisms provide great room for the development of trilateral cooperation. The Asia-Pacific regional cooperation mechanisms at various levels have witnessed vigorous development and have achieved great success in promoting economic integration, but this has not been the case in“high politics.”Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) launched counter-terrorism cooperation after 9/11, but in general its main task is to promote trade and investment integration. The East Asia Summit (EAS) as a“strategic forum”focuses on political and strategic issues. Its member states have not formed a consistent view for the direction of the EAS. As a multilateral mechanism reflecting the concept of“cooperative security,”the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has made limited progress in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The U.S., Japan and Australia do not take“cooperative security”as top priorities for the pursuit of regional order. In regional security cooperation, the six-party talks played a positive role, but they stalled recently in promoting the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with little hope to restart in the foreseeable future. The trilateral cooperation is a form of cooperation between bilateral alliances and multilateral security mechanisms. It makes up for the deficiency of bilateral alliances and multilateral mechanisms but will not replace existing mechanisms. Thus it became the choice of the U.S. and its allies. With the development of the alliance system, proposals to shape a new order in the Asia-Pacific have begun to appear, mostly through bilateral alliances or trilateral cooperations. For example, some propose taking the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation framework as the anchor of regional security cooperation framework in Asia, while APEC,ARF and EAS mechanisms are supplementary to the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation.

III.The Networking of Asia-Pacific Alliance Will Hardly Result in a“Mini NATO”in the Asia-Pacific

In the future, the U.S., Japan, the ROK, Australia and India will continue to promote mechanisms for trilateral cooperation and deepen security cooperation in various fields. Developments in recent years show that the U.S. and its allies attach increasing importance to trilateral cooperation. The common strategic objectives laid out in the joint statement adopted by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”Meeting) in May 2007 only made reference to the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral cooperation without mentioning the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral cooperation. As for India, the U.S. and Japan only claimed to build partnerships with India. The common strategic objectives adopted by the U.S.-Japan“2+2”meeting in June 2011 pointed out that the U.S.-Japan-Australia and the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation would be strengthened at the same time and the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue would be promoted.It can be seen that after a lapse of four years, U.S. and Japanese perceptions have changed considerably. The U.S.-ROK“2+2”meeting held in June 2012 stressed the importance of the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security consultations, and they made a commitment to strengthen trilateral security cooperation and coordination mechanisms. Some scholars believe that the U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation at the present stage focuses on dealing with the DPRK’s threat, but China will gradually become the decisive factor influencing trilateral cooperation. Some thinktank researchers have started planning the future of trilateral cooperations, and proposing to push mechanisms forward significantly. For example, some hold that the U.S., Japan and the ROK should establish a“trilateral security committee”to integrate the U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)and the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC)so as to plan the priorities of their trilateral strategies. Some advocate the establishment of a Secretariat for the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation by modeling China-Japan-ROK cooperation in order to promote trilateral cooperation based on the GSOMIA and the ACSA. One former Australian diplomat proposed to hold an Asia-Pacific Alliance Caucus so that the U.S.and its five allies - Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand - could hold an informal meeting to discuss sensitive issues that regional organizations are reluctant to discuss. The“2 +2”mechanisms have been established between the U.S. and Japan, between Japan and Australia, and between the U.S. and Australia respectively. One cannot rule out that they will be integrated in the future into a trilateral“2+2+2”mechanism.

Does the current development trend mean that a“mini NATO”in the Asia-Pacific is just around the corner? Will trilateral cooperation evolve into a“trilateral alliance?”Some scholars take the U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation as an example and point out that it is still unrealistic to establish a multilateral alliance modeled after NATO in the Asia-Pacific region. Others say that it is unrealistic to take China as a threat, while others point out that there are still conflicts between Japan and the ROK.Some scholars believe that the U.S. and its allies will form a“mini NATO”in the Asia-Pacific to contain China, with the U.S.-Japan-Australia axis being the general framework of the“mini NATO.”Such differing views indicate that there are diverging understandings of the connotation of“mini NATO”in the Asia-Pacific. Some measure Asia-Pacific trilateral cooperation according to traditional standards for allies, and some take trilateral cooperation as a variant of multilateral alliances.Compared with the temporary“Coalition of the Willing”that the U.S. established after 9/11, trilateral cooperation has more mechanisms for cooperation and it is more extensive and of more political and security significance. That being said, it can hardly be called a trilateral military alliance. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty includes an article that stipulates that either country is to provide military assistance when the other is attacked by a third party. But this article is not included in the Japan-Australia and Japan-India security declarations,meaning that there is no similar obligation for them to provide military assistance when the other country is attacked. The U.S.-Japan ACSA includes terms of supplying weapons and ammunition in case of armed attacks, while the Japan-Australia ACSA does not contain such terms and their mutual logistical assistance is limited to peacekeeping, disaster relief and so on.Such substantial differences suggest that the Japan-Australia and the Japan-India security cooperations are not yet on equal terms with the U.S.-Japan alliance. As such, they cannot be regarded as alliances. In the same vein, the U.S.-Japan-Australia cooperation established on the same basis cannot be called a trilateral alliance.

The trilateral cooperation is indeed geared against China to a certain extent, but whether it will evolve into a multilateral alliance excluding China depends on the following factors.

First, it will depend on the intention and capabilities of the United States. The U.S. has made no fundamental change in taking the trilateral cooperation as a“supplement”to bilateral alliances, not as a substitute for them. To promote trilateral dialogue is not to formally establish a multilateral collective security mechanism like NATO. The failure of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization during the Cold War may caution the U.S. to think twice about the establishment of a“mini NATO”in the Asia-Pacific. The establishment of a multilateral alliance requires a high level of military integration. The U.S. must take on more obligations and it is uncertain whether the U.S.is willing to do so. Even if the U.S. does not establish such a military alliance, it is not easy for the U.S. to maintain trilateral coordination mechanisms targeted against China. Judging from what happened in the past, U.S. allies do not want to be tied up to a“war chariot”against China. Politically, they do not want to follow the U.S. in lockstep. In October 2003, Australia gave the same reception to visiting President George Bush and President Hu Jintao. However, the opportunity to address the Australian parliament usually given to American presidents was given to President Hu. In August 2004, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that Australia had no obligation to side with the U.S. if tensions in the Taiwan straits erupted into a war, which caused shock and concern in the United States. The Roh Moo-hyun government of the ROK sought to establish a new order for the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia and proposed a concept of“balancing”in terms of foreign policy to strike a balance between China and the U.S., which caused dissatisfaction in the United States. The Japanese Hatoyama government called for“close and equal”Japan-U.S. relations and the establishment of the“East Asian Community”excluding the United States. One of the Hatoyama government’s important think tanks proposed building an equilaterally triangular China-U.S.-Japan relationship to achieve real diplomatic independence. The Hatoyama government gave a high-level reception to Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping during his visit to Japan;former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader Ichiro Ozawa led a large delegation to China. The U.S. was dissatisfied with all these proposals and activities. The above examples suggest that it is so difficult for the U.S. to coordinate policies towards China within the framework of bilateral alliances and it will be even harder within a multilateral framework.

Second, it will depend on the level of development of bilateral relations. When former U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained why the U.S. signed a series of bilateral treaties after World War II, he pointed out that Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines did not want to sign a multilateral security treaty that included Japan because of their fresh memories of the Japanese invasion. They worried about Japan even more than Russia and China. As Japan and Australia have signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, historical issues are no longer the obstacles to the development of Japan-Australia bilateral relations. But whether Japan and the ROK can completely eliminate historical barriers is a different matter because the territorial disputes between the two countries still cause fluctuations in their bilateral relations from time to time.The repeated postponement of signing the agreements after Japan and the ROK reached the GSOMIA and the ACSA reflects the ROK’s hesitation to deepen military cooperation with Japan.The majority of people are not optimistic about whether the U.S.-Japan-ROK will evolve into a trilateral military alliance.

Third, it will depend on the extent to which countries in the region unite against China. Concerns about China’s growing strength are still a strong driving force for the U.S. and its allies to strengthen their cooperation. The U.S. has not changed its goal of maintaining its dominant status in the Asia-Pacific region and it still hopes the formation of the network will spread this responsibility by uniting together against China. Japan still hopes that the trilateral cooperation will balance China’s influence and help promote the role of its military forces.Australia, India and the ROK also want to safeguard their own interests in this process and raise their voice in Asia-Pacific affairs. The development of trilateral cooperation shows that these countries have increasing consensus on policies towards China and they draw on each other’s advantages by“holding together”to enhance their own power. In the future these countries may also have more in-depth military cooperation as a response to the development of China’s military power. The real question is whether these countries are concerned enough about the rise of China as to believe that the formation of a multilateral military alliance is really necessary. Judging from the national strategies of respective countries, they will not necessarily resort to confrontation. The above-mentioned countries recognize that confrontation alone is no way out and want to keep a variety of policy alternatives available. The U.S. realizes that China is not the former Soviet Union and Chinese-U.S. relations should not become a“zero-sum”relationship. The United States’China policy framework in general is contact and containment. Japan not only actively promotes bilateral alliances and trilateral cooperation; it also has repeatedly advocated the establishment of a China-U.S.-Japan trilateral dialogue mechanism. In view of the role China has played in issues on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK does not want to stand in complete opposition to China.The online version of The Washington Post reported in October 2011 that President Lee Myung-bak hoped that the United States would contain China, but the ROK’s presidential palace quickly publicized the full text of the interview to clarify the false interpretation. Australia is geographically far from the disputed areas in the Asia-Pacific, so it is not as eager to contain China as the U.S. and Japan. India will not be manipulated by the U.S. and Japan and will not give up the development of relations with China, even though it has security concerns about China.The U.S. and Japan are also aware of that.

In sum, the future development of trilateral cooperation is faced with both a favorable situation and constraints. In the long term,the trilateral cooperation and bilateral alliances will develop in a parallel manner. The degree of militarization of the former will be strengthened, but it will hardly replace the latter. The“hub and spoke”structure will be transformed into a network structure rather than a multilateral alliance.

The networking of the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system brings new and complicated factors to China’s neighboring environment. From the perspective of security, the U.S. and its allies pose a direct military threat to China by promoting missile defense cooperation. The U.S. and countries in the region hold together in response to China’s rise, which has exacerbated regional military confrontation and is not conducive to building strategic mutual trust between China and its neighboring countries. The U.S. and its allies are collectively involved in regional hot issues,which has heightened tensions in the region and increased the difficulty with which China is attempting to promote“cooperative security.”It is also hindering China’s efforts to create a“harmonious neighborhood.”Politically, the U.S. and its allies urge China to comply with international rules and play the role of a“responsible stakeholder.”China faces pressure to assume greater responsibility in the region and beyond. Ideologically,the U.S. and its allies are all so-called democratic countries and regard each other as“natural”allies and partners. They echo each other on issues such as human rights and the“responsibility to protect.”As such, the political system and diplomatic norms that China adheres to are facing new challenges.

In response to the above situation, China should remain calm and adopt different counter-measures. First, China should express direct concern towards any moves involving China in the trilateral cooperation and resolutely oppose any attempts to establish an“alliance of democratic countries”as well as trilateral military cooperation against China. Second,China should continue constructive cooperation and strategic dialogues with these countries and be open-minded in international exchanges, with particular attention to interests so as to consolidate the basis for cooperation through mutual benefit and win-win relationships. Third, China should give full play to the role of China-U.S. consultation mechanisms at all levels and explore new ways for the China-U.S. cooperation in the Asia Pacific so that they may coexist peacefully. Fourth, China should make more efforts and take measures to alleviate the concerns of the United States’Asia-Pacific allies about the rise of China. Finally, China should change its mind and have more interactions with the United States’Asia-Pacific alliance and consider the establishment of a China-U.S.-Japan trilateral strategic dialogue mechanism at an appropriate time.