俄罗斯200海里以外大陆架划界案介评

潘 军

俄罗斯200海里以外大陆架划界案介评

潘 军*

划定200海里以外大陆架的外部界限,对于沿海国的政治、经济和军事具有深远的战略意义,对于世界海洋的新格局至关重要。联合国大陆架界限委员会对首例200海里以外大陆架划界案——俄罗斯2001年划界案的审议和建议,使俄罗斯以及各沿海国切实体会到依据国际法将本国大陆架扩展至领海基线200海里以外的复杂性和艰巨性。首次受挫的俄罗斯目前一方面以务实的态度不断与周边国家协调并通过各种方式积极营造国际氛围,一方面在科学数据等方面继续勘测,为重新提交划界案积极准备。俄罗斯划界案的得与失对于各沿海国,尤其是海洋划界困难重重的中国,提供了可借鉴的科学和法律实践。

俄罗斯 大陆架界限委员会 200海里以外大陆架 外部界限划界案

俄罗斯①俄罗斯划界案2001年12月20日提交,参见俄罗斯划界案主页,下载于http://www.un. org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm,2012年5月1日。是第一个根据1982年《联合国海洋法公约》②The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(1833U.N.T.S.3),at http:// treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en. pdf,1 May 2012.(以下简称“《公约》”)向联合国大陆架界限委员会③联合国大陆架界限委员会,联合国系统的一个专门委员会,设立于1997年,专司200海里以外大陆架外部界限事项,其职能为审议沿海国200海里以外大陆架划界案并提出建议以及应沿海国要求对其编制划界案提供技术咨询,迄今已历3届(1997年、2002年、2007年)。(以下简称“委员会”)提交200海里④1海里等于1852米。以外大陆架划界案的国家,涉及4个不同的海域,其中两个位于北极地区(中北冰洋和巴伦支海),两个位于西北太平洋(鄂霍次克海和白令海),涉及200海里以外大陆架总面积约158万平方公里。①匡增军:《俄罗斯的外大陆架政策评析》,载于《俄罗斯中亚东欧研究》2011年第2期,第74页。委员会经过审议,于2002年7月27日通过建议书, 4个海域的申请当时均未获得委员会的认可。自建议书通过之后至今的近10年内,俄罗斯进行了一系列锲而不舍的艰苦努力,预计在2012年重新提交划界案。本文拟结合发达国家的最新研究成果,对俄罗斯划界案的来龙去脉作一简要回顾及粗浅评述。

一、200海里以外大陆架法律制度及《公约》第76条对大陆架外部界限的界定

(一)200海里以外大陆架法律制度

历时9年(1973—1982)的第三次联合国海洋法会议,②第三次联合国海洋法会议创造了以往国际关系史上参加国最多、规模最大、时间最长的3个之“最”,也是国际法编纂史上所拟公约条文最多的一次,《公约》包括一个序言、17部分共320条以及9个附件。中国代表团自始至终参加了第三次联合国海洋法会议的各期会议。经过艰苦卓绝的谈判诞生了一项涵盖先前数项公约③1958年联合国第一次海洋法会议时所订立的4项公约:《领海与毗连区公约》、《公海公约》、《捕鱼及养护公海生物资源公约》以及《大陆架公约》。的全新海洋法公约——1982年《联合国海洋法公约》。《公约》是人类历史上迄今为止最为全面、最为完整的海洋法典(各海洋区域范围的示意参见图1)。《公约》根本性地变革了大陆架的法律概念,④一般认为,大陆架的法律概念经历了从1945年美国总统杜鲁门的《大陆架公告》,到1958年第一次联合国海洋法会议的《大陆架公约》(第1条),再到1973—1982年第三次联合国海洋法会议的《联合国海洋法公约》(第76条)的演化过程。其第76条及附件二成为目前划定200海里以外大陆架外部界限的纲领性国际法文件。

(二)《公约》第76条对大陆架外部界限的界定

《公约》第76条第1款规定:“沿海国的大陆架包括其领海以外依其陆地领土的全部自然延伸,扩展到大陆边外缘的海底区域的海床和底土,如果从测量领海宽度的基线量起到大陆边的外缘的距离不到200海里,则扩展到200海里的距离。”该款提出了大陆架外部界限的两个标准:“自然延伸”标准和“200海里距离”标准。沿海国可对号入座选择符合本国大陆边状况的标准。大陆边外缘超过领海基线200海里时,则须根据第76条第4～7款划定界限。

第4款规定:“(1)为本《公约》的目的,在大陆边从测量领海宽度的基线量起超过200海里的任何情况下,沿海国就应以下列两种方式之一,划定大陆边的外缘:(a)按照第7款,以最外各定点为准划定界线,每一定点上沉积岩厚度至少为从该点至大陆坡脚最短距离的1%[即“爱尔兰公式”①由参加第三次联合国海洋法会议的爱尔兰地质学家P.R.R.加德纳提出,故命名为“爱尔兰公式”。线];或(b)按照第7款,以离大陆坡脚的距离不超过60海里的各定点为准划定界线[即“海登堡公式”②由参加第三次联合国海洋法会议的美国地质学家H.D.海登堡提出,故命名为“海登堡公式”。线]。(2)在没有相反证明的情形下,大陆坡脚应定为大陆坡底坡度变动最大之点。”第4款界定的两条线称为“公式线”,沿海国亦可对号入座联合适用这两条公式线,即取其外部包络线成为最大公式线而尽量扩展外部界限。

第5款规定:“组成按照第4款(1)项(a)和(b)目划定的大陆架在海床上的外部界线的各定点,不应超过从测算领海宽度基线量起350海里,或不应超过连接2500米深度各点的2500米等深线100海里。”第5款界定的两条线称为“制约线”,沿海国同样可对号入座联合适用这两条制约线,即取其外部包络线成为最大制约线而尽量扩展外部界限。

最后将分别由第4款得到的最大公式线和第5款得到的最大制约线进行内部包络,即可初步建立符合沿海国最大利益的200海里以外大陆架的外部界限(参见图2)。当然这条界限的具体位置及组成线段的长度还要受《公约》第76条第3款③《公约》第76条第3款规定,大陆边包括沿海国陆块没入水中的延伸部分,由陆架、陆坡和陆基的海床和底土构成,它不包括深洋洋底及其洋脊,也不包括其底土。(深洋洋脊条款)、第6款④《公约》第76条第6款规定,虽有第5款的规定,在海底洋脊上的大陆架外部界限不应超过从测算领海宽度的基线量起350海里。本款规定不适用于作为大陆边自然构成部分的海台、海隆、海峰、暗滩和坡尖等海底高地。(海底洋脊条款)以及第7款⑤《公约》第76条第7款规定,沿海国的大陆架如从测算领海宽度的基线量起超过200海里,应连接以经纬度坐标标出的各定点划出长度各不超过60海里的若干直线,划定其大陆架的外部界限。(定点间距条款)等条款的制约。

图1 《公约》各海洋区域范围示意图①

图2 沿海国大陆架最大可能的外部界限示意图①

二、俄罗斯2001年划界案的提交和审议

(一)俄罗斯划界案的提交

俄罗斯2001年12月20日根据《公约》第76条第8款以及《公约》附件二第4条通过联合国秘书长(以下简称“秘书长”)向委员会提交划界案。②联合国海洋事务和海洋法司官方网站(以下简称“海法司官网”)同日发布了自委员会设立以来的第一份大陆架公告,①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_English.pdf,1 May 2012.并声明:本公告分发给联合国全体成员国以及《公约》缔约国……对划界案审议完毕后,委员会应按照《公约》第76条对俄罗斯提出建议,秘书长应妥为公布这些建议,俄罗斯在这些建议的基础上划定的大陆架界限应有确定性和约束力。海法司官网第二天又发布了更为详细的新闻公告,②See Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf Receives Its First Submission,at http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sea1729.doc.htm,1 May 2012.列明对俄罗斯划界案的审议应包括在委员会第10届会议的议程中,正式表明受理俄罗斯划界案。在秘书长按照《大陆架界限委员会议事规则》③See Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(CLCS/ 40/Rev.1),at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/309/23/PDF/ N0830923.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.(以下简称“《议事规则》”)第50条④《议事规则》第50条规定,秘书长应通过适当渠道,迅速将收到划界案一事通知委员会和联合国全体成员国,包括《公约》缔约国在内,并在完成翻译第47条第3款所述的执行摘要后公布执行摘要,包括委员会《科学和技术准则》(以下简称“《准则》”)第9.1.4节所述载于摘要内的所用海图和坐标。散发大陆架公告并公布俄罗斯划界案执行摘要的部分信息后,加拿大、丹麦、日本、挪威以及美国5个国家做出反应,5国对俄罗斯划界案中涉及与本国利益相关的直接或间接事项纷纷提交了维权照会。这些照会涉及的相关问题对委员会审议俄罗斯划界案以及做出的建议产生了重要影响。

(二)俄罗斯对划界案提交期限的处理

《公约》于1997年4月11日对俄罗斯生效,因而2007年4月11日应是俄罗斯提交划界案10年期限的原始截止日期。2001年5月第11届《公约》缔约国大会决定将提交划界案的截止日期更改为2009年5月13日。⑤《公约》附件二第4条的规定,沿海国家必须向委员会提交划界案,“……应尽早而且无论如何应于本公约对该国生效后10年内提出……”。《公约》于1997年4月11日对俄罗斯生效,意味着俄罗斯将必须在2007年4月11日之前提交划界案。《公约》缔约国大会主要是考虑提交划界案的技术难度以及发展中国家提交划界案的具体困难,将10年提交期限的起算日期更改为1999年5月13日,即《准则》的公布日期。See SPLOS/72,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/387/64/PDF/N0138764.pdf? Open Element,1 May 2012.俄罗斯本可以享受上述待遇,但俄罗斯最终决定在2001年提交划界案,比最后期限提前了7年半。分析其背后的原因有几个方面:首先,由于是首例划界案,委员会的审议在法律程序、数据的科学性等诸环节上肯定会存在一些不确定性和漏洞,俄罗斯很想钻这个空子;其次,科技进步有可能使旧数据到2009年时变为不再被广泛接受的次优数据,提交国不得不为新数据采集和重新计算边界进行昂贵投资;再次,划界案的编制需要长期规划,包括对大量关键的科学和法律方面的技术专长的维护,间断性意味着由于关键工作人员的变更而使政府失去这种技术专长;最后,缔约国大会对10年期限的更改并不完全符合修订《公约》的相关规定,①参见《公约》第312、313条涉及的《公约》的修正及简化修正程序。只是一种假定的功能等同,这种更改不能约束随后加入或批准《公约》的任何国家,如果在《公约》界定的原始期限之外提交划界案则有可能会遭到它们的挑战。但提前提交划界案也有负面影响,比如委员会为了树立其声誉,对首例划界案的审议必定会异常严格;再如由于对一些颇具争议的科学问题(如罗蒙诺索夫海岭的性质)的处理无先例可循,委员会对一些关键问题不敢妄下结论等等。

(三)委员会对俄罗斯划界案的审议

委员会根据《公约》附件二第5条和《议事规则》第42条成立了审议俄罗斯划界案的7人小组委员会。②《公约》附件二第5条规定,除委员会另有决定外,委员会应由7名委员组成的小组委员会执行职务,小组委员会委员应以平衡方式予以任命,同时考虑到沿海国提出的每一划界案的具体因素……向委员会提出划界案的沿海国可派代表参与有关的程序,但无表决权。《议事规则》第42条第1款规定,如果委员会根据《公约》附件二第5条的规定,决定设立小组委员会审议一个划界案,委员会应……从被提名候选人中任命小组委员会成员7人。负责审议俄罗斯划界案的7人小组委员会由Galo Carrera Hurtado(墨西哥,主席)、Karl H.F.Hinz(德国,副主席)、Peter F.Croker(爱尔兰,报告员)、Alexandre Tagore Medeiros de Albuquerque(巴西)、Lawrence Folajimi Awosika(尼日利亚)、Iain C.Lamont (新西兰)以及Yong Ahn Park(韩国)组成。俄罗斯划界案的最初审议列入了委员会2002年3月25日至4月12日在纽约举行的委员会第10届会议的议程中。在该次会议上,俄罗斯自然资源部副部长I.葛鲁莫夫介绍了俄罗斯划界案,并认为加拿大、丹麦、日本、挪威以及美国的照会不构成委员会审议划界案的障碍。③See CLCS/31,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/318/60/ PDF/N0231860.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.葛鲁莫夫还邀请委员会以实地核查相关数据库为目的访问俄罗斯,但委员会从未光顾。小组委员会在2002年4月1日至4月12日期间共召开了20次会议,其中6次是专门以问答形式与俄罗斯专家团之间进行磋商,共提出了36个问题,俄罗斯专家团提供了书面答复。小组委员会要求俄罗斯就划界案的某些事项提交额外的数据和资料,然后在第一届委员会成员任期2002年6月15日届满前的6月10—14日重新召开会议继续审议划界案,包括俄罗斯2002年5月15日提交的补充资料。为获得包含地震轨道线、多波道地震及条状水深方面的最新数据,海法司还安排委员会访问了美国拉蒙特—道荷地球天文台,④拉蒙特—道荷地球天文台,下载于http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamont%E2%80% 93Doherty_Earth_Observatory,2012年5月1日。并对比了美国“科学冰川探索”①SCICEX(Science Ice Exercise),at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCICEX and http:// nsidc.org/scicex/,1 May 2012.项目的SCICEX/99数据。②Suzette V.Suarez,The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf-Legal Aspects of their Establishment,Berlin/Heidelberg/New York:Springer Press Ltd.,2008,p.193.小组委员会的建议于2002年6月14日编制完毕,并提交委员会于2002年6月24—28日举行的第11届会议。在按照《公约》附件二第5条的相关法律程序处理了有关俄罗斯代表参会的程序性事项后,委员会继续以非公开会议的形式审议俄罗斯划界案和小组委员会的建议。小组委员会主席卡雷拉先生介绍了小组委员会的工作及其建议,委员会提出若干修订后于2002年7月27日协商一致通过了小组委员会的建议,并按《公约》将书面建议书提交了秘书长和俄罗斯。

(四)委员会对俄罗斯划界案建议的简短摘要

与处理对澳大利亚划界案的建议③See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Australia on 15 November 2004,recommendations adopted by CLCS on 9 April 2008,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_ new/submissions_files/aus04/aus_summary_of_recommendations.pdf,1 May 2012.相比,委员会和秘书长处理俄罗斯划界案相当低调,委员会迄今未编写一份较为完整对外公布的关于俄罗斯划界案的建议的摘要,④See CLCS/60,paragraph 59,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N08/523/33/PDF/N0852333.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.秘书长只是将建议高度浓缩为极其简短的结论性摘要后,作为向第57届联大提交的《海洋年度报告的增编》(以下简称“《增编》”)⑤See Oceans and the law of the sea/Report of the Secretary-General*Addendum(A/57/ 57/Add.1),paragraphs 38～41,at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/SG2002Oceansan dthelawoftheseareport.pdf,1 May 2012.对外公布。如此操作的原因应该是:其一,委员会受理的首例划界案基本上是无果而终,大肆宣扬似乎很不相衬;其二,未决争端是划界案未果的重要原因之一,利益相关国异常敏感,联合国尽量避免在国际社会挑起更多事端;其三,当事国俄罗斯受挫后也不愿意让国际社会过多了解其划界案的核心内容,不利于其后续申请;其四,由于无先例可循,委员会在处理划界案的科学问题上更多是尝试性的,成熟后扩大公开内容和公开范围较为妥当。

《增编》在概要性介绍划界案的审议过程之后指出,委员会的建议载有对俄罗斯所提交数据和资料的审查结果,其中特别提到俄罗斯对200海里以外大陆架的权利,以及是否按《公约》第76条规定适用了公式线和制约线的问题。关于巴伦支海和白令海,委员会建议,与挪威在巴伦支海以及与美国在白令海的划界协定一旦生效,即向委员会提供划界线的海图和坐标,①《议事规则》第54条第2款规定,根据《公约》第84条,在划定海岸相向或相邻国家间大陆架界限时,标明依照《公约》第83条规定划定的分界线的海图和坐标,应交存联合国秘书长和国际海底管理局秘书长。作为俄罗斯在两海域的200海里以外大陆架外部界限。关于鄂霍次克海,建议俄罗斯就其在该海域北部的200海里以外大陆架提交一份资料完备的划界案,该部分划界案不应妨害南部相关国家的海洋划界问题。南部划界案可在其后提出,建议俄罗斯尽最大努力按《议事规则》附件一第4条与日本达成协定。关于中北冰洋,建议俄罗斯根据建议所载的审查结果,修订其在该海域的划界案,显然委员会认为俄罗斯提供的数据不足以证明相关主张依据与俄罗斯陆块存在自然联系。另外,此处未提及任何其他国家,表明该海域的划界案与存在《议事规则》附件一意义上的领土或海洋争端并无直接联系。

如果沿海国不同意委员会的建议,《公约》和《议事规则》均允许沿海国在合理时间内向委员会提交修订的或新的划界案。②《议事规则》第53条第4款规定,沿海国不同意委员会建议的,应依照《公约》附件二第8条规定,在合理时间内向委员会提出订正的或新的划界案。《公约》附件二第8条规定,在沿海国不同意委员会建议的情形下,沿海国应于合理期间内向委员会提出修订的或新的划界案。但对“合理时间”一语未作定义,亦未规定沿海国通知委员会对其建议表示异议的最后期限。迄今为止未曾有任何修订或新的划界案(相对原始划界案而言)提交给委员会。俄罗斯于2003年6月3日函复了委员会的建议,信内载有一些问题和评论但内容未公布,尚不清楚俄罗斯是否同意委员会的建议。负责审议划界案的小组委员会编写了回复,委员会同意了回复内容和所采取的方法并随后转交给俄罗斯。③See CLCS/39,paragraph 20 and http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N04/359/63/PDF/N0435963.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.至此,俄罗斯划界案的第一阶段(即2001年的申请)告一段落。

三、俄罗斯2001年划界案概况

沿海国划界案的执行摘要按规定应该在海法司官网对外公布,由于存在划界争端和科学数据可信性两项主要原因,俄罗斯只同意公布部分信息,公布信息的条目和数量都是最低限度的,逻辑上也不很清楚,给人一种不得已而为之的印象。由是观之,俄罗斯不希望公众了解其划界案的清晰脉络,澳大利亚划界案的执行摘要则与之形成鲜明对比,公众通过海法司官网很快就能对澳大利亚划界案形成清晰的轮廓。

俄罗斯同意公布的信息包括3幅海图以及5个单页文字信息(单页1至单页5)。①See page 1～5,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ RUS_page1_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ rus01/RUS_page2_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_page3_Pacific.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page4_Pacific.pdf and http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page5_Legend.pdf,1 May 2012.3幅海图分别为俄罗斯大陆架外部界限总图②See the map,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS _CLCS_01_2001_LOS_1.jpg,1 May 2012.以及在北冰洋和太平洋的大陆架外部界限示意图(参见图3、图4),值得注意的是3幅海图在绘图方式、颜色选取以及图例说明上各不相同,罗列在一起不太符合常规表达,相比之下,澳大利亚所有性质相同的海图均使用统一方式绘制。单页1是关于俄罗斯在北冰洋拟议大陆架界限以及执行摘要行文中所使用的缩写和符号的简短说明;单页2是确定俄罗斯在北冰洋拟议大陆架外部界限的32个定点的信息(较详细);单页3是确定俄罗斯在白令海拟议大陆架外部界限的21个定点信息(较粗,只提供了经、纬度坐标),且该页前部的行文中存在明显的矛盾之处;③例如,该页第一段载明“北冰洋大陆架的外部界限由图3显示……”,但执行摘要的图3却是关于西北太平洋的海图。单页4是关于俄罗斯在白令海和鄂霍次克海拟议大陆架界限的简短说明(无任何定点坐标信息);单页5仅是将3幅海图的图例说明罗列在一起而没有其它内容,并无多少参考价值。以上5个单页明显是从俄罗斯划界案执行摘要主文及海图中截取、拼凑而成,处理得又较粗,所以在行文文字、单页内容的逻辑顺序、繁简以及页面效果等方面的问题比较明显。

由于委员会内部严格的保密规则,④《议事规则》附件二第2条第1款规定,提出划界案的沿海国,可以将依照第45条规定提交的任何未予公开发布的数据和其他材料列为机密……;第3款规定,沿海国列为机密的材料,在划界案审议完毕后,应继续予以保密,除非委员会在有关沿海国的书面同意下另有决定。无法直接得知俄罗斯2001年划界案中援引的法律条款和科学依据的具体细节,本文只能利用各有关国家的反应以及学者们的著述来探讨俄罗斯划界案的详细内容。⑤T.Gorski,A Note on Submarine Ridges and Elevations with Special Reference to the Russian Federation and the Arctic Ridges,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol. 40,2009,pp.51～60.

四、俄罗斯2001年划界案的主要相关问题

(一)在巴伦支海与挪威的海洋划界争端

巴伦支海是北冰洋靠近欧洲大陆的陆缘海之一,以16世纪荷兰探险家W.巴伦支的姓氏命名,为斯堪的那维亚半岛、斯瓦尔巴群岛、熊岛、法兰士约瑟夫地群岛、新地岛、科尔古耶夫岛、卡宁半岛以及科拉半岛所包围(参见图5),南部为深入俄罗斯大陆的海湾白海。巴伦支海面积约141万平方公里,平均水深229米,最大水深600米,南部的大陆架面积达127万平方公里,中西部横亘着几处深海沟,北部局部海底有台地,东南多浅滩。①Barents Sea,at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/53189/Barents-Sea,1 May 2012.

挪威和前苏联1957年曾在瓦朗厄尔峡湾划定部分海洋边界,但多年来未能就巴伦支海的海洋边界达成一致。争端区域位于东部挪威主张的中间线与西部俄罗斯联邦主张的经线之间。由于存在划界争端,俄罗斯提交划界案后,挪威随即提交了较为温和的照会。②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/NOR,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NORtext.pdf,1 May 2012.挪威照会主要强调以下几点:其一,巴伦支海中部相当大的区域是挪威和俄罗斯各自领海基线200海里以外的区域,其重叠部分的未决划界应是《议事规则》附件一第5条意义上的海洋争端(挪威提交了两份体现挪威和俄罗斯各自划界立场的坐标表);其二,该区域是完全位于两国领海基线350海里界限之内的大陆坡脚向陆区域;其三,根据《公约》第76条第3、4及5款,该区域可由两国直接协议划界而无须委员会进行技术评估;其四,挪威同意委员会审议俄罗斯划界案中的争端区域,但不得妨害挪威与俄罗斯联邦之间的海洋划界事项;其五,该照会是与俄罗斯在相关问题上达成一致后提交的。

另外,挪威2006年11月27日也向委员会正式提交划界案,③See Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea,Executive Summary,at http://www.un.org/Depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf,1 May 2012.涉及东北大西洋和北冰洋三处200海里以外大陆架的主张:巴伦支海的“环形圈区域”、西南森海盆区域以及挪威海的“香蕉洞”区域。俄罗斯同样引用《议事规则》附件一第5条对挪威划界案提交照会,要求委员会对挪威划界案的审议不得妨害俄、挪间的划界事项。④See Russia’s Note,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/ rus_07_00325.pdf,1 May 2012.委员会对巴伦支海区域提出的建议与对俄罗斯的建议如出一辙:一

旦两国缔结的划界协定生效,即向委员会提供该海域划界线的海图和坐标,以标明两国在巴伦支海200海里以外大陆架的外部界限。①See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006,at http://www.un. org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf,1 May 2012.

图5 2010年俄罗斯—挪威《巴伦支海条约》划界示意图①

(二)在鄂霍次克海与日本的海洋划界争端

鄂霍次克海是西北太平洋的一个边缘海,为堪察加半岛、千岛群岛、北海道岛、库页岛(亦称萨哈林岛)以及东西伯利亚的一段海岸所包围。通过萨哈林湾、鞑靼湾以及拉彼鲁兹海峡与日本海相连(参见图6),因俄罗斯在远东的第一个殖民地鄂霍次克而被命名。鄂霍次克海面积约158万平方公里,平均深度859米,最大深度3372米,北部和西部的大陆架约占海底面积的42%,中部的带状大陆坡约占48%,南部的千岛海盆约占9%,蕴藏约12亿吨石油和15亿立方米天然气。

俄罗斯与日本在该海域长期存在未决争端,焦点是北方四岛(以下简称“四岛”)的领土主权。①择捉岛、国后岛、色丹岛以及齿舞岛四岛,是位于太平洋西北部的千岛群岛的向南延伸部分,日本称之为北方领土或北方四岛,俄罗斯称为南千岛群岛,总面积约5000平方公里。目前隶属俄罗斯萨哈林州,居民绝大多数是来自前苏联各地的移民。“二战”结束后四岛被前苏联占领,日本一直坚持认为这是非法占领,并坚持四岛的主权始终属于日本。See Kuril Islands Dispute,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuril_Islands_dispute,1 May 2012.四岛北连堪察加半岛,南接日本海,西濒鄂霍次克海,东临太平洋,扼守鄂霍次克海进入太平洋的海上通道,具有重要军事战略意义。②冷战期间,鄂霍次克海是美国海军监控前苏联海军海底通信电缆的几次成功军事行动(包括“常春藤之铃”行动)的地点,也是1983年前苏联斯特拉尼防空部队攻击大韩航空007航班的现场。目前俄罗斯将鄂霍次克海用作太平洋舰队弹道导弹潜艇的隐蔽所。日、俄17世纪后期就开始了对四岛的争夺。自19世纪中期至“二战”结束的近一百年间,经过1855年的《日俄和亲通好条约》(又称《下田条约》)、1875年的《圣彼得堡条约》、1905年的《朴茨茅斯条约》、1945年的《雅尔塔协定》和《波茨坦公告》以及1951年的《旧金山和约》,③See Treaty of Shimoda,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Shimoda;Treaty of Saint Petersburg,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Saint_Petersburg_(1875); Treaty of Portsmouth,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Portsmouth;Yalta A-greement,at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c04.html;Potsdam Declaration, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration;Treaty of San Francisco,at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm,1 May 2012.包括四岛在内的千岛群岛的主权辗转于俄(苏)、日之间,目前四岛在俄罗斯的实际掌控之下。

如果失去四岛,仅凭北海道将使日本在鄂霍次克海的利益几乎丧失殆尽。俄罗斯划界案拟议的大陆架界限侵入了北海道和四岛的近海海域,而且将四岛的基点和基线作为基准使用,因而受到日本强烈挑战。④Michael Sheng-Ti Gau,Third Party Intervention in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Regarding a Submission Involving a Dispute,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,pp.61～79.日本指出,由于目前四岛主权争端的存在,俄罗斯划界案存在程序性缺陷。日本请求委员会审议时不要仅参考由俄罗斯提交的海图及附属资料,不要预断两国间的四岛主权争端以及大陆架的划界问题。①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/JPN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions _files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__JPNtext.pdf,1 May 2012.日本认为,按照《议事规则》附件一第5(b)款和《准则》第9.1.4(d)款,②《议事规则》附件一第5(b)款规定,向委员会提出的划界案和委员会就划界案核定的建议,不应妨害陆地或海洋争端当事国的立场。《准则》第9.1.4款规定,执行摘要将含有以下资料:……(d)委员会《议事规则》第44条和附件一所述任何争端。俄罗斯应告知委员会争端存在,并应采取措施确保其划界案不会妨害两国的划界事项。

(三)在白令海与美国的海洋划界争端及1990年美苏边界协定

白令海是太平洋沿岸最北的边缘海,面积约230万平方公里,平均水深1636米,最大水深4773米,北以白令海峡与北冰洋相通,南以阿留申群岛与太平洋相隔(参见图7),因1728年丹麦船长V·白令首先发现而命名。③Bering Sea,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Sea,1 May 2012.前苏联与美国在楚科奇海、白令海以及北太平洋的海洋边界线长达1390海里,为国际海洋边界长度之最,由1990年《美利坚合众国与苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟之间的海洋边界协定》(以下简称《1990年协定》)确定。④See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary,at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/USA-RUS1990MB.PDF,1 May 2012.该协定由当时的苏联外长谢瓦尔德纳泽与美国国务卿贝克代表两国政府于1990年6月1日在华盛顿签署,俄方习惯将这条海洋边界线称为“谢瓦尔德纳泽线”。这条海洋边界线比中间线向苏联一侧靠近了大约200海里,导致白令海和楚科奇海原属前苏联约2万平方公里的经济海域划归美国,但协定规定只有在两国议会获得通过以后才能正式生效。由于明显对美国有利,该协定在美国国会没费任何周折一年内便顺利通过,而苏联最高苏维埃未批准该协定,但当时两国外长互换了照会,同意以临时协议的形式生效。俄罗斯自独立以来一直认为前苏联在《1990年协定》中吃了大亏(白令海未按中间线划界),让俄罗斯承受这一结果不公平,故俄罗斯国家杜马亦未批准该协定。

俄罗斯一反常态在划界案中采用了1990年边界,背后有几个原因:其一,感到在其它几个海域(尤其是鄂霍次克海和中北冰洋)立刻获得委员会认可的可能性不大,俄罗斯欲“借”1990年边界在白令海先有所突破;其二,《1990年协定》已通过临时协议形式生效,俄罗斯心理上已有接受倾向;其三,如果废除该协定,另行谈判划界代价较大,即使再次谈判美国也不会轻易接受俄罗斯的中间线方案;其四,向美国暗示俄罗斯非正式接受《1990年协定》,期望尽可能减小美国对俄罗斯划界案的阻力;其五,模糊处理是为了日后与美国在白令海的划界上讨价还价,以弥补前苏联造成的损失。但采用1990年边界会创设俄罗斯以一般惯例方式遵守《1990年协定》的国际义务,如果美国证明俄罗斯基于法律义务或必要性遵守了该协定,俄罗斯就要受其约束,①D.J.Bederman,International Law Frameworks,2nd ed.,New York:Foundation Press, 2006,pp.16～17.这就意味着俄罗斯将可能失去与美国重新划界的可能性。

对于俄罗斯直接采用1990年边界的做法,美国一方面窃喜,另一方面又不失时机地在照会中重提俄罗斯国家杜马未批准的事实。②美国在照会中指出,尽管俄罗斯国家杜马事实上尚未批准该条约,但俄罗斯的划界案使用了《1990年协定》中的边界。美国还指出,使用该边界与俄罗斯和美国的预期稳定的共同利益是一致的,而且与《公约》附件二第9条规定的委员会的行动不应妨害海岸相向或相邻国家之间有关界限划定的事项一致。美国这样做是因为:其一,虽然《1990年协定》已通过互换照会的方式生效,但由于苏联解体导致了国际法上的条约继承问题,所以美国一直希望俄罗斯国家杜马早日批准协定,以便使美、俄间的海洋边界在国际法上确定下来;其二,美国暗示俄罗斯,美国不接受俄罗斯以在划界案中提及的方式表态,希望俄罗斯以正式方式批准《1990年协定》,防止俄罗斯日后节外生枝;其三,由于美国迄今尚未批准《公约》而无法有效参与200海里以外大陆架的划界,只能从侧面对俄罗斯划界案设置障碍、施加压力。

图8 北冰洋海底示意图①

(四)在中北冰洋的地质数据问题以及与北极周边国家的纠纷

1.北冰洋海底地形概况

北冰洋海底(参见图8)被罗蒙诺索夫海岭、α-门捷列夫海岭及加科尔海岭分割。罗蒙诺索夫海岭靠近欧亚大陆一侧的欧亚海盆被加科尔海岭分割为南森海盆和弗拉姆海盆,深度3300～3700米,最大深度5499米。罗蒙诺索夫海岭靠近北美大陆一侧的美亚海盆被α-门捷列夫海岭分割为加拿大海盆和马卡洛夫海盆,深度3000～3500米,最大深度4683米。

罗蒙诺索夫海岭从加拿大北极群岛的埃尔斯米尔岛开始,沿西经60°北延伸至北极点附近转向,然后沿东经140°向南延伸至俄罗斯的新西伯利亚群岛,是北冰洋的主要水下洋脊,高峻而陡峭,支配着整个海盆的地形,全长约1800公里,高于海底3300～3700米,最小深度是954米。①Lomonosov Ridge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lomonosov_Ridge,1 May 2012.现已证明罗蒙诺索夫海岭虽有火山活动但不具备《准则》所描述的地震活动的相关特点,且表面褶皱不明显,主要由沉积岩和变质岩组成,并非全球洋中脊系统的一部分。前苏联北极勘探队1948年首次发现该海岭,后以俄罗斯科学家M·V·罗蒙诺索夫的姓氏命名。

α-门捷列夫海岭是由α海岭和门捷列夫海岭组成的一个海岭系统,与罗蒙诺索夫海岭大致平行,规模稍小,起自俄罗斯北部弗兰格尔岛北侧,延伸至加拿大北部埃尔斯米尔岛东北侧与罗蒙诺索夫海岭汇合,全长约1500公里,相对高度较小,坡度平缓,距洋面约2000米,最高峰距洋面约800米,形成年代约8000万年前。前苏联北极勘探队1948年首次发现该海岭,1987年起以俄罗斯科学家D·I·门捷列夫的姓氏命名。

加科尔海岭,也称南森海岭,自俄罗斯勒那河口延伸至丹麦格陵兰岛北侧,与穿过冰岛而来的北大西洋海岭连接,长约2000公里,与罗蒙诺索夫海岭大致平行。加科尔海岭上有许多裂岩,有平行于轴向延伸的磁异常条带,还有垂直于轴向的横向断裂带,因此是全球洋中脊体系的组成部分。前苏联北极勘探队1948年首次发现该海岭,1987年起以俄罗斯探险家Y·Y·加科尔的姓氏命名。

以上三大海岭的名称,均获大洋水深制图委员会②GEBCO,at http://www.gebco.net/,1 May 2012.下属的国际海底地理名称命名分委员会③Undersea Feature Names,at http://www.gebco.net/data_and_products/undersea_feature_names/,1 May 2012.批准。④International Hydrographic Organization/Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, IHO-IOC GEBCO Gazetteer,at http://www.gebco.net/about_us/meetings_and_minutes/documents/gebco_scufn_15_report.pdf,1 May 2012.美国地质勘探局经过为期4年的勘察,2008年7月首次证实了北冰洋可能蕴藏830亿桶石油和44万亿立方米的天然气。⑤M.Byers,Who Owns the Arctic?Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.89.正是由于北冰洋巨大的资源储备以及日趋重要的军事战略地位,使得北极周边各国在数百年前就开始的北冰洋争夺愈演愈烈。

2.俄罗斯争夺北冰洋的历史渊源

俄罗斯有1/3的领土位于北极圈内,一直将北极视为其传统势力范围。早在彼得大帝时期,沙俄就多次组织对北极的考察,收集相关地理和地质信息。⑥在18-19世纪的所谓“北方探险”期间,沙俄就已有居民进住北极地区。到19世纪前半叶,俄罗斯建立了12个大规模的居民区分散在阿拉斯加,直到1867年将阿拉斯加卖给美国。1926年4月15日,前苏联演绎了加拿大根据“扇形原则”①1907年加拿大参议员P.波伊采尔首次提出“扇形原则”,即位于两条经线之间直至北极点的一切土地应当属于邻接这些土地的国家。进行的主张北极海域的国家实践,由前苏联中央执行委员会主席团单方面宣布《关于苏联在北冰洋的土地和岛屿领土公告》(也称《1926年命令》),宣告东经32°04′35″至西经168°49′30″之间以科拉半岛、楚科奇自治区及北极点为基准的约119万平方公里(占北冰洋45%)的三角形地带(以下简称“三角地”)为前苏联所有,并将其正式标注在前苏联时期的国家地图上(俄罗斯在前苏联解体后仍然延续这一标注)。②L.Timtchenko,The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept:Past And Present,ARCTIC,Vol. 50,1997,pp.29～35,or at http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic50-1-29.pdf,1 May 2012.20世纪30年代,前苏联开始在北极冰盖上建立考察站,并向北极地区“适度移民”。前苏联1948年首次发现罗蒙诺索夫海岭,至今仍是俄罗斯自称的对北极地区领土诉求的“科学和历史依据”。

但时至1997年,情况发生重大变化。出于经济、战略等因素的综合考虑,俄罗斯不想置身于1982年《公约》之外。北极海域事实上属全球未划界海域之一,《公约》缔约国只能根据《公约》的规定主张领海、毗连区、专属经济区以及大陆架等国家管辖海域,因此俄罗斯不得不在1997年签署《公约》,从而丧失对“三角地”单方面主张的所有权。俄国内一直有人指责加入《公约》非常荒谬,但随着国力复苏,俄收回“三角地”的愿望与日俱增。一旦收回“三角地”,俄罗斯在经济上将攫取北冰洋的大部分油气资源,在军事上将凭借独特的地缘优势赢得战略主导权而确保大国地位。③近年来,俄罗斯的战略生存空间不断被欧美国家挤压,出海口也被西方封堵,争夺北冰洋、打开北冰洋出海口成为维护俄罗斯战略安全的重要考虑。一旦收回“三角地”,如果北冰洋通航,俄罗斯的北方舰队便可随时进出北大西洋和北太平洋。俄罗斯一直处心积虑想把罗蒙诺索夫海岭这条北冰洋的“脊梁”纳入囊中,并于2001年向委员会提交200海里以外的大陆架划界案,以“扇形原则”、罗蒙诺索夫海岭以及α-门捷列夫海岭为主要支撑主张中北冰洋区域200海里以外的大陆架,但未被委员会认可。

3.其它利益相关国对北冰洋的争夺

(1)加拿大

近代国际法中获得领土的一项重要原则就是“先占”原则,即对“无主地”的发现和有效占领,18—19世纪英国凭借其航海优势率先对包括北极列岛和西北航道④Northwest Passage,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest_Passage,1 May 2012.在内的诸多北极区域“先占”,但并未获得国际社会的广泛承认。1880年英国将上述区域的所谓“主权”移交给加拿大,成为目前加拿大对包括西北航道在内的部分北极区域主张主权的根源。20世纪50年代加拿大曾宣布对北极拥有主权,亦未得到国际社会的承认。此外,加拿大与美国对西北航道(美国主张是国际开放水域和国际航道)以及波弗特海一块2.1万平方公里区域的主权归属长期存在争端;与丹麦对汉斯岛主权的争夺持续了近40年(自1973年起),①汉斯岛位于北纬80°西经66°,长1.3公里,宽1.2公里,面积约1.3平方公里,为邻近北极且无人监管、居住的小荒岛。如果在未来的海洋划界中给予效力,其周围海床蕴藏的石油和天然气资源相当可观,而且对于连接北冰洋和内尔斯海峡航道的控制权至关重要,因此受到丹麦、加拿大、俄罗斯等国家的争夺。1973年丹麦与加拿大试图在内尔斯海峡划界未果,引起迄今未决的主权争端。1984年时任丹麦格陵兰事务大臣的T.Hϕyem曾到访汉斯岛,在当地插上丹麦国旗并在旗竿底埋下一瓶白兰地酒,留下一张“欢迎丹麦”的字条。此后丹麦和加拿大经常开展“旗帜”战争,双方考察人员轮番登岛宣布主权。2005年加拿大军队登岛后插上加拿大国旗,并在旗竿底埋下一瓶加拿大黑麦威士忌。加拿大邮局还煞有介事地正式给北极分配了编号“HOHOHO”,围绕汉斯岛的冲突近年来大有升级之势。汉斯岛对于未来划界以及航道的控制权具有重要意义。

对于俄罗斯划界案的中北冰洋部分,当时尚未成为《公约》缔约国的加拿大的照会仅一般维权性指出,在无进一步支持数据供分析的情况下,加拿大无法确定是否同意俄罗斯的划界案,且无法评论不应解释为同意或默许,俄罗斯划界案以及委员会做出的任何建议不得妨害加、俄间的大陆架划界问题。②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/CAN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__CANtext.pdf,1 May 2012.国际北冰洋海底地形图③IBCAO,at http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/IBCAO_betamap. jpg,1 May 2012.显示,α-门捷列夫海岭和罗蒙诺索夫海岭距加拿大埃斯米尔岛非常近,加拿大也想日后基于两海岭提出北冰洋的大陆架主张。虽然加拿大与俄罗斯就两海岭存在潜在重叠划界问题,但由于两海岭的地质特征目前尚无定论,加上加拿大照会未提及任何具体问题且措辞平淡,故委员会未对加拿大照会做出特别回应。加拿大为提交自己的划界案,自委员会对俄罗斯划界案做出建议后,便把加入《公约》以及收集北冰洋海底数据提到议事日程之上。

(2)丹麦

丹麦对北极区域的争夺主要是基于格陵兰岛。移居冰岛的挪威人公元982年发现了格陵兰岛,1261年格陵兰成为挪威的殖民地。1397年丹麦、瑞典及挪威缔结《卡尔马条约》,组成斯堪的纳维亚共主邦联,格陵兰处于三国共管之下。1524年该邦联瓦解后,格陵兰又转属于丹麦—挪威双重君主国。1814年丹麦、挪威分治,丹麦根据《基尔条约》重获格陵兰。④See Treaty of Kalmar,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kalmar; Treaty of Kiel,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kiel,1 May 2012.后挪威与丹麦对格陵兰归属又起争执,海牙国际法庭1933年判归丹麦。1979年5月1日起格陵兰实行内部自治,2008年11月25日格陵兰举行了自治公投,2009年6月21日格陵兰成为一个内政独立但外交、国防以及财政相关事务仍由丹麦掌管的过渡政体。⑤Greenland,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland,1 May 2012.此外,格陵兰岛与埃尔斯米尔岛之间内尔斯海峡内的汉斯岛,是丹麦在北极区域争夺的另一个焦点。

对于俄罗斯划界案的中北冰洋部分,当时尚未成为《公约》缔约国的丹麦提出的维权性照会与加拿大照会相似,即指出:丹麦不能对俄罗斯划界案形成意见,专业评估需要更具体的数据,不发表意见并不意味同意或默许俄罗斯划界案,并且俄罗斯划界案和委员会的任何建议不得妨害丹麦与俄罗斯之间的大陆架划界。①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/DNK,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__DNKtext.pdf,1 May 2012.国际北冰洋海底地形图显示,罗蒙诺索夫海岭的一端位于格陵兰的大陆架上,丹麦正是基于这一点试图证实该海岭是格陵兰大陆架的自然延伸,藉此主张北冰洋200海里以外的大陆架。基于与加拿大相似的原因,委员会亦未对丹麦照会做出特别回应。自委员会对俄罗斯划界案做出建议后,丹麦亦把加入《公约》以及收集北极区域海底数据提到议事日程之上,为提交划界案积极准备。

(3)美国

由于美国对北极地区不具备地缘优势,又不甘忍受俄罗斯、加拿大等北极大国抢占北极利益,所以美国一直坚持北冰洋属于国际水域。美国国会1984年正式通过《北极考察和政策法案》,把美国对北极的科学研究、经济利益以及战略考量三者联系在一起以法律的形式确定下来。1993—2000年美国海军协助科学界共进行了6次“科学冰川探索”项目的北极任务。作为该项目的后续研究计划,美国2010年6月又制定了“科学冰川探索II”②SCICEX Phase II Science Plan,at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/scicex_plan.pdf, 1 May 2012.项目计划,意在与其它北极大国进行科考较量,为日后争夺北极做准备。

对于俄罗斯2001年划界案,美国是唯一提到科学和技术方面问题的国家。美国2002年2月28日向委员会提交的照会认为,③See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.俄罗斯划界案涉及北极大陆架主张的部分存在重大缺陷,最要害的部分就是关于罗蒙诺索夫海岭和α-门捷列夫海岭地质构造问题。美国照会首先指出,根据《公约》第76条第3款,大洋洋脊不能被认为是第76条意义上的自然延伸,为质疑俄罗斯划界案埋下伏笔,即如果罗蒙诺索夫海岭和α-门捷列夫海岭被定性为大洋洋脊,俄罗斯将失去其主张的依据。为给俄罗斯划界案设置障碍,美国利用其在海洋地质领域的科技优势,极力提出相关反证。

关于α-门捷列夫海岭,美国直接提供了地质解释:日益增多的地质和物理证据表明,α-门捷列夫海岭是岩浆从“热液口”④“热液口”是发源于地幔至少持续存在数千万年的岩浆源,其上覆地壳在大陆漂移跨越热液口的过程中,热液口间歇产生火山喷发。溢出并向一亿两千万至三千万年前沿在北冰洋发育的美亚海盆的扩散轴扩散、堆积,在新形成的大洋地壳上形成的约35公里厚的热液口火山洋脊,即大洋地壳上的热液口通过火山喷发机制形成的一个单一连续的地质特征的表层形态。美国从水深、航磁、地震以及基岩等4个方面提出了α-门捷列夫海岭与俄罗斯大陆边不相连的具体证据:航空磁测和水深数据显示该洋脊整个横跨北冰洋,其航磁特征在大陆边的两端消失,而且未在相邻的大陆架出现……该海岭上发现的岩石是典型的远离陆地的深洋洋脊类型,而非大陆架上发现的更迅速沉积且通常较粗粒度的流层类型,且基岩类型全部起源于加拿大西北部,并广泛分布于北冰洋的美亚海盆。因此,α-门捷列夫海岭是仅发育在美亚海盆大洋地壳上的、具有海洋起源的火山型洋中脊,而不是任何国家大陆架的组成部分。这个论点对俄罗斯划界案是致命的,因为《准则》指出,与热液口处地壳运动相关的火山活动形成的洋脊,很可能是大洋洋脊而非大陆架的自然延伸。

关于罗蒙诺索夫海岭,美国认为该海岭是由于海底扩张从斯堪的纳维亚和俄罗斯西北部大陆边分离出来的大陆性地质结构,是北冰洋海盆大洋深处一个独立的地形特征,不是火山活动的产物,是由玄武岩组成的洋中脊,因而不是俄罗斯或任何其它国家大陆边的自然组成部分。美国还提供了大量在α-门捷列夫海岭发现岩石源的证据。但近年来,美国国内各种政治势力围绕是否批准《公约》以及美国未来的海洋权益的博弈始终没有停止。目前,美国政府主导美国学界对罗蒙诺索夫海岭性质的态度发生根本性转变,有极力主张罗蒙诺索夫海岭与相关陆块存在较强地质联系的趋势,预示了美国将重新界定其在北极海域的利益和策略。

(五)其它问题

随着以前苏联为首的社会主义集团的衰落以及“冷战”的结束,美国迎来了绝对主导国际事务的时代。由于美国出于其它利益考虑尚未批准《公约》,导致其在200海里以外大陆架划界领域的话语权受到严重削弱,但它绝不会心甘情愿让其它国家抢得先机。面对世界上首个、又是老对手提出的划界案,应该说美国下了大功夫从侧面发动了强有力的攻势。除了直接挑战罗蒙诺索夫海岭和α -门捷列夫海岭的性质外(如前所述),还利用《准则》的相关规定进一步设置难度,其目的就是一方面遏制俄罗斯,一方面加强自己的话语权并维护潜在利益。美国指出,委员会《议事规则》允许委员会考虑其它国家对执行摘要所载数据的意见以及任何与划界案相关的争端的资料。美国对俄罗斯划界案提出了一系列异议,其它几个问题也相当有分量,如果情况属实,将严重阻碍俄罗斯的任何后续主张。

1.需要提供客观的数据来源确定2500米等深线和大陆坡脚的位置

美国的照会指出,俄罗斯划界案对2500米等深线和大陆坡脚位置两项信息不明确,这些信息对任何划界案而言是不能忽略的。尽管《准则》不要求将2500米等深线定点包含在划界案执行摘要中,①See CLCS/11,paragraph 9.1.4,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.但美国担心俄罗斯划界案中涉及2500米等深线和大陆坡脚的保密信息,可能与国际北冰洋海底地形图数据库中的数据有出入,②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.因此美国呼吁委员会对俄罗斯的相关定点进行客观评价。③美国敦促委员会立足于相关的科学界,特别是公开的、同行评议的科学文献报告作出决定,美国极力主张参考最新的国际北冰洋等深线图(IBCOA),因为它是国际北极科学委员会、政府间海洋学委员会以及国际海道测量组织的合作成果。如果俄罗斯2001年及未来的划界案与国际海洋学委员会提供的国际公认数据有明显出入,俄罗斯必须使用国际公认数据消除这一差别。关于这一问题的审议结果尚未公开,尚不能得知俄罗斯2001年划界案中的2500米等深线和大陆坡脚位置是否符合委员会《准则》的要求。

2.俄罗斯2001年划界案执行摘要中未提及“海底洋脊”术语

美国照会还指出,由于“海底洋脊”术语未被俄罗斯用于建立大陆架的外部界限,“海底洋脊”条款就不能适用于这一目的。④See paragraph“SUBMARINE RIDGES”on page 3 of CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__ USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.但美国照会实际上只涉及俄罗斯划界案执行摘要所公开的部分信息,尚不清楚未公开部分及划界案主文是否引用了该条款。尽管委员会的《准则》要求划界案必须包含所援引第76条具体条款的说明,但《准则》或《议事规则》均未提及省略这一环节的后果。有些学者⑤For example,B.Spielman(Notes&Comments Editor of Emory International Law Review),An Evaluation of Russia’s Impending Claim for Continental Shelf Expansion:Why Rule 5 Will Shelve Russia’s Submission,Emory International Law Review,Vol.23, 2009,p.329.(包括美国学者)认为,如果俄罗斯首次划界案不引用该条款会导致其未来的划界案也不能引用该条款,这种观点值得商榷。俄罗斯2001年划界案不太可能违反说明援引第76条具体条款的规定,只是鉴于对数据的科学性没有把握而不愿公开,以免招致更多非议。如果确实未引用“海底洋脊”条款,对俄罗斯的影响应仅限于2001年划界案不能基于海底洋脊主张200海里以外大陆架,不应影响其后续划界案。

从所公开的海图判断,俄罗斯最有可能引用的是“海底高地”条款,⑥M.Benitah,Russia’s Claim in the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in UNCLOS, ASIL INSIGHTS,Vol.11,Issue 27,2007,or at http://www.asil.org/insights071108. cfm,1 May 2012.因为该条款不受350海里限制,可依据2500米等深线加100海里主张大陆架,与俄罗斯的海图相符。虽然“海底高地”和“自然组成部分”术语在《公约》中未被定义,但如果俄罗斯认为罗蒙诺索夫海岭和α-门捷列夫海岭属于海底高地,那就要冒天下之大不韪了,这也许是俄罗斯不愿公开其所引用条款的真正原因。一旦委员会认可罗蒙诺索夫海岭可界定为海底高地,将给未来200海里以外大陆架划界带来相当的负面影响,即鼓励各沿海国效仿俄罗斯牵强地将并非海底高地的海底地形特征“异构”,从而动摇《公约》及《准则》的一致性和权威性。此外美国还指出,委员会无权处理基线问题,不论这些基线是否符合国际法。美国设置的难度是最大的,所抛出的也是俄罗斯未来划界案最棘手的问题。

五、俄罗斯2001年划界案之后相关国家的动态

(一)俄罗斯

俄罗斯2001年划界案受挫后,考虑到巨大的能源、军事等方面的潜在利益以及未来俄罗斯在国际社会的地位和影响力等因素,俄罗斯并没有放弃努力。基于委员会2002年对其划界案提出的建议,俄罗斯已把努力的方向及时调整到海洋划界争端和数据的科学性两个关键问题上。在解决海洋划界争端方面, 2010年与挪威签订的《巴伦支海条约》为俄罗斯成功且创造性地扫清了在巴伦支海海域主张200海里以外大陆架的障碍,但在白令海和鄂霍次克海还没有太大起色。白令海的问题并不严重,主动权在俄罗斯手中,从某种角度看可能称不上是问题,但在鄂霍次克海南部解决与日本的争端就目前形势看绝非易事,可能会旷日持久。

在数据的科学性方面,由于委员会的《准则》要求按自然延伸提出大陆架的主张必须找到大陆边缘,包括大陆坡坡脚转折点、大陆坡坡底区域、2500米等深线以及1%沉积岩厚度等等,至少需要单波束回声测深、多波束回声测深、测深侧扫声纳测量、相干侧扫声纳测量以及地震反射测深共5种数据,俄罗斯近几年的努力最主要就集中在这几方面。俄罗斯2004年编制出世界上第一幅北冰洋海底地形图;2005年夏天俄罗斯开始了新一轮大规模北极科考,调查α-门捷列夫海岭和西伯利亚大陆边之间在地质、构造方面的联系,并在美国地球物理联合会2005年秋季会议上提交了初步结果;①V.D.Kaminsky,V.A.Poselov,V.Y Glebovsky,A.V.Zayonchek and V.V.Butsenko,Geophysical and Geological Study of the Transition Zone between the Mendeleev Rise and the Adjacent Siberian Shelf:Preliminary Results,2005,at http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm05,1 May 2012.作为2007—2008国际极地年②国际极地年是全球科学家共同策划、联合开展的大规模极地科学考察活动,被誉为南北极科学考察的“奥林匹克”盛会,自1882年至今仅组织了4次:1882—1883年、1932—1933年、1957—1958年及2007—2008年。1957—1958年的国际极地年直接促成了《南极条约》的诞生。由于历史原因,我国未参加前3次国际极地年。作为第4次极地年的发起国之一,中国政府非常重视,且制定了行动计划,反映了中国极地科考的影响逐步加大。活动的一部分,俄罗斯2007年8月进行了名为“北极2007”的第二轮大规模北极科考。③在该次科考中,知名北极专家、时任俄罗斯国家杜马副主席的A.奇林加洛夫率领的由50名科学家组成的科考队乘MIR-1和MIR-2深海潜水器从北极点下潜至4261米深的北冰洋洋底,操纵深海潜水机器人取回地表和海洋生物样品,并在洋底安插了一面高1米、能保存100年左右的钛合金俄罗斯国旗,此举在国际社会引起轩然大波。

此外,自委员会2002年对其划界案做出建议后,俄罗斯在营造国际氛围方面也进行了大量的努力。针对委员会提出的问题,俄罗斯2003年在圣彼得堡举办了旨在与推进北极地区执行第76条以及地球科学相关的专题国际研讨会。为缓解日趋紧张的北极局势,同时也为打开国际对话之窗,俄罗斯2010、2011年成功举办了两届高层次、高水平的以“北极:领土对话”为主题的国际论坛,拟将其打造为常设国际论坛。值得一提的是,俄罗斯煞费苦心地挑选了罗蒙诺索夫④米哈伊尔·瓦西里耶维奇·罗蒙诺索夫(1711—1765),俄国百科全书式的科学家、语言学家、哲学家和诗人,被誉为俄国科学史上的彼得大帝。1748年创建了俄国第一个化学实验室,1755年创办了俄国第一所大学——莫斯科大学。的诞生地——阿尔汉格尔斯克作为第二届论坛的举办地。

2009年3月,俄罗斯出台《2020年前及更远的未来俄罗斯联邦在北极的国家政策原则及远景规划》,⑤Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and Beyond,at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html,1 May 2012.明确界定了在北极的各种利益。由于法律和科学数据方面的艰巨性,致使俄罗斯不得不一次次推迟再次提交划界案的时间。基于2010年在北极地区9000公里断面的测量以及2011年对两大海岭的最新勘测,俄罗斯声称获得了北极领土主权的重要证据,再次提交划界案可能定在2012年。此举反映出俄罗斯不想让加拿大和丹麦抢得先手的强烈愿望。

(二)挪威

经过长达40年的谈判后,挪威和俄罗斯终于在2010年签署了《挪威王国和俄罗斯联邦之间关于海洋划界和合作条约》(以下简称“《巴伦支海条约》”),①《巴伦支海条约》于2010年9月15日在摩尔曼斯克签署,挪威议会和俄罗斯国家杜马分别于2011年2月8日和3月25日批准该条约,2011年6月7日在挪威首都奥斯陆举行的仪式上,挪威外交大臣斯特勒和俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫交换了条约文本,条约已于2011年7月7日起生效。条约的英、俄文版分别参见http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/ UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf和http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/ Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_russisk.pdf,2012年5月1日。同意划定巴伦支海17.5万平方公里争端区域内的分界线。俄罗斯和挪威根据该条约建立了单一划界线,200海里之内专属经济区和大陆架单一划界,200海里之外大陆架划界(参见图5)。条约第1条确定了定义划界线的8个坐标,将争端区域调整为面积大致相同的两个部分,划界线的调整考虑了俄罗斯较长的海岸线这一因素,②两国在这一问题上参考了2009年黑海划界案,重点考虑争端区域的海岸线。See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea(Romania v.Ukraine),Judgment of 3 February 2009, paragraph 77～78,at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf,1 May 2012.这一事实表明非法律因素也可以在划界中给予权重。《巴伦支海条约》在国际法上独具特色的是,俄罗斯在划界线以东行使主权权利的区域中,有一小部分是位于挪威200海里界限之内、俄罗斯200海里界限之外的。这是一个超越国际法将一国的主权权利移至原属另一国管辖范围的案例,再次体现了国际法作为国际间意志协调的“软法”的特性。《巴伦支海条约》不仅为两国扫清了划界障碍,而且为世界各国间解决海洋争端,尤其是与200海里以外大陆架划界相关的争端提供了新模式。

(三)日本

直接影响俄、日在鄂霍次克海南部划界的北方四岛领土主权争端2004年再次出现转机,普京表示俄方意欲根据1956年《苏日联合宣言》③See 1956 U.S.S.R.-Japan Joint Declaration,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Japanese_Joint_Declaration_of_1956,1 May 2012.将齿舞、色丹二岛归还日本,但小泉坚持1993年《日俄东京宣言》④See Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations,at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n -america/us/q&a/declaration.html,1 May 2012.的底线即四岛同时归还,从而失去了一次解决争端的佳机。2006年日本外相麻生太郎提出以四岛面积的等分线作为日俄边境,但俄方未予理会,反而同年通过了9年内用179亿卢布开发千岛群岛(包括四岛在内)的《2007年至2015年千岛群岛社会经济发展专项计划》。日方不甘示弱,2009年通过《〈促进北方领土问题解决特别法〉修正案》,首度明确赋予“日本拥有北方四岛主权”的国内法地位,2010年度《日本防卫白皮书》中亦称,竹岛和四岛皆为日本领土。自2010年年底开始,俄、日围绕四岛的冲突不断升级,俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫2010年11月1日以国家元首身份首次视察国后岛。梅德韦杰夫的登岛彰显了俄方在四岛问题上的强硬立场,用意是向国际社会强烈昭示四岛是俄罗斯的重要组成部分,同时也为俄罗斯早日划定在鄂霍次克海南部的200海里以外大陆架向日本加压。

(四)丹麦

2001年俄罗斯划界案之后,丹麦2004年11月16日批准《公约》,同时加快了申请本国大陆架的基础工作。为勘测海底和减少研究成本,丹麦与加拿大2005年6月27日签署谅解备忘录,合作收集埃尔斯米尔岛和格陵兰岛周边海底数据。①T.L.McDorman,The Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm:Law and Politics in the Arctic O-cean,Journal of Transnational Law and Policy,Vol.18,2009,pp.155～193.丹麦的专项大陆架项目包括LORITA-1、LOMROG 2007、Spring 2009以及LOMROGⅡ2009。②Expeditions and fieldwork,at http://a76.dk/greenland_uk/north_uk/gr_n_expeditions_ uk/index.html,1 May 2012.2009年丹麦科技部部长H·桑德指出,初步调查表明罗蒙诺索夫海岭是格陵兰岛北部海岸的地质延伸。③M.Rajabov,Melting Ice and Heated Conflicts:A Multilateral Treaty as a Preferable Settlement for the Arctic Territorial Dispute,Southwestern Journal of International Law, Vol.15,2009,p.427.从2010年开始,丹麦科考专家运用声波定位仪、地震学仪器及全球卫星系统提供的数据再度科考,旨在确定格陵兰岛大陆架及北冰洋海床的边缘。为预防围绕争夺北冰洋大陆架的潜在军事争端,丹麦议会2009年6月24日通过《2010—2014年防务协定》,④See Danish Defence Agreement,at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Denmark2010-2014English.pdf,1 May 2012.拟在格陵兰岛设立军事基地以加强其北极军事力量。为营造申请北冰洋大陆架的氛围,丹麦政府又于2011年8月22日发布了《2011—2020年丹麦王国北极战略》,共对法罗群岛和格陵兰岛周围包括北极点在内的5个区域的北极大陆架提出了主权要求。此外,丹麦还独树一帜地于2012年1月17日宣布新增北极大使职位,负责协调实施丹麦的“北极战略”。按照《公约》规定的10年的划界案提交期限,丹麦预计在2014年年底提交200海里以外大陆架划界案。

(五)加拿大

事实上,早在俄罗斯“北极2007”科考以“插旗”的方式高调宣称北极主权前的2007年4月,加拿大和丹麦就已开始了北极冰层下的测绘工作。加拿大总理S·哈珀自2006年上任以来,其北极之旅已成为一年一度的宣示加拿大主权之旅。加拿大政府2009年7月27日公布最新的北极政策报告——《加拿大北方策略:我们的北方、我们的遗产、我们的未来》,2010年8月20日又发表《北极外交政策声明》,再次强调加拿大对北极地区拥有主权。另外,在北极相关问题上加拿大特别注重与美国的合作(尽管两国对波弗特海海底区域的归属存在争议),两国2008、2009及2010年连续三次联合对北极进行科考,收集有关北极大陆架和海底的科学数据,为将来提交划界案做准备。加拿大的研究指出,加拿大在北极东部区域的主张是基于α-门捷列夫海岭和罗蒙诺索夫海岭。加拿大2003年11月7日批准《公约》,按照10年的划界案提交期限,加拿大预计在2013年年底提交划界案。

(六)美国

由于美国是所有环北极圈诸国中唯一未批准《公约》的国家,①158个国家批准了《公约》。关于美国为什么不批准一直存在争论,一些观点认为不批准是因为担心侵犯美国主权;另一些观点则认为,这是因为批准《公约》会要求美国支付采矿权的费用以及会妨害美国在公海管辖与武器相关的事项等等。在未来有关200海里以外大陆架划界的较量中,美国将只能从侧面干预。美国深知,一旦将来择机批准《公约》后申请200海里以外大陆架,至少也要经历自己为俄罗斯划界案设置的难度。因此,美国2003年设立大陆架专项工作组,并于2003、2004及2007年进行了三次大规模“北极海洋国土”测绘,新罕布什尔大学的海洋和海道联合测绘中心还绘制了楚科奇海等相关区域的海底三维地形图。美国目前一方面积极准备科学数据,做北极争端和平解决而最后不得不批准《公约》、争取有限的北极利益的打算;另一方面,美国不会很快批准《公约》,可能会重演在“一战”、“二战”中的故伎想坐收渔利,即等北极其它4国对北极问题失去耐心而火拼时伺机行动。另外,美国历来无视国际法,虽不批准《公约》,但已着手军事及国内法方面的准备:美国海军、海岸警卫队、海军陆战队2007年10月联合发布《21世纪海军合作战略》;②See A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,at http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf,1 May 2012.2009年1月9日,时任总统布什签署“国家安全总统指令第66号(NSPD-66)”和“国土安全总统指令第25号(HSPD-25)”,③See National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, at http://www.arctic.gov/news/2009%20Arctic%20Region%20Policy.pdf,1 May 2012.全面阐述了美国的北极政策;2009年11月批准《海军北极路线图》,④See U.S.Navy Arctic Roadmap,at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/ 2009/11/us-navy-arctic-roadmap-nov-2009.pdf,1 May 2012.制订了美国海军针对北极地区的相关政策和战略;自1993年以来几乎每年在北极地区举行代号“北方利刃”⑤Northern Edge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Edge,1 May 2012.的联合军事演习。军事威慑是美国从侧面遏制包括俄罗斯在内的其它国家主张北冰洋200海里以外大陆架的又一利器。

六、俄罗斯划界案未来的展望

由于受联合国和《公约》的约束,加上在目前国际问题上的影响力与前苏联时期相比已大大削弱,俄罗斯在当今的国际事务中不可能像美国及其主导的北约那样肆意超越国际法。可以推测,俄罗斯未来的划界案不太会突破委员会对其各海域建议的框架,事实上近10年俄罗斯一直在这一框架下努力。

(一)巴伦支海区域

如前所述,2010年俄—挪《巴伦支海条约》的签订基本上扫清了俄罗斯在巴伦支海主张200海里以外大陆架的障碍,剩下的只是一些轻微的、程序性的事项(如提交坐标和海图、宣布界限等)。从目前形势看,俄罗斯尚无单独宣布该海域200海里以外大陆架界限的打算,应该是等委员会对其未来再次提交的整体划界案审议后,与其它几个区域的200海里以外大陆架界限同时宣布。

(二)白令海区域

如前所述,俄罗斯在2001年划界案中直接采用了1990年边界作为其在白令海区域200海里以外大陆架的外部界限,间接表明俄罗斯已倾向接受1990年边界。但由于1990年边界仍属于与美国的未决边界,俄罗斯在白令海的主张仍然会成为《议事规则》附件一第5条意义上的争端。为杜绝美国以此为由提出异议,俄罗斯国家杜马必须在适当时间履行批准协定的程序,这也是美国一直所期望的,所以俄罗斯是有主动权的。如果按照这一方式进行,俄罗斯划定该海域200海里以外的大陆架也不会有多大困难。但如果俄罗斯在未来提交的修订划界案中不采用1990年边界而是采用其它边界,将表明俄罗斯认为本身不愿受《1990年协定》的法律约束,这势必将创设另一项《议事规则》附件一第5条意义上与美国的海洋边界争端,严重妨害委员会对其修订划界案的审议,也将大大增加划界难度,面对美国这个强劲的对手,估计俄罗斯会谨慎行事,不会贸然重新划界。

(三)鄂霍次克海区域

委员会建议的简短摘要隐含了认可鄂霍次克海的全部海底是法律大陆架的一部分,加上北方四岛的争端不会波及到鄂霍次克海北部,因此俄罗斯提交关于该海域的北部划界案没有什么障碍。南部的情况较为棘手,日、俄在北方四岛这一关键问题上的互不相让,可能导致两国在该海域的划界会旷日持久,从而直接影响俄罗斯在鄂霍次克海南部划定200海里以外的大陆架。但目前的情势显示,俄罗斯似乎渐渐失去与日本进行持久战的耐心,意欲凭借地缘优势,搁置争端而抢先开发鄂霍次克海的油气资源,以强硬立场威慑日本并择机划界。日本由于在地缘、军事等方面处于劣势,加上与中国的钓鱼岛争端以及其在西北太平洋200海里以外大陆架划界案并不十分乐观的结果,目前在与俄罗斯在鄂霍次克海的争端中明显处于被动局面。所以,在鄂霍次克海出现突变形势而使俄罗斯划定在该海域全部200海里以外大陆架的可能性仍然存在,当然这取决于俄、日在诸多方面的背后较量。

(四)中北冰洋区域

对于俄罗斯来说,最困难的200海里以外大陆架划界还是在中北冰洋,因为首先要面对3个强劲对手(丹麦、加拿大将直接参与争夺,美国则在侧面设置障碍),其次又要在海洋地质科学取证方面倾注巨大的努力,再次还需积极营造国际氛围以期与委员会以及国际法律、科学界达成有效的共识。应该说俄罗斯在该海域主张200海里以外大陆架的前景最不乐观,但该区域的潜在利益却是巨大、诱人的。

学术界对北极问题探讨过多种方案:中间线方式、扇形方式、《南极条约》①See Antarctic Treaty System,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctic_Treaty_System,1 May 2012.方式、《斯瓦尔巴条约》②See Svalbard Treaty,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svalbard_Treaty,1 May 2012.方式、军事方式以及《公约》方式等等,就目前的形势看,采取《公约》方式的可能性最大,但也不排除相关国家由于巨大利益的诱惑而无视国际法,采用极端方式的可能性。根据《公约》,主张中北冰洋区域的大陆架(目前看只有俄罗斯、丹麦以及加拿大有可能)必须首先通过《准则》规定的从属权利检验。③See CLCS/11,paragraph 2.3,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.俄罗斯、丹麦及加拿大3国近年来正紧锣密鼓通过北极科考搜集相关科学数据,可能在2012—2014年相继提交划界案。如果经委员会审议后只有一个国家的数据获得认可,问题就简单了,该国只要履行后续的程序性事项即可。如果3国中有两个以上国家的数据获得认可,就会产生第二个问题,即相关国家间关于重叠主张区域的划界问题。如果进行到这一步,委员会基本上就脱离了干系,之后相关国家必须经谈判、协议划界后将海图和坐标交存秘书长,方可获得国际社会认可的200海里以外大陆架边界,但重叠区域的划界难度较大,往往会旷日持久。

鉴于目前地质科学界对于北冰洋海底的构造历史和地质特征尚未达成广泛的共识,只有一些学者基于迄今为止的科考提出了一些待定的观点。比如澳大利亚的P·西蒙兹将α-门捷列夫海岭描述为大陆周边附近的一个微大陆,其发源及与主大陆分离的方式难以界定;①P.A.Symonds,Ridge Issues,in P.J.Cook and C.M.Carleron,ed.,Continental Shelf Limits:The Scientific and Legal Interface,New York:Oxford University Press,2000,p. 290.美国的A·格兰兹指出,α-门捷列夫海岭与北大西洋的冰岛—法罗海岭起源类似,是包含较深大洋地壳的陆架明显断裂后与周围大陆边分离形成的;②A.Grantz,Treatment of Ridges and Borderlands Under Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:the Example of the Arctic Ocean,in M.H.Nordquist, J.N.Moore and T.H.Heidar,ed.,Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental Shelf Limits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2004,pp.206～207.加拿大的R·麦克纳布则认为,要解释潜在的形态断裂,就需要更好地了解海岭端部与大陆边之间的形态断裂或深海沟等等。③R.Macnab,Submarine Elevations and Ridges:Wild Cards in the Poker Game of UNCLOS Article 76,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.39,2008,p.226.委员会未来审议3国划界案时,特别是关于罗蒙诺索夫海岭和α-门捷列夫海岭的地质特征是否符合各沿海国陆块的“自然延伸”标准问题,势必与地质科学界进行深入的交流才能做出结论。如果3国间此前能达成谅解,将极大地增加委员会认可各国主张的可能性。

俄罗斯能否利用《公约》第286条的强制性机制④《公约》第286条规定,……在第3节限制下,有关本公约的解释或适用的任何争端,如已诉诸第1节而仍未得到解决,经争端任何一方请求,应提交根据本节具有管辖权的法院或法庭。解决北冰洋的潜在划界争端?答案是否定的,因为俄罗斯在签署《公约》时明确声明,它将不受“与海洋边界划界相关的争端的强制性程序的有约束力的决定”的约束。⑤Declarations and Statements,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm#Russian%20Federation%2OUpon%20signature,1 May 2012.除非俄罗斯撤回保留,否则无法利用这种机制。即使俄罗斯撤回保留也无法鼓动强制划界,因为加拿大、挪威及丹麦都拒绝使用仲裁法庭来解决海洋划界争端,况且强制划界是一种被动之举,不会给俄罗斯带来更大利益。

在国际政治层面,成立于1996年的北极理事会⑥Arctic Council,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_Council,1 May 2012.和北极5国2008年的《伊卢利萨特宣言》⑦See The Ilulissat Declaration,at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_ Declaration.pdf,1 May 2012.均从侧面暗示国际社会,北极是北极国家的,外人不应染指。南极之所以相对平静是因为《南极条约》的存在,谁也不愿意轻易去碰南极这颗“硬钉子”。但由于没有类似的《北极条约》,况且北极各国极不情愿再增加任何束缚来阻碍对北极的争夺,《公约》目前只能暂缓争夺的局面,随着3国划界案的相继提出,《公约》肯定无法遏制相关国家争夺北极。各国争夺的套路基本相似,即法律和军事途径并行,法律途径不通下一步就必然借助军事和地缘优势抢先开发资源,再伺机划界,以避免它国插足。

另外,美国对遏制俄罗斯2001年划界案的中北冰洋部分起到了决定性作用。美国的“科学冰川探索”项目仍在继续,美国一方面为自己将来有可能申请做准备,另一方面肯定会在俄罗斯(再次)、加拿大、丹麦相继提交北冰洋200海里以外大陆架划界案时使用更加有力的方式遏制3国的主张,它绝不会坐视3国瓜分北极利益。因此,俄罗斯未来再次提出划界案主张中北冰洋200海里以外的大陆架,肯定会比其2001年难度更大、变数更多。

七、俄罗斯划界案对中国200海里以外大陆架划界问题的启示

探究俄罗斯2001年划界案受挫的原因,最主要集中在三个方面:一是未能在提交划界案前处理好与利益相关国间的争端,来自相关国家的强大阻力最起码导致委员会不愿介入其中而挑起更多国际争端;二是其划界案中提供的地质科学数据未能获得国际社会(特别是委员会)的认可,与《准则》的要求尚存较大差距;三是第一个向委员会提交划界案就触及极地区域(中北冰洋),招致了对此极为敏感的国际社会(主要是美国)的有力抵触。①D.A.Colson,The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf between Neighboring States,The American Society of International Law,Vol.97,2003,pp.91～107.但受挫后俄罗斯并未坐以待毙,而是努力调整、准备,并为其下次提交划界案积极营造国际氛围。

中国2009年5月11日已正式提交东海200海里以外大陆架外部界限的初步信息,下一步就是提交东海、南海真正的划界案,我们应未雨绸缪,从各方面做好应对大陆架界限委员会、《公约》缔约国以及周边海洋邻国的准备。中国要想顺利主张东海、南海的200海里以外大陆架,缓和、化解直至解决在两海域与周边邻国的争端势在必行。实践证明,千篇一律地用一种方式处理争端,往往会付出较大的成本。巴伦支海争端的解决以及澳大利亚划界案中澳大利亚与周边邻国多项海洋争端的解决,为我国和其它正在或准备提交划界案的国家提供了有价值的法律实践。此外,划界案整体的规范性、详实的科学数据以及对国际法的谙熟应是得到支持的重要支柱。中国的200海里以外大陆架划界之路任重而道远,需要用更加灵活的手段来处理东海、南海的海洋争端,最大限度地争取国家的海洋权益。

Russia①Russia’s submission was submitted on December 20,2001,see home page of Russia’s submission,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus. htm,1 May 2012.is the first country that presented to the UN Commission on theLimits of the Continental Shelf①The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(CLCS),a special committee of UN system,was established in 1997,dedicated to handling matters concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.The function of CLCS is to consider submissions concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm submitted by coastal States,make recommendations and provide scientific and technical advice,if requested by coastal States concerned during their preparations.It so far has lasted for three terms(1997,2002 and 2007).(hereinafter as“the Commission”)its submission for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm②1 nm(nautical mile)is equal to 1852 m(meter).in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea③The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(1833U.N.T.S.3),at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en.pdf,1 May 2012.(hereinafter as“the Convention”),involving four different waters including two in the Arctic region(Central Arctic and Barents Sea)and two in the Northwest Pacific region(Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea),with a total area of 1.58 million km2of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.④Kuang Zengjun,Russia’s Policy on Outer Continental Shelf,Studies on Russia,Central A-sia and Eastern Europe,No.2,2011,p.74.(in Chinese)The recommendations by the Commission were issued on May 27,2002 with non-approval for each of the four waters.In the ten years after the recommendations,Russia has made a series of painstaking and persevering efforts and is expected to resubmit in 2012.In light of the latest research from developed countries,this paper intends to make a brief review of,and comments on,the ins and outs of Russia’s submission.

Ⅰ.The Legal System on the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm and the Definition on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Set by Article 76 of the Convention

A.The Legal System on the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm

The third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea⑤The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea created three MOSTs in the history of international relations:number of participating countries,scale and duration.It was also the convention with the most provisions in the history of international law codification.The Convention includes a preamble,17 parts comprising 320 articles,and 9 annexes.China’s delegation had participated in all sessions.,which lasted nine years(1973～1982)with arduous negotiations,gave birth to a brand-new convention on the law of the sea-The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of theSea covering several previous conventions.①The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 established four Conventions:Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone;Convention on the High Seas;Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas and Convention on the Continental Shelf.The Convention is the most comprehensive and complete maritime code in the history of mankind by far(for maritime space set by the Convention,see Fig.1).The Convention has radically renovated the legal concept of the continental shelf.②It is generally acknowledged that the legal concept of the continental shelf has gone through an evolutionary process from The Continental Shelf Notice by US President Harry Truman in 1945 to The Convention on Continental Shelf(article 1)in 1958,and then to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(article 76)in 1982.Its article 76 and AnnexⅡhave become programmatic documents in international law in the field of delimitation of the outer limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm for the time being.

B.The Definition on Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Set by Article 76 of the Convention

Article 76,paragraph 1 of the Convention reads,“The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin,or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”This paragraph puts forward two kinds of criteria for the outer limits of the continental shelf:“natural prolongation”and“200-nm distance”.A coastal State may choose either of them according to its continental margin.Paragraphs 4～7 in article 76 should be followed in delineating the continental edge which is more than 200 nm from the territorial baselines.

Paragraph 4 reads:“(a)For the purposes of this Convention,the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,by either(ⅰ)a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 percent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope[namely“IrishFormula”①It was put forward by the Irish geologist P.R.R.Gardiner participating in the Third U-nited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,thus named“Irish Formula”.line],or(ⅱ)a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope[namely“Hedberg Formula”②It was put forward by the American geologist H.D.Hedberg participating in the Third U-nited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,thus named“Hedberg Formula”.line];(b)in the absence of evidence to the contrary,the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.”The two lines defined by paragraph 4 are known as“formula line”,which coastal States can apply singly or jointly according to their specific situations to maximize their outer limits by taking the outer envelope of the lines as the formula line farthest from shore.

Paragraph 5 reads:“The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed,drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(ⅰ)and(ⅱ),either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath,which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.”The two lines defined by paragraph 5 are known as“constraint line”,which coastal States can apply singly or jointly according to their specific situations to maximize their outer limits by taking the outer envelope of them as the constraint line farethest from shore.

Finally,the greatest outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm for the best interests of coastal States can be established initially by inner-enveloping of the maximum formula line from paragraph 4 and constraint line from paragraph 5(see Fig.2).Of course,the specific location of this line and the lengths of composing segments are also subject to such terms of article 76 of the Convention as paragraph 3③Article 76,paragraph 3 of the Convention reads:“The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State,and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf,the slope and the rise.It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.”(oceanic ridges),paragraph 6④Article 76,paragraph 6 of the Convention reads:“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5,on submarine ridges,the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin,such as its plateaus,rises,caps,banks and spurs.”(submarine rid-ges)and paragraph 7①Article 76,paragraph 7 of the Convention reads:“The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf,where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length,connecting fixed points,defined by coordinates of latitude and longitude.”(segmental length)etc.

Fig.1 Maritime Space Set by the Convention②

Fig.2 Possible Maximum Outer Limit of Continental Shelf①

Ⅱ.The Presentation of and the Consideration on Russia’s 2001 Submission

A.The Presentation of Russia’s 2001 Submission

Russia presented its submission to the Commission through the UN Secretary-General on December 20,2001 pursuant to article 76,paragraph 8 and arti-cle 4 of AnnexⅡin the Convention.①Article 76,paragraph 8 of the Convention reads:“Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under AnnexⅡon the basis of equitable geographical representation.”Article 4 in AnnexⅡto the Convention reads:“Where a coastal State[…]shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that state.”The official website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea(hereinafter as“DOALOS”)released the first continental shelf notice on the same day as the establishment of the Commission,②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_English.pdf,1 May 2012.announcing:the bulletin would be distributed to all UN members and parties to the Convention[…]following consideration of the submission,the Commission ought to make recommendations to Russia in accordance with article 76 of the Convention;the UN Secretary-General should make due publicity;and Russia’s limits of continental shelf based on these recommendations would be final and binding.The DOALOS issued a more detailed press release the next day stating that consideration of Russia’s submission should be included in the agenda of the Commission’s 10thsession,indicating the official hearing on Russia’s submission.③See Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf Receives Its First Submission,at http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sea1729.doc.htm,1 May 2012.After the UN Secretary-General distributed the notice and made public part of the information in the executive summary of Russia’s submission in accordance with article 50④Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“UN Secretary-General shall,through the appropriate channels,promptly notify the Commission and all UN States Members,including States Parties to the Convention,of the receipt of a submission,and make the executive summary known for public including all charts and coordinates referred to in paragraph 9. 1.4 of the Guidelines and contained in that summary,upon completion of the translation of the executive summary referred to in rule 47,paragraph 3.”in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(hereinafter as“Rules of Procedure”)⑤See Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(CLCS/ 40/Rev.1),at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/309/23/PDF/ N0830923.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.,Canada,Denmark,Japan,Norway and the United States responded by presenting their diplomatic notes to safeguard their rights because the five countries were directly or indirectly involved in Russia’s submission. The problems related to those notes exerted serious impacts on theCommission’s consideration and recommendations on Russia’s submission.

B.Russia’s Treatment of the Deadline of its Submission

The Convention entered into force for Russia on April 11,1997,thus making April 11,2007,the original terminal date for Russia’s submission,against the 10-year deadline.The 11thsession of the Assembly of State Parties to the Convention in May 2001 postponed the deadline for submission to May 13, 2009.①The Assembly of States Parties to the Convention considered the technical difficulty of a submission especially prepared by developing countries,and postponed the date of commencement for the 10-year deadline to May 13,1999,also the date on which the Guidelines were made public.The Convention came into force for Russia on April 11,1997,which means Russia would have to put forward its submission before April 11,2007.See SPLOS/72,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/387/64/PDF/ N0138764.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.Russia would have taken this advantage,but finally decided to present its submission in 2001,seven and a half years earlier than its deadline.There are several aspects behind this to be analyzed.Firstly,there was some uncertainty and vulnerability in the Commission’s consideration in terms of such aspects as legal proceeding and the scientific nature of data because it was the first submission,from which Russia sought to gain an advantage.Secondly, scientific and technological progress may have rendered the old data sub-optimal(and in fact it was no longer widely accepted by 2009),thus forcing the submitting State to make costly investments for new data and recalculate their limits.Thirdly,preparation of submission requires long-term planning including maintenance for a number of key scientific technical and legal areas of expertise,and intermittence means that governments would lose the expertise due to the turnover of key staff.Finally,the alteration of the 10-year deadline by the Assembly of States Parties does not fully comply with relevant procedures on amendment to the Convention,②See articles 312,313 of the Convention involving the amendment and simplified amendment procedure of the Convention.but is merely a putative functional equivalent,thus resulting in an inability to bind those who accede to or ratify the Convention subsequently.Presenting a submission beyond the original deadline set by the Convention may be subject to their challenges.However,presentation ahead of schedule would have negative impacts including extremely strict consideration by the Commission for the purpose of establishing its reputationin its first case.In addition,the Commission dares not jump to conclusions on some key issues since there are no precedents on a number of controversial scientific issues(such as the nature of Lomonosov Ridge).

C.The Consideration on Russia’s Submission by the Commission

In accordance with article 5 of AnnexⅡto the Convention and article 42 of the Rules of Procedure,the Commission established a seven-member subcommittee responsible for considering Russia’s submission.①Article 5 in AnnexⅡto the Convention reads:“Unless the Commission decides otherwise,the Commission shall function by way of sub-commissions composed of seven members,appointed in a balanced manner taking into account the specific elements of each submission by a coastal State…the coastal State which has made a submission to the Commission may send its representatives to participate in the relevant proceedings without the right to vote.”Paragraph 1 in rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“If,in accordance with article 5 of AnnexⅡto the Convention,the Commission decides to establish a subcommittee for the deliberation of a submission,it shall…appoint from among the nominated candidates seven members of the subcommittee.”The 7-people subcommittee considering Russia’s submission consisted of Galo Carrera Hurtado(Mexico,the President), Karl HF Hinz,(Germany,Vice-Chairman),Peter F.Croker(Ireland,Rapporteur),Alexandre Tagore Medeiros de Albuquerque(Brazil),Lawrence Folajimi Awosika(Nigeria), Iain C.Lamont(New Zealand)and Yong Ahn Park(South Korea).The initial consideration on Russia’s submission was included in the agenda of the Commission’s 10thsession held from March 25 to April 12 in New York in 2002.Russia’s Vice Minister of Natural Resources Ivan F.Gloumov introduced Russia’s submission at the session,and believed that diplomatic notes from Canada,Denmark,Japan,Norway and the U.S.did not constitute a barrier to the Commission’s consideration on Russia’s submission.②See CLCS/31,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/318/60/ PDF/N0231860.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.Gloumov also invited the Commission to visit Russia for the purpose of verifying data on the spot,though this was followed by no response from the Commission.The subcommittee held a total of twenty sessions from April 1 to 12 in 2002,six of them only for exchanging views with a team of Russian experts in the form of question-and-answer,and a total of thirty-six questions being put forward followed by written reply from the Russian experts.The subcommittee required Russia to submit additional data and information concerning certain matters, and went on with the consideration from June 10 to 14 just before expiration of the first term of the Commission on June 15,2002,including considering addi-tional data submitted by Russia on May 15.In order to get the latest data on seismic track line,multi-wave channel seismic and strip depth,the DOALOS had also arranged for the Commission to visit Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory①Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamont%E2% 80%93Doherty_Earth_Observatory,1 May 2012.in the U.S.and compare them with SCICEX/99②Suzette V.Suarez,The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf-Legal Aspects of their Establishment,Berlin/Heidelberg/New York:Springer Press Ltd.,2008,p.193.data from the U.S. Scientific Ice Expeditions project.③SCICEX(Science Ice Exercise),at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCICEX and http:// nsidc.org/scicex/,1 May 2012.Recommendations from the subcommittee were completed on June 14,2002 and submitted to the Commission’s 11thsession held from June 24 to 28,2002.After the settlement on procedural matters related to Russian members’involvement in consideration in accordance with relevant legal procedures set by article 5 of Annex II to the Convention,the Commission continued to consider recommendations by the subcommittee on Russia’s submission in a closed session.Mr.Carrera,chairman of the subcommittee,introduced the work of the subcommittee and its recommendations. The Commission’s recommendations based on certain amendments after consultation were unanimously adopted on May 27,2002,and were passed on to the UN Secretary-General and Russia in writing according to the Convention.

D.Brief Summary of Recom mendations on Russia’s Submission by the Com mission

Compared with the recommendations on Australia’s submission,④See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Australia on 15 November 2004,recommendations adopted by CLCS on 9 April 2008,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_ new/submissions_files/aus04/aus_summary_of_recommendations.pdf,1 May 2012both the Commission and the UN Secretary-General addressed Russia’s submission in a very low-profile manner.The Commission has not worked out a more complete summary of recommendations on Russia’s submission for the public so far,⑤See CLCS/60,paragraph 59,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N08/523/33/PDF/N0852333.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.while the UN Secretary-General has merely summarized the recommendations into an extremely brief,conclusive version submitted to the 57thsession of the UN General Assembly as Addendum to the Report of the Secre-tary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea(hereinafter as the“Addendum”)①See Oceans and the law of the sea/Report of the Secretary-General*Addendum(A/57/ 57/Add.1),paragraphs 38～41,at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/SG2002Oceansan dthelawoftheseareport.pdf,1 May 2012.for publicity.The reasons might be as follows:firstly,as the first and an essentially fruitless case considered by the Commission,it seems better not to trumpet it;secondly,the outstanding disputes are extraordinarily sensitive to other stakeholders,and the UN avoided stirring up more trouble in the international community;thirdly,frustrated Russia was unwilling to make the international community more informed of the core contents of its submission in order to avoid negative effects on its resubmission;finally,because the Commission dealt with scientific data in a tentative manner due to the absence of any precedent,it would be more appropriate to publicize the contents and range concerned carefully.

The Addendum,with a brief introduction to the consideration on Russia’s submission on its front page,pointed out that the Commission’s recommendations contained results of its deliberations on data and information submitted by Russia,specifically mentioning Russia’s rights on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm and whether formula and constraint lines set by article 76 of the Convention had been applied.As to the Barents Sea and the Bering Sea,the Commission recommended that Russia,upon entry into force of the maritime boundary agreements with Norway in the Barents Sea and with the U.S.in the Bering Sea,transmit the charts and coordinates of delimitation lines to the Commission as they would represent Russia’s outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nm in these two seas.②Paragraph 2 in rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“Pursuant to article 84 of the Convention,in the case of delimitation on continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts,charts and/or coordinates describing the lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 83 of the Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.Regarding the Sea of Okhotsk,the Commission recommended that Russia make a well-documented,partial submission for its extended continental shelf in the northern part of that sea,stating that this partial submission shall not prejudice questions relating to delimitation of boundaries between States in the south for which a submission might subsequently be made,and do its best to effect an agreement with Japan in accordance with paragraph 4 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.As regards the Central Arctic Ocean,the Commission recommended thatRussia present a revised submission in respect of its extended continental shelf based on the findings contained in the recommendations.Apparently,the Commission found that the data provided by Russia were insufficient to prove that there is a natural link between the Russian landmass and its related claims.In addition,there is on mention of any other State here,which means that there was no direct connection between the part of submission concerning this water with any territorial or maritime disputes in the sense of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

In the event that a coastal State disagrees with the Commission’s recommendations,both the Convention and the Rules of Procedure allow the coastal State to resubmit a revised or new submission to the Commission within a reasonable time.①Paragraph 4 in rule 53 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“In the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission,the coastal State shall,in accordance with article 8 of Annex II to the Convention,make a revised or new submission to the Commission within a reasonable time.”Article 5 in Annex II to the Convention reads:“In the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission,the coastal State shall,within a reasonable time,make a revised or new submission to the Commission.”However,the term“reasonable time”is not defined,nor is the deadline for a coastal State to have the Commission informed about its objection.There has been no revised or new submission(relative to original submission)from Russia to the Commission so far.On June 3,2003,Russia replied to the Commission’s recommendations in a document containing a number of questions and comments yet unpublished,and thus whether Russia agreed to the Commission’s recommendations is unknown.The subcommittee considering Russia’s submissions prepared a written reply,while the Commission agreed with the content and the method adopted and subsequently transferred it to Russia.②See CLCS/39,paragraph 20,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N04/359/63/PDF/N0435963.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.At this point,the first phase of Russia’s submission(2001 Submission)came to an end.

Ⅲ.Overview of Russia’s 2001 Submission

As stipulated,the executive summary of coastal States’submissions should be made publicly available on the official website of the DOALOS.Because of the demarcation disputes and scientific data credibility,Russia had on-ly agreed to release part of its information,while the open items and quantity of information is at the lowest level without clear logic,thus leaving a“last resort”impression.In view of this,Russia did not want the public to have a clear understanding of its submission.In stark contrast,the executive summary of Australia’s submission gives the public a clear outline readily available on the official website of the DOALOS.

The information Russia agreed to make public included three charts and five single-pages of text(pages 1～5①See pages 1～5,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ RUS_page1_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ rus01/RUS_page2_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_page3_Pacific.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page4_Pacific.pdf and http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page5_Legend.pdf,1 May 2012.).The three charts include Russia’s general outer limit of the continental shelf②See the map at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_ CLCS_01_2001_LOS_1.jpg,1 May 2012.and two individual ones in the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean(see Fig.3,Fig.4).It is noteworthy that the three charts are drawn in different ways,and with different colors and legends, which,listed together,seem to be unconventional.By contrast,all of Australia’s charts of the same nature were drawn in a unified approach.Page 1 of Russia’s executive summary is a short description of the abbreviations and symbols employed in the summary and the proposed limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean;page 2 provides the information of thirty-two fixed points which determine Russia’s proposed outer limits in the Arctic Ocean (more detailed);page 3 reflects the information of twenty-one fixed points which determine Russia’s proposed outer limits in the Bering Sea(more simple,with only longitude and latitude coordinates),followed by apparently inconsistent wording on the front of the page;③For example,the first paragraph on this page reads,“The outer limit of continental shelf in Arctic Ocean is shown on map 3…”,but map 3 in the executive summary is the chart for Northwest Pacific.page 4 is a brief description of Russia’s proposed continental shelf limits in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk(without any coordinate information on the fixed points);page 5 is only a list of legends to the three charts without further reference value.Apparently,these five pages are coarsely clipped and scraped together from the executive summary of Russia’s submission and charts,with obvious problems in wording,logical order,and extent of coverage by the contents of a single page,a-mongst other issues.

Due to the Commission’s strict internal rules of confidentiality,①Article 2(1)in Annex II to the Rules of Procedure reads:“The coastal State making a submission may classify as confidential any data and other material,not otherwise publicly available,that it submits in accordance with rule 45…;article 2(3)reads:“Confidential material so classified by the coastal State shall remain confidential after the consideration of the submission is concluded unless decided otherwise by the Commission with the written consent of the coastal State concerned.”it is impossible for the public to become directly informed on the specific legal and scientific details which Russia cited in its 2001 Submission.This article can only trace the details of Russia’s submission from the reaction of related countries and scholarly writings.②T.Gorski,A Note on Submarine Ridges and Elevations with Special Reference to the Russian Federation and the Arctic Ridges,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol. 40,2009,pp.51～60.

Ⅳ.The Main Issues Related to Russia’s 2001 Submission

A.The Dispute on Maritime Delimitation with Norway in the Barents Sea

The Barents Sea,named after the 16thcentury Dutch explorer W.Barents, is a marginal sea of the Arctic Ocean near the European continent,and is surrounded by the Scandinavian Peninsula,Svalbard,Bear Island,Franz Josef Land,Novaya Zemlya,Kolguyev Island,the Kanin Peninsula and the Kola Peninsula(see Fig.5).The southern part of the sea is a gulf called the White Sea, extending deep into Russia’s mainland.The Barents Sea covers an area of about 1.41 million km2,with an average depth of 229 m,and a maximum depth of 600 m,having a continental shelf of 1.27 million km2in the south,several deep trenches in the center and west,a platform in the north and shoals in the southeast.①Barents Sea,at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/53189/Barents-Sea,1 May 2012.

Norway and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(U.S.S.R.) had delimited part of the maritime boundary between them at Varangerfjord in 1957,but failed to reach agreement on maritime boundary in the Barents Sea. The disputed area is located between a middle line claimed by Norway in the east and a longitude line claimed by Russia in the west.Due to the dispute, Russia’s submission was immediately followed by a moderate note from Norway.②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/NOR,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NORtext.pdf,1 May 2012.Norway’s note emphasized the following points:firstly,because a large area in the central Barents Sea is beyond 200 nm from Norway’s and Russia’s baselines,pending delimitation on the overlap should be categorized as a maritime dispute in the meaning of rule 5 in Annex I to the Rule of Procedure (Norway submitted two lists of coordinates reflecting Norway’s and Russia’s respective stances on delimitation);secondly,the region is entirely located within the landwards area from the foot of the continental slope,and within the 350-nm limits from the baselines of the two countries;thirdly,according to paragraphs 3,4 and 5 in article 76 of the Convention,the delimitation of this region can be directly settled by an agreement between the two countries withouta technical evaluation by the Commission;fourthly,Norway agreed that the Commission could consider the disputed area in Russia’s submission but without prejudice to the issues of maritime delimitation between Norway and Russia;and finally,the note was submitted upon an agreement with Russia on the relevant issues.

In addition,Norway made a formal submission of its own to the Commission on November 27,2006,①See Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea,Executive Summary,at http://www.un.org/Depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf,1 May 2012.involving three parts of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Northeast Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean:Ring in the Barents Sea,western Nansen Basin and Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea.Citing rule 5 in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure,Russia also put forward a note on Norway’s submission requesting that the Commission’s consideration on Norway’s submission be without prejudice to the delimitation between Norway and Russia.②See Russia’s Note,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/ rus_07_00325.pdf,1 May 2012.The Commission’s recommendations on the Barents Sea for Norway are exactly the same as those for Russia:in order to mark the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm for both countries in the Barents Sea, both parties should submit the charts and coordinates of their maritime boundary to the Commission,as soon as the delimitation agreement concluded between them enters into force.③See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006,at http://www.un. org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf,1 May 2012.

Fig.5 Russia-Norway Barents Sea Treaty Line in 2010①

B.The Dispute on Maritime Delimitation with Japan in the Sea of Okhotsk

The Sea of Okhotsk is a marginal sea comprising the northwestern part of the North Pacific Ocean,surrounded by Kamchatka,Kuril Islands,Hokkaido, Karafuto(also known as“Sakhalin Island”)and a section of the coast of east Siberia,and connected to the Sea of Japan by Sakhalin Gulf,Gulf of Tartary and La Pérouse Strait(see Fig.6).The sea is named after Okhotsk,Russia’s first settlement in the Far East.The Sea of Okhotsk covers 1.58 million km2, with a mean depth of 859 m,and a maximum depth of 3,372 m.Its continental shelf in the north and west accounts for about 42%of the total seabed,its continental slope strip in the center about 48%,and the Kuril Basin in the south 9%,with reserves of 1.2 billion tons of oil and 1.5 billion m3of natural gas.

There has been a long-standing dispute focusing on territorial sovereignty of the four northern islands(hereinafter the“Four Islands”)between Russia and Japan in these waters.①Etorofu,Kunashir,Shikotan and Habomai are the southern extension of the Kuril Islands in the Northwest Pacific,with a total area of about 5,000 km2.Japan calls them Northern Territory or Four Northern Islands,while Russia names them South Kuril Islands.They are currently under the control of Russia’s Sakhalin,and the vast majority of their residents are immigrants from various regions of the former U.S.S.R.,which occupied these four islands after World War II.Japan has deemed the occupation illegal,and insists that the sovereignty of the four islands belong to Japan all the time.See Kuril Islands Dispute, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuril_Islands_dispute,1 May 2012.Four Islands connecting Kamchatka in the north, the Sea of Japan in the south,the Sea of Okhotsk in the west and the Pacific O-cean in the east,guard the sea lanes connecting the Sea of Okhotsk with the Pacific Ocean,with important strategic military significance.②During the Cold War,the Sea of Okhotsk was the location of several successful military operations in which the U.S.Navy had monitored undersea communications cable of U. S.S.R.Navy(including Ivy Bells action),and was also where U.S.S.R.Strany Air-defense Forces attacked Flight 007 of ROK Airlines in 1983.Russia takes the Sea of Okhotsk as the shelter for ballistic-missile submarines of its Pacific Fleet by now.Both Japan and Russia began to contend for them in the late 17thcentury.During nearly a hundred years from the mid-19thcentury to the end of World War II,the sovereignty of Kuril Islands including Four Islands was tossed about between Russia (the U.S.S.R.)and Japan by a series of treaties such as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia(also known as“Treaty ofShimoda”)(1855),the Treaty of Saint Petersburg(1875),the Treaty of Portsmouth(1905),the Yalta Agreement(1945),the Potsdam Proclamation(1945) and the San Francisco Peace Treaty(1951).①See Treaty of Shimoda,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Shimoda;Treaty of Saint Petersburg,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Saint_Petersburg_(1875); Treaty of Portsmouth,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Portsmouth;Yalta A-greement,at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c04.html;Potsdam Declaration, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration;Treaty of San Francisco,at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm,1 May 2012.Four Islands is currently under the actual control of Russia.

Losing Four Islands and with Hokkaido alone,Japan would be deprived of almost all of its interests in the Sea of Okhotsk.The limits of the continental shelf proposed in Russia’s submission invaded the coastal waters of Hokkaido and Four Islands by employing base-points and the baseline of Four Islands as a benchmark,thus provoking Japan’s intense challenge.②Michael Sheng-Ti Gau,Third Party Intervention in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Regarding a Submission Involving a Dispute,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,pp.61～79.Japan pointed out that Russia’s submission reflected a procedural flaw due to the presence of sovereignty disputes on Four Islands.Japan requested that the Commission not just refer to charts and ancillary data submitted by Russia,or prejudge the sovereignty disputes between the two countries on Four Islands as well as the delimitation issues on the continental shelf.③See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/JPN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions _files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__JPNtext.pdf,1 May 2012.Considering paragraph 5(b)in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure and Section 9.1.4(d)in the Guidelines,④Article 5(b)of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure reads:“The submissions made before the Commission and the recommendations approved by the Commission thereon shall not prejudice the position of States which are parties to a land or maritime dispute.”Article 9.1.4.of the Guidelines reads:“The executive summary will contain the following information:…(d)Any disputes as referred to in rule 44 and annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.”Japan believed that Russia ought to inform the Commission of the existing disputes,and should take measures to ensure that its submission would not prejudice the delimitation issues between the two countries.

C.The Dispute on Maritime Delimitation with the U.S.in the Bering Sea and the 1990 U.S.-U.S.S.R.Agreement on Maritime Border

The Bering Sea is the northernmost marginal sea of the Pacific Ocean, with an area of 2.3 million km2,an average depth of 1,636 m and a maximum depth of 4,773 m,connected with the Arctic Ocean by the Bering Strait in the north,and separated from the Pacific Ocean by the Aleutian Islands in the south(see Fig.7).It was named after Danish captain V.Bering who was the first European to discover it in 1728.①Bering Sea,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Sea,1 May 2012.The maritime boundary between the U. S.S.R.and the U.S.in the Chukchi Sea,the Bering Sea and the northern Pacific was determined by an agreement between them in 1990(hereinafter“the 1990 Agreement”),②See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary,at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/USA-RUS1990 MB.PDF,1 May 2012.The agreement was signed by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker on behalf of their governments in Washington on June 1,1990.Russia used to call the boundary line“Shevardnadze Line”.The line moved to USSR side about 200 nm against the medium line,resulting in the fact that an economic zone about 20,000 km2which originally belonged to the U.S.S.R.was transferred to the U.S.in the Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea.However,the agreement provided that it could only come into effect subject to the approval by their parliaments respectively.and is the longest international maritime border at 1,390 nm.The 1990 Agreement was smoothly adopted by the U.S.Congress within a year without any twists or turns because it was obviously favorable to the U.S.,while it was not ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.However,the foreign ministers of the two governments exchanged a note and agreed to make the 1990 Agreement enter into force in the form of an interim agreement.Since its independence,Russia has believed that the U.S.S.R.suffered a great loss in the 1990 Agreement(delimitation in the Bering Sea not by the medium line),and that it is unfair for Russia to bear the consequences;Russia’s Duma has not ratified the 1990 Agreement.

The reasons behind the scenes for Russia’s taking the boundary set by the 1990 Agreement(hereinafter as“the 1990 Boundary”)uncharacteristically in its submission might be as follows:firstly,realizing the gloomy prospect of getting immediate approval by the Commission in other waters(especially in theSea of Okhotsk and the Central Arctic Ocean),Russia wanted to“borrow”the 1990 Boundary in the Bering Sea as a breakthrough;secondly,the 1990 Agreement entered into force against a provisional agreement,Russia has been inclined to accept it;thirdly,the cost would rise dramatically if another negotiation on delimitation were to be carried out,and the U.S.would not accept Russia’s medium-line precept easily on a second negotiation;fourthly,Russia’s willingness to accept the 1990 Agreement informally was based on the hope that U.S.resistance to Russia’s submission would be minimized;fifthly, Russia’s obfuscation could pave the way to a bargain with the U.S.concerning delimitation on the Bering Sea in the future in order to compensate for the losses caused by the U.S.S.R..However,taking the 1990 Boundary would create an international obligation for Russia to comply with the 1990 Agreement in the manner of following general practice.If the U.S.could prove that Russia complied with the 1990 Agreement based on legal obligation or necessity, Russia would be bound by the agreement.①D.J.Bederman,International Law Frameworks,2nded.,New York:Foundation Press, 2006,pp.16～17.That means Russia would lose the possibility for a“re-delimitation”with the U.S..

The U.S.chuckled to itself on Russia’s taking the 1990 Boundary directly,while losing no opportunity to bring up again the fact that the 1990 Agreement had not been sanctioned by Russia’s Duma,②The U.S.pointed out in its note that,the 1990 Agreement border had been employed in Russia’s submission although Russia’s Duma had not ratified the Agreement in fact.The U.S.also stated that taking this border would be consistent with the common stable expected interests of Russia and the U.S.,and in conformity with article 9 in Annex II to the Convention which provides that the actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.for the following reasons: firstly,although the 1990 Agreement has become effective by means of the exchange of notes,in order to make the maritime boundary between the U.S. and Russia confirmed in international law,the U.S.has been hoping for the Russian Duma’s ratification of the agreement at an early date because there would be a problem on the succession of the treaty in international law due to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.;secondly,the U.S.intimated to Russia that it did not accept Russia’s manner by only mentioning the 1990 Agreement in its submission,and that it hoped Russia could approve it in a formal manner in order to avoid a branch-off in the future;thirdly,the U.S.cannot effectively participate in the delimitation on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm due to itsnon-ratification on the Convention,and is therefore only able to obstruct and exert pressure on Russia’s submission indirectly.

Fig.8 Arctic seabed①

D.The Geological Data in the Central Arctic Ocean and the Disputes with Bordering Countries in This Region

1.Overview of the Seabed Topography of the Arctic

The Arctic seabed(see Fig.8)is split by the Lomonosov Ridge,theα-Mendeleev Ridge and the Gakkel Ridge.The Eurasian Basin,a basin of the Lomonosov Ridge close to Eurasia,is divided into the Nansen Basin and the Fram Basin by the Gakkel Ridge,with an average depth of 3,300～3,700 m, and a maximum depth over 5,499 m.The Amerasian Basin,a basin of the Lomonosov Ridge close to North America,is divided into the Canada Basin and the Makarov Basin by theα-Mendeleev Ridge,with an average depth of 3,000～3,500 m,and a maximum depth over 4,683 m.

The Lomonosov Ridge governing the Arctic Basin is the main underwater ridge of the continental crust in the Arctic Ocean,spanning 1,800 km from Ellesmere Island of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago to the Arctic Point northwards along west longitude 60°,then to Russia’s New Siberian Islands southwards along east longitude 140°,rising 3,300～3,700 m above the seabed with a minimum depth of 954 m.①Lomonosov Ridge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lomonosov_Ridge,1 May 2012.It has been proven that the Lomonosov Ridge does not possess relevant characteristics of seismic activity described in the Guidance,despite of its volcanic activity.It consists mainly of sedimentary and metamorphic rocks with obscure folds on the surface,and is not part of the global oceanic ridge system.It was first discovered by a U.S.S.R.Arctic exploration crew in 1948 and named after the Russian scientist M.V.Lomonosov.

Theα-Mendeleev Ridge,a ridge system with a total length of 1,500 km and roughly parallel to but smaller than the Lomonosov Ridge,is composed of theαRidge and the Mendeleev Ridge,starting from the northern side of Wrangel Island in the north of Russia to the northeastern side of Ellesmere Island in the north of Canada,and eventually converging with the Lomonosov Ridge. The Mendeleev Ridge,aged about 80 million years,is of relatively low height and gentle slope,and is about 2,000 m below sea level with a minimum depth over the ridge of approximately 800 m.It was discovered in 1948 by a U.S.S. R.high-latitude expedition and named after the Russian scientist D.I.Mendeleev.

The Gakkel Ridge(or Nansen Ridge),stretching from the estuary of Russia’s Lena River to the northern side of Denmark’s Greenland and connecting with the North Atlantic Ridge which crosses Iceland,is about 2,000 km long and roughly parallel to the Lomonosov Ridge.Since there are many cracked rocks,abnormal extensions parallel to the magnetic axis as well as perpendicular transverse fault zones,it is an integral part of the global oceanic ridge system.The ridge was first discovered by a U.S.S.R.polar expedition in 1948 and named after the Russian explorer Y.Y.Gakkel.

The names of the above ridges were all approved by the SCUFN②Undersea Feature Names,at http://www.gebco.net/data_and_products/undersea_feature_names/,1 May 2012.(subcommittee on geographical names and nomenclature of ocean bottom features)of the GEBCO①GEBCO,at http://www.gebco.net/,1 May 2012.(General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans).②International Hydrographic Organization/Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, IHO-IOC GEBCO Gazetteer,at http://www.gebco.net/about_us/meetings_and_minutes/documents/gebco_scufn_15_report.pdf,1 May 2012.After four years of investigation,the US Geological Survey confirmed for the first time in May 2008 that the Arctic Ocean could hold 83 billion barrels of oil and 44 trillion m3of natural gas.③M.Byers,Who Owns the Arctic?Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.89.The huge energy reserves in the Arctic Ocean and its growing importance as a military-strategic position have increasingly intensified the contention among the Arctic nations for the Arctic Ocean,which began several hundreds of years ago.

2.The History of Russia’s Contention for the Arctic Ocean With one third of its territory located within the Arctic Circle,Russia has always taken the Arctic as its traditional sphere of influence.As early as the period of Peter the Great,Tsarist Russia organized several investigations on the Arctic collecting relevant geographic and geological information.④During the so-called“Northern Adventure”in the 18thand 19thcenturies,some residents from Tsarist Russia had moved to live in the Arctic.Russia had established 12 large-scale settlements scattered in Alaska by the first half of the 19thcentury before it was sold to the United States in 1867.Following state practice by Canada claiming Arctic waters under the Sector Principle,⑤For the first time in 1907,Canada’s Senator P.Poirier put forward the“Sector Principle”which holds that all land between two meridian lines and the Arctic point should belong to the country whose territory abuts up there.the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.announced“On the Declaration of Soviet Land and Island Territories Located in the Arctic Ocean”(“1926 Decree”)unilaterally on April 15,1926,declaring that the Gore Area(or“the Triangle”)about 1.19 million km2(accounting for 45%of the Arctic Ocean)between the meridian 32°04′35″E and the meridian 168°49′30″W.Fixed by the three points of Kola Peninsula,Chukchi Autonomous Region and North Pole belonged to the U.S.S.R.,which was officially marked on its national map(Russia followed suit after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. with the same marking).⑥L.Timtchenko,The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept:Past And Present,ARCTIC,Vol. 50,1997,pp.29～35,or at http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic50-1-29.pdf,1 May 2012.The U.S.S.R.set up research stations on the Arctic ice cap in the 1930s,and encouraged moderate emigration to the Arctic.TheU.S.S.R.discovered the Lomonosov Ridge in 1948,which remains the scientific and historical basis for Russia to claim Arctic territory.

However,the situation came to a significant turning point in 1997.Out of comprehensive consideration of such factors as economy and strategy,Russia did not want to stay outside the Convention.As the Arctic waters in fact have not been demarcated,members to the Convention may only claim such national jurisdiction waters as contiguous zone,EEZ or continental shelf in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.Russia had to sign the Convention in 1997,thus losing the ownership it had unilaterally claimed over the Triangle. There has been censure in Russia stating that joining the Convention was absurd,while the desire for Russia to recover the Triangle is growing with its recovery of national power.Once the Triangle was recovered,Russia would grab most of the oil and gas resources in the Arctic Ocean for its economy,and secure its great-power status by gaining strategic military dominance with its unique geographical advantage.①In recent years,Russia’s strategic living space has been squeezed by the Western States,its estuaries also blocked thereby.Striving for the Arctic Ocean and opening the Arctic sea outlet has become an important consideration for Russia to maintain its strategic security. Once the“Triangle”was taken over again,Russia’s Northern Fleet could easily pass in and out of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific at any time provided that the Arctic Ocean is navigable.Russia has been seeking all means to gain control of the Lomonosov Ridge,the backbone of the Arctic Ocean,and presented its submission on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm to the Commission in 2001 by means of the Sector Principle,to claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm,mainly comprising the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges in the Arctic,although ultimately in vain because of the adverse recommendations of the Commission.

3.Other Stakeholders’Contentions for the Arctic Ocean

a.Canada

An important principle of acquiring territory in modern international law is“Occupation”,namely discovery and effective preemption over“terra nullius”.During the 18thand 19thcenturies,the U.K.took advantage of its navigation strength to preempt vast amounts of the Arctic regions including Arctic Islands and the Northwest Passage②Northwest Passage,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest_Passage,1 May 2012.followed by non-recognition by the international community.The above so-called“sovereignty”was handed over to Canada by the U.K.in 1880,and became a source by which Canada claims sov-ereignty over parts of the Arctic regions including the Northwest Passage. Canada declared sovereignty over the Arctic in the 1950s but its claim was not recognized by the international community.In addition,there has been a longstanding sovereignty dispute between Canada and the U.S.over the Northwest Passage(the U.S.views it as open waters and an international waterway)and an area of 21,000 km2in the Beaufort Sea.The sovereignty dispute with Denmark over Hans Island,①Hans Island near the Arctic is a small,unsupervised and uninhabited barren knoll measuring 1.3 km2,1,300 m long and 1,200 m wide.If being awarded efficacy in future maritime delimitation,it would be entitled to considerable reserves of oil and gas resources within the surrounding sea-bed.In addition,it has been contended by Denmark,Canada and Russia for control over fairway which is vital for connecting the Nares Strait and the Arctic Ocean.Denmark and Canada tried to make demarcation in the Nares Strait in 1973 but failed,thus causing unresolved sovereignty dispute so far.T.Hϕyem,former Denmark’s minister for Greenland affairs,visited Hans Island in 1984,planting a flagpole with Danish flag,burying a bottle of brandy at the end of the pole and leaving a note marked“Welcome Denmark”.Since then,Denmark and Canada often carry“banner war”,taking turns landing and declaring sovereignty.Canadian Army landed,planted Canadian flag and buried a bottle of Canadian rye whiskey at the end of the polein 2005.Canadian post-office also pretentiously assigned HOHOHO,a postal code created for the Arctic officially.Conflict concerning Hans Island in recent years appears to upgrade potentially.which is of great significance for future delimitation and waterway control,has existed for nearly forty years(since 1973).

As to the Central Arctic Ocean in Russia’s submission,Canada as a nonmember to the Convention at that time put forward a note of right protection pointing out that,in the absence of further supporting data for analysis,Canada could not determine whether to agree to Russia’s submission,but that the comment should not be construed as consent or acquiescence to Russia’s submission,and also that any recommendations by the Commission should not prejudice delimitation on the continental shelf between Russia and Canada.②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/CAN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__CANtext.pdf,1 May 2012.The International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean(IBCAO)③IBCAO,at http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/IBCAO_betamap. jpg,1 May 2012.shows that theα -Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges are very close to Canada’s Ellesmere Island from Ace Kashmir.Canada also wants to claim the continental shelf in the Arctic based on the two ridges.Despite a potential problem on overlapping demarcation concerning the two ridges between Canada and Russia,the Commission did not respond in particular to Canada’s note because the geologicalfeatures of the two ridges have not been determined and Canada’s note was of plain wording and avoided mentioning any specifics.In order to prepare its own submission,Canada has put two issues on agenda,namely joining the Convention and collecting seabed data of the Arctic Ocean,after the recommendations of the Commission to Russia’s submission were made.

b.Denmark

Denmark’s contention for the Arctic regions is based mainly on Greenland.Norwegians emigrating to Iceland in AD 982 discovered Greenland,which became a colony of Norway in 1261.Denmark,Sweden and Norway concluded the Kalmar Treaty in 1397 which resulted in a Scandinavian confederation to place Greenland under a condominium.After the collapse of the confederation in 1524,Greenland was transferred to a dual monarchy of Denmark-Norway. Denmark regained Greenland by the Kiel Treaty after the separation between Denmark and Norway in 1814.①See Treaty of Kalmar,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kalmar; Treaty of Kiel,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kiel,1 May 2012.Norway and Denmark faced another rough spot concerning Greenland later on,when the International Court of Justice in the Hague awarded Greenland to Denmark in 1933.Greenland was granted home rule by Denmark on May 1,1979 and an autonomy referendum on November 25,2008 resulted in a transitional regime in which its internal affairs are independent while its foreign affairs,defense and financial-related matters are still in the charge of Denmark after June 21,2009.②Greenland,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland,1 May 2012.In addition,Hans Island in the Nares Strait between Greenland and Ellesmere Island is another bone of contention for Denmark in the Arctic region.

As to the central Arctic Ocean part of Russia’s submission,the note of rights protection presented by Denmark,then a non-member of the Convention,was similar to Canada’s in the sense that Denmark could not propose a comment on Russia’s submission because professional evaluation needs further supporting data,and that non-comment does not mean a consent or acquiescence to Russia’s submission,and further that any recommendations by the Commission should be without prejudice to delimitation on the continental shelf between Russia and Denmark.③See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/DNK,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__DNKtext.pdf,1 May 2012.The IBCAO shows that one bottom of the Lomonosov Ridge is located on the continental shelf of Greenland.It isbased on this point that Denmark attempts to prove that the ridge is a natural prolongation of the continental shelf of Greenland,thus claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic Ocean.The Commission made no particular response to Denmark’s note just as it did not make a response to Canada’s.In order to make active preparation for its own submission,Denmark has also put the same things on agenda:joining the Convention and collecting seabed data of the Arctic Ocean after the recommendations on Russia’s submission by the Commission.

c.The U.S.

As the U.S.is in an inferior geographical position in the Arctic and unwilling to tolerate losing its Arctic interests to Russia,Canada and other Arctic countries,it has insisted that the Arctic Ocean be international waters.The U. S.Congress adopted the Arctic Research and Policy Act(ARPA)formally in 1984,binding U.S.Arctic scientific research,economic interests and strategic consideration in a form of law.From 1993 to 2000,the U.S.Navy carried out six missions for the Scientific Ice Expeditions(SCICEX)in assisting the U.S. scientific community.The U.S.enacted the SCICEX PhaseⅡScience Plan①SCICEX Phase II Science Plan,at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/scicex_plan.pdf, 1 May 2012.as a follow-up study plan in June 2010 for the purpose of contesting with other Arctic countries and preparing for future competition in the Arctic.

The U.S.was the only country referring to scientific and technical aspects in Russia’s 2001 Submission.In its note submitted to the Commission on February 28,2002,②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.the U.S.stated its belief that the part of Russia’s submission concerning the claim of Arctic continental shelf had significant defects,the most crucial problem being the nature of geological structure of the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges.In order to pave a way to questioning Russia’s submission,the U.S.’s note pointed out at its front that according to article 76, paragraph 3 of the Convention,oceanic ridges cannot be considered as natural prolongation in the meaning of article 76.That means that if the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges are defined as oceanic ridges,Russia will lose the basis of its claim.The U.S.has strongly put forward relevant evidence to the contrary by means of its technological advantages in the field of marine geology for the purpose of setting obstacles to Russia’s submission.

As to theα-Mendeleev Ridge,the U.S.gave a geological interpretation directly:much geological and physical evidence has indicated that theα-Mendeleev Ridge,thirty-five km thick,is a newly formed volcanic ridge on the oceanic crust from a“hot spot”①A“hot spot”is a magma source rooted in the Earth’s mantle that is persistent for at least a few tens of million of years and intermittently produces volcanoes on the overlying earth’s crust as it drifts across the hot spot during continental drift.where magma overflowed,diffused and accumulated along an axis located in the Amerasian Basin in the Arctic Ocean 120 to 130 million years ago;it is a surface morphology with a single continuous geological characteristic formed through the volcanic mechanism by a hot spot on the oceanic crust.The U.S.has put forward evidence in the form of bathymetric,aeromagnetic,seismic and bedrock data to show that theα-Mendeleev Ridge is not connected to Russia’s mainland:aeromagnetic and bathymetric data show that the ridge goes across the Arctic Ocean,aeromagnetic features disappear at both ends of the continental margin without appearing on the adjacent continental shelf;the rocks found in the ridge are of an oceanic type rather than the more rapidly deposited,typically coarser-grained current-bedded deposits found on continental shelves.Furthermore,all types of bedrock originated from northwestern Canada and were distributed widely in the Amerasian Basin in the Arctic Ocean.Therefore,theα-Mendeleev Ridge is only a volcanic oceanic ridge by marine origin developed on the oceanic crust in the Amerasian Basin rather than part of the continental shelf of any country.This argument was fatal to Russia’s submission because the Guidelines point out that ridges formed by volcanic activity related to crustal movement at hot spot are likely to be oceanic ridges rather than a natural prolongation of the continental shelf.

Regarding the Lomonosov Ridge,the U.S.believes that it is a continental geological structure formed by seafloor spreading and separated from Scandinavia and Russia’s northwestern continental margin,and is an independent topographical feature in the deep part of the Arctic Ocean Basin rather than a product of volcanic activity.It is an oceanic ridge consisting of basalt,and therefore not part of the natural continental margin of Russia or any other countries. The U.S.has also provided a large amount of evidence of rock source found in theα-Mendeleev Ridge.But in recent years,the struggles among various domestic political forces in the U.S.as to whether to ratify the Convention or not,as well as how to maintain U.S.maritime rights and interests in the fu-ture,have not stopped.Currently,the attitude towards the nature of the Lomonosov Ridge by U.S.government-led academics has changed fundamentally, taking a trend arguing that the Lomonosov Ridge has a strong geological connection with the related land mass.This indicates that the U.S.might re-define its interests and strategies in the Arctic waters.

E.Other Issues

With the decline of the socialist bloc headed by the U.S.S.R.and the end of the Cold War,the U.S.has ushered in an era in which it absolutely dominates international affairs.Out of consideration of other interests,the U.S. has not ratified the Convention,thus leading to a serious weakness on its discourse power in the field of delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm. However,the U.S.is unwilling to lose its interests to any other countries.Facing the first submission in the world,which was put forward by its old rival, the U.S.has launched a strong offensive indirectly with great efforts.In addition to challenging the nature of the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges directly(as aforementioned),the U.S.also referred to relevant provisions of the Guidelines for the purpose of curbing Russia as well as strengthening its own rights to speak to maintain its potential interests.The U.S.pointed out that the Rules of Procedure permit the Commission to consider comments on data contained in an executive summary from other countries as well as any disputes related to a submission.The U.S.put forward a series of objections to Russia’s submission,and the remaining questions were also quite weighty,having the potential to seriously impede any of Russia’s follow-up claims.

1.The Need to Provide Objective Data Sources to Determine the Location of 2500-m Isobath and the Foot of Continental Slope The U.S.’s note stated that there were two pieces of unclear information in Russia’s submission,namely 2500-m isobath and foot of continental slope, which cannot be ignored in any submission.Although the fixed points of 2500-m isobath are not required in an executive summary according to the Guidelines,①See CLCS/11,paragraph 9.1.4,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.the U.S.still worried that such confidential data as 2500-m isobath and foot of continental slope might be inconsistent with those in the topogra-phy database of the IBCAO,①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.and therefore it appealed to the Commission to make an objective evaluation on Russia’s fixed points.②The U.S.urged the Commission to make decision based on relevant scientific data,especially open and peer-reviewed scientific literature reports.It also strongly advocated reference to the International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean(IBCOA),because it is a cooperative result contributed by the International Arctic Science Committee(IASC),the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission(IOC),and the International Hydrographic Organization(IHO).If the data in Russia’s 2001 Submission as well as its possible resubmission were significantly different from the internationally recognized data provided by the International Oceanographic Commission(IOC),Russia must employ the internationally accepted data to eliminate this discrepancy.Since the outcome of deliberations on this issue has not been made public,it is unclear whether the 2500-m isobath and the foot of continental slope in Russia’s 2001 Submission could meet the requirements of the Commission’s Guidelines.

2.Absence of the Term“Submarine Ridges”in the Executive Summary of Russia’s 2001 Submission

The U.S.’s note also pointed out that due to the absence of the term“submarine ridges”for Russia to establish the outer limits of continental shelf in its submission,submarine ridges could not be applied for this purpose in Russia’s submission any longer.③See paragraph“SUBMARINE RIDGES”on page 3 of CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__ USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.The U.S.’s note actually only involved part of the information in the executive summary disclosed upon Russia’s permission,while it is unclear whether submarine ridges were employed in the undisclosed portion and the main body of Russia’s submission.Though the Guidelines require that a description on specifics quoted from article 76 must be contained in a submission,both the Guidelines and the Rules of Procedure do not mention the consequences of an omission.Some scholars④For example,B.Spielman(Notes&Comments Editor of Emory International Law Review),An Evaluation of Russia’s Impending Claim for Continental Shelf Expansion:Why Rule 5 Will Shelve Russia’s Submission,Emory International Law Review,Vol.23, 2009,p.329.including those from the U.S.do not believe that Russia would be in a position to employ the provision(submarine ridges)if it were not employed in its first submission,but this argument is subject to challenge.Russia’s 2001 Submission was unlikely to vi-olate the requirements that the specifics cited from article 76 must be indicated.It indicated only that Russia was unwilling to make them publicly available due to uncertainty of scientific data,lest it incur more criticism.If the“submarine ridges”clause was truly not employed in Russia’s 2001 Submission,the effect should be limited within Russia’s 2001 Submission in which Russia could not claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm based on submarine ridges,rather than its subsequent submission.

Judging from the charts permitted by Russia for the public,the provision of“submarine elevations”was the most likely to be employed,①M.Benitah,Russia’s Claim in the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in UNCLOS, ASIL INSIGHTS,Vol.11,Issue 27,2007,or at http://www.asil.org/insights071108. cfm,1 May 2012.because Russia could claim continental shelf according to 2500-m isobath plus 100 nm free from the restriction set by the 350-nm limits,much in line with Russia’s charts.Although the terms“submarine elevations”and“natural components”are not defined in the Convention,if it deemed the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges as submarine elevations,Russia would provoke a serious condemnation from the world.That might be the true cause for Russia’s unwillingness to release the specifics it cited for public.Should the Commission recognize the Lomonosov Ridge as submarine elevations,it would exert considerable negative impact on future delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm,namely encouraging coastal States to follow Russia’s suit making farfetched submarine topographical structures into submarine elevations,thus undermining the consistency and authority of the Convention and the Guidelines. In addition,the U.S.also pointed out that the Commission has no competence to deal with baselines,regardless of whether or not they comply with international law.The challenge from the U.S.was the greatest,and the questions it posed were also the most difficult ones for Russia to handle.

Ⅴ.The Aftermath of Russia’s 2001 Submission

A.Russia

Russia did not give up its efforts in spite of its frustration on the 2001 Submission,considering the huge potential energy and military interests,its international position and influence in the future.Based on the recommendationsby the Commission on its submission in 2002,Russia has adjusted its direction to the two key issues of maritime delimitation disputes and scientific data.As to maritime delimitation disputes,the Barents Sea Treaty signed in 2010 with Norway cleared the barriers and paved a way for Russia to claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this water successfully and creatively,while there were not many improvements in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.The problem in the Bering Sea is not serious because the initiative is in the hands of Russia,and it might not be called a problem in some ways.However,the disputes with Japan in the southern Sea of Okhotsk will not be resolved easily for now,and might last for a long period of time.

In the realm of scientific data,most of Russia’s efforts in recent years have been focused on the requirements of the Guidelines,namely that it must find the continental margin based on prolongation by providing the turning point of continental slope,slope area,2500-M isobath and 1%sediment as well as at least five kinds of data such as single-beam echo,multi-beam echo,bathymetric side-scan sonar,coherent side-scan sonar and seismic reflection.Russia worked out the first topographic map of the Arctic seabed in the world in 2004,began a new round of large-scale Arctic expedition investigating the connection between theα-Mendeleev Ridge and the Siberian continental margin in terms of geology and tectonics in the summer of 2005,and presented its preliminary results to the 2005 AGU(American Geophysical Union)Fall Meeting.①V.D.Kaminsky,V.A.Poselov,V.Y Glebovsky,A.V.Zayonchek and V.V.Butsenko,Geophysical and Geological Study of the Transition Zone between the Mendeleev Rise and the Adjacent Siberian Shelf:Preliminary Results,2005,at http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm05,1 May 2012.Russia carried out the second round of large-scale Arctic expedition called“Arktika 2007”②In the expedition,A.Chilingarov,the renowned Arctic expert,former Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Duma,led his expedition team of 50 scientists and took deep-sea submersible MIR-1 and MIR-2 diving to the North Pole on the seafloor of the Arctic up to 4,261 m below the sea level.They had taken back land and ocean biological samples there by manipulating a deep-sea diving robot,and placed a 1-M high titanium Russian flag which could be preserved for about 100 years on the ocean floor.The move had caused an uproar in the international community.in August 2007 as part of its activities in the 2007-2008 IPY(International PolarYear)①International Polar Year(IPY)is planned and carried out jointly by scientists around the world,also known as the“Polar Olympic Games”for scientific expeditions.Only four Years have been organized since 1882 to date,namely 1882—1883,1932—1933,1957—1958 and 2007—2008.The 1957—1958 IPY directly contributed to the birth of the Antarctic Treaty.For historical reasons,China didn’t participate in the first three IPYs.As one of the sponsors for the 4thIPY,China’s government attached great importance to the activity by preparing an action plan,which reflected China’s increasing impact on polar expedition..

In addition,Russia has made a lot of effort in creating an international atmosphere following the Commission’s recommendations on its 2001 Submission in 2002.To cope with the Commission’s questions,Russia held a special international seminar at St.Petersburg in 2003 aiming to promote the implementation of article 76 as well as to discuss issues related to geosciences in the Arctic.In order to mitigate the increasingly tense situation in the Arctic and to open an international dialogue window,Russia held two high-level international forums themed“Arctic:territorial dialogue”in 2010 and 2011 successfully,intending to forge it into a permanent international forum.It is worth mentioning that Russia selected the birthplace of Lomonosov,②Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov(1711—1765),Russia’s encyclopedic scientists,linguists, philosophers and poets,also known as Peter the Great in Russia’s history of science,had founded Russia’s first chemical laboratory in 1748 and first university-University of Moscow in 1755.Arkhangelsk,as the site for the second forum.

In March of 2009,Russia introduced the Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and Beyond③Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and Beyond,at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html,1 May 2012.which clearly defines its interests in the Arctic.The exacting legal and scientific requirements have forced Russia to postpone its resubmission again and again.Based on the 2010 9000-km section survey in the Arctic and the latest data collected for the two ridges in 2011,Russia announced that its evidence for territorial sovereignty in the Arctic had been acquired,and its resubmission might be set in 2012.The move reflected Russia’s strong desire not to be a loser to Canada and Denmark with the same desire for the Arctic.

B.Norway

After a 40-year negotiation,the Treaty Between the Kingdom of Norwayand the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean①The Barents Sea Treaty was signed on September 15,2010 in Murmansk,and was ratified by Norway’s parliament and Russia’s Duma on February 8 and March 25,2011 respectively.At a ceremony on June 7,2011 in Oslo,Norway,Norwaw’s Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stϕre and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchanged the text of the treaty which came into effect on May 7,2011.For the English and Russian versions of the treaty,at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf and http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_russisk.pdf respectively,1 May 2012.(hereinafter“the Barents Sea Treaty”)was finally signed in 2010,marking the maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea concerning a disputed area of about 175,000 km2.A single delimitation line for both EEZ and continental shelf within 200 nm and for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm was established between Russia and Norway under the treaty(see Fig.5).Eight coordinates defining the delimitation line which divides the disputed area into two parts of roughly the same area are determined by article 1 of the treaty.The fact that the delimitation line has been adjusted by taking Russia’s long coastline into account reflects that non-legal factors can also be given weight in delimitation.②The two countries referred to the Black Sea Demarcation Case in 2009,which gave more consideration on the coastline of disputed area.See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.Ukraine),Judgment of 3 February 2009,paragraph 77～78,at http://www. icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf,1 May 2012.The Barents Sea Treaty has a unique feature in international law:a small portion in which Russia exercises its sovereign rights to the east of demarcation line is actually within Norway’s 200-nm limit and outside that of Russia.The case that the sovereign rights of one nation by origin can be moved into the jurisdiction of another country by surpassing international law reflects once again that international law is characteristically soft law resulting from the coordinated will of the international community.The Barents Sea Treaty has not only cleared the demarcation obstacles for the two countries,but also set a new model for the settlement of maritime disputes between countries around the world,especially for the disputes related to delimitation on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.

C.Japan

The dispute on territorial sovereignty over Four Islands,which is a direct impact of the delimitation between Russia and Japan in the southern Sea of Ok-hotsk,saw a turnaround again in 2004.Putin said that Russia intended to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan under the 1956 U.S.S.R.-Japan Joint Declaration,①See 1956 U.S.S.R.-Japan Joint Declaration,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Japanese_Joint_Declaration_of_1956,1 May 2012.while Koizumi insisted upon the bottom line set by the 1993 Russo-Japanese Tokyo Declaration,②See Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations,at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n -america/us/q&a/declaration.html,1 May 2012.namely that Four Islands ought to be returned at the same time,thus losing the best opportunity for the settlement of disputes.Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro also put forward a bisector of the area of Four Islands as Russo-Japanese border in 2006,which was ignored by Russia.Instead,Russia passed a nine-year development plan called“Social-Economic Development of Kuril Islands in 2007—2015”costing 17.9 billion rs(ruble)in the same year.Unwilling to admit Russia’s victory,Japan adopted a bill of amendment called“Special Law to Promote Settlement of Problems Concerning the Northern Territories”in 2009,which,for the first time,expressly conferred the status of domestic law to Four Islands by stating that“Japan has sovereignty over Four Islands”,while its annual white paper entitled“The DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2010”also said that Takeshima and Four Islands are Japanese territory.Conflict between Russia and Japan around Four Islands have been escalating since Russia’s former President Dmitry Medvedev visited Kunashir on November 1,2010 as head of state for the first time.Medvedev’s visit highlighted Russia’s tough stance on the issue of Four Islands,not only strongly proclaiming to the international community that Four Islands are an important part of Russia,but also exerting heavy pressure on Japan in order to settle delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the southern Sea of Okhotsk.

D.Denmark

After Russia’s 2001 Submission,Denmark ratified the Convention on November 16,2004,while speeding up its basic work on the submission for the continental shelf.In order to survey seabed and reduce research costs,Denmark and Canada signed a memorandum of understanding to collect seabed data surrounding Ellesmere Island and Greenland jointly on June 27,2005.③T.L.McDorman,The Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm:Law and Politics in the Arctic O-cean,Journal of Transnational Law and Policy,Vol.18,2009,pp.155～193.Denmark’s special projects on the continental shelf include LORITA-1,LOMROG 2007,Spring 2009 and LOMROGⅡ2009.①Expeditions and fieldwork,at http://a76.dk/greenland_uk/north_uk/gr_n_expeditions_ uk/index.html,1 May 2012.Denmark’s Minister of Science and Technology,H.Sander,pointed out that the preliminary investigation had shown that the Lomonosov Ridge is a geological extension of the northern coast of Greenland.②M.Rajabov,Melting Ice and Heated Conflicts:A Multilateral Treaty as a Preferable Settlement for the Arctic Territorial Dispute,Southwestern Journal of International Law, Vol.15,2009,p.427.Beginning in 2010,Denmark’s experts have employed sonar,seismological instruments and global satellite system in their re-expedition to pinpoint the edge of continental shelf of Greenland and the seabed of the Arctic.In order to take precautions against potential military disputes concerning competition for the continental shelf of the Arctic,the Danish parliament passed the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 on June 24,2009,③See Danish Defence Agreement,at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Denmark2010-2014English.pdf,1 May 2012.intending to establish its military bases in Greenland for the purpose of strengthening its military force in the Arctic.In order to create an appropriate atmosphere for submission for the continental shelf in the Arctic,the Danish government released the Kingdom of Denmark-Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 on August 22,2011,claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf of the five regions around Faroe Islands and Greenland including the North Pole in totality.In addition,Denmark announced a new position of Arctic Ambassador responsible for coordinating and implementing Denmark’s unique strategy in the Arctic on January 17,2012.In accordance with the 10-year deadline,Denmark is expected to put forward its submission by the end of 2014.

E.Canada

In fact,Canada and Denmark had already begun mapping work under the ice of the Arctic before Russia high-profiledly announced its Arctic sovereignty by planting a flag during its expedition named“Arktika 2007”in April 2007. Since Canada’s Prime Minister S.Harper took office in 2006,his Arctic trip has become an annual tour declaring Canada’s sovereignty.Canada’s government stresses that Canada has sovereignty over the Arctic by making public its latest Arctic policy report-“Canada’s Northern Strategy:Our North,OurHeritage,Our Future”on May 27,2009,and its“Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy”on August 20,2010.In addition,Canada has paid special attention to cooperation with the U.S.on Arctic-related issues in spite of a dispute between the two countries over the ownership of seabed area in the Beaufort Sea.In order to prepare for their future submissions,they carried out three joint Arctic expeditions collecting scientific data of seabed,including the continental shelf of the Arctic,in 2008,2009 and 2010.Canada’s research pointed out that its claim over the eastern region in the Arctic is based on theα-Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges.In light of the 10-year deadline,Canada is expected to make its submission by the end of 2013,as it ratified the Convention on November 7,2003.

F.The U.S.

As the U.S.is the only country that has not ratified the Convention among nations within the Arctic Circle,①158 countries have ratified the Convention.There has been debate on why the U.S.has not ratified the Convention.Some hold the view it is because of the concern about infringing sovereignty,while others think that the U.S.would be asked to pay the fees of mining rights as well as bound to prejudiced jurisdiction on the high seas and weapons-related matters.it can only intervene indirectly in the delimitation contests on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.The U.S.is deeply aware that once it chooses to ratify the Convention to apply for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the future,it will experience at least as much difficulty as it has created for Russia.Therefore,the U.S.established a special working group for the continental shelf in 2003,and carried out three largescale mappings on its so-called“Arctic Ocean Territory”in 2003,2004 and 2007.The Center for Coastal Ocean Mapping(CCOM)and the Joint Hydrographic Center(JHC)in the University of New Hampshire have also drawn three-dimensional topographic maps of the relevant seabed in the Chukchi Sea. On one hand,the U.S.is actively preparing scientific data for what it will do after the Arctic dispute is peacefully settled at last and when it has to ratify the Convention for the limited interests of the Arctic.On the other hand,the U.S. would like to make a profit from other parties’conflict as it did during the World Wars rather than ratifying the Convention soon;that is,take opportunistic action when the other four Arctic countries lose patience and start to fight.In addition,always defying international law,the U.S.has already embarked on preparation in military tactics and domestic law:A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea-power was issued jointly by the U.S.Navy,Coast Guard,and Marine Corps in October 2007 in spite of its non-approval of the Convention;①See A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,at http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf,1 May 2012.former President Bush signed the presidential directives NSPD-66 and HSPD-25 which are the comprehensive exposition of U.S.Arctic policy on January 9, 2009;②See National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, at http://www.arctic.gov/news/2009%20Arctic%20Region%20Policy.pdf,1 May 2012.the Navy Arctic Roadmap formulating policies and strategies of the U. S.Navy for the Arctic region was approved in November 2009;③See U.S.Navy Arctic Roadmap,at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/ 2009/11/us-navy-arctic-roadmap-nov-2009.pdf,1 May 2012.military joint exercises code-named“Occam’s Razor”have been held almost every year since 1993.④Northern Edge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Edge,1 May 2012.Military deterrence is another tool for the U.S.to deter other countries,including Russia,from claiming the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic.

Ⅵ.The Prospect of Russia’s Future Submission

Due to the constraints from the UN and the Convention,coupled with its weakening influence on international affairs compared with the former U.S.S.R.,Russia cannot keep up with the former U.S.-led NATO which exceeds what is allowed by international law at will in international affairs.It can be speculated that Russia’s future submission will be less likely to break through the framework proposed by the Commission for all of its waters,and as a matter of fact,Russia has been working hard within this framework for nearly ten years.

A.Barents Sea

As mentioned earlier,the Russia-Norway Barents Sea Treaty in 2010 cleared the obstacles for Russia to claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Barents Sea,leaving only some minor and procedural matters(such as sub-mitting coordinates and charts,announcing boundaries,etc).Based on the current situation,it seems that Russia has no intention to announce its limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this water separately.It will come up with the limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm of other regions as a whole in Russia’s future resubmission upon the consideration by the Commission.

B.Bering Sea

As previously discussed,the direct use of the 1990 Boundary determining the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Bering Sea in Russia’s 2001 Submission reflected that Russia has tended to accept the 1990 Boundary.However,Russia’s claim in the Bering Sea would still be a dispute in the meaning of paragraph 5 in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure as the 1990 Boundary is still a pending boundary with the U.S.In order not to leave room for the U.S.to raise objection on this pretext,Russia’s Duma should ratify the agreement at an appropriate time,which has also been desired by the U.S.as such,the initiative would be on Russia’s side.In this way,it would not be difficult for Russia to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this water. But if Russia does not employ the 1990 Boundary in its future resubmission, another maritime boundary dispute with the U.S.would definitely arise in the sense of article 5 in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure because that move would demonstrate that Russia itself is unwilling to be bound legally to the 1990 Agreement.Such action would seriously prejudice consideration by the Commission on its revised submission as well as increase the difficulty for delimitation.It is estimated that Russia,facing a strong rival in the U.S.,will act cautiously rather than proceed to re-delimitation without careful consideration.

C.Sea of Okhotsk

The brief summary of recommendations by the Commission implicitly recognized that all the seabed under the Sea of Okhotsk is part of the legal continental shelf in that area.Furthermore,the dispute on Four Islands will not spread to the northern Sea of Okhotsk.Thus,there is no obstacle to Russia putting forward its submission there.The situation in the south is more difficult.The seesaw battle concerning the critical problem on Four Islands between Japan and Russia may lead to a protracted case of delimitation,thus af-fecting Russia’s delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in that area.However,from the current situation,Russia seems to have gradually lost patience with Japan on the protracted conflict,preferring to shelve disputes and preemptively exploit oil and gas resources in the Sea of Okhotsk by virtue of geographical advantages as well as to overawe Japan and to exploit opportunities to delimit.Japan is now in the dock concerning the dispute with Russia in the Sea of Okhotsk due to its geopolitical and military disadvantage coupled with its dispute on Diaoyu Islands with China as well as its less-than-optimistic outcomes on the delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Northwest Pacific.Therefore,it is possible for Russia to settle all of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Sea of Okhotsk subject to possible alterations.Of course,that depends on the contest behind the scenes between Russia and Japan.

D.Central Arctic Ocean

For Russia,the most difficult delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm is in the Central Arctic Ocean.Firstly,it has to face three strong competitors including Denmark and Canada from the front as well as the U.S.laterally;secondly,collecting geo-scientific evidence calls for great effort;thirdly,in order to cope with the circle of science,international law and the Commission, a positive international atmosphere has to be created.It should be mentioned that Russia’s claim for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this area would encounter the greatest difficulty,while the potential benefits are the most attractive.

Academics have put forward a variety of schemes for the Arctic such as the Medium-Line approach,the Sector Principle,the Antarctic Treaty①See Antarctic Treaty System,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctic_Treaty_System,1 May 2012.approach,the Svalbard Treaty②See Svalbard Treaty,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svalbard_Treaty,1 May 2012.approach,the military method as well as the Convention approach.Judging from the current situation,taking the Convention approach is the most likely option,while the possibility of relevant countries taking extreme approaches cannot be ruled out because they might prefer ignoring international law due to the temptation of huge profits.According to the provisions in the Convention,claiming for the continental shelf of the Arctic(only possible by Russia,Denmark and Canada)must pass the test of appurtenance at first.①See CLCS/11,paragraph.2.3,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.Russia,Denmark and Canada in recent years have been in full swing with Arctic expeditions collecting scientific data which will serve their following submissions possibly from 2012 to 2014.If the Commission only recognizes data from one country,the problem would be simple,with only such follow-up matters as procedure.If the data of two or three countries are recognized,a second problem,namely overlapping delimitation between the relevant countries,might follow.If the matter goes this way,the Commission would basically be free from the bondage.Then the countries concerned must negotiate to reach an agreement and submit their charts and coordinates to be deposited with the UN Secretary-General in order to be recognized by the international community for their limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nm.However, delimitation of the overlapping region is difficult and often protracted.

As no broad consensus within the geo-science circle has been reached on the tectonic history and the geological features of seabed in the Arctic Ocean, only a few scholars have put forward some points based on the expeditions to date.For instance,Australia’s P.Symonds described theα-Mendeleev Ridge as a micro-continent within the vicinity of a continent,its origin and separation from the main continent difficult to define;②P.A.Symonds,Ridge Issues,in P.J.Cook and C.M.Carleron,ed.,Continental Shelf Limits:The Scientific and Legal Interface,New York:Oxford University Press,2000,p. 290.A.Grantz from the U.S.pointed out that the origins of both theα-Mendeleev Ridge and Iceland-Faroe Ridges in the North Atlantic are similar,both formed by the separation between the shelf of deep oceanic crust and the surrounding mainland upon fracture;③A.Grantz,Treatment of Ridges and Borderlands Under Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:the Example of the Arctic Ocean,in M.H.Nordquist, J.N.Moore and T.H.Heidar,ed.,Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental Shelf Limits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2004,pp.206～207.Canada’s R.Mac Nab believed that in order to explain the potential form of fracture,one needs to better understand the form of fracture or the deep trench between the end of ridge and the continental margin.④R.Macnab,Submarine Elevations and Ridges:Wild Cards in the Poker Game of UNCLOS Article 76,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.39,2008,p.226.When it comes to the Commission to consider the submissions of the three countries,a conclusion could only be reached by a deep exchange with the geo-science circle,especiallyon whether the geological features of the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges are consistent with the norm of“natural prolongation”from the land mass of coastal States.Should an understanding among the three countries be reached in advance,the possibility for the Commission to recognize their claims would be greatly increased.

Is it possible for Russia to employ the mandatory mechanism expressed by article 286①Article 286 of the Convention reads:“Subject to section 3,any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall,where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1,be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.”of the Convention to handle the potential delimitation dispute in the Arctic Ocean?The answer is no,because Russia declared upon its signature on the Convention explicitly that it would not be bound to a decision“related to the delimitation dispute of maritime boundaries by the mandatory procedures”.②Declarations and Statements,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm#Russian%20Federation%2OUpon%20signature,1 May 2012.Russia is unable to take advantage of this mechanism until it withdraws its reservations.In addition,Russia could not agitate a forced delimitation since Canada,Norway and Denmark have refused to make use of an arbitration court to resolve the disputes on maritime delimitation even if Russia withdraws its reservations.Moreover,a forced delimitation is a passive way which would bring no greater benefits to Russia.

At the international political level,the Arctic Council③Arctic Council,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_Council,1 May 2012.established in 1996 and the Ilulissat Declaration④See The Ilulissat Declaration,at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_ Declaration.pdf,1 May 2012.by the five Arctic countries in 2008 both suggested to the international community that the Arctic belongs to the Arctic countries,while outsiders ought to have no finger in the pie.The Antarctic is relatively calm because of the existence of the Antarctic Treaty,a“hard nail”no one wants to touch.However,due to the absence of a similar Arctic Treaty and extreme reluctance on the part of Arctic countries to increase any further constraint to curb contention for the Arctic,the Convention can only suspend contention for the time being.With future submissions to be put forward by the three countries,the Convention would not be in a position to prevent relevant nations from contending for the Arctic.The above countries share the same strategy to contend for the Arctic,namely a parallel arrangement by legaland military means followed by military deterrence and exploiting the resources in advance in order to prevent other countries from becoming involved,provided that the legal resolution does not work,and then waiting for a chance to make the proper delimitation.

In addition,the U.S.played a decisive role in curbing Russia’s 2001 Submission especially for the central Arctic Ocean.The U.S.’s glacier study project continues for the purpose of preparing for future submission of its own and employing more effective ways to curb the claims of Russia(resubmission), Canada and Denmark upon their submissions concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic.The U.S.will not sit by and watch the three countries carve up the Arctic pie.Therefore,Russia’s resubmission concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic will surely be more difficult and present more variables than its 2001 Submission.

Ⅶ.The Implication of Russia’s Submission for China’s Future Submission

To sum up,Russia’s 2001 Submission failed mainly due to the following three reasons:firstly,Russia’s failure in settling the disputes with stakeholder countries before its submission led to a strong resistance which at least made the Commission unwilling to intervene,lest more international disputes be provoked;secondly,the geo-scientific data provided in its submission,with a wide gap from the requirements of the Guidance,failed to obtain the approval of the international community(especially the Commission);thirdly,its submission, as the first to the Commission,touched the polar regions(Central Arctic O-cean),thus incurring a strong resistance from the international community (mainly the U.S.),which is very sensitive to them.①D.A.Colson,The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf between Neighboring States,The American Society of International Law,Vol.97,2003,pp.91～107.Rather than sitting still on its frustration,Russia has made a great endeavor in adjusting its strategy and actively creating an international atmosphere for its next submissions.

China officially submitted its preliminary information about the outer limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the East China Sea on May 11, 2009.The next step is to make a formal submission for the East China Sea and South China Sea.China should take precautions to cope with the Commission, the States parties to the Convention,and its surrounding ocean neighbors from

all aspects.In order to solve the problems on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the East and South China seas successfully,it is imperative for China to mitigate,neutralize and resolve the disputes with its neighboring countries in the two waters.Practice has shown that dealing with all disputes from one approach tends to exact a greater cost.The settlement of disputes in the Barents Sea as well as those for Australia with neighboring countries in its submission has provided valuable legal precedent for China and other countries that are preparing to make a submission.In addition,the overall standardization of a submission containing detailed scientific data and being versed in international law are important pillars to support a submission.To maximize its oceanic rights and interests,China will have a long way to go for its delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm,which calls for more flexible measures to deal with the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.

On Russia’s Submission Concerning the Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM

PAN Jun*

Delimitation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is of far-reaching strategic significance for coastal States on their politics,economy and military affairs,and factors significantly in the new order set by the UN Convention on Law of the Sea.Russia’s 2001 Submission,the first one of this kind considered by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,has acquainted Russia and other coastal States with the complexity and difficulty in their attempts to extend their continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baseline of the territorial sea under international law.Frustrated,Russia has coordinated with its neighbors in a pragmatic manner and proactively created an international atmosphere,while carrying out further survey for geo-scientific data to prepare its resubmission carefully.The gains and losses of Russia’s submission have provided good lessons on scientific and legal practice for the coastal States,especially for China facing great difficulty in maritime delimitation.

Russia;CLCS;Continental shelf beyond 200 nm;Outer limits; Submission

*潘军,加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校法学院2012/2013年度高级访问学者,北京大学法学院2009/2010年度访问学者,江苏建筑学院副教授,主要从事国际法、海洋法研究。电子邮箱:pj670805@126.com。基金项目:本文系教育部2009年人文社会科学研究规划基金项目《基于联合国海洋法公约框架下中国未来海洋权益的外大陆架法律问题研究》(09YJA820068)资助的阶段性成果,作者为该项目主持人。

①《公约》各海洋区域示意图,下载于http://image.baidu.com/i?tn=baiduimage&ct= 201326592&lm=-1&cl=2&word=%B4%F3%C2%BD%BC%DC,2012年5月1日。

《公约》第76条第8款规定,从测算领海宽度的基线量起200海里以外大陆架界限的信息资料应由沿海国提交根据附件二在公平地区代表制基础上设立的大陆架界限委员会。《公约》附件二第4条规定:“一个沿海国……应将这种界限的详情连同支持这种界限的科学和技术资料,尽早提交委员会,而且无论如何应于本公约对该国生效后10年内提出。”

①图中阴影区域显示俄罗斯在巴伦支海和中北冰洋200海里以外大陆架的位置,红色线为200海里界限,下载于http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_2.jpg,2012年5月1日。

①T.Henriksena and G.Ulfsteinb,Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic:The Barents Sea Treaty,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.42,2011,p.3.

①Sea of Okhotsk,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/okh.html,1 May 2012.

①Bering Sea,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/bseamap.html,1 May 2012.

①File:Arctic Ocean bathymetric features.png,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arctic_Ocean_bathymetric_features.png,1 May 2012.

*PAN Jun,senior visiting scholar at Law School of University of California,Berkeley during 2012/2013,visiting scholar at Law School of Peking University during 2009/2010,associate professor at Jiangsu Institute of Architectural Technology,is mainly engaged in the research on international law and the law of the sea.E-mail:pj670805@126.com.This article is one of phased results of a project titled“Legal Study on Outer Continental Shelf for China’s Future Maritime Rights and Interests under the Framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”(Grant No.09 YJA820068),funded by the Ministry of Education, PRC in 2009,and directed by the author.

②See Schematic of marine divisions set by the Convention,at http://image.baidu.com/i? tn=baiduimage&ct=201326592&lm=-1&cl=2&word=%B4%F3%C2%BD%BC% DC,1 May 2012.

①Kuen-chen Fu,Essays on International Law of the Sea,Xiamen:Xiamen University Press,2004,p.283.(in Chinese)

①The shaded area shows the position of Russia’s continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea,while the yellow line is the agreed demarcation line between the U.S.S.R.and the U.S.in 1990.See the map at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs _new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_3.jpg,1 May 2012①The shaded area shows the position of Russia’s continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,while the red line demarks its 200-nm limits.See the map at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_ LOS_2.jpg,1 May 2012.

①T.Henriksena and G.Ulfsteinb,Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic:The Barents Sea Treaty,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.42,2011,p.3.

①Sea of Okhotsk,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/okh.html,1 May 2012.

①Bering Sea,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/bseamap.html,1 May 2012.

①File:Arctic Ocean bathymetric features.png,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arctic_Ocean_bathymetric_features.png,1 May 2012.