Evolution of Vietnam’s Maritime Militia and Its Impact on the Situation in the South China Sea

CUI Haoran

Abstract:The ideology of “the all-people national defence” and the historical tradition of militia system have shaped a growing reliance of Vietnam on private forces such as fishermen in the South China Sea disputes.Against the backdrop of State dominance,the maritime militia and self-defense force,mainly composed of fishermen and employees of marine-related enterprises,emerged at the historic moment.Vietnam focuses on institution building and policy planning and design for maritime militias,highlighting the dual attributes of “military and local” in terms of leadership and command mechanism;clear division of tasks and hierarchy at all levels in terms of organization and institutional establishment;and extensive construction and focused approach in terms of force and scale layout.In their capacity as a paramilitary organization,the “sovereignty” assertion of Vietnam’s maritime militia over the disputed waters of the South China Sea and their activities there such as aggressive illegal fishing are detrimental to the overall ecological environment and the conservation of fishery resources in the South China Sea,while bringing potential conflicts,which is not conducive to regional stability and development.

Key Words:Vietnam;Maritime militia;The South China Sea;Disputed waters

Vietnam’s maritime militia,officially called the maritime militia and selfdefense force,is the branch of the Vietnam Militia and Self-Defense Force(Vietnamese:Dân Quân TV,) that operates at sea.Back in the late 1980s,Vietnam established its maritime self-defense force anchored by a number of coastal enterprises and institutions.1For example,in October 1989,the Con Dao Seafood Development Company was found simultaneously with the establishment of the maritime self-defense force.See WEI Qiang,Vietnam’s Maritime Militia and Self-defense Force, Modern Ships,Vol.50:4,p.40 (2012).(in Chinese)In the midst of the intensifying disputes in the South China Sea,Vietnamese policymakers have fully recognized fishermen’s utility in the State’s national defense and coastal defense,and have therefore vigorously promoted the building of a mechanism featuring military-civilian integration and cooperation between fishing vessels and law enforcement vessels.2As of the end of 2019,Vietnam boasts more than 96,600 fishing boats of various types,a fishing population of 4 million,and a total fishery catch of 3.77 million tons,accounting for 4%-5% of GDP,making it the world’s fifth largest exporter of aquatic products,according to statistics from the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP).See Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers,Fishery Profile (1 June 2020),http://mseafood.vasep.com.vn/685/onecontent/fishery-profile.htm.With the advantages of being both soldiers and civilians,as well as the organizational characteristics of being highly disciplined,large in number and widely distributed,the maritime militia,together with the Navy and Coast Guard,constitute the three-layer system of Vietnam’s maritime law enforcement force,playing an important role in maritime law enforcement and security maintenance.3Nguyen The Phuong &Truong Minh Vu,Vietnam Coast Guard:Challenges and Prospects of Development,CSIS (2 Jan 2017),https://amti.csis.org/vietnam-coast-guard-challengesprospects/.Considering the evolution of the South China Sea situation,it is necessary to follow up and study maritime militias,a special subject of activities springing up in the disputed waters.In this context,this paper begins with an introduction to the background of the establishment of Vietnam’s maritime militia,followed by an analysis of the development status and institutional characteristics of Vietnam’s maritime militia,and ends with some thoughts and countermeasures by sorting out the activities and practices of Vietnam’s maritime militia and their impact on the situation in the South China Sea.

I.Background of the Establishment of Vietnam’s Maritime Militia

The recent years have seen a high priority given by the Communist Party of Vietnam and the government to the building of the maritime militia and selfdefense force,with emphasis on strategic planning and top-level design.With the special status of the maritime militia being both soldiers and civilians,Vietnam has attempted to turn the “maritime militia-fishing vessels” into the State’s mobile“sovereignty monument” through multi-layered promotion by the Communist Party and government,central and local governments,in order to gain an advantageous position in face to the complex conflicts in the South China Sea.Vietnam’s raising of a maritime militia force owes to both historical and practical factors.

A.Influence of the Ideology of “the All-People National Defence”

In Vietnam,the ideology of “the all-people war” prevailed in the revolutionary war and national defense construction,which is called the ideology of “the allpeople national defence”.This ideology,as the guiding ideology of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the State,contributed substantially to Vietnam’s victory in the war for national independence and the realization of national unification.Upon reunification in 1975,Vietnam adopted the ideology of “the all-people national defence” as the guiding principle of national defense construction,and committed national defense forces in various sectors including politics,economy,and society,emphasizing the overall security concept of the State.

Since Vietnam’s innovation and opening up in 1986,the Communist Party and the government have maintained the emphasis on the applicability of the ideology of “the all-people national defence” amidst the new historical conditions.In the view of Vietnamese policymakers,it is not the case that this ideology applies solely to the military sphere or warfare.Any action in peacetime that can fully utilize and mobilize the collective strength of the masses to protect the fundamental interests of the State and the people can be called the application of the ideology of “the all-people national defence”.4Đ Nng u tư cho cc i dn qun t v trn bin,dqtv (2 Jan 2019),https://www.dqtv.vn/2019/01/a-nang-au-tu-cho-cac-oi-dan-quan-tu-ve.html.(in Vietnamese)With respect to the protection of maritime rights and interests,it has always been the guideline of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the government to coordinate the border and coastal defense construction and promote the economic and social development in border and coastal areas through the joint efforts of the military and the civil.Given their characteristics of being “both soldiers and civilians”,“widely distributed” and “not detached from production”,the militia is considered to play a vital part in the ideology of “the all-people national defence” as they can effectively complement the conventional military forces of the State in carrying out related activities.Vietnam has incorporated the ideology of “the all-people national defence” into its fight for maritime security,and put forward the concept of “all-people coastal defence”.5Mt s vn v t chc v hot ng ca lc lưng dn qun t v bin,National Defence Journal (20 March 2017),http://tapchiqptd.vn/vi/nghien-cuu-trao-doi/mot-so-van-de-ve-tochuc-va-hoat-dong-cua-luc-luong-dan-quan-tu-ve-bien/9901.html.(in Vietnamese)By relying on fishermen and other maritime forces,Vietnam has established the maritime militia and self-defense force and entrusted them with certain tasks of maritime law enforcement and support operations,seeking to realize a strategy of combining military and civilian forces for national coastal defense.

B.Historical Tradition of the Militia System

The militia is an ancient military service system,holding an important place in the history of human military development.The armed forces led by the Communist Party of Vietnam (Vietnamese People’s Army) evolved from the “Militia and Self-Defense Force”—the mass armed force that was founded upon the decision of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Indochina (the predecessor of the Communist Party of Vietnam) held in Macao,China on 28 March 1935,during which the corresponding constitution of organization,discipline and activities was formulated.6Khnh Hòa:Xy dng lc lưng dn qun t v vng mnh,ton din,rng khp,ktv (28 Sep 2019),http://ktv.org.vn/tin-tong-hop/an-ninh-quoc-phong/khanh-hoa-xay-dung-lucluong-dan-quan-tu-ve-vung-manh-toan-dien-rong-khap/.(in Vietnamese)The date of March 28,marking the founding of the Militia and Self-Defense Force,is celebrated every year with activities by the Vietnamese government.The Militia and Self-Defense Force has contributed greatly to the victory of the revolutionary war by assisting the Vietnamese People’s Army in the war for national independence and liberation and the unification of North and South Vietnam.

Since the new era,laws of Vietnam such as theConstitution of Vietnam,theLaw on National Defenseand theLaw on Military Servicehave made it a point to bring into play the strength of all people to protect the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the State.7For example,the Constitution of Vietnam,as revised in 2013,upholds the ideology of“the all-people national defence”,and Article 45 thereof stipulates that “It is the sacred duty and the noble right of citizens to defend their Fatherland.Citizens must fulfill their military obligation and join in building a national defence of all the people”.Article 2 of Vietnam’’s Law on National Defense,as revised in 2018,stipulates that “national defense is the joint effort of all the people to defend the country”.See Hin pháp,Điu 45,Lawsoft (28 Nov 2013),https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Hienphap-nam-2013-215627.aspx;Lut Quc phòng,Điu 2,Lawsoft (8 Jun 2018),https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-quoc-phong-340395.aspx.(in Vietnamese)To this end,the Communist Party of Vietnam and the government have attached great importance to the militia work and issued a number of special and supporting laws and regulations to safeguard the build-up and growth of the militia.It was back in 1996 that the National Assembly of Vietnam adopted theOrdinance on the Militia and Self-Defense Force,which for the first time specified the duties and obligations of the Militia and Self-Defense Force in the form of national legislation with a clear statement that the Militia and Self-Defense Force is “the mass armed forces not detached from production and work and a component of the people’s armed forces of Vietnam”.8Pháp lnh này quy đnh v dân quân t v,Điu 1,Lawsoft (9 Jan 1996),https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Linh-vuc-khac/Phap-lenh-dan-quan-tu-ve-1996-45-LCTN-39604.aspx.(in Vietnamese)Subsequently,Vietnam amended the Ordinance twice in 2004 and 2009,and based upon the Ordinance,formally promulgated theLaw on Militia and Self-Defense Forcesin 2009 to adjust and improve the militia system to adapt it to the new development situation,and to confer rights and obligations on the maritime militia to participate in maritime rights defense and other activities9Art.5,para.4 of the 2009 Law on Militia and Self-Defense Forces gives the following explanation to the concept of “marine militia and self-defense force”:“a force within the core militia and self-defense force organized and active in Vietnam’s coastal communes,island communes and in agencies and organizations for the purpose of engaging in maritime economic production activities while assuming the responsibility of safeguarding national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” Refer to Lut dân quân t v,Điu 5,Lawsoft (23 Nov 2009),https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luatdan-quan-tu-ve-nam-2009-98743.aspx.(in Vietnamese)On October 15,2010,Nguyen Tan Dung,then Prime Minister of Vietnam,approved thePlan on Measures for the Establishment,Training,Operation and Management of the Militia.In the same year,the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense also issued supporting documents on the construction of the maritime militia and self-defense Force.At a meeting held on July 25,2018,the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of Vietnam decided to establish a permanent maritime militia force under the Central Military Commission to protect maritime and island sovereignty,specifically tasked with performing defense of the State’s islands and borders.10Đ xut xy dng Hi i dn qun bin,VGP News (25 Jul 2018),http://baochinhphu.vn/Chinh-tri/De-xuat-xay-dung-Hai-doi-dan-quan-bien/342199.(in Vietnamese)

Besides legislative and institutional efforts in building the militia system,Vietnam also accords a great weight to the reserve and application of maritime militia forces.For example,with a view to improving the emergency response capability of the maritime militia,Vietnam organizes and conducts regular training for the maritime militia in coordination with the navy,coast guard,maritime departments,etc.,on special operations such as maritime law enforcement,rapid mobilization,information reconnaissance,cover in coordination,and rescue at sea.11Pht huy tt vai tr ca lc lưng dn qun t v bin,CPV Online Newspaper (17 Jun 2019),http://dangcongsan.vn/quoc-phong-an-ninh/phat-huy-tot-vai-tro-cua-luc-luong-danquan-tu-ve-bien-525759.html.(in Vietnamese)

C.Realistic Demand for Maritime Rights Defense

Currently,policies of the South China Sea disputants in this regard are centered on safeguarding their vested interests and strengthening and controlling the islands and reefs occupied.For disputed waters,various States generally claim“sovereignty” by conducting law enforcement activities with administrative law enforcement forces.It can be said that there is a close relationship between the rise of Vietnam’s maritime militia activities and the evolving situation in the South China Sea.

First,standoffs and conflicts still arise occasionally at sea.Despite a stabilizing ease in the overall situation in the South China Sea,the law enforcement activities by the South China Sea disputants in the disputed waters may still lead to maritime confrontations and even violent conflicts at certain times.For example,a maritime standoff broke out between China and Vietnam over the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig in the waters off Xisha Islands in May 2014.In this standoff,Vietnam deployed a number of vessels,including law enforcement vessels and fishing vessels,and even sent “frogmen” underwater agents to forcefully disrupt Chinese operations.Up to 63 Vietnamese vessels were deployed at a time at the site,with a cumulative total of 1,416 vessels breaching of China’s operational security zone and ramming of Chinese public service vessels.12The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig,Viet Nam’s Provocation and China’s Position,MFAPRC (18 Jun 2014),https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/zyxw/201406/t20140608_328063.shtml.In July 2019,a standoff occurred again between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in the waters around Wan’an Tan in the South China Sea.The standoff scene involved Vietnamese fishing vessels again in addition to law enforcement vessels from both sides.The recent standoffs are all related to the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea.Predictably,the competition for oil and gas resources among the South China Sea disputants will be increasingly intense before the formal conclusion of negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

Second,maritime law enforcement forces are diversified.The South China Sea disputants have now deployed various forms of law enforcement forces for law for enforcement actions in the South China Sea in an effort to maximize the protection of their rights and interests.China’s main forces in safeguarding rights and enforcing laws in the South China Sea are the navy,coast guard and maritime department,etc.,with the coast guard as the main body and other departments as auxiliary forces.As for the main composition of the maritime law enforcement forces of other States,Vietnam includes the navy,coast guard,maritime department,fisheries surveillance entities and maritime militia and self defense forces;the Philippine includes the navy and coast guard;Malaysia includes the navy and the Maritime Enforcement Agency;Indonesia includes the navy,the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and the Ministry of Transportation;and Brunei includes the navy and coast guard.Classified by institutional nature,the above-mentioned law enforcement bodies can be divided into three types:administrative,military and paramilitary.There is an asymmetric and diversified character of law enforcement forces in the South China Sea,with an increased risk of confrontation between different law enforcement bodies.As a result,for the effective implementation of law enforcement activities,the parties involved need to allocate matching law enforcement bodies and flexibly use and deploy various forces,including private fishermen.13CUI Haoran,The Maritime Militia’s Participation in National Maritime Rights Protection Activities from the Perspective of Public-Private Cooperation,Vol.48:3,p.72-83 (2021).(in Chinese)

Third,there is a mismatch between the costs and benefits of the South China Sea policy.The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea and covers a vast area,but much of it is disputed.Despite the fact that Vietnam has been strengthening its navy and coast guard forces in recent years and has seen a certain degree of improvement in its maritime security and maintenance capabilities,Vietnam’s policies for the South China Sea are under constant adjustment due to the unbalanced level of domestic economic development and the huge expenditure of human and material resources required for the construction of maritime hard power.14CUI Haoran,Policy on South China Sea under the New Situation and China’s Response Strategy,Issues of Contemporary World Socialism,Vol.36:4,p.156-165 (2018).(in Chinese)Facing a situation similar to that of Vietnam,the South China Sea disputants have turned to the promotion and application of their maritime soft power.For example,the Philippines instituted the South China Sea Arbitration against China in 2013 under Article 287 and Annex VII of theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) in an attempt to remedy or win the asymmetric game with China by means of legal tools.With fishermen’s large number,wide distribution and familiarity with sea conditions,Vietnam believes that engaging fishermen in national maritime security and struggle operations can effectively compensate for their lack of traditional maritime forces and achieve the efficacy of weak winning the strong.

II.Institutional Characteristics of Vietnam’s Maritime Militia

Riding on the advantages of the traditional militia system and with the longterm support of the Communist Party and State,the central and local governments,Vietnam has developed its maritime militia forces in a targeted manner,thereby significantly improving the organization and scale of the maritime militia,which,in general,shows four characteristics.

A.Prominent Dual Leadership and Command Attributes of Military and Local

Vietnam implements a dual leadership and command mechanism of “military and local” for its maritime militia and self-defense forces,i.e.,under the unified leadership of the central government,local Party committees and administrations at all levels lead the militia and self-defense forces within their respective jurisdictions.In terms of military command,they are under the uniform command of the Vietnamese Minister of National Defense,assisted by local military agencies at all levels.Vietnam has also established the militia and self-defense force general headquarters at the central level to coordinate the tasks of the militia and selfdefense forces nationwide,which is under the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army.In addition,the obvious territorial dimension of militia activities puts local party and government organs often in charge of the concrete implementation of militia policies.Each year,the competent party and military organs in coastal regions will include in their annual resolutions on military and national defense work the relevant contents of the work of the militia and self-defense forces and formulate specific action plans to fulfill the State resolutions on the subject of the militia and self-defense forces.15Mt s vn vtchc v hot ng ca lc lưng dn qun t v bin,National Defence Journal (20 Mar 2017),http://tapchiqptd.vn/vi/nghien-cuu-trao-doi/mot-so-van-de-ve-tochuc-va-hoat-dong-cua-luc-luong-dan-quan-tu-ve-bien/9901.html.(in Vietnamese)

B.Clear Composition and Distribution of Members

Vietnam’s militia and self-defense force comprises two parts:the militia and the self-defense force.Among them,the former refers to the mass armed forces organized in communes and wards,while the latter refers to the forces organized in state agencies,enterprises and public institutions.According to the latest revisedLaw on Militia and Self-Defense Forcesof Vietnam in 2019,Vietnam abolished the division between permanent militia and regular militia and incorporated all types of militias in mobile,garrison,maritime and performing special tasks (air defense,coast defense,engineer,reconnaissance,communication,etc.) into permanent militia.16Lut dân quân t v,Điu 2,Lawsoft (22 Nov 2019),https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-dan-quan-tu-ve-nam-2009-98743.aspx.(in Vietnamese)The maritime militia and self-defense force is generally composed of fishermen in coastal communities or employees of enterprises and public institutions engaged in maritime activities,who are tasked with performing specific State missions in Vietnam’s sea areas,including the defense of island sovereignty and maritime rights,and the coordinated exploitation and protection of resources.In terms of specific distribution,the militia forces composed mainly of fishermen are widely distributed in coastal grassroots communities.The self-defense forces composed mainly of corporate employees are distributed in organizations such as sea-related enterprises and institutions.

C.Hierarchical Organizational Structure and Task Allocation

Vietnam’s maritime militia and self-defense force is organized in five levels:group,squad,platoon,company and battalion in ascending order.Commanders at all levels are mostly served by grass-roots leaders of the people’s committees of coastal communities (communes) or the enterprises and public institutions they belong to,or by selected fishermen who are politically reliable,experienced and technically competent,and at least 30% of the members shall be from grassroots communities.17See LI Huajie,An Analysis of Vietnam’s Maritime Militia and Self-defense Force,International Data Information,No.12,p.25 (2013).(in Chinese)In addition,Vietnam has organized fishermen at sea into solidarity groups,solidarity teams and cooperatives based on vessels,which mainly engage in fishing while performing State-specific tasks such as “sovereignty” assertion and military reconnaissance.They collaborate with each other to deal with unexpected situations.A relatively large and powerful maritime self-defense force has been formed based on large State-owned vessels,oil rigs,lighthouses and offshore installation platforms to take charge of security,patrol and alert work.Notably,Vietnam has also built maritime militias in foreign-owned enterprises and private enterprises with 100% shareholding to ensure absolute leadership of the Communist Party over the militia organizations.18Dn qun t v có vai trò nòng ct trong nn Quc phòng ton dn,ktdtonline (12 Dec 2019),http://kinhtedothi.vn/dan-quan-tu-ve-co-vai-tro-nong-cot-trong-nen-quoc-phongtoan-dan-360697.html.(in Vietnamese)

D.Progressive Scale of Personnel and Force Layout at the Right Time

Vietnam’s maritime militia and self-defense force is built according to the policy of “extensive construction and highlighted focus”.Currently,maritime militia and self-defense force have been raised in all provinces and municipalities along the coast of Vietnam,varying in size and subject to the development of the maritime situation.Vietnam has also invested huge amounts of funds,manpower and material resources to build strong maritime militias in some key areas,such as Da Nang that “manages” the Xisha waters (under the administrative establishment of which Vietnam has illegally established “Hoang Sa District”),Khanh Hoa Province that “manages” the Nansha waters (under the administrative establishment of which Vietnam has illegally established “Truong Sa District”),and Quang Ninh Province in the Beibu Gulf that borders China.19As of 2019,Da Nang accommodates 112 fishing associations,fishing unions and other maritime cooperative production groups,with more than 730 fishing boats.Khanh Hoa Province houses more than 10,000 fishermen and nearly 2,000 fishing boats,which are used as a basis by grassroots communities to establish hundreds of mutual aid groups and marine militia platoons.The total number of militia and self-defense forces accounts for 1.43%of the province’s population,among which 22.24% are party members.See Đ Nng u tư cho cc i dn qun t v trn bin,dqtv (2 Jan 2019),https://www.dqtv.vn/2019/01/a-nang-au-tu-cho-cac-oi-dan-quan-tu-ve.html；Khnh Ho tng kt thc hin Lut Dn qun t v,khonline (29 Aug 2017),https://baokhanhhoa.vn/chinh-tri/201708/khanh-hoatong-ket-thuc-hien-luat-dan-quan-tu-ve-8051322/.(in Vietnamese)Members of Vietnam’s maritime self-defense force show a growing trend during the period from 2009 to October 2019,accounting for 1.22% of the maritime working population.20Đng vin trong lc lưng dn qun t v tng t 13,8% ln 20,1%,dqtv (1 Mar 2020),https://www.dqtv.vn/2020/03/ang-vien-trong-luc-luong-dan-quan-tu-ve.html.(in Vietnamese)By March 2020,a total of distant-water fishing vessels have been built in Vietnam,including 362 iron-clad vessels,571 wood-hulled vessels,99 new-material vessels and 37 modified vessels supported by loans.21Resolution No.67 of the Vietnamese government helps fishermen make a living from the sea,VNA (1 Sep 2019),https://zh.dantocmiennui.vn/政策文件/越南政府第67 号议定助力渔民靠海谋生/236671.html.(in Chinese)Nearly 8,000 fishing vessels are maritime militia vessels,accounting for 1.07% of the total number of vessels at sea.22EU Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies,Research for PECH Committee -Fisheries in Vietnam,Europarl (21 Jun 2020),https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/629175/IPOL_STU(2018)629175_EN.pdf.According to some scholars,Vietnam’s maritime militia may amount to more than 70,000 people,making up more than 4.7% of the total number of militia and selfdefense forces in the country.23CHEN Xiangmiao,The “Black Hole” in the South China Sea -Vietnam’s Maritime Militia,NISCS (30 Apr 2020),http://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/432.html.(in Chinese)As for vessel equipment,vessels for Vietnam’s maritime militia are generally small and medium-sized,and those for maritime selfdefense forces organized in coastal enterprises consist of two types:the TK-1482,a class of 400-ton ironclad fishing vessels equipped with modern fishing gear;and the 1,200-ton Truong Sa-class logistic ships,mainly used long-distance transportation and power delivery.24Nguyen the Phuong,Vietnam’s Maritime Militia is Not a Black Hole in the South China Sea,May.22,2020,https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-maritime-militia-is-not-a-black-hole-inthe-south-china-sea/.

III.Activities and Practices of Vietnam’s Maritime Militia and Their Impact on the South China Sea Situation

Vietnam’s maritime militia primarily undertake the following three types of activities in practice:first,assisting in and cooperating with the navy,coast guard,border force and fishery administration departments to participate in maritime law enforcement and emergency rescue;second,heading to the disputed waters of the South China Sea to assert their “sovereignty” and produce artificial fishery disputes while fishing illegally,so as to fake the image of “victims” and deceive international attention and sympathy;third,making use of the identity of fishing vessels to track and monitor specific sea areas and activities of subjects,and to collect and report foreign military information and marine production information to the relevant departments of the State.

A.Maritime Law Enforcement and Emergency Rescue

Subject to the unified deployment among “government and military” by the Communist Party of Vietnam,all established maritime militias will be arranged to participate in or assist local law enforcement authorities in maritime activities.By the end of 2020,there were over 2,000 maritime law enforcement and maritime rescue activities in which Vietnam’s maritime militia was directly involved.For example,demobilized soldiers were recruited in Thuan Nam District,Ninh Thuan Province,Vietnam to form a permanent militia platoon and two permanent maritime militia squads on six high-powered fishing vessels,which followed the government’s instructions to implement the “three same” strategy (same fishing operations,same fishing grounds and fishermen in the same area) and cooperated with the coast guard,border defense forces and fishing inspection departments to carry out special tasks such as hundreds of sea patrols,surveillance of foreign vessels and electronic reconnaissance.More than 20 ships in distress and hundreds of fishermen have been rescued.25Huyn Thun Nam vi vic xây dng dân quân bin vng mnh,National Defence Journal(10 Oct 2018),http://tapchiqptd.vn/vi/tong-ket-thuc-tien-va-kinh-nghiem/huyen-thuan-namvoi-viec-xay-dung-dan-quan-bien-vung-manh/12931.html.(in Vietnamese)To a certain extent,the maritime militia and self-defense force,serving as a complement to the law enforcement force,has compensated for the State’s lack of administrative force and strengthened Vietnam’s maritime governance.

B.Lllegal Fishing and “Sovereignty” Assertion

By preaching that “every fishing vessel serves as a mobile sovereignty monument”,the Vietnamese government has launched various forms of preferential tax policies to ease the burden of fishermen and boost their personal income as a way to attract and inspire this crowd to carry out production activities in the waters off Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands and claim Vietnam’s “sovereignty” while fishing illegally.Moreover,the Vietnamese Navy makes active efforts to support the fishery production by providing military docks for fishing vessels to dock,helping them with the contact using communication systems and protecting them.

In the HYSY-981 standoff between China and Vietnam,dozens of Vietnamese boats surrounded the Chinese oil rig to assist the Vietnamese coast guard in the standoff with Chinese vessels.Although there was no official call from the government,a letter of encouragement by then-president Nguyen Tan Dung calling on all people to “defend the sovereignty of the country’s seas and islands” and a call from the State-sponsored Vietnam Fisheries Society for fishermen to sail to the disputed waters,implying that Vietnam implicitly incorporated civil vessels into sovereignty-protection activities.26Nguyen Khac Giang,Vietnam’s response to China’s Militarised Fishing Fleet,East Asia Forum,4 Sep 2018.Following the HYSY-981 standoff,the Vietnamese government decided to commit more resources to strengthen their fishing fleet.Decree No.67 of the Prime Minister’s Office was issued on July 3,2014,which aimed to support fishermen to build bigger and more modern steelhulled boats that are able to resist bad weather and threats from sudden incidents at sea.As per the Decree,the government has assigned a preferential loan of around US$400 million in three years to support building new distant-water fishing boats and renovating old wooden ones,with 800 ships planned to be built,half of which are steel-hulled with extremely high crashworthiness.Vietnam also plans to spend US$500 million on building coast guard and fishery surveillance vessels.27Vietnam invests US$200 million to build distant-sea fishing vessels and US$500 million to build coast guard vessels,Soho (4 Jul 2014),http://news.sohu.com/20140704/n401801653.shtml.(in Chinese)

C.Military Reconnaissance,Tracking and Surveillance

Vietnam’s maritime militia vessels,while fishing illegally,are tasked with military reconnaissance,tracking and surveillance designated by relevant departments.As of December 2020,Vietnam’s maritime militia has contributed tens of thousands of intelligence information on the hydrography,maritime security,and fisheries production of islands and reefs in the South China Sea,according to incomplete statistics from the Vietnamese military.28Mt s vn v t chc v hot ng ca lc lưng dn qun t v bin, National Defence Journal (20 Mar 2017),http://tapchiqptd.vn/vi/nghien-cuu-trao-doi/mot-so-van-de-ve-tochuc-va-hoat-dong-cua-luc-luong-dan-quan-tu-ve-bien/9901.html.(in Vietnamese)Notably,Vietnam engages in military reconnaissance activities primarily against military bases on China’s Hainan Island and military facilities deployed on islands and reefs in the South China Sea.In March 2020 alone,there were up to 569 Vietnamese fishing boats illegally intruding into waters off China’s Hainan Island,according to a series of studies released by the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative of the Peking University Institute of Ocean Research starting in March 2020.29From February to April 2020,there was an upsurge in the number of Vietnamese fishing boats illegally entering the waters under Chinese jurisdiction,as detailed in the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative:Vietnamese Fishing Vessels Skyrocket in March,with 569 near Hainan Island and 9152 in the SCS,SCSPI (3 Apr 2020),http://www.scspi.org/en/dtfx/1586358643.(in Chinese)With their organized,targeted,batch-based,and large-scale activities in specific waters,these Vietnamese boats apparently appeared for purposes more than mere fishing in nature.It is also found from the studies that most of the Vietnamese fishing boats that intruded into China’s waters were found within the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea baseline of Hainan Island with a concentration in the southeastern waters of Hainan Island rather than in the northwestern waters in close proximity to Vietnam.Considering the fact that the southeastern waters off Hainan Island have a high distribution of Chinese naval and air military bases,these fishing boats,instead of fishing as their main purpose,may be maritime militia vessels operating to perform Vietnam-designated military reconnaissance missions.Amidst the complex and changing situation in the South China Sea,Vietnam’s military reconnaissance activities in the guise of fishing boats are likely to lead to misjudgment of the objects of investigation and maritime conflicts,which is not conducive to regional peace and stability.

Vietnam’s maritime militia also undertakes tracking and surveillance of oil and gas exploration activities by other States in the South China Sea.In early July 2019,for example,when the Chinese marine survey vessel HAI YANG DI ZHI BA HAO was conducting oil exploration in the waters near Wan’an Tan and Riji Jiao at the western end of Nansha Islands under the escort of several Chinese coast guard vessels,Vietnam rushed a large number of law enforcement vessels and fishing boats to the scene to track and monitor the Chinese vessel,attempting to obstruct the legal operations of the Chinese vessels.30China Risks Flare-up over Malaysian,Vietnamese Gas Resources,CSIS (13 Sep 2019),https://amti.csis.org/china-risks-flare-up-over-malaysian-vietnamese-gas-resources/.In October of the same year,in response to Malaysia’s oil and gas exploration activities in waters east of Wan’an Tan of Nansha Islands,Vietnam deployed a number of fishing boats for real-time surveillance of the Malaysian drilling rig.31Hon Hai 73207,Vessel tracker (1 Jul 2020),https://www.vesseltracker.com/en/Ships/Long-Son-07732-I2131346.html.

D.Impact of Vietnam’s Maritime Militia Activities on the Situation in the South China Sea

The situation in the South China Sea has suffered from Vietnam’s aggressive efforts to stimulate fishermen and dispatch its maritime militia to fish in the disputed waters and carry out State-specific tasks.First,Vietnam stirs up frequent fishery disputes,especially the so-called “Xisha disputes between China and Vietnam”.In the absence of any official acknowledgement by China of the existence of a sovereignty dispute between the two States over Xisha Islands,Vietnam makes unilateral claims as the basis for its financial subsidies and other policies launched in a bid to stimulate its fishing boats’ incursions into the waters off Xisha Islands,intentionally seeking to collide with Chinese law enforcement vessels or fishing boats,and making use of domestic and international media to hype the incident of the fishermen’s crew falling overboard to highlight the existence of the dispute.For example,in May 2014,the Vietnamese fishing boat QNg90205TS from Binh Son District,Quang Ngai Province was engaged in illegal fishing in waters off China’s Xisha Islands and was removed by a Chinese fishing inspection vessel.However,upon the concerned fishing boat’s return to the Vietnamese port of Tinh Ky,the fishermen raised public concern by filing a complaint with the media about the“violent law enforcement” by Chinese law enforcement officers and the “physical and property damage” caused.32Fishing boats attacked by Chinese fishing inspection forces in Quang Ngai Province of Vietnam has docked,Vietnam News Agency (May.19,2014),https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/越南广义省被中国渔检力量攻击的渔船已靠岸/25657.vnp.(in Chinese)In April 2020,the Vietnamese fishing boat QNg90399TS illegally entered the baselines of China’s territorial waters off Xisha Islands and was spotted and warned by a Chinese coast guard vessel,which sank after repeatedly making dangerous moves and ramming the Chinese coast guard vessel.As seen from the information disclosed by the Vietnamese side afterwards,the said two boats QNg90205TS and QNg90399TS were not involved in the maritime conflict during the incident.They took videos on the scene and promptly sent these materials to the domestic and foreign media to trigger heated discussions at home and abroad.33Supra note 23.These are the clear examples of how Vietnam is trying to hype the Xisha dispute by its fishing boats’ deliberate crashing,which has seriously jeopardized the cooperation and development of bilateral relations between China and Vietnam.

Second,there is a growing problem of illegal,unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) by Vietnamese fishing boats.34As per statistics from the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers,49%of Vietnam’s fishing boats are 6-12 meters long,19% are 12-15 meters long,29% are 15-24 meters long and 3% are more than 24 meters long.Regarding the material of fishing boats,wooden ones account for 97%,while the rest are made of steel or new materials.This shows that most of Vietnam’s fishing boats are small and medium-sized wooden ones.These boats are mostly owned by fishing families,individuals and retail investors in coastal communities,which are difficult to manage.Due to the absence of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) required by international and domestic laws on many fishing boats,illegal,unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) activities are rampant.The EU,Vietnam’s second largest export market for aquatic products,issued an IUU “yellow card”warning on Vietnamese fisheries in October 2017,restricting imports of its aquatic products.Supra note 2.Backed by substantial economic benefits and favorable government policies,Vietnamese fishermen make desperate attempts to illegally access the exclusive economic zones and even territorial waters of other States for illegal fishing.States neighboring Vietnam,such as China,the Philippines,Indonesia and Malaysia,have suffered gravely in this regard.Recent years have witnessed an occupation of 70% by Vietnamese fishermen among all detected IUU activities by foreign fishermen in Philippine jurisdictional waters,as well as frequent seizures,penalties,and trials of Vietnamese fishermen who illegally cross the border by Philippine law enforcement and judicial agencies.35The Philippines confiscated Vietnamese fishermen’s boats on the spot for crossing the border illegally,Soho (7 Sep 2019),https://www.sohu.com/a/339398758_769126.(in Chinese)Since 2014,Indonesian law enforcement agencies have publicly blown up Vietnamese fishing boats that illegally crossing the border on several occasions.On April 19,2020,there were three Vietnamese fishing boats engaged in illegal activities in the waters bordering Indonesia and Malaysia,one of which was rammed and sunk by an Indonesian law enforcement vessel with four people missing,and the other two apprehended.Statistics of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency show that the Malaysian side seized 184 Vietnamese vessels and detained 1,600 Vietnamese fishermen engaged in IUU activities in just six months from May 2019 to the end of November 2019.The number of IUU activities by Vietnamese fishing boats in Malaysia’s territorial waters has surged again in 2020.36184 Vietnamese vessels seized,1,600 crew detained in Op Naga,NST (26 Dec 2019),https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/11/542300/184-vietnamese-vessels-seized-1600-crew-detained-op-naga;YAN Yan,When Will the Chaos of Vietnamese Fishing Boats Stop?, NISCS (26 Mar 2020),http://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/422.html.The whole year of 2011 marked a figure of only 8,800 Vietnamese fishing boats operating in the waters offNansha.In contrast,the figure of those operating in the South China Sea was 9,208 in April 2020 alone,which,if plus boasts engaged in IUU activities,is much higher than the statistics.37HU Bo,Protection of Fishery Resources in the South China Sea Allows of No Delay,Huanqiu (21 Mar 2020),https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/de583b/3yK0nzfsvwX?p=1&agt=46.(in Chinese)Vietnam’s massive illegal fishing activities have seriously damaged the conservation of fishery resources and ecological environment in the South China Sea,and have a negative impact on regional security and stability.

Furthermore,in their role as enforcers of Vietnam’s South China Sea policy,the maritime militia has fueled the internationalization of the South China Sea issue by engaging in specific incidents of conflict and acting as focal points of controversy.In July 2019,Vietnam succeeded in gaining “moral” support from the United States by fabricating the false impression that Vietnamese fishing boats were“bullied” by Chinese law enforcement vessels during the standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels off Wan’an Tan.In response,the United States issued two official statements thereon,namely theChinese Coercion on Oil and Gas Activity in the South China Sea38Chinese Coercion on Oil and Gas Activity in the South China Sea,USDS (20 July 2019),https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinese-coercion-on-oil-and-gas-activity-in-the-south-chinasea/index.html.by State Department Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus on July 20,and theEngel Statement on Chinese Interference in Vietnamese-Controlled Watersby Eliot L.Engel,Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,on July 26.39Engel Statement on Chinese Interference in Vietnamese-Controlled Waters,USFA (26 Jul 2019),https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-releases?ID=2BF26425-D69F-4EC8-BDCAB90174B6DEC2.These two statements viciously speculated on the standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels by portraying China as a typical example of “the big bullying the small” in order to put pressure on China,even with the expression“China to immediately withdraw any and all ships from the territorial waters of its neighbors”.It is well known that Wan’an Tan does not fall within Vietnam’s territorial waters,which is not even considered so by Vietnam itself,but is claimed as “within the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone”.40A VNA report on July 28,2019 stated that “Wan’an Tan (called Tu Chinh in Vietnam)is located within the exclusive economic zone extending outward from the baseline of Vietnam’s territorial waters.” See Vietnam has always been committed to peaceful ways to exercised and defended sovereignty,VNA (28 Jul 2019),https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/100103.vnp.The above two U.S.statements revealed a clear bias in favor of Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea.Emboldened by the said statements,Vietnam responded immediately,with many of mainstream media outlets there reproducing the U.S.government’s statements,41U.S.State Department says concerned by reports of Chinese interference in East Vietnam Sea,Tuoi Tre News (21 Jul 2019),https://tuoitrenews.vn/news/politics/20190721/us-statedepartment-says-concerned-by-reports-of-chinese-interference-in-east-vietnam-sea/50729.html;H vin M,Hnh ng ca Trung Quc vi phm ch quyn ca Vit Nam,Vietnam Plus (27 Jul 2019),https://www.vietnamplus.vn/ha-vien-my-hanh-dong-cua-trung-quoc-vipham-chu-quyen-cua-viet-nam/584712.vnp.(in Vietnamese)followed by a series of cooperation agreements between Vietnam and the United States in areas such as maritime security and economic trade.As can be expected,as a tool for Vietnam to confront China in the South China Sea issue in the context of the U.S.–China game in the South China Sea,the maritime militia’s role as the “the weak” and “the bullied” in certain incidents is an important means for Vietnam to gain support from the United States and other extraterritorial forces.Its political and propaganda significance should not be underestimated.

IV.Conclusion

The combined implications of history and reality have rendered the engagement of private forces such as fishermen a vital part of Vietnam’s South China Sea policy,contributing to the growing status of maritime militias in Vietnam’s national maritime governance and maritime security system.Vietnam’s maritime militia has been booming rapidly as a result of the long-term overallplanning and strategic design of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the State for the maritime industry.In particular,the National Assembly of Vietnam has issued and amended a number of marine-related laws concerning the institutional construction and practices of the maritime militia.The competent government agencies in charge of maritime affairs have also released a number of supporting administrative regulations and departmental rules,conferring basic rights and obligations on maritime militias to conduct maritime activities,and guiding them to conduct purposeful and targeted activities such as “sovereignty” assertion,illegal fishing and military reconnaissance.However,there exists a possibility that the rising maritime militia,a special subject of maritime activities in the disputed waters,may trigger conflicts and confrontations between different subjects of activities.Faced with such situation,China should,in view of risk prevention and regional stability,discuss and formulate rules on maritime activities of militia ships in collaboration with Vietnam and other States involved in the South China Sea dispute,in an effort to maintain a safe distance between ships and reduce and control accidental incidents such as ship conflicts.The goal is,above all,to minimize misjudgment and conflict between different subjects of maritime activities of various States in peacetime.In case of conflicts or confrontations between maritime militia vessels and State government vessels or fishing boats,the parties involved shall take positive measures to ease tensions and prioritize the handling of disputes and the aftermath through peaceful dialogue channels such as diplomacy,on the basis of equal communication and professional assessment.