亚太区域合作的话语消退与重新激活

吴琳

Entering the third decade of the 21st century， Asian regional cooperation is standing at a new starting point. Internally， regional cooperation has reached a plateau， which requires regional countries to make necessary policy adjustments and show greater political wisdom and resolve. In a wider context， regional cooperation is disturbed by several factors， including changes in regional political and economic structures， the Indo-Pacific strategy pursued by major powers， the deterioration of China-US relations and the swing mindset of small and medium-sized countries in the region. Meanwhile， new demands for cooperation from regional countries have been constantly emerging as the severe consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic， ecological degradation and climate change appear， and regional hotspots are coupled with non-traditional security threats. In this critical period of transition， Asia faces dual tensions created by the fading of cooperation discourse and the increase of cooperation demands. This article will analyze the causes behind the fading of Asian regional cooperation discourse as well as the new forms of regional cooperation under the dual tension， and explore the potential choices and approaches for China to reactivate Asian regional cooperation.

Causes of the Fading Asian Regional Cooperation Discourse

The fading of Asian regional cooperation discourse refers to a process in which the dominant discourse of regional cooperation， gradually and widely learnt， accepted， and practiced by Asian countries since the end of the Cold War， increasingly loses its traditional influence. This discourse includes the ASEAN Community， the ASEAN way， ASEAN centrality， East Asian cooperation， Asia-Pacific cooperation， the APEC way， Asia-Pacific Free Trade Zone， the “Shanghai Spirit，” and cooperative security. In recent years， regional cooperation has reached a plateau. As the Indo-Pacific concept bears increasing political and strategic connotations and major-power competition over institutions becomes more intense in the region， the discourse of Asian regional cooperation is further impacted while the competition discourse is strengthened.

Asian regional cooperation reaching a plateau

Asian regional cooperation encountered an overall bottleneck around the year 2010. With China’s rapid growth， the power gap between China and ASEAN is widened， which causes ASEAN’s growing strategic misgivings about China. Since then， this weakening trust in China has become a major obstacle restricting the development of China-ASEAN relations. In the meantime， a series of major events happened， including the Diaoyu Islands dispute and the escalation of South China Sea tensions， which further aggravated the disputes between China and Japan， as well as between China and other South China Sea claimant countries. This has made it hard to advance the cooperation among ASEAN， China， Japan and South Korea （10+3） and the construction of the China–Japan–South Korea （CJK） free trade area. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization also faces new difficulties after India and Pakistan joined. Due to limited capacity， internal division， and major-power competition， sub-regional organizations such as ASEAN， the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation （SAARC） and the Pacific Islands Forum （PIF）， could not take the responsibility of promoting Asian regional cooperation either.

Indo-Pacific concept strengthening competition discourse

The discourse of competition， with “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” （FOIP） as the core， has been constantly strengthened due to the dominant powers’ construction of the Indo-Pacific strategy. As a result， the discourse of regional cooperation， which had enjoyed a traditional prominent status， has been suppressed. This can be seen from three aspects.

First， competition against China in maritime discourse has gone into the open. In November 2017， the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the United States， Japan， India， and Australia （Quad） was restarted with Japan’s push after ten years’ silence. In their respective statements， the US， Japan， and Australia committed to establish a “rules-based order” and support “freedom of navigation and maritime security” as well as resolving maritime disputes according to international law. India， which then took a cautious attitude， did not mention this in its statement. As a result， the four countries did not succeed in forming a unified discourse on the reconstruction of the maritime order at that time. However， since 2020， the four countries have accelerated cooperation as India significantly adjusted its China policy. The first Quad leaders’ summit was held in March 2021， and the new concept of “the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas” was written into the joint statement. The US and Japan have taken the lead in launching a maritime discourse offensive against China. In the joint statements of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee （2+2） and the bilateral leaders’ meeting， the two countries publicly accused China of undermining the existing international rules-based order and maritime rules， reaffirmed that Article V of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Diaoyu Islands， and underscored the importance of protecting their interests and freedom across the Taiwan Strait. Later， major European countries like Germany and France also joined the campaign， furthering marginalizing the maritime discourse of peace and cooperation.

Second， discourse in key areas is constructed with the intention to exclude China. In particular， the “resilient supply chain” is becoming an important part of the Indo-Pacific discourse of competition. The US， Japan， India， Australia， and the European Union （EU） have all proposed to establish resilient value chains in the high-tech sector， aiming to weaken China’s core competitiveness in the future and reconstruct supply and industrial chains that exclude China. Japan is particularly active on this. During the COVID-19 pandemic， Japan has been actively lobbying ASEAN countries. It also tried to raise the new topic of “reconstructing the resilient supply chain in the Indo-Pacific” under the Track 2 mechanism of “10+3” to test ASEAN’s attitude towards introducing the Indo-Pacific agenda into East Asian cooperation mechanisms， which was opposed by ASEAN countries. Many other parts of the Indo-Pacific discourse also share the obvious intention to contain and exclude China， such as the “equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific，” “quality infrastructure investment，” “democratic resilience，” and criticism about China’s “vaccine diplomacy，” “coercive diplomacy，” “wolf warrior diplomacy，” and “cyber-attacks.”

Third， the centrality of traditional regional discourse is further squeezed by the intervention of the EU normative discourse. The EU demonstrates and strengthens its role in the Indo-Pacific mainly through soft intervention， namely leading the direction of regional cooperation discourse by emphasizing its normative superiority. In September 2020， Germany issued its Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific after taking rotating presidency of the EU and proposed to formulate its Indo-Pacific strategy based on European principles and values. In April 2021， the EU issued its first Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific， which started by regarding the values of “democracy， human rights， the rule of law and respect for international law” as the basis for the construction of regional order. The EU’s priority values are essentially no different from those of the US， but are markedly distinct from the core nominative discourse in the region， such as strengthening ASEAN centrality， openness， inclusivity， respect for sovereignty， non-intervention， complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks， equality， mutual respect， mutual trust and mutual benefit. Thus， the intervention of the EU normative discourse and the strengthened Western values have impacted the ASEAN way and other Asian local values.

Major-power competition restraining cooperation dynamics

First， the institutional competition provoked by the United States against China has adversely impacted ASEAN centrality in regional structure. Essentially， the formation of East Asian regional cooperation architecture with ASEAN at the core is due to US policy towards China and the nature of China-US relations， rather than ASEAN’s initiative. In the mid-1990s， the Clinton administration established the engagement policy towards China， believing that differences between China and the US could be diminished through “dialogue and exchange.” Thus， China-US relations entered a stable period and witnessed rapid development. The moderate competition and constructive cooperation between the two countries provided opportunities for ASEAN to play the role of a middleman or mediator. However， the strategic competition policy， which originated in the Obama era and was formed in the Trump era， declared the failure of the engagement policy. Thus， in the United States’ strategic considerations， the role of ASEAN-led institutions in restraining China and reconciling US-China relations has been decreased. Hence， the US has moved to other options， including reconstructing the Quad and planning to expand its membership by absorbing more regional countries， upgrading the once stagnant Lower Mekong Initiative （LMI） to the Mekong-US Partnership， building issue-based coalitions with allies and partners such as “techno-democracies （T12）” and the “club of democratic partners （D10），” launching public opinion wars and diplomatic wars against China under the ASEAN Regional Forum （ARF） framework on issues like the South China Sea and human rights in Tibet， Hong Kong and Xinjiang， and pushing to incorporate “Women， Peace and Security （WPS），” “Youth， Peace and Security （YPS）” and “inclusive processes” into regional discourse. As a result， ASEAN faces dual challenges： the marginalization of ASEAN with its declining recognition and significance， and the loss of its traditional role within the ASEAN-led institutions.

Second， the return of China-Japan relations to the focus of institutional competition in East Asia brings uncertainties to the regional cooperation agreements that have been reached. As engines for regional cooperation in East Asia and the broader Asia， the fluctuation of relations between China and Japan would directly affect the progress of regional cooperation. In the first decade of the 21st century， Japan was worried that China might achieve dominant influence in the region. With the “10+3” mechanism as the starting point and the East Asia Summit as an arena， East Asia began to witnessed competition between the established power （Japan） and the rising power （China） over regional institutions. However， the major players of regional institutional competition have become China and US since the US put forward its rebalancing to Asia strategy and started to intervene in regional affairs as an active participant of ASEAN-led institutions. After Trump took office， the institutional competition has turned into a vicious one dominated by the US due to its contempt for ASEAN’s role. In the meantime， Japan took this opportunity to strengthen its leadership in rules-making of areas such as cybersecurity， and accelerate the synergy with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific （AOIP）. In November 2020， Japan and ASEAN issued the Joint Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific， which was of great political significance as it was the first of this kind ASEAN signed with external partners. The Biden administration’s re-emphasis on alliances and multilateralism has also been leveraged by Japan to constrain China in many areas， such as technological competition and innovation， the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. China and Japan’s return to the center stage of regional institutional competition would bring more uncertainties to regional cooperation agendas that have achieved some progress， including “10+3，” the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement （RCEP）， China-Japan-South Korea cooperation， and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.

Third， the institutional competition among major powers has intensified the strategic anxiety and speculation of small and medium-sized countries in the region， making it more difficult to maintain the stability of regional cooperation. ASEAN’s launch of the AOIP is a strategically aggressive move and a stress response to the escalated competition among major powers， reflecting the widespread strategic anxiety within ASEAN. In comparison， the mindset of South Asian small countries is more of strategic speculation， which is partially derived from the strategic culture of South Asia and closely related to the escalation of major-power competition there. By playing the China card， these countries aim to achieve more benefits from the US and India， which in many cases would undermine China’s interests and exacerbate China-India mistrust. This strategic anxiety and speculation of small and medium-sized countries about major-power institutional competition would directly affect their expectations for the stability of regional cooperation. Therefore， they would be more likely to adopt hedging or free-riding strategies for short-term profits， rather than long-term regional cooperation. In a period when the world order is undergoing constant changes， it would be more difficult to maintain the momentum of regional cooperation.

New Trends of Asian Regional Cooperation under Dual Tensions

In contrast to the fading of Asian regional cooperation discourse， the COVID-19 pandemic is creating a series of new cooperation demands due to its profound impact on the direction of future international relations and all aspects of human society. The pandemic makes regional countries and organizations deeply realize the importance and urgency of enhancing regional public health resilience. Furthermore， the pandemic promotes new consensus among Asian countries to systematically respond to environmental turbulence. As Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Kung Phoak highlighted， the COVID-19 pandemic and its recovery should be seen as an opportunity to explore ways and leverage existing partnership and initiatives towards a more collective and coordinated response to mitigate impacts. Theresa Mundita Lim， Executive Director of the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity， also said that “the COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed an increased awareness of the need for nature-based solutions and cross-sectoral actions.” The pandemic also accelerates the co-evolution of regional countries’ concepts of development and security. Under the impact of the pandemic， the Western concept and model of development driven by “high consumption， high waste， high enjoyment， and high cost” has proved unsustainable， and regional countries have turned to “a more resilient， inclusive and sustainable recovery.” The surging digital economy and green economy have gained new momentum for Asia’s “developmental regionalism.” The concept of security has also evolved simultaneously， the most important aspect of which is the emphasis on human security. These new ideas and ways might be introduced into Asian regional cooperation in the future， and will potentially become new engines of cooperation. Asian regional cooperation is moving into a new stage of complex diversification and co-opetition due to the dual tensions from increasing cooperation demands and fading discourse of traditional cooperation.

ASEAN centrality facing reconstruction

The ASEAN-based concentric structure in East Asia is likely to be reconstructed. It may be only a part of the future architecture of regional cooperation， as more mechanisms led by the US， China， Japan and other major countries emerge. These mechanisms overlap with， rather than being subordinate to， traditional ASEAN-based institutions. However， the forms of these mechanisms are not necessarily concentric， and are largely dependent on the process of institutional construction and policy interaction of major powers. Currently， the US has been adding the Quad and multiple issue coalitions onto its traditional hub-and-spoke alliance system. China， on the one hand， has established new mechanisms like the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation （LMC） under the ASEAN-led framework to strengthen ASEAN centrality， and created new platforms， such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB） and the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations， to expand the cooperative network of ASEAN-led framework. In this context， the ASEAN centrality would inevitably be reconstructed.

Main cooperation mechanisms in the region evolving amid major-power competition

With institutional competition among major powers becoming a new normal， main regional cooperation mechanisms are likely to experience gradual development. China knows that it cannot exclude the US from Asian regional cooperation， while the US is aware that a “de-Sinicized” Indo-Pacific is not possible. According to the Biden administration’s Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell， a better solution would be for the US and its partners to persuade China that there are benefits in a competitive but peaceful region. For China， healthy competition is acceptable， and cooperation can also be achieved through joint efforts. Therefore， it can be concluded that US-China competition in major regional mechanisms would exist for a long time. Gradually， China， the US， Japan and other major powers would find new consensus and equilibrium points on regional rules-making and China’s role in the region. In the meantime， regional cooperation mechanisms would continue to adjust their internal relations to find an incremental development approach.

Sub-regional organizations lacking sufficient capacity despite strengthened identity

Though the collective identity of sub-regional organizations is likely to be strengthened， insufficient capacity remains a main obstacle restraining their role. Under pressure of intensified major-power competition and fading discourse of regional cooperation， many sub-regional organizations have initiated “stress responses.” For example， ASEAN launched the AOIP in 2019 and the 2020 Year of ASEAN Identity to defend its centrality. Worrying about being bound by the Indo-Pacific framework， the PIF launched the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent that prioritizes issues of its members’ concern such as climate change， so as not to choose between the “China alternative” and traditional partners. Its Secretary-General Dame Meg Taylor has repeatedly called on major countries to understand the concerns and demands of regional countries on important issues such as sea level rise， climate change and natural disasters， and to take action through regionalism. Nevertheless， the insufficient capacity of these organizations always undermines their role. This can be clearly seen from ASEAN countries’ attitudes towards a UN General Assembly June 2021 resolution calling for halt of weapons to Myanmar， which was pushed by Western countries. As the initial draft of the resolution included stronger language， nine ASEAN countries （except Myanmar） proposed to remove that language. However， in the formal vote， Indonesia， Malaysia， Singapore， the Philippines and Vietnam voted yes， while Brunei， Cambodia， Laos and Thailand abstained. This exposes ASEAN’s insufficient capacity and internal differences in implementing the “five-point consensus” on Myanmar.

Informal pragmatic mechanisms becoming new players of regional cooperation

A series of pragmatic， flexible and mini-lateral informal mechanisms and new models of cooperation have emerged， and become actors in the Asian regional cooperation architecture together with traditional and formal regional mechanisms. China is a strong promoter of this process. In recent years， in order to promote the resolution of regional hotspot issues like the Afghanistan issue and the Rohingya issue， China has successively created several mini-lateral mechanisms， such as China-Afghanistan-Pakistan （CAP）， China-Myanmar-Bangladesh （CMB） and China-Central Asia. These mechanisms are informal， flexible， pragmatic， and faster to react when a crisis appears. For example， in the face of the rapid spread of COVID-19 in South Asia， China has initiated the “CAP+” cooperation and taken the lead in holding a series of video conferences on COVID-19， such as “CAP+Nepal，” “CAP+Nepal， Sri Lanka and Bangladesh，” and “China-Pakistan-Nepal-Sri Lanka-Bangladesh” meetings. Compared with formal mechanisms， these mechanisms are more focused and actionable. In addition， new impetus has been injected into Asian regional cooperation thanks to innovative multilateral practices such as cloud diplomacy， party diplomacy， sub-national diplomacy， people-to-people exchanges， “2+X” and third-party market cooperation.

Strengthened role of state and non-state actors spawning new forms of co-opetition

With strengthened roles of state and non-state actors in Asian regional cooperation， new forms of co-opetition have emerged. The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the importance of national governance and accelerates the return of nationalism， making all countries pay more attention to improve their national governance capability and strengthen the resilience of the public governance system. The other trend is that non-state actors， such as cities， private sectors， women， youth， NGOs and social media， are playing a new role in regional cooperation. They are not only active in social， cultural and economic activities， but are also increasingly important in regional security affairs， such as conflict mediation and preventive diplomacy. For example， under the promotion of the US， Canada， Thailand and other countries， the WPS agenda has become a new topic for the ARF， which is originally a part of the UN agenda. The ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation （ASEAN-IPR）， whose establishment was approved by the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in 2012， is also an example. It is dedicated for research activities and capacity building to support ASEAN conflict resolution. As a knowledge hub， ASEAN-IPR has been developing relations with ASEAN member states， sub-regional organizations， international think tanks， the United Nations， and building networks with the civil society and other stakeholders. Deep participation of these non-state actors in regional cooperation would definitely promote changes and innovations in the existing mechanisms and interaction ways， spawning new forms of co-opetition.

Approaches to Reactivating Discourse of Cooperation

In contrast to the fading of discourse， the reactivation of discourse in Asian regional cooperation refers to reinvigorating the dominant discourse in the region which are resilient but currently suppressed. For China， the construction of regional architecture has become an important way to shape regional order and relations with neighboring countries， so reactivation of the discourse of Asian regional cooperation is an inevitable choice. Facing the dual tensions and new trends of regional cooperation， China should start from overall construction of the region and get involved in shaping the discourse of major regional agendas so as to consolidate common interests of the region and weaken adverse impacts of major-power competition. This includes the ASEAN-led discourse， the discourse of developmental peace and the discourse of rules and order.

Supporting the ASEAN-led discourse

It is in China’s overall interest to support the reconstruction of ASEAN centrality. The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for China to deepen the convergence of interests and improve its relations with ASEAN. China could strengthen the resilience and vitality of ASEAN-led discourse in regional cooperation in three ways， namely shaping the institutional functions of ASEAN-led mechanisms， accelerating the process of RCEP， and building a “One Health” model led by China and ASEAN.

First， actively shaping the institutional functions of ASEAN-led mechanisms. Faced with the ever-escalating pressure from the US， China should be more active in shaping ASEAN-led mechanisms from the perspective of institutional functions. This includes promoting China and the US to come up with new rules under ASEAN-led mechanisms， supporting ASEAN’s role in practical areas like public health， regional supply chains and climate change based on sufficient communication， strengthening the resilience of ASEAN norms with a dialectical view on their development and changes， adhering to the ASEAN way， and getting involved in various decision-making processes of the regional mechanisms in a more active， constant and effective way. As the environment of strategic competition is not likely to change in the short-term， China should also do more research on the tension between supporting the reconstruction of ASEAN centrality and carrying out limited competition with the US.

Second， accelerating the process of RCEP. Initiated by ASEAN， RCEP and its progress is directly related to the international reputation of ASEAN. Thus， accelerating the process of RCEP is a way to promote ASEAN centrality. It is also a rare opportunity for ASEAN to re-establish regional prestige if it can help propel economic recovery of regional countries. ASEAN may also become influential on Japan’s efforts to coordinately advance the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership （CPTPP） and the RCEP， as Japan is committed to synergizing its FOIP with the AOIP. For China， the focus of its promotion of RCEP at present should be serving economic recovery and giving full play to the ASEAN-led regional advocacy network. In this process， ASEAN’s near-term and mid- to long-term recovery demands should be prioritized to support its leadership. The ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework and its implementation plan adopted at the 37th ASEAN summit clearly shows that response to COVID-19 and steady socioeconomic recovery are regarded as ASEAN’s top tasks， with public health， social security， trade and investment， digital economy and sustainable development as priorities. China should seize the opportunity and explore phased plans to help ASEAN restore economic resilience， which could be based on China’s negative list commitment in the investment sector under RCEP. By promoting the active advocacy role of regional institutions including the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies （ASEAN ISIS）， the Network of East Asian Think-tanks （NEAT） and the Boao Forum for Asia， the RCEP topic would remain heated and visible in regional discussions when most member countries are yet to complete their domestic ratification process.

Third， building a new public health governance model led by China and ASEAN from the “One Health” perspective. The concept of “One Health，” which is advocated by ASEAN， is a preventive and holistic governance approach focusing on comprehensive ecological governance to avoid pandemics. It recognizes that the health of people is closely connected to the health of animals and environment. It calls for new strategies of interdisciplinary and cross-regional communication and collaboration to jointly promote the health of people and animals and improve the ecological environment. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the inevitability of the “One Health” approach， and in fact there are theoretical and practical foundations for the new public health governance model led by China and ASEAN. One is the ancient philosophy of harmony between man and nature that interprets the harmonious coexistence between the two within a community of life. The other is the global cooperative actions aiming to build “a global community of health for all” proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Construction of a new governance model first requires the building of a knowledge community. Currently， the COVID-19 discourse in Asia can be seen in political， professional， and social arenas. The competitive discourse mainly appears in the political arena， while the professional and social discourse is affected by politics to varying degrees. Under this pressure， China should strengthen the construction of professional discourse at the regional level through multiple approaches， such as creating an “expert bank” of infectious disease specialists， establishing a “One Health” Academy， and building interdisciplinary and transboundary international exchanges centers that deeply cooperate with official organizations and non-official academic groups， including the World Health Organization （WHO）， the Food and Agriculture Organization （FAO）， the World Organization for Animal Health （OIE）， the ASEAN Secretariat， and the ASEAN Center for Biodiversity （ACB）. In addition， “One Health” industrial parks could be established to facilitate synergy of health industries and cooperation between enterprises.

Promoting the discourse of developmental peace

Western countries have been coating development issues with human rights implications and promoting the “securitization” of development to outcompete China. China should remain vigilant about the trend and try to mitigate the intervention and complicated influence of related measures on development cooperation. This could be achieved by promoting the discourse of developmental peace and guiding Asian regional cooperation to first meet the development needs of regional countries.

First， China should prudently avoid the trap for developing countries in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In order to weaken the discourse of developing countries， represented by China， in the field of development， Western countries played a leading role in the formulation of the 2030 Agenda， which for the first time places the objectives of three pillars， namely human rights， development and security， in an inseparable agenda. This has left the West with a lot of space to use pretexts like human rights and security to dominate the direction of global development cooperation. For China， due to its advantages in shaping the discourse of regional development， its leveraging of the 2030 Agenda to advance development cooperation with regional countries is both reasonable and legitimate. However， China should be aware of two traps. One is to emphasize those high-quality environmental and technological standards that are unachievable for developing countries， and the other is to frame issues like women， youth and NGOs into ones about human rights and link these issues to development assistance. Many developing countries are concerned that resources originally allocated for development may be diverted to areas like humanitarian assistance and peace building. China should widely collect the interests of developing countries and take the Year of China-ASEAN Sustainable Development Cooperation in 2021 as an opportunity to promote development cooperation in the digital economy， technological innovation， energy saving， green infrastructure， sustainable finance， poverty alleviation， and youth employment.

Second， the development dimension of cooperation on climate change should be emphasized. Currently， China’s climate change agenda is witnessing major development， with opportunities in store after the release of the China-US Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis. However， it is also faced with mounting challenges such as the emergence of the security dimension in the climate change issue which is propelled by Western countries’ securitization of ecological problems， and the gap between ASEAN and China on the perception of China’s climate responsibilities. At this stage， in order to balance rights and responsibilities， China should cautiously address the securitization of the climate change issue and focus on the development dimension. Starting from localizing global cooperation and internationalizing domestic experience， China could deepen regional cooperation on climate change and try to eliminate the misunderstandings of ASEAN and other regional countries.

Localizing global cooperation means that China should not only actively participate in global cooperation on climate change， but also contribute to regional practices of global concepts. In 2010， the FAO formally proposed “Climate-Smart Agriculture，” a new model of agricultural development in the context of global climate change， in The Hague， aiming to promote it around the world. The concept and its related technologies were localized in 2014 by China’s launch of the climate-smart staple crop production project. On this basis， China should play a leading role in the region on low-carbon transformation of agricultural production by increasing financial and technological assistance to， and sharing its experience with， countries and organizations that have been severely affected by climate change， such as ASEAN， the PIF and South Asian states.

Internationalizing domestic experience is a way for China to take up its responsibility as a major country. On the climate change issue， China is getting increasingly prepared in terms of both concepts and practices， with the development of an ecological civilization， the carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals， green development and ecological poverty alleviation having integrated into all aspects and the entire process of domestic development. Among them， developing an ecological civilization is a Chinese local discourse， which demonstrates China’s national governance approach on environment and climate change， namely an organized socio-ecological transformation led by national strategies. This has something in common with the “eco-welfare state” discourse and is very attractive to regional countries with similar systems and orientations. Therefore， inter-governmental policy coordination could be a way to realize the integration and transformation of the two discourses. China’s new tools and approaches to achieve sustainable development， including green finance and ecological poverty alleviation， could also be promoted to the world. In this process， NGOs， international organizations and multilateral financing platforms can play a unique role.

Third， the discourse foundation and practical conditions for “peace through development” should be consolidated. In recent years， China has elaborated this concept on many occasions， including discussions on regional hotspots and at the UN Security Council meetings. To put it simply， “peace through development” means that in essence， enhancing people’s livelihood and employment， and narrowing inter-regional development gaps are the best policies for long-term peace and security. Based on this logic， the best approach for China to help resolve regional hotspot issues is to promote inter-regional cooperation and connectivity and help post-conflict countries integrate into regional development. To achieve this， China could link its discourse with the 2030 Agenda and further elaborate the theoretical meaning and practical paths of promoting peace and human rights through development. Meanwhile， China could also consolidate a series of informal cooperation mechanisms with neighboring countries. Especially， the situation in Afghanistan and its peaceful reconstruction is an opportunity for China to enhance economic cooperation with Afghanistan， Pakistan， Russia and Central Asian countries under regional frameworks like the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI）， the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan （RECCA）， and the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process （HoA-IP）.

Reshaping the discourse of rules and order

“The rules-based order” is essentially a Western-designed discourse trap aimed at containing China. For China， the solution is not to avoid the rules， but to increase its supply capacity of regional rules and maintain the stability of regional order from three aspects， namely institutionalization of the BRI， maritime governance， and resolution of regional hotspot issues.

First， establishing and improving BRI-related institutions and rules. The competition on infrastructure standards and rules would be even more fierce between China and the US， Japan and India， with the successive announcement of their huge infrastructure plans. China needs to accelerate the high-quality transformation of the BRI， especially the institution-building and rules-making of foreign investment and assistance. Besides synergizing with existing global rules， China should also explore ways to update the rules， including introducing new principles such as wide consultation， gradualism， and upholding justice while pursuing shared interests. In this way， China could build the cooperation， distribution and supporting mechanisms necessary for the BRI’s sustainable development， and facilitate the development of regional cooperation in a standardized and institutionalized direction under the auspices of the BRI.

Second， promoting regional maritime governance guided by the new security concept and the vision of a maritime community with a shared future. The US suppression of China with its competitive maritime discourse has exposed China’s weaknesses in regional maritime governance. However， with the acceleration of negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea （COC）， China’s political determination is further evident. This would to some extent consolidate regional countries’ trust in China and lay a foundation for deepening maritime cooperation. In the future， China should focus on the consultation of COC norms， integrate the new concept of common， comprehensive， cooperative， and sustainable security and the vision of a maritime community with a shared future into the consultation， and actively participate in shaping the regional maritime order. The new security concept and the idea of a maritime community with a shared future could also be used to support regional rules-making in non-traditional security areas， such as maritime security and cooperation （maritime risk management and waterway safety）， safety of navigation （maritime search and rescue and ferry safety）， and marine environment and sustainable development （emergency management of marine hazards， coastal disaster mitigation， and marine oil spill response）.

Third， promoting institutional solutions to regional hotspot issues. The resolution of regional hotspot issues may become an important leverage for China to stimulate regional cooperation in the future. In a regional environment that is increasingly competitive and confrontational， China should explore institutional solutions to regional hotspot issues from the two aspects of “whose rules” and “what rules.” There can be three steps. First， facilitating basic principles of crisis management based on interests of relevant parties， like the “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” principle in Afghanistan’s peace and reconciliation process. Then， adopting a solution which considers the overall conflict situation and accommodates all parties’ comfort levels. In this process， regional organizations could help provide solutions based on regional rules to prevent the escalation of conflicts， while informal multilateral mechanisms could also play a mediation role when needed. The last step is to improve the regional security architecture and establish a long-term mechanism for conflict prevention.

Conclusion

Asian regional cooperation has actively promoted the sustained peace and economic take-off in Asia in the post-Cold War era. However， in recent years， many cooperation mechanisms in the region have gradually reached a plateau. The existing regional architecture has encountered impacts and challenges from the geopolitical reconstruction brought by the Indo-Pacific concept and the intensified major-power competition. The traditional cooperative discourse of Asian regional cooperation is suppressed， making it hard to maintain the momentum of cooperation. On the other hand， the expectation of Asian countries for regional cooperation has not been weakened; on the contrary， the COVID-19 pandemic has generated new demands for regional cooperation. Under the dual tensions from increasing cooperation demands and fading discourse of traditional cooperation， Asian regional cooperation presents a new trend of complex diversification and co-opetition， bringing opportunities for its reactivation.

China has always been an active participant， contributor， and supporter of Asian regional cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War， China has developed relations with neighboring countries and engaged in the construction of a new neighborhood order under the new environment， which is mainly reflected in its regional cooperation practices. Regional cooperation is key to China’s construction of its neighborhood order. In addition， it shows the recurrence of China’s regional conception when it is becoming stronger. The future direction of Asian regional cooperation could directly influence how China shapes its neighborhood.

In July 2019， China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi raised three principles of China’s participation in Asian regional cooperation： first， focusing on East Asia and Asia without affecting the existing cooperation mechanisms and achievements in the region; second， focusing on cooperation and consensus without engaging in geographic confrontation and games; third， focusing on openness and inclusiveness without forming factions or seeking small cliques. It shows that competition， exclusivity， and seeking regional dominance are not China’s policy options. Rather， China’s goal is to build an open， cooperative， and win-win neighborhood community with a shared future based on existing regional cooperation frameworks， characteristics of the new era and new demands of regional cooperation. China should focus on promoting the ASEAN-led discourse， developing the discourse of developmental peace， and shaping discourse of rules and order， and in the meantime carry out “targeted communication” and “regionalized expression.” This is the pragmatic way for China to strengthen the resilience of its relations with neighboring countries， rebuild regional confidence in cooperation， and reactivate the momentum of regional cooperation.