Tension in the Middle East：Iran and Arab Shiites

□ Li Fuquan

Tension in the Middle East：Iran and Arab Shiites

□ Li Fuquan

Although Iran is the most populous Shiite Muslim country in the world， Shiite Muslims also dwell in other Arab countries， such as Iraq，which is 60% Shiite， Lebanon （45%）， Saudi Arabia （10%）， Bahrain（75%） and Kuwait （30%）， just to name a few.1Vali Nasr， “When the Shi'ites Rise，” Foreign Affairs， Vol. 85， No. 4， 2006， p.65.The common religious belief between these religious followers forms an unbreakable tie between Iran and the world's Shiite Muslims. Iran's policy towards the Arab Shiites has deeply influenced Middle Eastern politics since 1979， and the rise of the so-called“Shiite Crescent” in 2003 attracted even more attention. Generally speaking，Iranian-Arab Shiite ties can be characterized by sensitivity， complexity and uncertainty， and they remain profoundly influenced by the political climate in the Middle East， domestic politics in Arab countries and Iran's regional policy. Interpreting relations between Iran and the Arab Shiite people is of great significance to understanding the current politics of the Middle East.

Mutual Perceptions of the Arab Shiah and Iran

As indicated above， Iranian-Arab Shiite ties are sensitive， complex and uncertain， exerting widespread and multifarious influences on the regional order.

The Arab Shiites' perception of Iran

For the Arab Shiites， Iran serves three major functions： it is the primary habitation of Shiites， the center of the Islamic revolution and a nation itself.2Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke， The Arab Shi'a： The Forgotten Muslims， St. Martin's Press，2002， pp.71-77.

First， this paper will address Iran's role as the primary habitation of Shiites. From the rise of Islam until the 15th century， most Persians were Sunni Muslims and Arabs were dominant among the Shiites. The Ottoman Empire designated Shiism as its state religion in the beginning of the 16th century， making Iran the most important and powerful Shiite country in the Middle East. This decision produced far-reaching effects on the ethnic composition of the Shiites， as well as relations between Iran and the Shiite world. As Shiism rose in Iran， the Persians started to outnumber the Arabs， soon becoming the primary ethnic group among the Shiites. The influence of the Persians' among Shiites increased steadily， and Shiites soon comprised the main body of the Shiite Ulema， the elite group of religious scholars. To this day， Iranian Shiites represent 48 percent of Shiites worldwide， while Arabs only make up 17 percent.3Vali Nasr， “When the Shi'ites Rise，” p.65.This great demographic disparity is not only recognized by Arab Shiites — more importantly， it is Iran's primary advantage in influencing Arab Shiites.

The Islamic revolution in 1979 marked a turning point in Iranian-Arab ties. From a religious perspective， Iranians achieved an absolute advantage over the Arabs among Shiites. Under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors， the Shiite sect gained unprecedented ground in Iran，with Qom replacing Najaf as the prominent religious educational center for Shiites in Iraq. As the core of Iran's ruling class， the Shiite Ulema rose rapidly in numbers. The number of Shiite Ulema in Iran approached 200，000 by 2006， with only 12，000 Ulema outside of Iran.4Mehdi Khalaji， The Last Marja： Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism， The Washington Institute for Near East Policy， Policy Focus #59， September， 2006， p.3.Deeming itself the “Vatican of Shiism，” Iran tried to command and lead Shiites in other realms.5Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr， “Iran， the Vatican of Shi'ism？” Middle East Report， No.233， 2004， p.40.While not denying the huge number of Iranian Shiites， the Arab Shiites nonethelessrefused to accept Iran's “Vatican” status out of national awareness， and consciously stressed religious independence.

Second， one must understand Iran's role as the center of the Islamic revolution. Iran's Islamic revolution exerted a profound impact on Middle Eastern politics and the Arab Shiite world. As a successful model of the oppressed fighting against tyranny， the Iranian revolution provided a significant spiritual impetus for Arab Shiites who had long been discriminated against. Encouraged by Iran， Arab Shiites initiated large-scale anti-government movements in Iraq，Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Iran thus became the Islamic revolutionary center in the Middle East， attracting Arab Shiites in various countries for political training. The idea of the Iranian revolution was of great interest to Islamists among the Arab Shiites， providing them with directions for their political operations，and the Iranian model proved to be an effective way for them to realize their political goals. Secular Shiites did not agree with the Iranian revolution， but they recognized that Iran was more democratic than most Arab countries.

Iran， however， could not guarantee that all the Arab Shiites would accept its revolutionary ideology without reservations. In fact， the theory of clerical rule was met with some objections in Iran and aroused great disputes among the Arab Shiites. Although the Arab Shiite's political force， represented by the Lebanese group Hezbollah， recognized the leadership of Ayatollah's Khomeini and Khamenei， many people， including the Ulema of the Arab Shiites， refused to accept their authority.6Sajjad Rizvi， “Political Mobilization and the Shi'i Religious Establishment，” International Affairs， Vol. 86， No. 6， 2010， pp.1301-1302.In addition， many people became fed up with Iran's regional aspirations， nationalism and its great chauvinism in the post-revolution period. Secular Arab Shiites grew to despise the religious fanaticism and radicalism displayed by Iranian Shiites. They held that Iran's radical diplomacy and violent activities damaged the Shiite image， making Arab Shiites potential betrayers in the eyes of Sunnis and terrorists in minds of the West.

Third， one must understand Iran's role as a nation. For the Arab Shiites，Iran's most important identity is as a country with a distinct territory， culture and nationality. Arab Shiites hold contradicting views regarding Iran as anation. They respect Iran as the only country whose state religion is Shiism，they admire Iran's abundant and rich culture， and they are grateful for Iran's sheltering of persecuted Arab Shiites. Many Arab Shiites that have lived in Iran feel that they are despised and discriminated against by Iranians. Arab Shiites in exile in Iran complain that they are unable to find meaning employment because of their Arabian identities. In the 1990s， Iran even enacted a law prohibiting Arab males from marrying Iranian women.7Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke， The Arab Shi'a： The Forgotten Muslims， p.76.In the political realm，many Arab Shiites hate Iran's interference in their internal affairs， because most of Arab Shiites identify primarily as Arabs and only secondly as Shiites. When Arab countries are in conflict with Iran， nationalism is the major factor influencing the attitudes of Arab Shiites. Even Nasrallah， Secretary General of Hezbollah， claimed that Hezbollah would safeguard the Lebanese state interest when it was in conflict with Iran.8Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr， Constructing Lebanese Nationalism： Transnationalism， Shi'ism， and the Lebanese State， Ph. D. Diss.， The University Chicago， August 2005， p.78.At the same time， Arab Shiites also indicated that the worse their living conditions were in Arab countries， the more they would turn to Iran to seek balance， aiming to remind Arab rulers that excessive oppression of the Shiite public was unwise.9Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke， The Arab Shi'a： The Forgotten Muslims， p.78.

Iranian perception of the Arab Shiites

The Iranian perception of Arab Shiites is also versatile and complex.

To begin， it is important to note that Iranians generally despise the Arabs. Islam first rose among the Arabs， who historically conquered the Iranians. However， Iranians are confident and proud of their civilized and long history. They despise the Arabian way of life and educational level， and they feel greatly superior to the Arabs.10When carrying out research in Iran from April to May， 2008， the author repeatedly heard that the local Iranians disliked the Arabs.As the Persian proverb goes， “Even a dog in Isfahan lives a better life than the Arabs on the Arabian Peninsula.”11Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke， The Arab Shi'a： The Forgotten Muslims， p.79.As for ethnic groups， Iranians hold that there is no difference between Arab Sunnis and Shiites. In other words， Arab Shiites are not free from Iranian discriminationbecause of their religious belief. Fundamentally speaking， Iranian perceptions are the complex results of national contradictions between Persians and Arabs，as well as Persian pride in their civilization.

Second， Iran sympathizes with the experiences of the Arab Shiites， who are viewed as the oppressed people in Arab countries， and the Shiites have in fact long been marginalized in Arab countries. Deeming itself the protector of Arab Shiites， Iran feels obliged to protect Arab Shiites from being “persecuted”by Sunni governments. Iranian King Pahlavi once supported the political actions of Lebanese and Iraqi Shiites during the 60s and 70s of the 20th century. After 1979， the Iranian revolutionary regime offered Arab Shiites a great deal of financial assistance agitating and opposing Sunni regimes. Iranian support and enthusiasm for the Arab Shiite revolutions declined in the 1990s. However， Iran's concern over the Arab Shiites remains a major feature of Iran's regional diplomacy.

Finally， Iran considers Arab Shiites to be accountable for Iran's regional policy.12Oliviwe Roy， “The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Middle East，” in Sabrina Mervin ed.， The Shi'as World and Iran， Translation by Bart Peeters， Saqi Books， 2010， p.30.Although modern Iran has called itself an Islamic republic since 1979 instead of claiming to be a Shiite country， the Arab Shiites are still primary in Iran's external religious contact. But emotions and a sense of responsibility based on common religious belief cannot change the manner in which Iran prioritizes national interest. The existence of the Arab Shiites in Arab countries is a “natural weakness” for Iran. Iran makes conscious use of the Arab Shiites in order to expand its impact and realize its regional goals. In response to a request for assistance from Bahraini Shiites in 2006， an Iranian diplomat said，“I have always been telling my Bahraini friends to be somewhat realistic： what good can it do to Iran by supporting 300，000 Shiites on a small island？”13aurence Louer， Transnational Shia Politics： Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf， Hurst & Company， 2008， p.184.Even for Ayatollah Khomeini， the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran，common belief in Shiism does not threaten or supersede Iran's state interests.14Robin Wright， In the Name of God： The Khomeini Decade， Simon and Schuster， 1989， p.173.

It can be seen that mutual perceptions between the Arab Shiites andIran are largely misplaced. For the Arab Shiites， Iran's role as the primary Shiite habitation lays a foundation for Iran to relate to Arab Shiites， and it contributes to Iran's significant influence on Arab Shiites. Iran's role as the Islamic revolutionary center exerts a huge political impact on Arab Shiites and changes the latter's domestic circumstances. Iran's status as a state is a fundamental factor for Iran. Iran despises， sympathizes and exploits the Arab Shiites all at the same time. To elaborate， the hatred stems from ethnic contradictions between the Arabs and the Persians； the sympathy flows out of common religious emotions； and the exploitation is based on mainstream concept and realistic emphasis on state interests. When interacting， the two sides are in severely asymmetric situations. Iran is the powerful and active influencing agent with absolute superiority， while the weak Arab Shiites have a disadvantageous status and exert little influence on the overall situation.

Iran's Ways of Influencing the Arab Shiites

Iran attaches great importance to the role of the Arab Shiites in its regional policy. After the Islamic revolution， Iran began to comprehensively influence the Arab Shiites. Drawing on political， economic， religious and other resources，Iran exerted influence on the Arab Shiites in numerous ways. After 1989， Iran's external policy became more practical and moderate， with a greater emphasis on actual effects on the Arab Shiites， and on the role of religion and culture in the region. Specifically， Iran influenced the Arab Shiites in the following ways.

Advocating the Islamic revolutionary idea

Iran is a country that attaches immense importance to external publicity in the Middle East， and the Islamic revolutionary idea is a critical component of its external publicity. It is by relying on the radical idea of disrupting existing domestic and international orders that Iran attracts widespread attention in the Muslim world and has become the center of the Islamic revolution. Iran publicizes the Islamic revolutionary idea as a major element of its external interactions， releasing a great deal of publicity materials and delivering theseto Arab countries. Iran holds many international meetings to “instill the revolutionary ideology” into foreign Muslims； Iran also asked overseas students and embassies to shoulder some publicizing responsibilities；15Chen Quan'an： “Iran's Islamic Revolution and its International Influence”， Fudan University Press，2007， p362.the annual hajj was also been endowed with significance in publicizing the Iranian revolution. To this day， revolutionary discourse still appears in Iran's diplomacy from time to time. Iran's spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei holds that recent protests in the Middle East and North Africa are an extension of the Islamic revolution.

Establishing and supporting military and political organizations of the Arab Shiites

Military and political organizations are the most direct and essential way for Iran to influence the Arab Shiites. The greatest outcome of Iran in exporting revolution was the establishment of the Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Lebanon in 1982 and established Hezbollah in alliance with pro-Iranian Shiite Islamic forces. Iran continuously supplied Hezbollah with capital and weapons， helping it grow rapidly into a powerful military and political force. Iran supported Iraqi Shiites in establishing the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq （ISCI） the same year. The subordinated Badr Brigade received training and used weapons from Iran， even participating in operations against the Iraqi military in the Iran-Iraq War.16aleh A. Jabar， The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq， Saqi Books， 2003， p.241.Taking advantage of the Iraqi chaos， Iran has comprehensively permeated Iraq through Shiites since 2003. Apart from supporting ISCI， Iran also established training bases for the Mahdi of Al-Sadr Movement.17Kimberly Kagan， in Frederick W. Kagan， Kimberly Kagan， and Danielle Pletka eds.， Iranian Influence in the Levant， Iraq， and Afghanistan， American Enterprise Institute， 2008， p.20.Iran has been providing the Justice League with financial assistance， arms and training in support of its active attacks on the United States military in Iran since 2006.18Marisa Cochrane， The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement， Iraq Report 12， The Institute for the Study of War， 2009， pp.18-21.In Bahrain， Iran helped set up the Islamic Liberation Front， which initiated a political coup in 1981. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also directly supported thefounding of Saudi Arabian Hezbollah in 1987， and helped it orchestrate a series of disruptive activities.19Toby Matthiesen， “Hizbullah al-Hijaz： A History of the Most Radical Saudi Shi'a Opposition Group，”The Middle East Journal， Vol. 64， No. 2， 2010， p.184.

Providing shelter for the Arab Shiites in exile

Since 1979， Iran has emerged as the major destination for Arab Shiite refugees. Due to the bloody oppression and armed expulsion of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party regime， a great number of Iraqi Shiites were forced to leave their country and Iran became their host country. There were 580，000 Iraqi refugees in Iran in 2000，20Antoine Bernard， Iraq： Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing， International Federation for Human Rights， January 2003， p.36.most of whom were Shiites. Additionally，the Shiite opposition in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also chose Iran as primary destination to seek refuge. Iran's accepting attitude received compliments from the Arab Shiites. Though they suffered from some discrimination in Iran，they could still act in an overall free manner. Apart from offering material relief for the Shiite refugees， Iran also provided anti-Arab government forces with economic aid and weapons. Having returned to their own countries，these exiles became important channels for Iran to influence regional politics. A number of important Shiite leaders， including former Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Eshaiker al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki， all lived in Iran at one time.

Arab Shiites Studying in the Holy City of Qom

After the Shiite Ulema， headed by Ayatollah Khomeini， came into power，Qom grew rapidly into the largest religious educational center for Shiites across the world. As the training and publicizing institution for Islamic revolutionary ideology in Iran， Qom became the primary study destination for Arab Shiite theology students. Iran had less than 10 Lebanese students before 1979， but the number rose sharply to 450， and after the 1990s stabilized around 300.21Rula Jurdi Abisaab， “The Cleric as Organic Intellectual： Revolutionary Shi'ism in the Lebanese Hawzas，” in H. E. Chehabi ed.， Distant Relations： Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years， I. B. Tauris，2006， p.243.Currently， Qom has over 50 different theology schools， over 60，000 Ulema，more than 10，000 non-Iranian theological students from over 90 countries，22“A Brief Introduction of Qum's Islamic Seminary，” Imam Reza Network， March 9， 2014.and the majority of them are Shiites. Qom has also become a training base for political ideology in the Shiite world. While receiving their religious educations， many Arab Shiite students are being deeply influenced by Islamic revolutionary ideas. Having returned to their own countries， they are now the backbone force and core leadership of local Shiite Islamic movements. The founders of the Saudi Arabian Hezbollah were all educated in Qom， including Muqtada al-Sadr， leader of the al-Sadr movement in Iraq. Qom's international theological education is not only conducive to establishing Iran's leadership in the Shiite world — more importantly it facilitates religious and political permeation through students from relevant countries.

Establishing and consolidating the status of Ayatollah Khamenei as the Grand Ayatollah23According to the religious doctrine of Twelver Shi'ism， every ordinary believer should choose an ayatollah or grand ayatollahs to guide his spiritual purity. Grand ayatollahs are called “Marja” with supreme status in the spiritual world.

After the demise of Ayatollah Khomeni in 1989， Ayatollah Khamenei became Iran's Supreme Leader. According to the Iranian Constitution，the Supreme Leader must be a marja， of which Khamenei was not then qualified. Although a Constitutional amendment cancelled this stipulation，Ayatollah Khamenei's relatively low religious status posed a direct threat to his authority， while also damaging the legitimacy of the Islamic regime. After the death of the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Araki in 1994， Khamenei was officially declared the new marja. This aroused great disputes in Iran，and many of Iran's grand ayatollahs declined to recognize Khamenei as a marja.24Maziar Behrooz， “The Islamic State and the Crisis of Marja'iyat in Iran，” Comparative Studies of South Asia， Africa and the Middle East， Vol. 16， No. 2， 1996， pp.93-100.The Iranian government ultimately started to call Khamenei a marja internationally， attracting Shiites to follow him in many ways. Publicizing Khamenei became one of the core aspects of Iran's diplomatic work. One major mission of the Abna' al-Nabiy foundation was to establish the religiousauthority of Khamenei globally.25Mehdi Khalaji， The Last Marja： Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism， p.16.After many years， Khamenei now has a great number of followers in the Arab world. For the Iranian government， there is no fundamental difference between Khamenei's religious authority and Iran's regional influence. The more Khamenei's followers grow， the more qualified Iran becomes in the Shiite world， and the greater political influence Iran can have among Arab Shiites.26Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr， Shi'ite Lebanon： Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities， p.191.

Results Assessment of Iran's Impact on the Arab Shiah

The results of Iran's impact on the Arab Shiites can be analyzed from three angles — namely， the Arab Shiites， Iran itself and Middle Eastern politics.

Boosting Arab Shiite political movements while worsening the domestic political environment

Iran's dissemination of revolution accelerated the political awakening of the Arab Shiites and strengthened the appeal of Islamic movements. The model of the Iranian revolution offered new paths for Muslims that were discontented with the status quo， and also gave positive publicity to Shiite Islamic movements. At the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980， Arab countries generally witnessed a climax in Shiite protests， marking the end of Arab Shiite political silence.

More importantly， Iran offered Arab Shiites practical help for many years， improving their organizational standards and boosting their political energy at home and abroad. Iran was the primary shelter for Arab Shiites when they were suppressed. Iran directly supported countries like Iraq，Lebanon， Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in establishing military and political organizations， and assisted them with capital， weapons， necessary information and training for military personnel. Iran donated at least 100 million dollarsto the Lebanese Hezbollah alone.27Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh， In the Path of Hizbullah， Syracuse University Press， 2004， p.63.Iran also actively supported Iraqi Shiites in fights for political power in their own countries as early as 2003. There is no doubt that Iran is the major external force that Arab Shiites rely on. Without Iran's support， Lebanese Hezbollah would not be so powerful and other organizations could hardly retain their present influence.

Iran's support has rendered the public opinion environment extremely unfavorable for the Arab Shiites. Arab Sunnis are strongly skeptical of Iran's support， and view Iranian motivation for supporting Shiites as an attempt to establish Islamic countries just like Iran in the Arab world. The government of Iran during Saddam period， Bahrain and Saudi Arabia all viewed the growth of Shiite power in their countries as an expansion of Iran's influence. They held that Shiite Islamists were Iran's “fifth column，” and that the Arab Shiites were“natural betrayers.” Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak declared that Arab Shiites were loyal to Iran rather than their own country in April of 2006.28Vali Nasr， “When the Shi'ites Rise，” p.67.This negative announcement provided excuses for Arab governments to adopt tough policies against Shiites， leading to tensions between domestic Sunnis and Shiites. The Arab Shiites have become increasingly isolated domestically in recent years. According to research conducted by the Pew Center in 2012，at least 40 percent of Sunnis thought Shiites were not Muslims in most Arab countries.29Pew Research Center， The World's Muslims： Unity and Diversity， The Pew Global Attitudes Project，August 9， 2012， p.9.Under such circumstances， Arab Shiites can hardly make a justifiable appeal for their own rights.

Expanding Iran's influence while deteriorating its relations with Arab countries

Iran is a country dominated by Persians but ruled by Shiites. Such ethnic and religious sect composition has led to Iran being isolated by Sunnis and other nationalities. As a result， breaking down ethnic and religious sect barriers and permeating the majority Arabs are important aspects of Iran'sregional policy. Iran has been advocating pan-Islamism and promoting unity among Muslims since 1979 an effort to weaken ethnic and religious sect identification and intensify their Islamist identity. Insurmountable sectarian contradictions made the Arab and Afghan Shiites major targets in Iran's export of revolution.30Only Hamas among the Sunni Islamist organizations supports Iran.Iran used natural connections with Arab Shiites to build its own soft power and partly divide the Arabs. Pro-Iranian Arab Shiite military and political organizations became tools for Iran to realize its regional strategy. More specifically， Lebanese Hezbollah expanded Iran's influence to the East Coast of the Mediterranean， and helped Iran gain some speaking rights in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran has actively supported Iraqi Shiites， and has become an important force influencing Iraqi political stability since 2003.31Michael Eisenstadt et al.， Iran's Influence in Iraq： Countering Tehran's Whole-of-Government Approach， The Washington Institute for Near East Policy， Policy Focus， No.111， 2011， pp.12-17.Iraqi Shiites provided leverage for Iran to change its political situation， and was also an effective resource for Iran to affect politics in the Arab countries.

However， Iran's actions also damaged its ties with Arab countries. In the view of Arab countries， Iran's actions were undoubtedly interfering in their internal affairs. Iran's excessive export of revolution posed a direct challenge to Arab governments， such as Saudi Arabia， Bahrain and Iraq. Some scholars hold that Saddam Hussain's launching of the Iraq-Iran War was essentially due to the threat posed by the pro-Iranian anti-government activities of Iraqi Shiites.32Chibli Mallat， “Iran， Shi'ism， and the Arab Middle East，” in Makoto Mizutani ed.， The Middle East into the 21 Century， Garnet Publishing Limited， 1996， p.152.Saudi Arabian or Bahraini governments will always blame Iran whenever Shiites arouse protests in the two countries， leading to substantial setbacks in bilateral relations. Iran's high-profile announcement that it would assist protest activities in Bahrain directly triggered Iran's diplomatic crisis with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Therefore， Iran paid the price for having tensions with many Arab countries while intensifying its connections with Arab Shiites.

Intensifying sectarianism and polarization in Middle East

Sectarianism has been the obvious political trend in the Middle Eastfor the past 30 years. One of the major reasons underlying the increasingly deteriorated sectarian contradictions is Iran's consistent concern over and support for Arab Shiites. After the Shiites came to power in Iraq in 2003， the so-called “Shiite Crescent” was formed in the Middle East， including Shiites from Iran， Syria and Iraq as well as Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran became the core cohesive force for Shiism in the Middle East. Iranian conservatives claimed that Lebanese Hezbolla， Iraqi Shiites and the Iranian government should form the axis of “Nasrullah-al-Sistani-Khameini” in concerted efforts to safeguard Shiite interests.

The rise of the “Shiite Crescent” led to further deterioration of sectarian relations in the Middle East. An investigation by the Pew Center in 2009 showed that 95 percent of Lebanese Muslims， 59 percent of Egyptian Muslims and 55 percent of Jordanian Muslims agreed that sectarian contradictions were universal in the Middle East.33Pew Research Center， Mixed Views of Hamas and Hezbollah in Largely Muslim Nations， The Pew Global Attitudes Project， February 4， 2010， pp.4-5.Political opposition and fights took place between Iranian-led Shiite alliances and the Salafi Sunni alliance led by Saudi Arabia after drastic changes in the Middle East in 2011. Bahraini Shiite protests and the Syrian civil war emerged as two major focuses of bilateral contradictions. The Iranian government publicly expressed support for the Bahraini Shiites in fighting against the Sunni regime. In response， the Gulf Cooperation Council （GCC） countries sent armies to Bahrain， turning Bahraini protests to regional fights between the pro-Iranian Shiite protesters and the Sunni House of Khalifa backed by the gulf monarchies.

As for the Syrian civil war， two opposing camps were formed in the Middle East： one side consisting of Iran in favor of the Alawite regime， Iraq dominated by the Shiites and Lebanese Hezbollah，34Thomas Pierret， “The Reluctant Sectarianism of Foreign States in the Syrian Conflict，” United States Institute of Peace， November 18， 2013， pp.1-2.and the other side being Sunni countries supporting Syrian oppositions like Saudi Arabia， Qatar，Jordan and Turkey. Sectarian differences already became a distinctive feature of Middle Eastern politics.

Li Fuquan is Associate Professor at the Institute of Middle East Studies， Northwest University， which is located in Xi'an city， China.