Will Island and Reef Construction Change the Status Quo in South China Sea?

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Will Island and Reef Construction Change the Status Quo in South China Sea?

□Zhu Feng

The West Pacific has become a new hot spot in the tense East Asian security situation. Aside from the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, which is far from being resolved, the South China Sea (SCS) issue is catching a lot of attention, especially given China’s island and reef construction (IRC) activities on its Nansha Islands. On April 8, 2015, when new U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter visited Japan, he openly accused China of “militarizing” SCS.1Robert Burns, “Carter Chides China over Approach to Territorial Disputes”, Associated Press, April 10, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/carter-chides-china-over-approach-territorial-disputes-080540221--politics. html.On April 28, Evan Medeiros, Senior Director of Asian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, complained in public that China’s IRC in SCS posed “real challenges” and was “very problematic” in terms of its “scale, speed and scope”.2“U.S., Japan Unveil New Defense Guidelines for Global Japanese Role”, Reuters, April 28, 2015.The frequent attacks on China from the United States, Japan, and other countries over the SCS issue seem to indicate that this issue has surpassed traditional hot spot issues in East Asia in importance (such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the Taiwan question) and become the very cause of strategic rivalries among major countries in Asia. In other words, the new geopolitics in East Asia is characterized by a shift in major powers’ diplomatic and strategicstruggle from land to oceans. However, to what extent is such an argument true? China’s legitimate IRC being made a hot spot is to a large extent due to hyping by some extra-regional countries, such as the United States and Japan, and some claimant countries in the region. Learning the opinions of related parties on the IRC issue may therefore help elucidate the SCS situation accurately and objectively.

IRC is Conducive to the SCS Status Quo of Peace and Stability

Conducted in accordance with international laws, China’s IRC activities on the Nansha Islands are infrastructure construction activities within Chinese territory. Foreign countries can observe, but they have no right to point fingers at China. While foreign scholars and media organizations stress that IRC should not change the natural properties of islands and reefs and no Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf claims should be based on expanded islands and reefs,3“PH Not Reclaiming in South China Sea: ‘Let Photos Speak’”, Rappler, April 30, 2015, http://www. rappler.com/nation/91687-philippines-tithu-south-china-sea-reclamation?cp_rap_source=yml#cxrecs_s.they more or less neglect the fact that IRC for the purpose of improving the living conditions of island inhabitants, national defense, scientific research, ecological protection, etc. is by nature the fundamental rights of a maritime country.

The Chinese government explained, “The construction and maintenance activities of China on some garrisoned islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands are primarily for the purpose of improving functions of these islands and reefs, improving the working and living conditions of garrison staff, safeguarding China’s territorial and maritime rights and interests and better fulfilling China’s international responsibilities and duties with respect to marine search and rescue, disaster prevention and relief, scientific research, climate observation, environmental protection, assurance of navigation safety, fishery production and service, etc.”4“Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying on April 9, 2015”, the website of Foreign Ministry of China, April 9, 2015, see http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/ t1253375.shtml.In other words, China’s IRC issomething appropriate, justified, and legitimate within the jurisdiction of China. It targets no other country and should not be disputed at all.

A Chinese fishing fleet arrived at the waters near the Yongshu Reef in South China Sea.

China is not the first country that has conducted IRC on the Nansha Islands. Since the 1970s and 1980s, countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have been engaging in illegal construction activities on Chinese islands. They have not only conducted unlawful massive reclamation but also constructed airport and other facilities and even deployed offensive weapons such as missiles on these islands.

For example, the Philippines has built an airport and a dock on China’s Zhongye Dao (island), constructed “tourist facilities” on China’s Zhongye Dao, Mahuan Dao, and Feixin Dao, etc. and even attempted to occupy China’s Ren’ai Jiao (reef) by reinforcing its illegally “grounded” military vessel there.

Likewise, Vietnam has engaged in large-scale reclamation activities on more than 20 maritime features of China’s Nansha Islands. Simultaneously, it has constructed a lot of fixed facilities on these islands including harbor basins, an airstrip, missile bases, office buildings, barracks, hotels and lighthouses. In addition, it has constructed stilted houses and helipads on some other Chinese maritime features including Wan’an Tan (bank), XiweiTan, Lizhun Tan and Aonan Ansha (shoal).5“Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei on April 29, 2015”, the website of Foreign Ministry of China, April 29, 2015, see http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1259195. shtml.While criticizing China’s legitimate activities in its own territories, the United States, Japan, and other countries have adopted double standards by deliberately keeping a blind eye to the long-term illegal IRC activities of the Philippines and Vietnam on Chinese soil.

China’s IRC in SCS is commensurate with its economic size and power as the largest economy in Asia.

Among the parties of SCS disputes, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia all have airports on China’s Nansha Islands, while China has no airports there. Even Western media have acknowledged that many claimants have engaged in IRC activities, while pointing out that China’s efforts have been “the most extensive and dramatic”.6Ben Blanchard, “China ‘Extremely Concerned’ by ASEAN Statement on Disputed Sea”, Reuters, April 23, 2015.But is it really the cause of SCS tensions? Common sense tells us that China’s IRC in SCS is commensurate with its economic size and power as the largest economy in Asia. Conjecturing that China’s strategic aims in SCS are “resolving the SCS disputes by compulsory means” on the ground of “scale” and “speed” of IRC only is nothing but sheer malicious incitement.

A semi-closed sea bordering a large number of coastal countries in the West Pacific, SCS has the busiest sea lanes and most diversified resources and ecological environment in the world. However, so far, no effective multilateral cooperation regime has been established among neighboring coastal countries. International cooperation is scarce with respect to marine search and rescue, environmental protection, climate surveillance, navigation safety, etc. In the depths of SCS, necessary and reliable rescue facilities are extremely scarce and rare. Therefore, through IRC, China can effectively satisfy regional needs in these respects and provide civilian public goods to related coastal countries with respect to scientific research, search and rescue,resource protection, etc. The position taken by the Chinese government has always been positive, open and transparent. A spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry said, “After the construction, the islands and reefs will be able to provide all-round and comprehensive services to meet various civilian demands besides satisfying the need of necessary military defense. The maritime areas in the South China Sea, where shipping lanes crisscross and fishing grounds scatter around, are far away from the landmass. These areas are prone to marine accidents due to the influence of typhoon and monsoon. Civilian functions and facilities will be included in the construction for ships to take shelter, and for navigation aid, search and rescue, marine meteorological observation and forecast, fishery service and administration, so as to provide services to ships of China, neighboring countries and other countries that sail across the South China Sea.”7“Q&A by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson on Chinese IRC on the Nansha Islands and Sino-Indian border issues”, China News Service, April 9, 2015, see http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/04-09/7196351.shtml.

However, officials of some countries deliberately neglected the civilian functions of China’s IRC described above and chose instead to sensationalize the military purpose of China’s IRC. For instance, Daniel Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, remarked in a Congress hearing that, once China’s IRC was completed, China would be able to deploy long-range radars, troops, and missile systems on the islands, designate an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and play a bigger role in the disputed area.8“Locklear: Chinese reclamation works in South China Sea could lead to new ADIZ”, April 18, 2015, http://air.dfns.net/2015/04/18/locklear-chinese-reclamation-works-in-south-china-sea-couldlead-to-newadiz.In Philippine congressional hearings, some Philippine naval officers also accused China of attempting to designate an ADIZ by warning Philippine warplanes when they flew over China’s islands and reefs.9“Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying on May 7, 2015”, the website of Foreign Ministry, May 7, 2015, see http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/ t1261549.shtml.In the face of these charges, we need to make some clarifications: Even though some facilities constructed by China can be partially used for military purposes, they are primarily used for defense purposes. Simply associating China’s IRCwith a military “threat” is clearly false. There is no causality between China’s IRC and designating an ADIZ in SCS either because, even though China has rights to designate ADIZs, the designation itself depends on whether China’s air safety is threatened and to what extent. Given the general climate of active and positive cooperation between China and ASEAN countries, sensationalizing the “SCS ADIZ” issue has clearly a hidden agenda and ulterior motives.

Will IRC Aggravate Maritime Strategic Competition in West Pacific?

The so-called “SCS tensions resulting from China’s IRC” have three main causes.

First, countries with territorial disputes in SCS with China, including the Philippines and Vietnam, chose to distort facts and attack China on groundless charges to validate their illegal seizure of China’s Nansha Islands. For instance, the Philippines sensationalized China’s legitimate IRC into a “global problem”, misinterpreted China’s intention as monopolizing SCS by force and defamed China’s actions as “bullying”.10David Brunnstrom, “Philippines Says South China Sea Dispute a Global Problem”, Reuters, April 10, 2015.On the one hand, it staged a “tragedy show” in international media by lamenting its inability to fix airstrips in Manila, let alone on the Nansha Islands;11“We Can’t Even Fix Airstrips at Manila, Why in the Spratly?” ABS-News, April 30, 2015, http://www. abs-cbnnews.com/nation/04/30/15/we-cant-even-fix-manila-airport-so-why-spratlys.on the other hand, it organized together with the United States a large military exercise involving more than 11,500 soldiers in late April 2015.12Jim Gomez, “US, Philippines Start Combat Drills amid Chinese Reclamation”, Fox News, April 20, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/04/20/us-philippines-start-combat-drillsamid-china-massive-landreclamations-in.In a certain sense, it was the blunt military provocation of the United States and the Philippines that caused tensions in SCS. The situation was aggravated further by extraregional powers’ continuous armament of Vietnam and the Philippines,which posed a great threat to China’s IRC.13“Vietnam Purchased New Submarine Missiles Targeting China’s Man-Made Islands in SCS”,Reference News, May 1, 2015.

Secondly, extra-regional powers sensationalized China’s IRC to serve their own geopolitical interests. Highly sensitive to the wax and wane of sea powers in the Asia-Pacific region, traditional sea powers such as the United States and Japan tended to view China’s activities in SCS through narrowminded geopolitical lenses, which increased instability in SCS. For instance, there were three schools of thought about China’s IRC in American think tanks. The first school thought that China’s expanded IRC was primarily targeted at resolving SCS disputes by suppressive or coercive measures, during the process of which China would “redefine” its “nine- dashed line”claims based on its IRC expansions in SCS;14Denny Roy, “New PRC South China Sea Bases No Cause to ‘Relax’” ,The Diplomat, April 30, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/new-prc-south-china-sea-bases-no-cause-to-relax; Shannon Tiezzi, “Is There a Silver Lining to China’s South China Sea Land Reclamation?”The Diplomat, February 20, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/is-there-a-silver-lining-to-chinas-south-china-sealand-reclamation.the second school thought that China’s profit-seeking by “invasive” measures in spite of international opposition made it less and less “cooperative” and more and more “hostile”, indicating the country was having “big problems” in both its foreign and regional policies;15Luke Hunt, “China Challenges ASEAN with Land Fills in South China Sea”,The Diplomat, March 10, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-challenges-asean-with-land-fills-in-southchina-sea.the third school thought that China’s desire to change the status quo in SCS as well as its plan to convert reefs and shoals into islands to claim EEZs would eventually threaten “navigational freedom” in SCS.16Tetesuo Kotani, “The Maritime Security Implications of the New U.S.-Japan Guidelines”,CSIS-AMTI, April 30, 2015, http://amti.csis.org/the-maritime-security-implications-of-the-new-u-s-japanguidelines; Everett Rosenfeld, “Chinese Naval Push Could Affect Global Trade”, CNBC, August 29, 2014, http://www. cnbc.com/id/101952236.In brief, most foreign scholars believed that China had become increasingly“aggressive” and its international behavior increasingly “revisionist”. Some even asserted that China would eventually turn SCS into another Caribbean Sea by making it part of China’s sphere of influence.17Robert D. Kaplan,Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, New York: Random House, 2014, pp. 32-50.

The United States has been monopolizing sea and air superiorities inEast Asia since the conclusion of the Cold War. However, in recent years, with the rapid growth of China’s naval forces and China’s growing resolve to safeguard its maritime rights and interests, Washington felt its absolute superiority in the region was somewhat threatened. Therefore, in response to China’s “counter-intervention and area denial” strategies, the United States proposed an Air-Sea Battle Strategy and upgraded related action plans and programs to protect its regional military projection power from being weakened by its imagined arch-rival China. Meanwhile, calls for strengthened U.S. military presence in West Pacific, tighter ties with allies, and baring teeth were constantly heard in U.S. political debates on policies toward China.18Andrew Chubb,Exploring China’s Maritime Consciousness, Perth US-Asia Center, 2014; Patrick M. Cronin ed.,Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, Center for a New American Security, 2012.

Changes in the SCS situation were not only the most important driver behind the changes in the Obama administration’s policy towards Asia and China after its inauguration in 2009, but also a critical component in its Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy in which “selective intervention” was replaced by comprehensive “strategic intervention”. “Strategic intervention”here meant nothing but manipulating the development of SCS situations in favor of the United States by means of America’s advantageous positions in diplomatic, military and international law affairs. Otherwise, the United States would not have had the motives to resolve the SCS disputes“peacefully” and “in accordance with international law”.19For the Obama administration’s systematic elaborations on its SCS policies, please see Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “ASEAN and America: Partners for the Future,” Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, CA, July 28, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ rm/2014/07/229872.htm.In essence, the purpose of the so-called “peaceful resolution” was to suppress China in its disputes with other countries. Likewise, the purpose of “resolving the SCS disputes by referring to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” was to patronize countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam by deliberately ignoring customary international law and the doctrine of intertemporal law, which had been established before the convention took effect. As a result, Washington would be able to judicialize the SCS disputes in a way easy forthe United States to manipulate and favorable to U.S. interests. It was out of this strategic calculation that the United States called on China to clarify its“nine-dashed line” claims in SCS. The whole play staged by the United States was in essence an attempt to tie China’s hands on the SCS issue. In doing so, the United States not only deliberately neglected China’s legitimate rights and interests in SCS that should be restored after World War II, but also ignored the historical fact that no objection was ever raised over China’s “nine-dashed line”claims when they were first announced in 1948. Furthermore, during the course of the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s repeated encroachments on China’s Nansha Islands, the United States kept a blind eye and did nothing to stop their illegal actions.

Each country has its own needs and each takes advantage of the IRC issue to serve its own security, political, and strategic interests.

Lastly, though harmonious on the surface, the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies have as a matter of fact different purposes and agendas on the issue of China’s IRC. In other words, each country has its own needs and each takes advantage of the IRC issue to serve its own security, political, and strategic interests. Currently, the focus of the Obama administration’s“rebalancing” strategy is to encourage, support, and direct its regional allies and security partners in holding China back. For instance, Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, claimed during a speech in Australia in April 2015 that China’s IRC was part of a larger campaign of provocative actions against smaller Asian states and was meant to create a “Great Wall of Sand” in SCS.20Josh Rogin, “U.S. Misses Real Threat of China’s Fake Islands”, Bloomberg, April 2, 2015, http:// finance.yahoo.com/news/u-misses-real-threat-china-10015256.html.The SCS IRC dispute not only gave the U.S. government and military an opportunity to fight China together with its allies and security partners, but also allowed the United States to show to its allies and partners that it, as the leading hegemonic power in Asia-Pacific, was still there to shield them from the “China threat”.

Aggravated struggles involving China’s IRC on the Nansha Islands were in the final analysis a new chapter in the overall Sino-U.S. strategic competition in the Asia-Pacific region.

The current tension in East Asian waters is the aftermath of a power shift in the Asia-Pacific region that has been going on since the mid-1990s. With the rapid economic growth of China, China’s naval forces underwent considerable growth. This not only caused a tremendous concern on the part of the United States over whether its sea and air hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region would be challenged and eclipsed, but also caused many Asia-Pacific countries to hedge their bets on China and the United States at the same time. Since 2010, Washington’s focus on Chinese military power has been gradually shifting to the growth of the Chinese navy. It was at that time that the Sino-U.S. dispute over SCS began to turn hot. However, focusing on a federal deficit cut and economic revival at home, the Obama administration proposed a plan in 2012 to cut U.S. military spending by $500 billion in the 10 years that followed. Weakening U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, the cut was a great pinch to the Pentagon which always pitched for American dominance in Asia-Pacific sea power struggles. Against this background, how to “deter” China on the high seas became an increasingly pressing challenge for the United States.21Michael McDevitt, “Assessing U.S. Policy in the South China Sea”, Center for Naval Analysis, December 10, 2014, http://amti.csis.org/assessing-u-s-policy-in-the-south-china-sea; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense”,Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 2 (March/April 2014), pp. 78-86; Ely Ratner, “A Summer Calendar for Advancing U.S. Policy toward the South China Sea”, Center for New American Security, May 2014.The Republican majority in the U.S. Congress made the fight between the White House and Congress even more ferocious. As a result, Obama’s health care reform and immigration plans encountered strong opposition from Congress. Under these circumstances, increasing military spending was basically impossible in the absence of a bipartisan consensus. This dumped the Pentagon further into concerns over China’s growing naval power. In other words, the Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategyand Air-Sea Battle Strategy were both stranded by over-stretched government budgets.22For the impact and influence of military spending on the Obama administration’s military strategies in Asia, please see Aaron L. Friedberg,Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia, London: Routledge, 2014.Against this background, a well-fabricated story of “expanding Chinese navy versus justified American intervention” naturally made a perfect pitch for the removal of domestic restraints to increased military spending.

For the sake of its diplomatic legacy, the Obama administration made a vivid and dramatic show of its Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy. Its direct confrontation with China over the IRC issue was primarily meant to maintain America’s image as a reliable “protector” and “security provider”before its Asian allies and security partners so that the United States could win continued diplomatic and strategic support in East and Southeast Asia.23Gregory Poling, “Furthering U.S. Strategic Goals in the South China Sea”,CSIS-AMTI, April 23, 2015, http://amti.csis.org/furthering-u-s-strategic-goals-in-the-south-china-sea/.In the face of China’s growing economic and financial influence brought by strategies such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the new Silk Road Initiative, the most effective approach for the United States to balance China might be pressuring China on territorial disputes and maritime conflicts, leveraging the country’s competitors into the geopolitical game of balancing China. Aggravated struggles involving China’s IRC on the Nansha Islands were in the final analysis a new chapter in the overall Sino-U.S. strategic competition in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States’“suppression”, however, brought no substantial concession from China at all.

How should the Sino-U.S. dispute over the SCS be resolved? What new plans, rules, and structures should be devised to accommodate the two countries’ major strategic interests? So far, it seems that the United States is not yet ready for dialogue to redefine its scope of actions because Washington still thinks that its strategic power is overwhelmingly greater than China’s. Many U.S. strategic analysts even don’t want to accept the fact that extensive U.S. strategic superiority in the West Pacific is already considerably discounted. Instead, they choose to believe that their country is still actively expanding its political, diplomatic, and strategic presence in the region bydiffusing the “China threat” among China’s neighbors. In the eyes of the United States, China has not yet become powerful enough to challenge U.S. strategic interests and demand adjustment of the U.S. maritime sphere of influence in the West Pacific. In other words, as evidenced by its continued verbal abuse against China over the SCS IRC issue, the United States not only thinks it necessary to reprimand China continuously, but also has faith in its capacity and power to do so.

Is Sino-U.S. Maritime Security Cooperation Possible?

The diplomatic confrontation caused by SCS IRC is not due to changes in SCS status quo mistakenly attributed to China but due to historical and contemporary distortions inherent in Asia-Pacific marine security regimes. In response to international concerns over the SCS IRC issue, the Chinese government has made consistent efforts to state and explain the truth to the general public in a patient manner and through multiple channels. For instance, on April 30, 2015, during his phone conversation with U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert, Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli invited the United States to use Chinese island and reef facilities in SCS when conditions mature in the future, indicating that China would like to provide more support to American and other countries’ humanitarian rescue operations and climate change studies there. Wu’s offer was shrugged off by the United States.24“US Rejects China’s Offer over Disputed Islands,” AFP, May 1, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/usrejects-chinas-offer-over-disputed-islands-222924079.html.

On the SCS IRC issue, since the United States and other countries have already made some vitriolic and embarrassing remarks, “cooling down” the situation would not be so easy, even verbally. The United States, Japan, and other countries are considering coercing China into suspending and terminating its IRC activities by exercising more military and political pressure on China. Meanwhile, countries like the Philippines and Vietnam refuse to stop their trouble-making either. They will, on the one hand, trytheir best to defame China on the IRC issue, and on the other hand leverage the United States and Japan into deeper involvement in SCS affairs. This is especially true with the Aquino government of the Philippines, which has staged many shows of being “suppressed” by China. The deeper the United States and Japan are involved in SCS affairs, the “safer” Manila feels and the more stakes it garners in dealing with China. Likewise, in the eyes of Vietnam, which has always worried about China’s dominance, the United States and Japan are useful “powerhouses” that it can resort to over a long period of time. Hence, it will absolutely try all possible means to hoax the two countries into the role of a present-day Robin Hood to “protect the weak against the strong” over the SCS issue. In short, in the foreseeable future, we will see a continued “two-tier game” over the SCS issue25For detailed analysis on “double gaming”, please see Zhu Feng’s article “New Situation in SCS Sovereignty Dispute: Big Countries’ Strategic Competition and Small Countries’ Interest Games--a Case Study on the Conflict over Drilling Platform 981 in SCS”,Northeast Asia Tribune, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 1-13.as well as the continued “diffusion effect” of such disputes in Asia.

We will see the Abe cabinet’s continued criticism of China and lobbying for more aggressive defense legislation and modification of Japan’s pacifist constitution. Currently, SCS matters are already frequently quoted and discussed in Japan’s Diet debates.26Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan Ruling Party Gears up to Revise Pacifist Constitution”, Associated Press, April 30, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/japan-ruling-party-gears-revise-pacifistcharter-074641023.html.SCS claimant countries are not only counting on the United States and Japan, but also proactively soliciting the involvement of India and Australia. For instance, egged on by Japan, a statement on SCS was issued at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Likewise, at the instigation of the Philippines, a chairman’s statement implicitly criticizing China’s IRC was adopted at the 26th ASEAN Summit.27“Foreign Ministry’s Response to the Declaration on SCS Issues by the 26th ASEAN Summit”, China. com.cn, April 29, 2015, see http://www.china.com.cn/guoqing/2015-04/29/content_35450578.htmIt is expected that such actions, led by the United States and Japan, to suppress China will continue in the future. At the same time, the dispute may negatively impact public sentiment in some countries. For instance, due to frequent friction between China and Vietnam on SCS issues, Vietnam’s alternating love and hatred towards China and the United Statesare experiencing some subtle changes recently.28Donald Kirk, “Forty Years after Fall of Saigon, Vietnam Now Directs Anger at China”,Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 2015.In other words, the closer Vietnam and the United States become, the more vigilant and alert Vietnam is toward China.

Technically speaking, the tension around China’s IRC activities on the Nansha Islands is a matter of territorial dispute and maritime security. However, if studied through the lens of overall strategy, it is the natural result of actions taken by China, a major rising power, to safeguard its own national interests. This process will inevitably cause the vigilance, fear, and even opposition of other countries. This is, as a matter of fact, a typical “Thucydides’ trap” phenomenon. China’s actions to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests based on historical facts and legal principles were reduced indiscriminately to “power struggles initiated by China” in the discourses of the West.29For typical opinions and statements in this respect, please see Bill Hayton,The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, 2014; Robert Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific,Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2015; Aaron L. Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011.As the seed of a “new background factor” is taking root in the SCS issue, we should keep alert and take active measures to cope with it. The United States will not stop its military, diplomatic, and strategic watch over China’s marine rights protection actions, nor will it soften its position of suppressing China on the IRC issue. For instance, on April 9, 2015, while openly criticizing China for “elbowing aside” neighbors, President Obama demanded China stop “using sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions”.30“China’s Neighbors Must Not Be ‘Elbowed Aside’: Obama”, AFP, April 9, 2015, http://news.yahoo. com/us-warns-beijing-against-destabilizing-south-china-sea-175121491.html.In the history of Sino-U.S. relations after the Cold War, this was perhaps the first time that an American president openly criticized China for “bullying”. Even during the days of the Taiwan Straits crisis, no such embarrassing remarks were ever made by an American president. A simple IRC issue with limited effects seemed to have been granted disproportional weight in the balance of overall U.S.geopolitical and strategic considerations. This is obviously not conducive to the general trend of maintaining a stable and healthy Sino-U.S. relationship.

Since the “China factor”has become a top strategic consideration of the U.S.-Japan alliance, China should remain highly alert to this matter.

In the future, geopolitical situations in SCS may grow even more complicated, especially against the background of a U.S.-Japan alliance continuously consolidated and upgraded. Even though it is not yet clear to what extent the Abe cabinet will follow U.S. orders on the SCS issue, the alliance seems at least itching to have a go. Therefore, the graveness of strategic situations in SCS in the future should by no means be underestimated. There was already evidence in this respect. For instance, the two countries signed the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (GDC) in late April 2015. In his speech at a joint session of the U.S. Congress, Abe openly pitched joint efforts by the United States and Japan to meet the “China challenge” 70 years after World War II. In the new GDC, geographic restrictions on Japan’s military duties in the alliance are removed. This provides the very political guarantee to the intervention of the United States and Japan into SCS affairs in the future.31Shannon Tiezzi, “A Closer Look at the New US-Japan Defense Guidelines”,The Diplomat, May 1, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/a-closer-look-at-the-new-us-japan-defense-guidelines.

Meanwhile, Japan also voiced willingness to patrol SCS together with the United States.32Nobuhiro Kubo, Tim Kelly and David Brunnstrom, “Exclusive: Japan Considering Joint U.S. Air Patrols in South China Sea”, Reuters, April 28, 2015.Since the “China factor” has become a top strategic consideration of the U.S.-Japan alliance, China should remain highly alert to this matter.33“In U.S.-Japan Talks, China’s Xi a Key Factor”,Japan Times, April 28, 2015.With the SCS disputes becoming the new excuse of the United States and Japan to balance and suppress China, a new round of diplomacy in response to sharpened strategic competition among big powers will consequently ensue in an unprecedented way around the much contested maritime order in East Asia.

To dissipate the pressure from the United States and other countries, China should resort to diplomatic and political means rather than engaging in a regional Cold War with the consolidated U.S.-Japan alliance.

It is critical that China, the United States, and other major Asian countries develop a situation of competitive cooperation on East Asian marine affairs. China should pay attention to the special sensitivity of the United States towards the East Asian marine order in the framework of America’s overall interest definition in the Asia-Pacific region, while the United States should pay attention to the complexities of the SCS disputes by taking reference to historical facts, legal principles, and China’s domestic politics. America’s continued suppression of China on SCS and East China Sea issues helps nothing but fueling China’s growing nationalist sentiments.

This will make cooperation from the Chinese government even more difficult. The United States should stay sober and become aware in time that the SCS IRC issue is in essence a matter of China’s sovereign right and an internal affair, and so it is by no means an indication of fundamental changes in China’s overall strategy. Interpreting China’s SCS policy unduly and sensationalizing China’s IRC are neither beneficial to the stability of Sino-U.S. relations nor helpful to the relief of SCS tensions, particularly when one considers that neither China nor the United States wants war on East Asian waters. Although China’s power is on the rise, it is not strong enough to dialogue with the United States on an equal footing. It is also not in a position to pursue its targets and objectives in SCS at will. In other words, the means, capabilities, and resources at China’s disposal to solve problems are still limited. Therefore, to prevent the SCS issue from igniting maritime conflict between China and the United States, the following proposals are made:

First, to address the IRC issue, another round of dialogue on defense and military affairs should be initiated between China and countries such as the United States, Japan, etc. More contacts and exchanges between defense authorities and effective multilateral trust-building measures on the SCSissue are increasingly important to stability in SCS. With the expansion of its maritime rights and interests and the development of its navy, China will inevitably catch more attention from its neighbors and the United States. Therefore, China and the United States should try their best to intensify maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region because both parties know maritime conflict is not conducive to Asia-Pacific security in the 21st century.

Second, China and ASEAN countries should conduct practical dialogue within the dual-track framework to address concerns on IRC. In other words, China should make greater efforts in explaining to ASEAN countries the purpose and future functions of China’s IRC, prompting ASEAN countries to view China’s IRC in sensible and positive ways, showing ASEAN countries the significance of IRC to SCS cooperation, and guiding ASEAN countries in resource-sharing by diplomatic and political means. Only in this way can all countries contribute together to resource exploitation, environmental protection, fishery development, and humanitarian rescue in SCS and the Asia-Pacific at large. In this respect, Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli’s statement on April 29, 2015 serves as a good guideline on the general direction in which such collective contributions should be made.34Wu Shengli explicitly indicated that China welcomed the United States and other countries to use Chinese facilities constructed in SCS for weather forecast and marine rescue purposes. See Ben Blanchard,“China Says U.S. Welcome to Use Civilian Facilities in South China Sea”, Reuters, May 1, 2015, http:// news.yahoo.com/china-says-u-welcome-civilian-facilities-southchina-020237258.html.

Finally, in an environment where efforts are needed to avoid a new Cold War in SCS, any action or discourse targeted at expanding one’s own military presence in SCS on the excuse of China’s IRC is detrimental to the general trend of regional cooperation and the construction of a community of common destiny in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, however, announced that it would station troops in eight Philippine military bases alternately. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter warned that China’s IRC would encounter dangerous situations. Against this background, to dissipate the pressure from the United States and other countries, China should resort to diplomatic and political means rather than engaging in aregional Cold War with the consolidated U.S.-Japan alliance.

Conclusion

China’s IRC on the Nansha Islands will not tilt the balance of power between Chinese and U.S. navies, nor will it cause China to take compulsory actions against other SCS claimant countries. Aimed at improving China’s civilian presence in SCS by providing more public goods and services to SCS coastal countries with respect to fishery, search and rescue, ecology, and environmental protection, China’s IRC activities not only conform to international law, but are also legitimate acts within China’s sovereign territories. Even if IRC can be put into some military use in the future, such use is defensive in nature. Washington’s impatient attack on and criticism of China before China’s IRC even works are neither fair nor justified.

The United States, Japan, and some other countries will not give up their habitual practice of viewing and judging China’s IRC from military and strategic perspectives. They will not stop suppressing China by diplomatic, political, and even military means. Being continuously exaggerated and maliciously sensationalized, China’s IRC, an ordinary and legitimate affair, has gradually escalated from a point of contention in SCS into an issue exacerbating maritime strategic competition in East Asia. This evidences that China is not yet powerful enough to engage in equal dialogue with the United States on Asia-Pacific maritime issues. That is why the United States can still afford deeper intervention in China’s SCS affairs by mobilizing resources, playing the role of a “protector” for its allies and acting as the“watchdog” of the Asia-Pacific order. In the face of such challenges, China should by no means suspend or stop its IRC activities simply because of opposition from the United States and other countries. Meanwhile, we should adhere to the principle of dialogue and cooperation when dealing with the SCS issue to prevent it from fermenting into a full-scale conflict between China and the United States and between China and other SCS stake-claiming countries.

Zhu Fengis executive director of the Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies, based at Nanjing University.