Proactive Pacifism: A Blessing for the Japan-US Alliance?

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Proactive Pacifism: A Blessing for the Japan-US Alliance?

□Hu Lingyuan & Gao Lan

When Shinzo Abe assumed office the second time as Japanese Prime Minister, he put forward the diplomatic strategy of proactive pacifism, drawing worldwide focus. Under this strategy, Japan, the most significant ally of the US in the Pacific region, is worth paying attention to and studying: will it continue to be a faithful strategic partner of the US, or will it become a strategic burden on the latter?

The Essence of Abe’s Proactive Pacifism

In October 2013, Abe proposed the concept of proactive pacifism in a speech at the Hudson Institute in the US, and vowed to make Japan a“proactive contributor to peace.” In a policy speech made at the Japanese parliament, Abe stated that as global interdependence deepens, Japan cannot safeguard its own peace alone, and it should actively fulfill its responsibility for global peace and stability. He continued that based on the doctrine of international cooperation, Japan must become a country making positive contribution to world peace and stability. The term “proactive” is applied to demonstrate that the pacifism implemented under the postwar Constitution has been “passive.” In the context of changing international environment, especially the rise of China, Japan’s defense-oriented strategy under the PeaceConstitution is inapplicable any more. Japan must shift from passive pacifism to proactive pacifism.

In other words, given the US implementing the rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific, Japan wants to strengthen the Japan-US alliance by exercising the collective self-defense right, with an aim to safeguard Japan’s national security and the peace of its surrounding areas, thus contributing to world peace and stability. Abe said it is the only way to make Japan secure; the only way to gradually lift Japan to being equal with the US; and the only way for Japan to emerge out of the post-war system and become a “normal country.”

The security strategists in Japan complain that since the end of the Second World War Japan has lacked an overall strategy to integrate diplomacy and national security as a result of the Japan-US alliance system. In response Abe has proposed proactive pacifism with a view to renewing an old Japan, and consolidating the new Japan. This move can also provide ideological and theoretical support for the transformation of Japan’s security strategy, while guiding and shaping institutional building of the securitysystem. This shows that Abe aims to make proactive pacifism Japan’s guideline for diplomacy and national security on his way to creating a comprehensive national security system.

The exercise of proactive pacifism in Japan’s diplomacy and security can be illustrated through the following four aspects.

First, the Japanese government is pushing for the revision of the Peace Constitution to create preconditions for its proactive pacifism policy.Japan’s current Constitution was ratified on November 3, 1946, and came into effect on May 3, 1947. Article 9 of the Constitution declares:“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Thanks to this article, the Constitution has been referred to as the Peace Constitution. Japan’s postwar peace and prosperity could hardly have been achieved without this Constitution. Abe insists that the Peace Constitution reflects “passive pacifism,” which is outdated and completely unable to meet Japan’s international needs. If Japan is to be safe and able to make contribution to the world, it is necessary to implement “proactive pacifism.” The premise is to remove the barriers set by the post-war Constitution. In other words, a Constitutional amendment is the only way out.

After regaining power at the end of 2012, Abe has repeatedly raised the prospect of Constitutional amendment. On December 24, 2014, Abe called it his historical mission as the Japanese Prime Minister to promote the amendment of the Constitution, and he believes that this is his fate as the descendant of Kishi Nobusuke. On February 6, 2015, Abe consulted with Funada Hajime, Acting Chairman of Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision to the Constitution of the Liberal Democratic Party, and the two agreed to carry out a vote on the national Constitution revision after the 2016 Senate election.

The essence of revising the Constitution is to amend Article 9. On February 3, 2015, Abe explained to the Budget Committee of the Senate that the revision of Article 9 is to complete the task of protecting the lives and property of citizens, because the Constitution lacks security guarantee clauses that safeguard national security and peace. In addition, the Constitution mentions the protection of safety and survival of citizens, with its prerequisite being the dependence on the justice and faith of various countries’ peaceloving citizens. Considering, however, the merciless killing of Japanese hostages by the Islamic State, as well as China’s actions aimed at changing the status quo regarding the Diaoyu Islands, this prerequisite has ceased to exist.

Abe stressed that in order to tackle China’s military expansion and North Korea’s nuclear threat, Japan’s medium and long-term priorities are to improve its constraining capability, enhance joint response capabilities with the US, and actively make international contribution. As such, it is a necessary move to revise Article 9 of the Constitution, promote the right to collective self-defense, modify the guidelines for Japan-US defense cooperation and launch a series of other initiatives.

Considering the fact that many Japanese citizens are cautious about the revisions of Articles 9 and 96, and that a three-quarter majority is needed (Katsuya Okada of the Democratic Party clearly declared that he would not discuss the Abe administration’s revision of the Constitution), Abe has no choice but to adopt circuitous measures. On July 1, 2014, the Japanese cabinet adopted a resolution to officially revise the interpretation of the Constitution and lift the ban on the right to collective self-defense. On February 26, 2015, the Liberal Democratic Party held a constitutional revision promotion meeting at its headquarters, proposing to take “clearly stating the establishment of national defense forces in Article 9” and“relaxing the conditions of constitutional revision in Article 96” in the LDP’s constitutional revision draft of 2012 as highly important items.

In light of the difficulties encountered in revising Article 9, Funada Hajime, Acting Chairman of the LDP Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision to the Constitution pointed out that the revision will be dividedinto two steps: first, the LDP will start with items easily agreed upon by each party, advance discussion in a step-by-step manner, earnestly promote relevant procedures, and establish emergency clauses and environmental rights clauses; second, the LDP will take steps to revise Article 9 of the Constitution.

Second, the Japanese government established the National Security Council (NSC) to launch the design of a new security structure.Under Abe’s active promotion, the Japanese House of Representatives approved bills related to the establishment of the NSC on November 7, 2013. The NSC is composed of the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister, who will regularly discuss Japan’s medium and long-term strategic issues, and decide fundamental policies concerning diplomatic and security issues. On January 7, 2014, the Abe government officially established the National Security Bureau as the administrative body of the NSC, to be headed by Yachi Shotaro, former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and special advisor to the Cabinet. The NSC is broken down into six departments: General, Strategy, Intelligence, Allies and Friendly Countries, China and North Korea, and Other Regions. It is composed of over 60 officials from the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, National Police Agency and Self-Defense Forces, and it is responsible for Japan’s security strategy, such as intelligence collection, planning and formulation, emergency coordination and settlement.

Japan’s NSC has borrowed its basic concept and model from the US National Security Council, and the functions are equivalent to its US precursor. The creation of the US National Security Council was driven by the idea that in the era of “total war” when external threats and international conflicts are becoming intensified in an unprecedented way, national security occupies a primary, central and overriding position among the various goals and functions of the federal government. In the American mind, national security is a kind of “high politics” that dominates all governmental affairs. The NSC carries out, at the highest levels of government, centralized planning and overall coordination of independent functional areas anddepartments, including politics, military, diplomacy, internal affairs, economy and intelligence, aimed at achieving the cohesion and integration of decision-making procedures. Through this top-level design, Abe has strengthened his highly centralized leadership of diplomacy and security, while demonstrating the prominent position of security in government policies. This is a historical transition of the Japanese postwar security policies.

Third, the so-called “security chain” reflecting proactive pacifism was introduced quickly.After introducing the top-level design of the security architecture with the NSC at its core, Abe immediately put forward the security chain to make his proactive pacifism more concrete. On December 13, 2013, the Act on Protection of Specified Secret was promulgated. Four days later, the National Security Strategy, National Defense Program and Mid-term Defense Force Preparation Plan were approved. There are three dangerous areas in the National Security Strategy: first, Japan’s security strategy will go from being “passive” to “proactive”; second, the “physical threat” from China is emphasized in particular, claiming that China changes the status quo with military force, including provoking the Diaoyu Islands dispute and the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone; third, Japan will respond comprehensively and in all directions on the diplomatic, especially security fronts.

The most prominent feature of the National Defense Program is the emphasis on the “China threat.” In terms of the defense plans, the Japanese government has put forward the idea of changing the “dynamic defense force”into an “integrated mobile defense force,” strengthening the network security structure with the Japan-US alliance as its basic core, and sea-lanes as its important direction. Introduced at the same time as this new Program and as its supporting policy, the Mid-term Defense Force Preparation Plan makes it clear that Japan will introduce 52 amphibious vehicles, 99 mobile tanks, 17 Osprey Transport Aircrafts, 3 drones and 28 F35 fighters. The defense budget for 2014-2018 is 24.67 trillion yen (roughly $207.2 billion), the first growth in defense budget since 2002. On January 14, 2015, Japan adoptedthe Annual Budget Bill 2015, of which the defense budget was 4.9801 trillion yen (roughly $42.3 billion), reaching a record high for the third consecutive year.

Moreover, to achieve the above security objectives, the Abe government abolished the so-called Three Principles on Arms Exports, which have been implemented beginning from 1967, and established the Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, with the aim of supporting its security objectives with arms technology and equipment. This shows that the Abe government is adopting the proactive pacifism policy as Japan’s guideline in all security and diplomatic areas, through integration with US security strategy in East Asia, cooperation with Western countries sharing common values such as the US so as to create favorable conditions for “national normalization,” while gaining the initiative to break through difficulties in diplomacy and resolving disputes on maritime rights and interests.

Fourth, the Abe government aims to lift the country’s ban on collective self-defense right, and promote proactive pacifism through force.The right to collective self-defense refers to the ability to intervene and forcefully stop armed attacks on states that maintain close ties with Japan, regardless of whether Japan itself is attacked. It is an inalienable right of sovereign states, but to ensure the peaceful development after the Second World War, Japan had always given up the right to collective self-defense through legal interpretation.

In the mind of the Abe government, Japan is an independent state, and it should have the right to collective self-defense. Abe is paving the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense abroad through the proactive pacifism policy, so as to allow Japan to extensively integrate itself into the US global strategy, and expand Japan’s military presence on the international stage. On July 1, 2014, Japan held a provisional cabinet meeting, adopting a resolution to revise the Constitution and lift the ban on the right to collective self-defense.

The resolution overturns the three conditions to exercise right to self-defense, and proposes a set of three conditions of military exercise: first, when Japan or countries having close ties with Japan suffer armed attacks that threaten Japan’s survival and constitute fundamental dangers to the Japanese nationals’ right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; second, when there is no other means to overcome the above attacks and protect the country and people; third, when the exercise of force is limited to the“minimum necessity.”

The resolution claims that when the above three conditions are all satisfied, Japan is permitted to use force for “self-defense” purposes. The lifting of ban on the right to collective self-defense marks a fundamental shift in Japan’s security policy – once dominated by the exclusively defenseoriented strategy after World War II, which indicates the possibility that Japan will exercise military force worldwide in the name of “self-defense” in future.

Impact of proactive pacifism on the Japan-US Alliance

With the aim of containing China, the Japan-US alliance is at the core of Japan’s security policy. In the short run, proactive pacifism is intended to strengthen the Japan-US alliance, and forge Japan’s own security system through alignment with the alliance. This intention is opposite to the US’intention of controlling Japan through the alliance.

In December 2012, Abe was prepared to visit the US as his first overseas trip after his reelection, but he was politely turned down by the US. It was not until February 2013 that he was allowed to visit the US, and the US only provided a very simple reception, so simple that some observers called Abe’s visit a “one-day tour.” After that, some agreements have been reached between Japan and the US. For example, during his visit to the US in February 2013, Abe promised President Obama that Japan would participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations despite all odds.

When Obama visited Japan in April 2014, the two sides finally settled on ways to push negotiations on access to agricultural and automotiveindustry markets, indicating that their bilateral TPP negotiations are entering into a new phase. Regarding agricultural products, the US and Japan have begun conducting negotiations to cut tariffs product-by-product. In the automotive industry, the two countries have begun consultations on sensitive issues such as standards and dispute settlement mechanisms. Given that the Japanese side insisted on keeping import tariffs on some agricultural products, some US congressmen suggested that the Obama government rule out Japan and reach agreements with other TPP members first. Due to the Abe government’s efforts, the two sides finally reached consensus on the removal of the US troops stationed on the Futenma Base, which was suspended for a long time.

Nevertheless, Abe also took bold actions against the will of the US after reassuming office. For example, in May 2013, Abe sent the advisor of Cabinet Secretary Isao Iijima to North Korea for a private visit without informing the US. The US expressed strong dissatisfaction with that action and urged the Japanese side to proffer a reasonable explanation. Despite the US’ repeated warnings, Abe chose to visit the Yasukuni Shrine one year later after he took office, to the disappointment of the US.

Therefore, although proactive pacifism and the US rebalancing strategy are largely consistent with one another in response to a rising China, the essence of proactive pacifism is to break the mold for “post-war Japan” that was forged by the US, and strengthen Japan’s autonomous diplomatic and security policies, bringing significant variables and challenges to the Japan-US alliance. Conflicts between Japan and the US are bound to expand, which is manifested in the following aspects.

First, Abe’s conservative historical views have challenged the moral principles and values of the US

The key word in proactive pacifism is “proactive,” and it faces a difficulty in logical starting point. As a defeated country in World War II, Japan should draw historical lessons, and “proactively” implement pacifism and take the road of peaceful development. As such, the question of how to understand World War II is the logical starting point and touchstone for“proactively” implementing pacifism. In his treatment of historical issues, however, Abe has exhibited a stubborn conservative view of history and historical revisionism, which has not only led to doubt from the countries that suffered from Japanese aggression, such as China and Korea, but also increasingly made the US dissatisfied, becoming a negative asset in the Japan-US alliance, and to some extent challenging the moral principles and values upheld by the US.

Abe’s conservative view of history denies that there was “aggression,”which is unacceptable for the US, who suffered from Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the launch of the Pacific War, who paid great price in fighting Japan. On October 3, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel visited the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery in Japan, giving a strong hint for Abe to abandon paying homage to the Yasukuni Shrine. The US hint was not heeded by Abe, the latter instead insisted on paying homage to the Yasukuni Shrine. The US embassy in Japan expressed disappointment for Abe’s behavior, warning the move had intensified tensions in Northeast Asia.

In January 2013, Abe expressed his hope to deliver a 21st century Abe Statement to replace the Murayama Statement issued by the Japanese government in 1995. Under US pressure, Abe had to announce he would carry forward the stance of previous cabinets in the Senate Budget Committee meeting on March 3, 2014. When Democratic senator Masayoshi Nataniya asked him to clarify whether he would extend the content of “colonial rule and aggression” written in the Statement, Abe just exhibited a negative and indifferent attitude.

On June 9, 2014, in the Senate Budget Committee meeting, Abe accused the former LDP president and Speaker of House of Representatives Yohei Kono of acknowledging the fact that the Japanese authorities and army forcefully recruited comfort women during World War II and for apologizing and reflecting on that, claiming that Kono’s deed had left bane for Japan’s future generations. Abe also pushed for the investigation into the formation of the Kono Statement, asserting it was formed under the influence of theKorean government.

Rather than the denial of aggression, Abe’s position and attitude on the comfort women issue has violated the bottom line of American values and moral principles, leading to criticism from various branches of the US government, Congress and mainstream media. On January 25, 2015, Abe said in a televised program that the Abe Statement to be released at the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II would not follow the key terms such as “colonial rule” and “aggression” in the Murayama Statement. The US ambassador to Korea Mark Lippert emphasized that Abe should reiterate the spirit of the Murayama Statement and Kono Statement, and reflect on and apologize for Japan’s war-time atrocities and aggression in the past.

Second, the collision between Japan’s will to increase autonomy and the US intention to strengthen control over Japan

With the growing trend of international multi-polarity after the Cold War, Japan’s diplomacy has begun to break through the non-independent and ambiguous strategy that it espoused during the Cold War, and its security strategy has enhanced the awareness to “sail far by borrowing other’s ship” through the Japan-US alliance. In the 21st century, the new generation of Japanese politicians realizes that with the relative decline of American power and the formation of a multi-polar international situation, Japan should lower its strategic dependence on the US and establish its own comprehensive strategy in the 21st century.

Abe in his first term adopted “autonomous diplomacy” in general. In his second term, Abe advocated proactive pacifism and adopted “globetrotting diplomacy,” frequently visiting other countries in an extremely“proactive” posture. While appreciating Abe’s efforts to forge the “Democracy and Security Diamond” and “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” to contain China, the US maintains a high degree of vigilance towards Abe’s tendency to strengthen “autonomous” diplomacy in international political and economic fields. The crux is that the proactive pacifism will lead to arms expansion and war preparation, which will inevitably lead to a strong reaction from countries surrounding Japan that have suffered from its aggression. Abe’s“globe-trotting diplomacy” is seemingly attracting attention; in fact the country is unprecedentedly isolated from its neighbors in terms of diplomacy. This has left the US with space to enhance control of Japan’s diplomacy.

With the decline of US clout in the security area, Japan is worried that its peripheral security environment will become increasingly challenging. There are two different voices in Japan in terms of the national security of Japan: one is to maintain Japan’s security under the framework of the Japan-US alliance; the other is to keep away from the existing framework by breaking the Constitutional shackles and developing an independent defense force. The latter view has gradually gained an upper hand, and has been embodied by Abe’s security strategy of proactive pacifism. In terms of containing China, Japan and the US have highly different strategic demands. The strategic essence of the US’ returning to Asia or Asia-Pacific rebalancing lies in maintaining American leadership and balancing powers within the whole region, including balancing relations between China and Japan. But one of the major strategic demands of the proactive pacifism on the security front is to treat China as an imaginary enemy or quasi-enemy, with a series of major military layouts targeted at China. To this end, Abe has tried to bind the US by Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security through intensifying the Diaoyu Islands disputes.

Given the relative decline of the US in terms of overall strength, the US wants Japan to share more responsibility in East Asian security strategy. Japan grasped this opportunity to consciously and constantly improve its “autonomy” in security area with a view to ridding itself of US control someday. This is an important implication of the proactive pacifism, of which the US is well aware. It is widely known that the Japan-US alliance is a product of the Cold War era, which from the very beginning featured conflicting characteristics of control and counter-control. According to the principles of power politics, the decline of a dominant party generally means the increase of autonomous awareness and the capability of an obeying party. Japan will act more in its own way and take advantage of the Japan-US alliance, rather than only serve the strategic interests of the US. It shows thatproactive pacifism will bring greater risks to the US-Japan alliance in the field of diplomacy and security.

Third, Japan attempts to challenge the US-led post-war system

The foundation of the Japan-US alliance is closely related to the Japanese postwar system forged single-handedly by the US. The Peace Constitution, the development of which was led by the US, provides Japan’s renunciation of war as the supreme law, and gives up the maintenance of force and the right to declare war. Through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan, the latter’s security is guaranteed.

The premise of the proactive pacifism is revising the Peace Constitution and the logic behind is that only by getting rid of the Peace Constitution and by making a Constitution by itself can Japan regain its dignity.1Martin Facklerdec, “Shinzo Abe Has Eyes on Revising Constitution in Japan,”The New York Times,December 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/world/asia/japan-shinzo-abe-begins-new-termwith-push-to-revise-constitution.html?_r=0.The proactive pacifism is actually a challenge to the US-led postwar Japanese system, as well as a challenge to the postwar world system, which will push the US into a very awkward position and bring significant variables into the US-Japan alliance.

Out of realistic consideration, the US only provided an obscure comment of “non-interference with Japan’s internal affairs” for Abe’s commitment to revising the Peace Constitution in the name of the proactive pacifism, but it also expressed its “dissatisfaction” with Abe’s efforts to shake off the postwar system with criticism from the US ambassadors to Japan and Korea.

Fourth, Japan seeks diversified alliances to rid itself of the unitary system of Japan-US alliance

Abe advocated proactive pacifism and has advertised his will to make“contribution” at the regional and global levels, which has led to the limitations because of the unitary Japan-US alliance system. The US has more than 50 military allies around the world, while Japan has the US allyalone. Japanese strategists argue that the country should no longer rigidly adhere to its unitary bilateral Japan-US alliance. Rather, Japan should also establish alliances with countries such as Australia, India, New Zealand and Singapore.

To this end, Abe established the “2+2” (Foreign Minister, Defense Minister) mechanism with several countries, the essence of which is to strengthen military cooperation. Before the Ukraine crisis, Japan actually planned to build a cooperative relationship with Russia (a paramilitary alliance), in order to rid itself of the unitary system of excessive dependence on the Japan-US alliance.

Abe views the establishment of diversified alliances as the platform and driver for him to implement the proactive pacifism, with the goal of increasing Japan’s independent voice in the international arena, and reducing its dependence on the Japan-US alliance. The US does not oppose Japan“proactively” sharing responsibilities regionally and globally by expanding allies, and it has even facilitated Japan’s actions. However the US maintains a high degree of vigilance regarding the real purpose and centrifugal tendency behind Abe’s proactive pacifism.

Fifth, the US’ unwillingness to be involved in the China-Japan conflict arouses Japan’s resentment

One of the reasons why Abe has adopted the proactive pacifism is due to the changing international security environment faced by Japan, and its disputes with China over the territorial sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands and the maritime rights and interests in the East China Sea have become the main items taken advantage of by Abe to advance this agenda. Japan has tried to use this to pull the US into troubles through the Japan-US alliance.

Considering its strategic interests, the US hopes that the China-Japan conflict maintains a certain degree of intensity out of its strategic interests, while avoiding escalation of disputes that may lead to armed conflict. Its strategy is to coordinate and control the situation by means of a dynamic equilibrium, which is demonstrated by the game played by the two sides when Obama visited Japan in April 2014.

Abe stressed that the Diaoyu Islands issue was written into the document of the Japan-US Summit Declaration, praising it as a landmark decision. In fact, Obama’s statement about the Diaoyu Islands issue had three meanings: first, Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Diaoyu Islands; second, the US stands on neither side regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands; third, the US warns Abe that trust should be built between China and Japan, that problems should be solved through dialogue, and that it does not want to see escalated disputes over the Islands.

Abe’s intention to escalate the Diaoyu Islands crisis for the justification of promoting the proactive pacifism poses a severe test to the Japan-US alliance. Once anything happens in the Diaoyu Islands, the US may be forced to become involved, which is neither in line with the political will of the US nor consistent with its strategic interests. This has put the US into a dilemma. The US avoids engagement in China-Japan disputes by all means, and US actions to coordinate and take advantage of the disputes will hardly satisfy Japan, with Abe questioning whether the Japan-US alliance can really ensure Japan’s safety. As such, the proactive pacifism does not bring more blessings to the Japan-US alliance, but rather, the possibility of expanding the gaps between the two sides.

Conclusion

The establishment of the Japan-US alliance has its own special background, with inherent structural conflict sown into the alliance from the very beginning. The conflict has manifested itself in various forms during different historical periods. The challenges posed by the proactive pacifism to the Japan-US alliance are a result of these structural conflicts, as well as the inevitable consequence of new historical conditions. In the future, the development of these conflicts will directly affect the direction of the Japan-US alliance and the peace and stability of East Asia.

Hu Lingyuanis Professor and Director of Center for Japanese Studies, Fudan University (Shanghai).

Gao Lanis Professor and Vice President of the School of International and Public Affairs, Tongji University (Shanghai).