On the Post-Cold War NATO Nuclear Strategy

By Xia Liping and Sun Chongwen



On the Post-Cold War NATO Nuclear Strategy

By Xia Liping and Sun Chongwen

Tongji University

NATO's nuclear strategy is an important part of its defense strategy. During the Cold War, there were lots of international research on NATO's nuclear strategy mainly focused on how to deter or defeat a massive USSR conventional attack on Western Europe through the use of theater nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons when necessary. While deterrence remains the target of NATO nuclear policy, but at this time NATO strength framework composed of conventional forces, theater nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces may be difficult to maintain peace. So, the author proposes to clarify the use of theater nuclear weapons, and makes it clear the connections among the conventional forces, theater nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces.1

Since the end of the Cold War, the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy has declined somewhat, but together with traditional weapons are still considered a core part of the NATO overall strategy. In recent years, real battle combat factors in NATO's nuclear strategy tends to decrease, and political factors gradually become a major consideration. Generally speaking, after the end of the Cold War, the international researches on NATO's nuclear strategy focus on how its nuclear strategy can make a turn; or what role the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons should play in Europe under the new situation; or whether it also necessary to continue to exist, the thinking of which has been there.

This article intends to sort out the evolution of NATO's nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War, and analyzes the five components of NATO's nuclear strategy and the main factors affecting the NATO nuclear strategy development. This research helps to gain a more comprehensive understanding of a role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense strategy in the post-Cold War, and a better reading of the future direction of NATO's nuclear strategy.

Part I. The Evolution of NATO's Nuclear Strategy Since the End of the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's nuclear strategy has undergone a process of evolution, so far can be divided into three stages:

(A) The “discouraging” strategy stage (from 1991 to 1998)

During the Cold War, NATO's nuclear strategy had undergone a process of shifting from a strategy of massive retaliation to a strategy of flexible response as well as from taking the nuclear weapons as a sword and conventional forces as a shield to nuclear weapons as a shield and conventional forces as a sword. In the 1970s-1980s, the Soviet Union had conventional forces advantages in Europe, NATO then mainly emphasized “triad” strategy of “early use” of nuclear weapons, i.e. through the use of tactical nuclear weapons to postpone and resist the Warsaw Pact military offense, and through upgrading the use of other types of nuclear weapons and conventional forces to win a war after the Warsaw Pact Group launched a massive military offense against Western Europe.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, fundamental changes have occurred in the strategic situation in Europe. In November 1991, NATO Summit adopted the Alliance New Strategic Concept, with four fundamental tasks of NATO: (1) Provide an indispensable essential foundation for a stable security environment in Europe; (2) Shape up a forum for allies to conduct cross-Atlantic consultations on key interests regarding the implementation of Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty; (3 ) Deter and defend any threat of aggression against any NATO member; (4) Maintain strategic balance in Europe.2NATO claims in the Alliance New Strategic Concept that NATO is purely defensive in purpose; its weapons are not used for the action beyond self-defense, and does not think that it is someone’s opponents,3which actually limits the use of NATO nuclear weapons to self-defense.

To achieve this strategic goal, the NATO Alliance New Strategic Concept requests it in the foreseeable future in Europe to maintain an appropriate mixed deployment of nuclear weapons and conventional forces; nuclear weapons and conventional forces should be kept at the lowest level necessary to prevent war and restore peace in the event of war.4The document believes that the strategic nuclear forces of the NATO Alliance, especially the U.S. strategic nuclear strength provides superior security guarantees to the Alliance; the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France have their own deterrent effects and contributed to the Alliance overall deterrence.5

In this context, the United States and Russia, in accordance with the provisions of the INF treaty, completely dismantled their medium-range missiles deployed in Europe by the early 1990s. After fulfilling these treaties and documents, their number of nuclear weapons in Europe was greatly reduced, in which the United States had reduced its deployed nuclear weapons in Europe by 85%, NATO also significantly reduced the sub-strategic nuclear forces, including elimination of all nuclear artillery and short-range land-based nuclear missiles; significantly reducing nuclear forces combat-ready standards; and canceling peacetime nuclear forces and other emergency operations plans. NATO retains only the air-based tactical nuclear weapons and no longer targets its nuclear forces at any country. In addition, Britain and France also eliminated the land-based tactical nuclear weapons.

(B) “Deterring war” strategy stage (from 1999 to 2009)

NATO Washington Summit held in April 1999 is the first summit after the NATO's eastward expansion. The admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary by NATO added 13 divisions, and military border extends eastward about 650-750 kilometers, so NATO's tactical air force can take off from the base in Poland, thus, including in their flight radius the St. Petersburg, Russian major cities , etc. Now, to squeeze Russia's military geo-strategic space becomes a reality.

The NATO Alliance Strategic Concept of NATO Washington Summit states that the current security environment does not require the use of nuclear weapons as a realistic option.6The document proposes the fundamental objective of the NATO's nuclear forces is political and to maintain peace and prevent (external forces) from taking any form of coercion and launching a war on (NATO allies);7and stresses that NATO nuclear weapons play an essential role in ensuring that any aggressors should have uncertainty in the event of military invasion, thus indicating that any aggression is not a rational option.8These indicate that NATO's nuclear strategy has shifted to war deterrence.

The NATO Alliance Strategic Concept emphasizes that NATO nuclear weapons will remain at a minimum level needed sufficiently to maintain peace and stability. They will have adequate flexibility and existence, and are regarded as credible and effective part of the NATO strategy of war prevention.9The document noted that NATO's nuclear weapons include the dual-purpose aircrafts and a small number of UK Trident warheads.10

The NATO Alliance Strategic Concept emphasizes that in NATO history for the first time the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery are taken as a matter of grave concerns; and such proliferation would be a direct military threat to NATO countries population, territory and military.

(C) “Linkage” strategy stage (from 2010 up to now)

In November 2010, NATO Lisbon Summit issued the third document of strategy and security conceptsince the end of Cold War. then, NATO has expanded to 28 Member States, and is in its heyday time. NATO believes that major security threats faced by Member States include proliferation of missiles, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyber-intrusion, new development of weapons technology, interruption of the international energy transport channel, climate change, etc. NATO notes that the conventional military threat faced by NATO is not big, but should not be ignored.

In this context, NATO identifies the collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security as three core tasks of the Alliance. To that end, the newly adopted document stresses that NATO will maintain an appropriate mixture of nuclear forces and conventional forces.11NATO links two conditions with its nuclear weapons: Firstly, despite NATO's commitment to creating the conditions to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons as the goal, NATO must maintain a nuclear alliance as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world.12Secondly, NATO links its future nuclear arms reduction with the Russian reduction of its short-range nuclear missiles. Thus, NATO's nuclear strategy has become the “linkage” strategy stressing the political role.

The NATO Alliance Strategic Concept emphasizes that another political role of NATO deployed sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe is to provide the necessary political and military link between its European ally and North American ally and the necessary link between itself and strategic nuclear weapons.

Part II. Main Features of the Current NATO Nuclear Strategy

Similar to the nuclear strategy of nuclear-weapon states, NATO nuclear strategy also consists of five specific policy components: statement policy, development policy, deployment policy, use policy and nuclear arms control policy.

(A) Policy on statement: nuclear forces along with conventional forces are the core of NATO comprehensive strategy

The Active Engagement and the Modern Defense (AEMD), a NATO strategy and security concept document states that deterrence based on the appropriate mixture of nuclear forces and conventional forces is the core part of the overall strategy.13The document specifies the nuclear role in the NATO's overall strategy as follows:

(1) Deterrence: to deter and fend off any threat to the safety and security of the Allies members and people.14

(2) Security assurance: to provide the highest-level security assurance to NATO member states.

(3) Participating in assurance: to ensure its allies the widest possible participation in its collective defense, including nuclear forces deployed in peacetime, as well as command, control and consultation arrangements in case of the nuclear usage.

(B) Policy on Development: while the United States, the United Kingdom and France continue to improve nuclear forces, NATO focuses on development of a missile defense system

In the year 2012, the United States launched the most expensive renovation program of its own nuclear arsenal, i.e. to upgrade its B-61 nuclear bombs, which is expected to cost about US$ 10 billion.

The United Kingdom will develop and build a new generation of ballistic missile nuclear submarines, which will take 17 years and cost 15-20 billion pounds, accounting for about 3% of total annual defense budget.

France is building a newer class of submarine-launched ballistic missiles M51.1, which is expected to be completed by the year 2015 and can be equipped with 6 nuclear warheads, with a maximum range of up to 8000 kilometers

At the same time, NATO accelerates the deployment of missile defense system in Europe. In the year 2011, Spain agreed to deploy 4 Aegis destroyers of the U.S. fleet in the country; Poland and Romania also agreed to deploy in the future the U.S. Standard III missiles. In early 2012, a U.S. warship deployed in Turkey was equipped with interceptors and radar, and the ship is to be transferred to the command of the NATO based in Germany. On 20 May 2012, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that NATO's European missile defense system has become a reality, which means an official announcement of the system chick-off. The current missile defense system is in “the first stage”, and by the year 2018 the system will cover NATO all member states, and can be put into use, so by the year 2020 the NATO comprehensive missile defense system is expected to be fully completed

(C)The policy on deployment: multi-national territorial deployment with joint participation of nuclear and non-nuclear member states

Currently, NATO deploys over 200 U.S. B-61 thermonuclear bombs in 6 military bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, and these free-fall bombs are called theater nuclear weapons, or tactical nuclear weapons, also known as non-strategic nuclear weapons, among which deployed in Italy and Turkey are 90 each, and in Belgium and Germany 20 each.

According to NATO's nuclear sharing program, these bombs are taken custody by the U.S. military, NATO non-nuclear member countries get involved in the nuclear arrangements, share with the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons-related intelligence, reconnaissance, command and control systems, and it is the NATO non-nuclear member states where these nuclear weapons are located are responsible for providing combat aircrafts to deliver these nuclear weapons.

In April 2010, the informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers held in Tallinn, the capital city of the Republic of Estonia decided that unless NATO all member states agree, otherwise, they will not remove any U.S. nuclear weapons, which actually gives each member the right to veto NATO withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

(D) Policy on Usage: The United States has the final decision-making authority

The main purpose of the 200 pieces of B-61 freefall nuclear bombs the United States has deployed in five European countries is to respond to any military attack, rather than any particular targets and especially to the Russian military attack. According to the NATO Alliance Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in 1999, the main function of NATO nuclear weapons is to deter aggression against NATO member states, and the current security environment does not require the use of nuclear weapons as a realistic option.

Despite the NATO non-nuclear member states get involved in the nuclear program and specially equipped with special aircrafts capable of delivering nuclear weapons, but NATO's final decision to use nuclear weapons is still with the United States

(E) Policy on nuclear arms control: committed to creating the conditions to achieve nuclear-free world .

Since the 1990s, NATO has cut 85% of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the territory of its member states in Europe

In November 2010, the AEMD adopted at the NATO Lisbon Summit states that NATO seeks security with the lowest level forces, and will achieve the creation of nuclear-free world.15The document also claims that NATO will continue to strengthen arms control, and play a role in promoting reduction and non-proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction,16but further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe must take into account the imbalance with the Russia’s large short-range nuclear arsenal, which actually hooks its future cuts with Russia’s short-range nuclear weapons reduction.

Part III. Main Factors Affect NATO's Nuclear Strategy

There is a variety of factors affecting NATO's nuclear strategy, in which the strategic environment faced by NATO and NATO's internal debate on its nuclear strategy have a significant impact on it and the United States plays a leading role in development of the NATO's nuclear strategy.

(A) The strategic environment faced by NATO

NATO's nuclear strategy is readjusted correspondingly in line with changing strategic environment it faces. Aspects having greater impact on its nuclear strategy include the changing Russia (USSR); NATO's eastward expansion; state actors and other non-state actors posing a threat to NATO.

Russia (USSR) is the biggest factor impacting NATO's nuclear strategy. During the Cold War, NATO's nuclear strategy was just to respond to a military offense that might be launched by the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have significantly reduced the external threats NATO faces. Under this circumstances, the NATO has shifted its main emphasis of the triad strategy of “early using” nuclear weapons against the Soviet troops attacking NATO allies to “discouraging strategy” of dispelling potential aggressors the idea of aggression. NATO states that it would seek to create conditions in the future for a further reduction of nuclear weapons, but any future reduction of nuclear weapons should seek Russia to agree to increase transparency of its nuclear weapons deployed in Europe17and to further reduce its tactical nuclear weapons.

A nuclear weapon-related new hot spot issue in the NATO's relations with Russia is the ballistic missile defense system by NATO. which makes its development the core element of its collective defense, and is willing to develop cooperation with Russia regarding missile defense. Moreover, Russia is worried of NATO ballistic missile defense system targeting at Russia and believes that it may cut its nuclear deterrent, and has requested NATO to justify its missile defense system for mainly using against Iran, otherwise, it will take retaliatory measures, including the deployment of new ballistic missile system.

NATO eastward expansion has largely compressed Russia's strategic space, further reducing the possibility of Russia's military offense against NATO. These further decline the reliance of NATO's strategy on nuclear weapons.

(B) Internal debates on nuclear strategy within NATO

So far since the end of the Cold War, NATO's internal debates on nuclear strategy have witnessed three rounds.

The first round was in the late 1990s. In the course of debates, two major schools of concepts shaped up. The first holds that since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the strategic pattern in Europe has significantly changed, NATO no longer faces a large-scale military offensive threat by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Group; a nuclear threat has been greatly reduced, and a possibility to suffer a nuclear attack is basically non-existent within Europe,; NATO should modify its nuclear policy and give up the first use of nuclear weapons. The second believes that some irresponsible countries may hold nuclear weapons, and target the United States and its allies with nuclear attack; therefore NATO must maintain a deterrent capability to deal with these so-called irresponsible countries.

In April 1999, the Alliance Strategic Concept of NATO Washington Summit actually reached a compromise. The document continues to emphasize the NATO's nuclear deterrent role; but proposes for the first time in the history of NATO that the fundamental purpose of NATO alliance nuclear forces is political and to maintain peace and prevent (external forces) from launching any form of coercion or war .18

The second round of debates was from the early 21st century to 2008. Then there was presence of two schools of thought. The first advocates NATO’s Western European members to prompt the United States to withdraw its non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. In the year 2001, the Greek Air Force played tricks with the United States in the purchase of new fighters, deliberately chose fighters models unable to carry nuclear bombs, and then, demanded the U.S. withdrawal of its nuclear weapons in Greece, the United States “quietly” did. In the year 2004, with the requests of Germany, the United States withdrew130 pieces of B-61 nuclear bombs from Germany, The second advocates the implementation of a more radical NATO defense policy reform, including, if necessary, taking the lead in using the nuclear weapons to launch a pre-emptive attack in order to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.19

The third round of debates was from 2009 to 2010. There were also two main schools of thought: The first is to ask the U.S. withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. On 26 February 2010, foreign ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Norway submitted an open letter to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, on behalf of their governments, responded positively to U.S. President Obama’s related initiative, supporting the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free world, and NATO should fully discuss how NATO contributes to nuclear disarmament. In early October the same year, 36 European former senior officials published a statement calling for reviewing NATO nuclear policy. In November 2010 before the NATO Lisbon Summit, “a European Leaders Network” composed of 34 former ministers and senior military officers issued a joint statement calling for reducing tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe in the context of reforming NATO's nuclear policy.

Their main supporting-reasons are that the U.S., French and British strategic nuclear forces can provide far greater power needed to contain Russian aggression; the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe can not provide security assurance; these tactical nuclear weapons are still needed to be carried by plane and dropped by pilots, which is apparently outdated; people are worried about the safety of these B-61 nuclear bombs, and that tactical nuclear weapons are the primary target terrorists seek to obtain because A B-61 nuclear bomb is very small in size and can be transported away with a pickup truck.

In May 2010, the NATO expert Panel headed by U.S. former Secretary of State M. Albright concludes that the NATO alliance retain tactical nuclear weapons for a use as a bargaining chip with Russia even though these tactical nuclear weapons are obsolete militarily.

Central and Eastern European countries are quite satisfied with the current NATO's nuclear posture. Poland and Baltic states state that the withdrawal of NATO nuclear weapons would destroy the foundation of NATO, i.e. collective security. These countries have skeptical stance toward Russia and view that the scattered nuclear deterrence in NATO member states is the best guarantee of their security. Some NATO members are worried about the negative impact on unity within NATO by the U.S. withdrawal of its nuclear weapons in Germany.

(C) The U.S. dominant role in development of the NATO's nuclear strategy

The United States is the only superpower after the end of the Cold War and the most important provider of NATO strategic nuclear forces and the sole owner of NATO tactical nuclear weapons, therefore, plays a leading role in development of the NATO's nuclear strategy.

Responding to the requests by Germany and other members for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany and Europe and NATO contribution to nuclear disarmament and other issues, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released five principles for guiding NATO nuclear weapons at an informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn on 22 April 2010 as follows: Firstly, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO should remain a nuclear alliance; secondly, sharing nuclear risks and nuclear liability is the fundamental and necessary; thirdly, while recognizing NATO has significantly reduced dependence on nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, continuous reduction of the role of nuclear weapons and the number of nuclear weapons should be made a main goal of NATO; fourthly, NATO alliance must establish a missile defense system as a major deterrent means to deal with a variety of threats of the 21st century; fifthly, as NATO continues reduction of nuclear weapons in the future, it should seek to increase transparency of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, and include in the next round of US-Russian arms control discussions non-strategic nuclear weapons as well as strategic and non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons.20

Hillary Clinton's five principles actually tune the policy on NATO's nuclear weapons given byissued by the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010.

In the post-Cold War, NATO has been shifting from a military-political alliance to a political-military alliance, but is difficult to completely get rid of its qualities of a military alliance basically due to its Charter of the North Atlantic Treaty. After dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO began its eastward expansion process, and its 16 member states during the Cold War have expanded to the present 28 member states. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's military operations have gone beyond NATO's defense zone, and even extended to Afghanistan. Now, the NATO member states are withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, but whether NATO’s momentum of global expansion stops there remains to be seen.

NATO's nuclear strategy is an important part of NATO's military strategy, but also the only nuclear strategy of the existing multilateral military alliance in the world. After the end of the Cold War, NATO no longer faces the threat of an external large-scale invasion, the role of its nuclear weapons has turned from getting prepared to repel Soviet conventional military offense to providing deterrence and allies security assurance as well as serves as one of the tools to maintain NATO as a bloc and chips to promote the Russian reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. As NATO is one of the main tools for the United States to maintain global hegemony, and NATO's strategic nuclear strength and theater nuclear weapons are mainly provided by the United States, therefore, NATO's nuclear strategy is actually an important part of the U.S. global strategy and nuclear strategy. With the declined role of nuclear weapons and development of anti-nuclear movement in Western European countries, NATO European members have significant differences on whether the United States should withdraw its deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Although the United States uses its advantageous dominant position to ensure NATO to agree on this issue superficially, yet, with further declining role of nuclear weapons as well as rising resentment of the people of Western European countries against the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons on their land, so the internal debate on NATO's nuclear strategy will not die down. As long as NATO continues to exist as a military-political alliance, the United States will endeavor to maintain its non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. If NATO continues eastward expansion, and conducts military operations beyond its territory, the United States will continue to attach importance to the deterrent role of these nuclear weapons.

Notes:

1.Jean G. Reed, NATO’s Theater Nuclear Forces: A Coherent Strategy for the 1980s, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1983, p.6.

2. “The Alliance’s New Concept” Agreed by the Heads of States and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, November 7-8, 1991,http:/www.nato.itn/cps/en/tatolive/official_texts_23847.htm.

3. “The Alliance’s New Concept”.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. “The Alliance’s New Concept” , Agreed by the Heads of States and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington DC. April 24 1999,

http:/www.nato.itn/cps/en/tatolive/official_texts_27433.htm

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. “The 2010 Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defense:, Agreed by the Heads of States and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Lisbon, November 19-20, 2010, http:/www.nato.itn/cps/en SID-F72A887C-DF43D01B/natolive//official_texts_68580.htm.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16 . Ibid.

17. Ibid

18. “The Alliance’s New Concept” , Agreed by the Heads of States and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington D.C. April 24 1999, http:/www.nato.itn/cps/en/tatolive/official_texts_27433.htm

19. Mei Qijun, “ A Reading of Technical Independence”, Shenyang, Northeast University Press, 2008, p.89.

20 . Oliver Meier, “NATO Chief’s Remarks Highlights Policy Rifs”, p.26