Arms Control and Strategic Stability1

By Hu Yumin, Deputy Secretary-General, CACDA



Arms Control and Strategic Stability1

By Hu Yumin, Deputy Secretary-General, CACDA

This essay intends to offer a comment on concepts, trends and attitudes relevant to arms control and strategic stability with reference to the current international security situation. It intends to draw reader’s attention from two different perspectives about strategic stability.

Part I

According to Russian academician A. A. Kokoshin in his book entitled“Strategic stability is a systematic, multi-faceted and interdisciplinary subject”2. We can presume that maintaining strategic stability is a systematic project that involves a number of variants including national security strategy, geo-political relations, balance of military power, and level of technological and economic development. Obviously, interactions between big powers are a key element that bears upon international or regional stability. For countries with nuclear weapons in a strategic competition, either realistically or potentially, maintaining strategic stability means, on one hand, that they need to promptly eliminate any factor that may lead to “the first use of nuclear weapons” by either side, and on the other hand, that they need to incessantly sustain the confidence of all parties concerned in the reliability of their nuclear strike capabilities3.

Here stability is not and is unlikely to be static or without change. Instead, it usually suggests predictable and controllable changes that develop in a positive or constructive direction. It is particularly essential to observe that “to eliminate factors that may lead to the first use of nuclear weapons by either side” does not necessarily imply that it is imperative to develop nuclear forces capable of “mutual assured destruction”. In a long-term point of view, the “asymmetrical approach”, maintaining the effective nuclear counterattack capability while pledging multilaterally or unilaterally to relinquish the first use of nuclear weapons in particular, is a more optimal and feasible strategic option4.

The “no first use of nuclear weapons” as a policy option is not first proposed by the Chinese but the American. In January 1950, the renowned U.S. expert on the Soviet Union George Kennan conceived the idea of “no first use of nuclear weapons” as the first step in the international effort to control atomic energy in a memorandum to the then U.S. state secretary, which is titled “The International Control of Atomic Energy”. However, his proposal was discarded. In 1955, during the Geneva Summit, the Soviet Union proposed banning nuclear weapons and suggested that before the ban is actually put into place, nuclear countries must agree not to use nuclear weapons first. Likewise, this idea was rejected by the United States, Britain, and other countries. In 1964, China solemnly declared that China will never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. For one time in 1982, the Soviet Union hinted that it was willing to accept the obligation of “no first use of nuclear weapons”. In 1996, China and Russia published a joint statement that includes a reciprocal commitment to “no first use of nuclear weapons against each other”.5

Strategic stability as a legal term appeared first in the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) concluded in 1987. It was quoted again in the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), which was reached in 1991.6In fact, from late 1960s to early 1970s, during the peak of U.S.-USSR nuclear arms race, strategic stability was actually a guiding concept that governed their arms control negotiations.7The two powers finally signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT I) in 1972 and meanwhile concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM).8The diplomatic history of the two superpowers thereafter reminds the world that the implementation of arms control is indeed one of the key steps to promote strategic stability.

Part II

It is usually believed that arms control consists of three dimensions: First, “to reduce or limit arms”. The efforts that were made for this purpose include the SALT II in 1979, the INF in 1987 and the START in 1991. Second, “to prevent the proliferation or illegal transfer of weapons”. The attempts made include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SEANFZT) in 1995. Third, “confidence and stability building measures”. Achievements in this respect include the ABM in 1972, the Moscow Declaration released by the United States and Russia in 1994, which pledge never to target the strategic nuclear missiles at each other, and the joint statement made by China and Russia in 1996 committing themselves to “no first use of nuclear weapons against each other”.

In fact, many treaties that aim to reduce or limit arms or prevent the proliferation of arms have provisions that cover nuclear inspection and confidence building. For example, the INF prescribes strict mutual inspection measures including the so-called On Site Inspection (OSI). In addition, there are stability measures, such as de-alerting their nuclear weapons, setting up hot lines, preventing accidents, and reducing the risk of nuclear wars taken by the two superpowers.9Broadly speaking, some unilateral acts to reduce nuclear arms and the efforts to increase the transparency of strategic and nuclear arms can all be included as measures to build confidence and stability.

In response to the acts of non-nuclear-weapon states to join the NPT, the countries with nuclear weapons have committed to offering them security assurance in the form of UN Security Council resolutions, the purpose of which is to create an international regime to immune them from nuclear strike or nuclear threat. Once these non-nuclear-weapon countries come under nuclear strike or threat, they can be assured of assistance and support. Firstly, the security assurance can be positive, that is to say, the countries concerned vow to extend assistance in the event that these non-nuclear-weapon countries come under nuclear strike or threat. Secondly, the security assurance can also be negative. Those countries concerned commit themselves to never using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on these non-nuclear-weapon states.10Such commitment by nuclear weapons states to the non-nuclear-weapon states has significant implications in the international law. It represents a step of strategic importance to achieve stability.

All in all, confidence and stability building measures are conducive to the shaping of a favorable regional and international environment. They constitute an indispensable part of the endeavors to fulfill arms control and strategic stability. The world is sometimes more attentive to the efforts to reduce or limit nuclear arms, and sometimes more drawn to the attempts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, from a long-term point of view, it is those indispensable confidence and stability building measures that pave the way for the efforts to reduce arms and prevent proliferation.

Part III

Currently, there exist two conspicuous trends in the international efforts of arms control, and are still in progress. First, in light of the ever increasing achievements in military technology and the ever renewing weapon development plans in major countries, the world is more and more concerned about non-nuclear issues in the discussions of strategic stability and the role of nuclear weapons. These non-nuclear issues include ballistic missile defense, precision guided long-range strike systems, outer space capabilities and cyber space capabilities.11For example, some countries submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, which is in agreement with most countries. However, in order to be able to research, test and develop outer space weapons when necessary, the United States has excluded the possibility of signing a new outer space treaty.12Moreover, according to the estimate of Russian defense experts, by 2015 the United States will acquire 1,500-1,800 sea-based and airborne precision guided cruise missiles for first-strike purpose, and by 2020 this figure will rise to 2,500-3,000. This long-range precision strike weapon system can combine with the space and missile defense system to form an integrated operational system. Thus, the United States will be able to use non-nuclear approaches to stop a target country from executing strategic counterattack in times of crisis.13In June 2013, U.S. President Obama suggested that the United States and Russia should further reduce their deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,000 each on the basis of the concluded New Treaty between the United States and Russia on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). In response, Russia emphasizes that the U.S. efforts to develop ballistic missile defense system and precision guided long-range strike system have undermined the strategic balance between the two countries. Such being the case, it is unlikely that Russia will accept the proposal of the United States.

Second, the emergence of regional issues exerts a noticeable impact on global stability. In recent years, Russia has repeatedly stressed that the missile defense system that NATO is deploying in Europe is compatible with the one that the United States has deployed on its homeland. Therefore, the NATO system is in fact the forward deployment of the U.S. missile defense system, which is targeted at Russia, therefore, it is liable to disrupt the global and regional balance. As illustrated above, at the moment, this issue has become the major obstacle in the U.S.-Russia negotiation on the further reduction of nuclear arsenal, including both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

However, more noteworthy is the happenings in the Asia Pacific. In this region, when talking about security, people focus their geopolitical concerns on the Western Pacific. Furthermore, inside the Western Pacific, the centre of gravity is the Northeast Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula, in spite of the existing disputes in the Southeast Asia that heat up from time to time. When referring to strategic balance, we need always have a geopolitical map in mind, on which situated are the U.S. allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines and its quasi-allies such as Singapore and Thailand. When talking about the balance of military power, we need to be aware that the importance of quality should by no means subordinate to that of quantity. For instance, Japan has the world’s first-rate missile defense, anti-submarine and electronic warfare capabilities. With the U.S. systematic support, through integrating national assets, the above capabilities of Japan will be multiplied. Presently, the U.S. missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific has already covered Japan and South Korea, and is likely to extend to other U.S. allies. Meanwhile, we must not neglect the underlying effect of the concept of extended deterrence on the security of Northeast Asia. It is said that over 50% of U.S. sea-based long-range strike capabilities have gathered in this area. Recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has stated that this percentage is likely to grow to 60% in 10 years’ time. The world may still remember that in the early year of 2013, before Mr. John Kerry was appointed U.S. State Secretary, he described in the U.S. Congress that the United States had already maintained the biggest military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and the attempt to further increase this military presence will raise suspicion among the countries concerned.14By contrast, the second statement represents a sober and responsible attitude.

Part IV

The fore-said two trends have a common propeller, so to speak. This propeller is based on the security strategy that attempts to pursue absolute national security as well as the armament development plan that is in line with this strategy. This strategy not only intends to seek advantages in offensive strategic weapon systems, but in defensive strategic weapon systems too. It not only attempts to acquire advantages in nuclear weapons, but to gain advantages in conventional weapons as well as in the outer space and the cyber space too. On the other hand, when determined to develop a critical weapon technology that is restricted by an international treaty, the United States will flatly take unilateral action to revoke such treaty.15

It is obvious from the above that there exist two different understandings of strategic stability. The first understanding proceeds from the obligation to safeguard universal security in the hope to prevent conflicts and instability from disrupting the international and regional security environment, on which hinges the peaceful development of the world. In contrast, the second understanding starts from the wish to maintain the global leadership of a super power. It aims to contain any challenge that sways or is likely to sway its global leadership. It is evident in the actual practices of international politics, including the efforts concerning the DPRK and Iran nuclear issues, that the policies derived from these two understandings are sometimes reconcilable and sometimes contradictory, which explain the complexity of the endeavors to resolve some international and regional problems.

Recently, the international community is talking about a notorious event, the PRIZM web-monitoring project of the U.S. National Security Agency.16This event illustrates that there can be even such an inconceivably huge discrepancy between the declared policy and the operational policy of the same government. What is more important, this colossal global monitoring project has reflected, or more precisely, proved a strategic intent of the United States, is to stop any country or country bloc in the Eurasian continent from challenging its overwhelming leadership in the world, be it Germany, Russia, Japan, China, or a country bloc like the Warsaw Pact or European Union. Obviously, such strategic intent is no good to maintain international and regional strategic stability.

In the global security structure, China has been contributing constructively to the stability of the world. One important reason is that China has been following a reasonable outlook of strategic stability, a manifestation of which is China’s commitment to “no first use of nuclear weapons”. Unlike the idea of “mutual assured destruction” that is based on the balance of power or the mirror-imaging armament structure, China’s outlook of strategic stability is an asymmetrical type. It is based on a defensive posture and a moderate level of armament. This outlook is without doubt a major support to international and regional stability. It is necessary to point out that the Chinese Government has repeatedly declared that China will never join any military alliance, and involve itself in any Cold-War-style confrontation or arms race, be it a nuclear, conventional or any other domain. However, it is apparently unwise to ask China to forfeit its lawful right to develop effective self-defense capabilities in the world of nation states.17

China and the United States both benefit enormously from the current international system, which is established chiefly in the wake of WWII, and has undergone some readjustments to cater to the changing international situation. For example, in the security sector, the UN Security Council has increased the number of its members. In the economic sector, G-20 has partially replaced the role of G-8. The basic structure and cardinal principles of this system are still valuable, operable, and in most cases energetic. Undoubtedly, the arms race and proliferation of WMD represent serious challenges to the current international system. It goes without saying that China and the United States have common interests and responsibility to maintain this system and safeguard international and regional stability. At the meeting in Annenberg Estate, California, the United States on 7 June 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama reached major consensuses on making joint efforts to develop a new type of major country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation. On 7 September 2013, they met again at the G-20 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia and reiterated the wish to maintain close communication, coordination and cooperation on major international and regional issues. The world has every reason to expect that China and the United States will commit themselves to building a win-win cooperative relationship of major powers and make new contributions to a stable international security architecture that is favorable for the peaceful development of the world.

Notes:

1. Written on the basis of the author’s speech at the International Symposium on Arms Control and Strategic Stability jointly hosted by China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, China Institute of International Strategic Studies and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

2. Kokoshin, A. A., The Doctrine of Strategic Stability, p9, 2012. Russian academician A. A. Kokoshin served in many important positions, including Attorney General of Russian Military Inspection Commission, Secretary of the National Security Council of Russian Federation, First Minister of the Defense Ministry of Russia; currently professor of Moscow University.

3. Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, “Strategic Stability in Today`s New World”, Washington Post, p13, April 23, 2012.

4. Xiangli, Sun, Strategic Options in the Nuclear Age, p140, 2013. Doctor Sun Xiangli is director of the Office of Arms Control of the Strategic Research Center of China Engineering Physics Institute.

5. Xiaogong, Chen, A Handbook of Arms Control and International Security, pp131-133, World Knowledge Press, 1998.

6. Kokoshin, A. A., The Doctrine of Strategic Stability, p30, 2012.

7. Xiangwan, Du, The Technological Basis of Nuclear Arms Control, pp295-296, Defense Industry Press, 1996

8. Kokoshin, A. A., The Doctrine of Strategic Stability, pp25-26, 2012.

9. Huaqiu, Liu, A Handbook of Arms Control and Disarmament, Defense Industry Press, 2000.

10. Xiaogong, Chen, A Handbook of Arms Control and International Security, World Knowledge Press, 1998.

11. Henry Kissinger & Brent Scowcroft, “Strategic Stability in Today`s New World”, Washington Post, p13, 2012. 12. Kokoshin, A. A., The Doctrine of Strategic Stability, p91, 2012.

13. Kokoshin, A. A., The Doctrine of Strategic Stability, p302, 2012.

14. Xian, Wen, “US Senate Interviews State Secretary Candidate: John Kerry Believes US and China are Competitors not Adversaries”, People’s Daily, p3, 26 January 2013.

15. For instance, in order to rid itself of the bondage to develop missile defense system, the United States, disregarding the opposition of Russia and the world at large, unilaterally backed out of the ABM in 2002.

16. “US Alleged to Have Made Cyber Assaults on China, Russia and Iran in 2011”, Morning News from Sina Tech Info, 2 September 2013: According to confidential documents obtained by Washington Post, in 2011, US intelligence agencies made 231 cyber assaults on other countries, including Iran, Russia and DPRK.

17. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p12, New York: Harper & Row, 1957