The Impact of Non-nuclear Factors on the Follow-up Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations between the U.S. and Russia

By Mou Changlin, Senior Research Fellow



The Impact of Non-nuclear Factors on the Follow-up Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations between the U.S. and Russia

By Mou Changlin, Senior Research Fellow

China International Institute for Strategic Society

In April 2010, the United States and Russia officially signed the New START Treaty in Prague, the capital of Czech. According to the Treaty, both the United States and Russia should reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1550 and reduce their strategic delivery vehicles to 800 (among which the deployed strategic vehicles should be reduced to 700.). Comparing to the Moscow Treaty, both their deployed strategic warheads should be reduced by 30% and the strategic delivery vehicles should be reduced by 50%. According to the exchanged data between the two countries in half a year released by the U.S. Department of State on October 1, 2013, the United States has 1688 deployed strategic warheads and 809 strategic delivery vehicles whiles Russia has 1400 and 473 respectively. This shows that Russia’s deployed strategic warheads are 288 less and 336 strategic delivery vehicles less. In June 2013, U.S. President Obama proposed to Russia that they both reduce one-third again of their deployed strategic warheads and cut the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. However, Russia is not enthusiastic for the U.S. proposal and maintains that on one hand, the United Staes has stepped up to develop and deploy missile defense systems, develop prompt global strike capability, and on the other hand calls on Russia to further reduce its nuclear weapons, which will seriously weaken Russia’s nuclear deterrence. In fact, Russia is seeking to link up any future nuclear arms reduction talks with non-nuclear factors including the U.S. development of ballistic missile defense systems.

I, The influence of the long-range precision guided conventional weapons

In recent years, with the development of science and technologies, the long-range precision guided conventional weapons play an increasingly important role in war-operations. Currently, the long-range precision guided conventional weapons equipped by the U.S. military are not only able to destroy hardened fixed targets and mobile armored targets, but also to carry out devastating blow to the enemy’s major targets including land-based mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile launching silos and combat operation centers. Therefore, the long-range precision guided conventional weapons gradually undertake part of nuclear weapons role. Some targets that can only be destroyed by nuclear weapons previously now can be taken up by long-range precision guided conventional weapons.

According to Russia’s estimate, the U.S. modified ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and ballistic missile nuclear submarines can carry as many as 2900 high efficient conventional warheads and long-range precision guided warheads. Besides, the U.S. surface ships, nuclear submarines and other tactical platforms can also carry 2000 long-range precision guided conventional warheads. The Russians believe that the U.S. development of long-range precision guided conventional weapons pose serious threat to its strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, only having powerful nuclear deterrent forces, can Russia maintain deterrence against possible long-range conventional strike against Russia and use nuclear weapons to revenge when necessary. The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces commander maintains that the Russian strategic nuclear forces must have about 1500 nuclear warheads so as to maintain strategic balance with the United States.

II, The influence of missile defense systems

Russia has always considered the U.S. development of missile defense systems a serious threat to its nuclear deterrent forces, which will break the strategic balance between them. According to some experts’ estimate, as the United States is to complete the Phased Adaptive Approach in 2020, the missile defense system deployed in Europe by the United States and NATO will have some capability to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles, which will become a integrated part of the U.S. global missile defense systems. In March 2013, the United States declared to suspend the implementation of the fourth phased program of the European Phased Adaptive Approach in deploying missile defense in Europe so as to focus on meeting the long-range ballistic missile threats from Iran and the DPRK. This U.S. decision has not eased Russia’s concern about the U.S. missile defense systems. Russia believes that the first three phases of the U.S. missile defense systems deployed have strong mobility, which will affect Russia’s nuclear deterrence so Russia maintains continuous objection .

As a response to the U.S. deployment of missile defense systems in Europe, Russia, in recent years, has stepped up deploying new intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missile nuclear submarines and increased the attack and penetration capability. According to its plan, Russia’s strategic rocket forces will be fully equipped with the 5thgeneration new missile systems by 2021 and Russia will decide whether or not to deploy the Iskander tactical missiles near the NATO member countries based on NATO’s deployment of missile defense system in Europe.

III, The influence of outer space weapons

Currently, outer space reconnaissance, navigation, communication, command and control systems are widely used for military domain. Space-based systems have become important military assets for major world powers. With the advancement of science and technologies and various contradictions between countries, outer space is likely to become a new battlefield for arms race and new military conflicts.

During the cold war period, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in arms race in research and development of outer space weapon systems, and both carried out research programs and deployed anti-satellite weapon systems. At present, the United States has the absolute technological superiority in outer space and owns nearly half of the world space assets. The U.S. Space Command has made it clear that the United States has three priorities for action in outer space fields in its 2020 Long Range Plan. In 2001, the U.S. Outer Space Committee proposed that the United States maintain its capability in deploying weapons in outer space and that outer space weapons undertake three tasks: the first is to protect the existing U.S. outer space weapons; the second is to prevent an enemy from using the outer space and outer space systems and the third is to strike any land, sea and space targets from the outer space. Since the declared U.S withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2001, the U.S. research, development, test and deployment of space based ballistic missile defense systems and their assemblies are beyond legal barriers.

Due to lack of resources and technologies, Russia’s current outer space programs and scale clearly lag behind that of the United States. Russia worries that the U.S. outer space programs, and possible deployment in future of space-based laser anti-missile systems and space-based anti-ground weapons will pose serious threats to Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces and break the U.S.-Russian strategic stability. Therefore, Russia stands for linking up a ban on and restriction of outer-space weapons with U.S.-Russian future nuclear disarmament talks and maintaining the U.S.-Russian strategic stability by a ban on or restriction of U.S. deployment of space-based missile defense systems.

IV, The fluence of the CFE Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe

In November 1990, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization signed the CFE Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in Paris, which clearly identified the numbers and the five categories of conventional weapons that the two military blocs could keep in the restricted areas. Since the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, some Central and Eastern European countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization have joined NATO, which has broken the balance in conventional weapons between NATO and Russia, and NATO holds the obvious advantages. In November 1999, the 6thOSCE Summit adopted The Adapted CFE Treaty, which uses the states quota system and territories quota system to replace the blocs quota system stipulated by the CFE Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. However, up to 2007, only Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty. The NATO member countries have refused to ratify the Adapted Treaty under the pretext that Russia has not fulfilled its commitments to reducing its armaments in the flanking regions and Russia still stations troops in Moldova and Georgia. As NATO continues to expand eastward and the United States plans to deploy missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, Russia becomes more concerned about NATO deployment of large-scale conventional forces along its border areas. According to statistics, in both north and south directions, the military conventional power balance between NATO and Russia is 11:1 and NATO holds absolute superiority. The reasons that this problem has not been resolved for a long time include the following: the first is that NATO is likely to continue eastward expansion about which Russia has much concerns; the second is that NATO does not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and believes that Russia has not withdrawn its military bases from Georgia. Russia maintains that as the number of nuclear weapons is gradually reduced, the role of conventional weapons in safeguarding national security is increasing. Russian President Putin points out recently that conventional weapons will very soon play the same role as nuclear weapons in resisting foreign aggression.

In a word, after the United States and Russia signed the new START Treaty, the follow-up nuclear arms reductions talks between the two countries still face many problems including tactical nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons in a third country and the above discussed non-nuclear factors and the non-nuclear factors influence is becoming more prominent. At the same time, the recent crisis of Ukraine also exerts important impacts on the future nuclear arms talks between them.