Facilitating Global Nuclear Disarmament

By Wu Jun, Deputy Director,



Facilitating Global Nuclear Disarmament

By Wu Jun, Deputy Director,

Center for Strategic Study, China Academy of Engineering Physics

I. Introduction

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, especially after the United States dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the capacity of massive and indiscriminate annihilation of nuclear weapons have made people of insight across the world realize that such weapons cannot be used arbitrarily. In the 1960s, the then Chinese leader Mao Zedong said that to throw them (nuclear weapons) about at will is committing a crime. To rid the world of nuclear weapons and achieve a nuclear-free world has become the shared wish of all peoples and has been endorsed by many countries. On 31 July 1963, the Chinese Government proposed in its statement that all the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states throughout the world solemnly declare the complete and thorough prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons with resolute efforts. In 1964, the Chinese Government appealed to the world for complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In March 1999, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin said in his speech at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that to eliminate nuclear weapons and root out the dangers of nuclear war is the common wish of people throughout the world. It is also an objective that the Chinese Government and people have been unswervingly striving for. Let us all work together for the ultimate realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Well-known American statesmen like Kissinger, Perry, Schultz and Lugar, etc. published articles in 2007 and 2008 to promote a nuclear weapons free world initiative, which was echoed by President Obama’s Prague speech this year as he publicly endorses a world without nuclear weapons—the first time a U.S. president gives open support, which manifests that the call for a world without nuclear weapons has won support of vast majority of people across the world.

The deep and irreversible nuclear disarmament among nuclear weapon states is the fundamental premise of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. At present, progress in nuclear disarmament is generally encouraging. The New START is going well under way. Though CTBT will not take effect any time soon, more countries have become its signatories including major nuclear states that have observed the commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests and given active support to the work of CTBTO. The International Monitoring System (IMS) is running smoothly and has showed its effectiveness in the critical role it has played in monitoring several nuclear tests by North Korea. Amidst the stagnation of FMCT talks within CD, the United Nations has set up a panel of experts to discuss the technical issues and prepare for the upcoming talks, so that an agreement can be reached soon after the talks begin. In April 2014, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the P5 Beijing Conference on strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation mechanism, during which the five countries briefed their respective policies and progress of nuclear disarmament and nuclear transparency. To make the exchanges more effective and transparent, the five countries agreed on compiling the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms under China’s leadership, which would define key terms of nuclear nonproliferation in Chinese, English, French and Russian. The compiling work is well under way. In the Beijing Conference, Dr. Zhao Yonggang, the Chinese coordinator of this program, reported the progress up to date and the plan for completion of the first phase of the Glossary by the 2015 RevCon. Through multiple rounds of talks, a shared framework on national reports was formulated, an important progress made in implementing the joint framework of the Nuclear Nonproliferation National Report adopted at the 2010 RevCon.

A world without nuclear weapons is a long-term goal with numerous difficulties along the way. All countries need to work together closely to dissolve the negative factors and facilitate nuclear disarmament in a step-by-step approach.

II. Reduce the role of nuclear weapons earnestly; adopting no-first-use of nuclear weapons is the prerequisite for further nuclear disarmament

Nuclear weapons occupy a unique role in many countries due to its massive destructive power. The United States, whose development of conventional weapons has slightly encroached on the role of nuclear weapons, still maintains deliberate ambiguity about whether or not it will use nuclear weapons first. It is believed that nuclear weapons are effective in deterring WMDs such as biochemical weapons and can play an important role in providing extended deterrence for its allies. That is why it needs to have a certain number of nuclear weapons to maintain its edge in a nuclear war and to develop sufficient nuclear weapons in high-alert status in case deterrence fails. This poses barriers to further nuclear disarmament, which is only possible, according to analysts, when the United States makes sharp adjustment of its nuclear strategy by adopting the policy of no-first-use and limiting the core role of nuclear weapons in deterring other countries from using them.

Russia once opted for a nuclear policy of no-first-use in the 1980s, but withdrew it in the 1990s. Nuclear weapons currently carry much weight in Russia’s national security architecture, and to a certain extent, fill the gap in Russia’s conventional forces against NATO. Currently, financial reason is the main drive for Russia to cut its nuclear weapons and the no-first-use policy is the underlying requirement for further nuclear disarmament.

No-first-use of nuclear weapons is conducive to promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear proliferation. No use or threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states is also helpful, since it would provide these countries a sense of security and reduce the impulses that prompt them to pursue nuclear weapons. No-first-use of nuclear weapons between nuclear weapon states and no targeting of nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon states would reduce the danger of a nuclear war and the possibility of non-authorized and unintended launches; it would build mutual trust between nuclear weapon states and foster a favorable atmosphere for them to take measures of transparency and join in nuclear disarmament. So no-first-use of nuclear weapons that China has advocated over the years is a major contribution to promoting nuclear disarmament, preventing nuclear proliferation and safeguarding regional and international security and stability.

III. The ongoing U.S.-Russia nuclear disarmament process has not brought substantive changes to the overall size of nuclear arsenals; further disarmament must involve stockpiled and tactical nuclear weapons.

The New START has cut two thirds of the offensive strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia respectively, but those are limited to deployed strategic warheads, which are only a portion of the nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, only a part of those that have been cut are destroyed, while the rest are stored or reserved as flexible responsive force and can be redeployed anytime when needed. In fact, while the number of deployed strategic warheads has been reduced, that of the stockpiled has increased, thus, there have been no substantive changes to the size of strategic nuclear arsenals. A cut as such is nothing more than moving the nuclear warheads from one place to another.

Currently, the core responsibility of nuclear disarmament still falls on the United States and Russia, which hold absolute advantages of the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons. To lay ground for other countries taking part in nuclear disarmament, the United States and Russia must further reduce the total number of nuclear weapons, stockpiled and deployed, tactical and strategic, and the warheads that have been cut should be disposed of in an irreversible manner.

From the day that it possessed nuclear weapons, China has been fulfilling its commitment to nuclear disarmament in a distinct way, which is that China has practiced significant restraint on developing its nuclear power. It has never entered into a nuclear arms race and kept the size of its nuclear arsenal within a very limited scale, even threatened and blackmailed by nuclear powers during the Cold War. After the Cold War, it closed the Qinghai nuclear weapon research base, which was officially transferred to the local government in May 1995 after environmental treatment. In this connection, China has been earnestly fulfilling its disarmament obligation in a distinct way and contributing to nuclear disarmament since an early time.

IV. The global missile defense system is a barrier to deep nuclear cut in the future.

Nuclear disarmament is a protracted process that requires a step-by-step approach. Each participant will conduct a comprehensive analysis of the security environment and assess the changes to its national security and strategic stability brought by nuclear disarmament. Under the global missile defense system, nuclear weapons within a small and limited scale would be powerless. Countries thus have to choose between having and not having nuclear weapons. The result of the choice is clear. Before the day that a world without nuclear weapons is materialized, few countries would voluntarily disarm its nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, strategic trust is the basis for deep nuclear cut, whereas missile defense is established on distrust. Russia has claimed that it would take into account the U.S. ballistic missile defense system and conventional precision attack system in its future nuclear disarmament process, which shows that these systems can generate an adverse impact on international security. Therefore, missile defense system is the biggest stumbling block in further nuclear disarmament.

V. The development of verification technologies is the basis for deep nuclear cut.

Because of the nuclear weapons’ capability of inhuman destruction, even a small fraction of nuclear arsenals can generate significant strategic instability during the course of deep nuclear cut, which requires not only a harmonious, safe, stable and trustful international environment, but also transparency in and verification of nuclear arms. This is the vital guarantee for the effective implementation of deep nuclear cut. Facilitating nuclear disarmament needs not only the genuine political will of nuclear weapon states, but also sound arrangements for verification, so as to ensure the authenticity and irreversibility of the disarmament process, so that the disarmed objects would not be easily reused in nuclear weapons.

The proper verification arrangement needs to balance between effectiveness and acceptability. On the one hand, the verification arrangements should convince the related parties that all the signatories have reduced and disposed of the objects in compliance with the nuclear disarmament treaty or agreement. On the other hand, the verification procedures and technologies would not infringe upon the political and security interests of the verified parties, neither leak sensitive information of arms designs or lead to security accidents such as theft, and economically would be affordable. Arrangements and technologies of verification that are too intrusive can hardly be accepted. Therefore, verification of nuclear disarmament should take into account the political will and technological feasibility. Signatories should establish a trust mechanism for consensus building in striking a balance between technological effectiveness and political, military and economic acceptability.

Conclusion

To achieve deep and irreversible nuclear cut, countries should work to foster a peaceful and stable international environment, settle international disputes through peaceful means, increase the sense of security for all countries, promote development, eradicate poverty, and remove the root causes of conflict and instability. Countries should work to maintain global strategic balance and stability and vigorously advance nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapon states should publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear weapons. When conditions are ripe, other nuclear-weapon states should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons, and take credible steps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon states should make an unequivocal commitment of unconditionally not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally-binding international instrument in this regard. In the meantime, nuclear-weapon states should negotiate, and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another.

Countries should also cease the deployment of global ballistic missile defense systems and the development of global precision attack systems. Verification and transparency are also an important undertaking in deep and irreversible nuclear cut. In-depth research is required to create technological conditions for nuclear disarmament.