Secrets Behind Arms Reduction

By LUO HUI & WANG FENG

Secrets Behind Arms Reduction

By LUO HUI & WANG FENG

Complex motives lurk behind the U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reduction treaty

The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (new START) officially took effect on February 5 when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchanged ratification documents in Munich, Germany.

The United States and Russia signed the treaty on April 8, 2010 to replace START I, which was signed in 1993 and expired on December 5, 2009. According to new START, the two countries should each reduce their deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 within seven years, a reduction of nearly one third. The new treaty was subsequently ratifed by U.S. and Russian lawmakers.

It took a long time to negotiate the new treaty, due to the competing interests of Russia and the United States. As early as 2005, Russia suggested signing a new treaty after START I expired, but the United States showed little interest in this proposal. The United States, however, suggested retaining START I’s verifcation protocol so that it could monitor the implementation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Agreement (SORT, also known as the Treaty of Moscow) signed in 2002. SORT called on the two countries to limit their deployed nuclear warheads to between 2,200 and 1,700 each. The treaty, originally scheduled to expire by the end of 2012, was superseded by new START.

Moscow insisted the two sides agree on an upper limit and rules for defning strategic missiles; otherwise, verifcation would make no sense. Subsequently, the two countries tried to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction treaty, but did not succeed. In addition, their bilateral relationship experienced diffculties when former U.S. President George W. Bush persisted in deploying a missile defense system in Europe.

The inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama increased the potential for progress in nuclear negotiations. In April 2009, Obama delivered a speech in Prague, the Czech Republic, on building a nuclear-free world. He also declared a new four-phase missile defense program in Europe, which was different from the program pursued by Bush. The move helped ease Russia’s concerns. In this more favorable climate, Washington set about to revive negotiations with Russia on a new nuclear arms reduction treaty.

Adjusting policy

The United States was motivated by several factors to change its former unilateral approach to arms control.

For example, the global financial crisis badly hurt the U.S. economy. In addition, the unilateralism of the Bush era damaged the national image of the United States. Furthermore, the country’s influence in the world has decreased in recent years.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world has moved from a bipolar to multi-polar system, with the appearance of several strong emerging economies. In this context, Washington needed to change its image in order to resume its leadership in arms control. All these factors contributed to Washington’s interest in negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia.

Actually, arms reduction is only a game of numbers for the United States. Although new START cuts nearly one third the number of warheads compared to the upper limit set by SORT, this smaller number is only a result of new calculation rules. For example, new START considers a strategic bomber as one warhead. In fact, such a bomber can carry 20 warheads. In addition, reducing the number of warheads is not tantamount to destroying them. So, the United States may store these warheads, leaving the possibility of deploying them again in the future.

The fundamental goal of the United States is to push forward its missile defense program. Although new START mentions a missile defense system, it does not include any terms for regulating such a system. In other words, the United States can continue to develop strategic defense capacity while maintaining a similar number of offensive strategic weapons as Russia. It intends to counteract Russia’s nuclear strength throughits missile defense system, in order to maintain its nuclear superiority.

XINHUA/AFP

Moreover, Washington is being tricky by getting Moscow to accept the United States’missile defense system in Europe. In the future, the United States will likely try to persuade Russia to disregard the missile defense system’s capacity to counteract strategic arms and accept an anti-missile system that is continuously upgraded. Then it may surround Russian territory with missile defense systems. In the end, if Russia attempts to launch a strategic nuclear missile, the missile may be shot down over Russia’s own territory.

Seeking supremacy

Although the verifcation mechanism of new START is not as complicated as that of START I, the new treaty requires onsite inspection of Russia’s strategic nuclear systems. Without this requirement, it would be hard for the United States to keep on top of Russia’s development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Washington holds the belief that it cannot maintain the absolute security of the United States if it is unable to monitor Russian strategic nuclear systems. Before new START was ratifed by the U.S. Congress, many U.S. arms control experts pointed out that the United States was losing track of Russia’s strategic arms deployment because of START I’s expiration, creating a dangerous situation for U.S. national security.

XINHUA/AFP

The new verifcation mechanism is desirable because it is believed to be much more economical and effective than the one put forward by START I. After many years of monitoring, the United States already has a good understanding of Russia’s strategic nuclear capacity and deployment. In addition, it no longer needs a complicated verifcation method due to its advanced satellite surveillance technology. Furthermore, Russia is unlikely to start a nuclear war because its economic, military and technological strength cannot compete with that of the United States.

Since the United States outperforms Russia in almost every respect, transparency measures are enough for the United States to gain a clear understanding of Russia’s strategic nuclear systems. If Russia changes its strategic deployment, the United States will be able to respond quickly. Moreover, it can maintain a substantial advantage over Russia with its nuclear and conventional strategic weapons—both offensive and defensive.

Indeed, the United States has always tried to maintain strategic superiority over Russia. That’s why it continues to develop the long-range precision attack capacity of its conventional arms while implementing its missile defense program. For example, many military experts believe the U.S. Air Force’s X-37B unmanned space plane, which had a debut flight in 2010, has military potential. They pointed out that the vehicle is the prototype of future space fghters, because it is able to scout and capture satellites in their orbits. In addition, it can carry missiles to launch space-to-land attacks.

Moreover, the United States is implementing a series of hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as the U.S. Air Force’s X-51A program and the U.S. Navy’s ArcLight program. Under these programs, the United States is developing offensive missiles not subject to the limits set by nuclear arms control treaties, which regulate only ballistic missiles.

Russia could have long been aware of the United States’ intentions. But because it doesn’t have a strong enough economy to support its nuclear weapon programs, it had to sign new START with the United States to seek a balance. Russia also declared it would quit the treaty if the United States unilaterally deploys an anti-missile system or other conventional weapons that threaten Russia’s security.

Luo Hui is an engineer with the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology; Wang Feng is a research fellow with the academy