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A New Direction

2010-10-14ByLIYAN

Beijing Review 2010年31期

By LI YAN

A New Direction

By LI YAN

Amendment of U.S.-Poland missile defense pact reveals new motives

On July 3 in K r a k o w, a city in south Poland, the United States and Poland signed an amendment to a 2008 agreement on the deployment of ballistic missile interceptors in Poland.

“This agreement marks an important step in our countries’ efforts to protect our NATO allies from the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction,” said a joint statement issued by U.S.Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski.

It was the first agreement under the United States’ new plan on missile defense system deployment.

From Bush to Obama

After taking of fi ce in early 2001, former U.S. President George W. Bush sought to establish an integrated missile defense system.To that end, he combined the National Missile Defense and the Theater Missile Defense.

On May 1, 2001, Bush declared a withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,paving the way for the deployment of a national missile defense system. The United States accelerated the deployment of the system, following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the same year.

In January 2007, with the aim of preventing missile attacks from Iran and North Korea, the Bush administration proposed deploying missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Negotiations began around the same time.

A year later, in July and August of 2008,the United States signed agreements with the two countries respectively, allowing for the deployment of a radar site in the Czech Republic and 10 missile interceptors in Poland.

After Barack Obama took of fi ce in 2009,he ordered the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reevaluate the U.S.missile defense system. They came to two conclusions.

First was that Iran’s experiments with short- and medium-range missiles went faster than the United States expected, while its experiments with intercontinental ballistic missiles went slower than the United States expected. In other words, in the short term,Iran’s missiles would not pose a direct threat to the United States, but could be a major threat to its European allies.

In June 2010, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that intelligence showed Iran may have obtained the ability to launch dozens, even hundreds, of missiles targeting Europe.

The other conclusion was that the rapid development of U.S. missile defense capabilities and technologies would provide a more effective means for dealing with Iran’s missile threat.

Based on the reevaluation, Obama decided to adjust the U.S. missile defense system, particularly the original plan for Eastern Europe. On September 17, 2009, he announced that the U.S. Government would abandon its plan of deploying a radar site in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland. Instead, it would implement a “phased adaptive approach” for European ballistic missile defense.

The new missile defense system the Obama administration is deploying is quite different from that of his predecessor. First of all, the scope of interception targets is dramatically expanded. The missile defense system Bush planned to deploy in Poland could only intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. But the system that the Obama administration will eventually deploy there can protect the whole North Atlantic region from attacks of various distances and directions, including short- and medium-range missile attacks.

What’s more, Obama will give priority to the use of sea-based interceptors. Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors became the fi rst choice after one of the missiles, launched from a Navy cruiser in the Paci fi c, successfully shot down a failing U.S. satellite in space in February 2008.

The Pentagon’s plan outlines, by 2011,the United States will deploy in Europe the sea-based Aegis combat system, SM-3 Block IA interceptors as well as a radar surveillance system. This is six to seven years earlier than the Bush administration’s original plan.

Obama also highlights cooperation with other NATO member countries, while maintaining openness and strengthening antimissile capabilities. By 2015, the United States will deploy more advanced SM-3 Block IB interceptors to respond to the threat of missiles within a range of 3,000 km.

And by 2018, even more advanced SM-3 Block IIA interceptors will be deployed to respond to the threat of missiles within a range of 5,500 km.

Further, by 2020, the United States will deploy SM-3 Block IIB interceptors to respond to the threat of various types of medium-range missiles and to the potential threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles.This should protect the whole of Europe.

The U.S. missile defense system will also be integrated with the NATO command and control network and missile defense systems of other NATO members.

Gains of Poland

The system that the Obama administration will eventually deploy in Poland can protect the whole North Atlantic region from attacks of various distances and directions, including short- and mediumrange missile attacks

Before the agreement was signed, more than 100 American soldiers and the first batch of Patriot missiles had already moved into a military base in the town of Morag, in northern Poland. This marks the first time American troops have been stationed in Poland since the end of the Cold War.

Poland could achieve three strategic objectives through the signing of the new missile defense pact and the deployment of Patriot missiles.

First, Poland has obtained a symbolic weapon to protect itself. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact alliance, Poland has been worried about its homeland security. Obtaining Patriot missiles and forming a military alliance with the United States helps not only alleviate Poland’s security concerns, but also enhances its level of military modernization.

The move can also help Poland gain more attention in NATO and the EU. Due to its weak economic and military strength,Poland’s actual in fl uence in the two organizations is far below its expectations. By forming an alliance with the United States, especially a military one, Poland’s status in the two organizations will naturally rise.

DEAL! U.S.Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchanges documents with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski at a July 3 signing ceremony for an amended missile defense agreement in Krakow

In addition, the U.S. military presence reflects the United States’ commitment to Poland. In the early days of his presidency,Obama was aloof from East European allies.Most notably, he gave up Bush’s missile defense plan, which disappointed Poland, the Czech Republic and others. This time around,the U.S. troops stationed in Poland, coupled with the new missile defense pact, will serve as an indication of the military alliance that the two countries have forged.

Gains of U.S.

The signing of the new pact is signi fi cant for the United States, too. With this step, the U.S. global missile defense system becomes more complete.

Before this, the United States had not only established missile defense bases in Alaska and other places within its borders,but also tried to develop a global missile defense system through military cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The successful deployment of a missile defense system in Poland has expanded this system.Geologically, Eastern Europe is undoubtedly an ideal region.

In addition, the deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe also bears geopolitical signi fi cance for the Untied States. With the missile defense system in Eastern Europe as an important part of its global missile defense system and with Poland and the Czech Republic as a base for its future eastward expansion, the United States aims to eventually realize strategic containment against Russia.

In order to gain Russia’s support on major international and regional issues, Obama has carried out a series of measures to improve U.S.-Russia relations since taking office.Despite these measures, long-term distrust between the two countries could not be changed in the foreseeable future.

The first Patriot missiles of the United States were deployed in Morag, only 60 km from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. To dispel Russian concerns, Poland said it would allow Russia to check the target of the missile defense system in Poland. Hillary Clinton also stressed the defensive nature of the system, and said it would not pose a threat to Russia.

But as one of the key issues affecting U.S.-Russia relations since the Cold War, the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe impacted U.S.-Russia relations greatly. This is undoubted.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said the United States made the move obviously with Russia in mind. The interceptors deployed in Poland were intended to deal with Russian missiles, he said.

It is possible that Russia will once again adopt tough measures, such as deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, if its security interests cannot be guaranteed.

In addition, the deployment of a missile defense system in Poland has not only consolidated the United States’ leading position in NATO, but also strengthened NATO’s military and political role.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report the Pentagon submitted to Congress in February emphasized that the United States will proactively promote the establishment of an integrated missile defense system within the NATO framework and will strengthen cooperation with speci fi c partners.

If NATO’s theater missile defense system is completed and integrated into the U.S.missile defense system, it will be able to cover all its European allies. This means there is no longer a need for NATO to develop its own missile defense system.

Actually, the real purpose of the United States is to restrict NATO from developing missile defense capabilities independent of the United States. With this move, the United States strengthens its allies’ security reliance on it and is virtually guaranteed to retain a leading strategic position in NATO.

The author is a researcher with the Institute of American Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations