New Developments in the Security Situation in China’s Neighborhood and the Building of a Community with a Shared Future for Neighbors

Zhou Fangyin

The world is undergoing a new round of turbulence and changes， with severe conflicts in multiple regions. This has far-reaching implications for the evolution of the international situation. In this context， Chinas neighboring regions have been impacted in many ways， and the security situation in the neighborhood is undergoing complex changes. This inevitably affects the building of a community with a shared future in the region.

New Developments in Chinas Neighborhood Security

Since 2020， the world has faced multiple security challenges as a result of intense strategic competition from the United States against China. Among them， COVID-19 represents the most significant non-conventional security shock in the past century. The Ukraine crisis， the largest armed conflict since the end of the Cold War， has generated extensive geopolitical repercussions for the international community. The latest round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has produced a series of knock-on effects in the Middle East. Under the influence of these conventional and non-conventional security challenges， the security situation in Chinas neighborhood is undergoing new changes.

Firstly， the United States strategic competition against China is wide-ranging and long-lasting， with a systemic impact on the international and regional order. The U.S. perceives China as the only nation capable of challenging its global dominance in economic， security， and technological fields. Although the protracted Ukraine crisis poses real challenge to the U.S. foreign policy， the U.S. maintains its focus and pressure on China， and continues to regard China as the biggest strategic rival in the coming decades. Against this backdrop， some new changes have emerged in the China-U.S. relationship： First， China has demonstrated resilience against U.S. strategic pressure. It is difficult for the U.S. anti-China strategy to yield decisive results within a short timeframe. This has prompted the U.S. to make tactic adjustments to its strategy to seek an approach that inflicts less harm on its domestic economy and is thus more sustainable. Second， the U.S. continues to strengthen integration of its alliance and partnership system to strengthen the anti-China force on the basis of “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. Notably， it seeks to draw New Zealand into AUKUS while reinforcing trilateral security cooperation among the U.S.， Japan， and ROK and the United States-Philippines alliance to augment the operation capabilities of U.S. forces in the vicinity of China. Third， despite the intensified U.S.-China competition， some factors are at play to keep the bilateral relationship from being derailed. For example， the complex interdependence between China and the United States is an objective reality developed over an extended historical period and is difficult to sever. A rapid and brutal decoupling will have a direct impact on the U.S. economy， which is something the United States cannot afford. Both countries are major military powers and nuclear states， and the cost of a large-scale military conflict is too great for either side. Despite intense U.S. containment and unjustified suppression， China maintains that there is no life-and-death competition between the United States and China， and that it is not a zero-sum relationship. China actively strives for fundamental stability in China-U.S. relations and has not given up efforts to cooperate with the U.S. in a number of important areas. At the San Francisco summit meeting in November 2023， President Xi Jinping noted that “China does not intend to overtake or replace the United States” and “the success of each other is an opportunity for both.” In addition， the gradual resumption of military exchanges， the more intensive high-level meetings， as well as the largely smooth channels of communication are conducive to maintaining the basic stability of China-U.S. relations.

Secondly， armed conflicts in other parts of the world have a spillover effect on Chinas neighboring regions. The Ukraine crisis， which began in February 2022， has persisted for two years. While the impact of the Ukraine crisis persists， a new round of Israel-Palestine conflict erupted in October 2023， evolving into Israels sustained military operations in the Gaza Strip， with multiple Middle Eastern countries and the U.S. becoming involved or drawn in various ways. The two conflicts not only undermine stability in Europe and the Middle East but also have spillover effects on other regions. Frequent international conflicts have eroded the confidence of Chinas neighboring countries in world peace and affected their perceptions of how countries around the world behave. Their expectations for international cooperation are less stable， and their confidence in the future development of the world has weakened. Both crises display signs of prolongation and have taken a course that was not initially anticipated by major parties. They vividly demonstrate the brutality of armed conflicts and the high level of uncertainty inherent in warfare. While worsening the international security situation， they also pushed Chinas neighboring countries to reflect on the consequences of the use of force.

Thirdly， the security mindset of small and medium-sized countries is undergoing subtle changes in the volatile international context. Outbreaks of large-scale armed conflicts have worsened the international security situation， exposing the fragility of the overall security environment. Compared to major powers， small and medium-sized countries often feel these vulnerabilities more acutely due to their limited military strength and capacity to shape their security environments. Just a few years ago， most such countries believed that the international environment in which they lived was generally stable， with their sovereignty and security largely guaranteed. The successive occurrence of international conflicts has made many small and medium-sized countries further realize the fragility of their own security autonomy and their inadequate capacity to restrain the behavior of major powers. Consequently， they are having a stronger awareness for strength through unity. This is reflected in stronger goodwill of Southeast Asian countries towards countries and international organizations such as Japan， the European Union and New Zealand， and the decline in their trust in the United States and Russia in recent years. As long as major power competition persists and international instability continues， this change in the security mindset of small and medium-sized countries will continue and may have serious international consequences.

Lastly， the increase in destabilizing factors in the surrounding region and the interaction of multiple factors have made it more difficult to effectively manage regional hotspots. The changes unseen in a century， the spillover of geopolitical conflicts， and the global economic instability affect neighboring countries in various ways. Different countries face different challenges and inter-state relations are reorganizing in a complex manner. The U.S.， out of strategic competition with China， continually stirs up regional hotspots， further destabilizing the region. Factors such as international instability， the proliferation of power politics thinking and opportunism within the international community， the rise of populism and xenophobia in some countries， have made it more difficult to manage regional hotspots. Hotspot issues that had been relatively well-managed for a time have resurged. In the South China Sea region， the Philippines has escalated its provocations， driven by both U.S. instigation and intricate domestic political factors in the Philippines. Although there is no military conflict on the Korean Peninsula， there are also undercurrents. There are changes in the internal situation of Myanmar， including the small-scale military clashes in northern Myanmar. Although it is an internal matter of Myanmar， it will， to a certain extent， affect the situation on the Indo-China Peninsulas as well as the China-Myanmar relations.

Impact of Changes in the Security Environment on the Building of a Community with a Shared Future for Neighbors

Despite complex changes in the surrounding security situation， substantive progress has been made in the building of a community with a shared future for neighbors. In a complex and volatile security environment， the building of a community with a shared future for neighbors also faces challenges of how to further deepen bilateral communities with a shared future and transform them into a regional one.

First， the existence of security contradictions and tensions in the security situation have markedly harmed mutual trust between countries， usually in the long run. As security issues are often linked to national sovereignty and core national interests， they easily stir societal sentiments and garner significant public attention. Under the traditional thinking of international relations， security conflicts often exhibit a strong zero-sum nature， where one sides gain is perceived as anothers loss even if they do not involve existential threats. The escalation of such conflicts is often accompanied by a high degree of antagonism in social sentiments between countries and undermines the goodwill and trust between them. The building of a community with a shared future for neighbors rests on a foundation of amicable feelings among its members. In the absence of strong mutual trust， the building of a community with a shared future for neighbors will lose its important emotional underpinning.

Second， the negative impact of security issues can easily spill over to other areas and disrupt the cooperation process， or reverse the existing cooperation outcome. At present， changes in regional security relations have affected the economic cooperation dynamics in this region. One direction of the U.S. efforts to create an anti-China bloc is to transform its alliance and partnership system into an international economic bloc that excludes and isolates China， turning security partners into anti-China economic partners. For example， as Japan and ROK have become more closely tied to the U.S. anti-China activities， their economic ties with China have been negatively affected. The ROK government statistics recorded a trade deficit of $18 billion with China， the first time ROK to have a trade deficit with China in the more than 30 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. An important reason is that， under the U.S. scientific and technological suppression against China， ROK has aligned with the U.S. policy of “small yards and high fences”. Its chip exports to China declined for 14 consecutive months， by 23.7 percent in 2023， falling from 2022.

Third， as the security situation deteriorates， negative security thinking， such as life-and-death confrontation， zero-sum competition， and bloc antagonism have a larger market in the international community. Tensions in inter-state security relations can lead to the spread of confrontational thinking in the international community， as well as the rise of nationalism and xenophobia. The spread of negative security thinking reinforces negative perceptions of “adversaries” and biased interpretations of security disputes， thus exacerbating tensions. Such a negative security mindset runs counter to the concept of the community with a shared future and is not conducive to the spread of this concept in the neighboring regions and its implementation.

Main Path to Promote the Building a Community with a Shared Future in the Neighborhood

In a volatile and highly uncertain international environment， the building of a community with a shared future for neighbors requires closer cooperation and the accumulation of mutual trust through the implementation of “small but beautiful” projects. At the same time， it is important to extend policy dividends to neighboring countries， further open Chinas domestic market and play a greater role in shaping the regional security order.

First， steady cooperation will increase certainty of state-to-state relations， boost the confidence of neighboring countries in cooperating with China， and consolidate and strengthen bilateral relationships. In an era of scarce certainty， many of Chinas neighbors are more focused on securing tangible， immediate benefits and less confident in long-term collaborative objectives. In order to stabilize the expectations of neighboring countries for cooperation， Chinas diplomacy needs to demonstrate greater patience in maintaining consistency in its approach. Especially amidst the U.S. containment and blockade， camp confrontation， and decoupling， China continues to adhere to peaceful development and win-win cooperation. China remains a constructive force in regional cooperation， and has demonstrated a high degree of stability in its behavior. This has deepened the neighboring countries understanding of the distinctive nature of Chinas diplomacy.

Second， Chinas cooperation with neighboring countries can proceed incrementally， gradually building up confidence and making the cooperation channels more stable. Heightened geopolitical competition， coupled with a significant trust deficit among states， has led to a general increase in wariness among the small and medium-sized countries toward major powers. Pursuing large-scale， long-term， high-level deep cooperation now faces greater difficulties and is more susceptible to smear campaigns and obstruction from the West. Therefore， it is advisable to break down grand plans and refine long-term goals. At the opening ceremony of the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in October 2023， President Xi Jinping emphasized the need to promote a large number of “small but beautiful” projects to improve peoples livelihoods. These projects help to deliver benefits to the general public with the results of cooperation as they are closer to the immediate interests of ordinary people in neighboring countries， and are less susceptible to the impact of geopolitical factors and the interference of the zero-sum mentality， so that they can be promoted in a more sustainable way.

Third， China should proactively demonstrate its unwavering commitment to opening-up， international cooperation and build a community with a shared future for neighbors. A major reason for difficulties in taking forward international cooperation is the lack of stable long-term expectations in the international community. Even when certain collaborations promise substantial benefits for nations involved， they still do not have enough confidence to promote and implement them. In this context， proactively offering policy incentives can boost the confidence of neighboring countries in engaging in and deepening cooperation with China. For example， on November 24， 2023， China announced a unilateral visa-free policy for ordinary passport holders from six countries， namely France， Germany， Italy， the Netherlands， Spain and Malaysia. Chinas approach has been positively received by neighboring countries such as Malaysia， Singapore and Thailand. These visa-free policies demonstrate the willingness and determination of the countries concerned to further open to each other， which will help boost the confidence in strengthening cooperation and prevent the spread of negative competition in the neighborhood.

Fourth， China should strike a balance between regional development and security， continue to provide public goods to the neighboring regions through high-quality initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Regional security situation could ease through common development of the countries in the region， enhanced interconnections， and sharing of common interests， so as to avoid excessive disruption of regional development caused by security issues. In the backdrop of strategic competition among the major countries， China and the United States both seek to strengthen relations with neighboring countries such as Southeast Asia， albeit with different purposes. The United States aims to suppress and isolate China. China is trying to create a favorable neighborhood environment for Chinas peaceful development， and make the region a pioneer zone and testing ground for building a community with a shared future for mankind. China can deepen economic and trade， investment and development cooperation with neighboring countries through the BRI and the Global Development Initiative， further open up the domestic market to neighboring countries， and tighten the interest links with neighboring countries， so as to maintain the stability of a peaceful development environment in the region.

Fifth， China should deepen its security cooperation with neighboring countries and enhance its capability to coordinate in the shaping of the regional security order. China and neighboring countries shall deepen cooperation to reach consensus on security concepts and build an inclusive regional security architecture， while exploring ways to respond to external provocations and strengthen the control of regional hotspot issues. In terms of regional security concepts， China has put forward the Global Security Initiative， emphasizing a win-win mindset in tackling complex， intertwined security challenges， advocating a balanced， effective and sustainable security architecture that respects reasonable security concerns of all countries. China explicitly supports and contributes to the ASEAN-centrality in regional security cooperation mechanisms and structures， and embraces the ASEAN Way based on consensus and accommodation of comfort level of all parties. This aligns its own security concepts with the security perceptions and concerns of neighboring countries. China has shown strong strategic restraint on hotspot issues concerning itself and actively engaged in communication， dialogue and consultation with neighboring countries. On other issues， it actively promotes peace talks for political solutions. Chinas efforts will help ease regional tensions and provide a basically reliable and stable security environment for building a community with a shared future among neighboring countries.

——————————————

Zhou Fangyin is Professor at the School of International Relations， Guangdong University of Foreign Studies， and Vice-President of the Guangdong Institute of International Strategic Studies