The US Alliance Strategy: Development,Adjustment and Dilemma

Wang Yinghui is Professor at the School of National Security, National Defense University of China.The article was originally published in Chinese inAsia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs, No.4, 2023.

The alliance system has been an important strategic asset of the United States for a long time.American strategic guru Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out in his bookThe Grand Chessboard:American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperativesthat “American global supremacy is buttressed by an elaborate system of alliances and coalitions that span the globe.”1Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives(Chinese edition), China Institute of International Studies, trans., Beijing: The People’s Publishing House,1998, p.36.As an important part of the American global strategy, the alliance system has played an indispensable role throughout US history, from its founding to developing and maintaining its hegemony.The US has used it to contain rivals, control allies, expand regional influence, maintain its global dominance, and strategically serve as a key promoter to maintain US global hegemony.Under the current background of the US resuming major-power competition and the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the United States is going through profound adjustments of its alliance strategy, rearranging its strategic layout targeting China and Russia as threats, and reintegrating the Asia-Pacific and the transatlantic alliance systems, in an attempt to establish a US-led exclusive, connected, and cross-board alliance that contains China in every possible way.However, the US alliance strategy is also restrained by a number of internal and external factors such as geo-economic realities, strategic culture, and intra-alliance tensions.The constraints add to the difficulties of the alliance system’s global implementation.

Theories of Alliance and the US Alliance Strategy

The alliance system is a phenomenon ubiquitous in international relations and a core concept of international political theories.The history of international relations is also a history of alliances between states and confrontations between groups.Since moving into the modern international system, Western powers have pursued alliance strategies to control resources,compete for world hegemony and dominance in regional affairs, and optimize their national interests.Alliance plays a fundamental role in the rise and fall of great powers and the evolution of international structure and regional order.The formation and development of the American alliance system reflects the general rules of alliance theory but also has its distinctive features.

Alliance is an important research topic in international relations theories.Stephen M.Walt argued explicitly inThe Origins of Alliancesthat failure to understand the issues behind alliances, such as how they started,carries fatal consequences.He further pointed out that many debates over foreign policy and grand strategy are based primarily on conflicting beliefs about the origins of international alliances.2Stephen M.Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Chinese edition), Zhou Piqi, trans., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2018, pp.1-270.A lot of research on the basic theories of alliance has been done in the West, including the definition,origins, functions and features of alliance, as well as the US theory of alliance.

In English, words such as alliance, alignment, coalition, bloc, and pact have similar meanings, but “alliance” is the most commonly used in academia.In its narrow definition, alliance refers to states’ formal military and security alignment.According toThe Encyclopedia Americana, a military alliance, or alliance for short, refers to a formal union of two or more states using force to deal with external threats.3The Encyclopedia Americana (Chinese edition), Beijing: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1994,p.361.In a broad sense,the academic community generally uses the concept of Stephen Walt:“An alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”4Stephen M.Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Chinese edition), p.12.Furthermore, states may not have a formal treaty of alliance but still have close and strong alignment, as in the case of the United States and Israel.Some Chinese scholars have also defined alliances.Liu Feng argues that “traditionally, an alliance is a form of cooperation between states based on security commitments, and the core is to provide security support to each other in the face of thirdparty military threats or attacks.”5Liu Feng, “Order Dominance, Internal Disputes, and the Transformation of the US Alliance System,”Foreign Affairs Review, No.6, 2021, p.25.In practice, when using the concept of alliance, the United States usually does not make a strict distinction but more likely proceeds from a pragmatic perspective.Its allies include states and organizations with which it has concluded formal treaties, typically NATO, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, as well as those it has de facto defense commitments without treaties.The US alliance system can be defined as a military group for collective security formed by the US and its global allies that can jointly use force against external threats.

Western scholars have done a lot of systematic research on the origins and development of alliances.Classical realist scholars, represented by Hans Morgenthau, emphasize the relationship between alliances and the balance of power, referring to alliances as a “necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multi-state system.”6Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Chinese edition), Xu Xin, Hao Wang and Li Baoping, trans., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006, p.219.Neorealist scholars propose the “balance of threats” and “balance of interests,” with a typical example being Stephen Walt’s “balance of threats” theory, which argues that alliances are formed to deal with threats and dissolve as threats disappear.7Stephen M.Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Chinese edition).Walt’s“balance of threats” theory can well explain the establishment of the US alliance system during the Cold War to balance the threats from the Soviet bloc.However, this theory fails to explain why the US alliance system did not dissolve with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

The theory of “cognitive alliance” was later proposed to explain why the US alliance system still existed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.This theory perceives the alliance as a community built on common socioeconomic and political conditions and characterized by consistency in terms of institution, ideology and mechanisms.The alliance may continue to exist for a long time, even if the common threats disappear.8Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, eds., US Allies in a Changing World, London: Frank Cass Publishers,2001.Once it exists, this cognitive identity may last through continuous interaction and practice.9Wang Fan, The US Asia-Pacific Alliance, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2007, p.18.Walt also wrote in 2009 to explain the post-Cold War US alliance system.He pointed out that the US has adjusted its alliance system in a unipolar world because it has more freedom to maneuver as the sole superpower and tends to choose a more flexible bilateral organizational structure rather than a highly institutionalized alliance arrangement.Alliances against the United States are unlikely in this scenario, and small and medium-sized states tend to turn to the US for their own interests.10Zhang Guoshuai, Research on the US Asia-Pacific Alliance System after the Cold War, Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing House, 2016, p.7.Liu Feng also argues that as strategic rivals fade away after the Cold War,“the United States needs to transform and upgrade its alliance system,”leading to the decline of traditional security protection against specific opponents and the rise of strategic coordination and order maintenance.11Liu Feng, “Order Dominance, Internal Disputes, and the Transformation of the US Alliance System,”p.26.These theories explain from different perspectives the persistence or enlargement of the US alliance system after the Cold War.On the one hand, partners in the US alliance system have come to some common understanding and trust from within, and established stable systems,mechanisms and norms; on the other hand, and more importantly, the US has managed over time to transform and adjust its alliance system in the post-Cold War era, adaptive to the changing international pattern and strategic environment.

With regard to the security dilemma in alliance politics, the two most typical issues are given by Glenn Snyder in his bookAlliance Politics: one is the formation of “counter-alliances” as a result of alliances, and the other is the problem of “entrapment“ and “abandonment“ as a result of asymmetric power and dependence within the alliance.12Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997, p.1.The security dilemma is inherent in the alliance, and it is a dead knot difficult to disentangle.13Chu Zhaofeng, “A Study on US Alliance Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era,” doctoral dissertation of the National University of Defense Technology, 2017, Introduction, p.13.Thomas Christensen, Jack Snyder and other American scholars also proposed the ideas of “chain-ganging” and “buck-passing.” In the post-Cold War era, the traditional dilemmas of “entrapment” and “abandonment” were reduced between the United States and its allies, and Walt pointed out that the security dilemma in a unipolar alliance system is weaker than that in a bipolar system.14Stephen M.Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, Vol.61, No.1, 2009, pp.98-99.However, under the current trend of multi-polarization and the intensified China-US rivalry, new security dilemmas emerge as the US and its allies increasingly calculate self-interests.In recent years, some Chinese scholars have proposed the theory of the “cost-benefit dilemma of alliances,” while others have analyzed the dilemma of the US building an Asia-Pacific alliance and the dilemmas of the US-Australia and US-ROK alliances.15See Zhao Jizhou and Zhao Chen, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of the US-EU Security Relations: A Theoretical Perspective of the New Alliance Dilemma,” Contemporary American Review, No.3, 2019,pp.101-120; Xu Shanpin and Zhang Tao, “Alliance Dilemmas, Rational Choices, and the Modest Upgrade of the Australia-US Alliance,” International Security Studies, No.2, 2021, pp.107-131; Wu Huaizhong, “The‘Alliance Dilemma’ Management and Evolution of Japan’s Relations with China,” Journal of Japanese Studies, No.5, 2022, pp.15-39.

Alliance is an important part of national security strategy and military strategy.Some scholars argue that alliance strategy refers to “a strategic alliance relationship one state establishes with another state or groups of states through formal or informal arrangements or agreements to ensure mutual security and achieve strategic goals, thereby safeguarding and promoting the fundamental interests of itself.”16Li Jingzhi, “Analysis of American Alliance Strategy,” Teaching and Research, No.10, 2015, p.49.The US alliance strategy,commonly called “collective security,” can be summarized as the theory and practice to maintain its global hegemony and achieve its global strategic goals, reflected in a series of strategic arrangements made in its global alliance system.

The US alliance system inherits the alliance tradition of Western powers in some respects while keeping some peculiarities in its own way.First, historically, most alliances were temporary during wartime or only existed for some time, such as the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.However, built on strong institutions, system stability, and distinctive American hegemony, the modern US alliance system has sustained for more than 70 years.It has been maintained at a large scale in peacetime and symbolizes the US hegemony.Second, the US alliance system is global with a focus on the two wings of the transatlantic and the Asia-Pacific.While the US has established over time four blocs of allies in the transatlantic, transpacific, Middle East, and Americas, it has consistently put more emphasis on NATO, the transatlantic multilateral alliance, and important bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.The US has regarded Europe and the Asia-Pacific as the two major regions of geostrategic importance to stranglehold Russia and China.Third, the US has established a highly asymmetric and absolutely“authoritarian” alliance system, in which the US dominates and its allies are in subordinate or dependent positions.The US superior authority is unprecedented in human history.17Wang Weimin, Alliance Theories and America’s Alliance Strategy—A Case Study of the US-Japan and US-Korea Alliances, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2007, p.97.The allies have not only helped the US realize its global military presence and deep involvement in regional affairs, but also extended support to its unilateral decisions.Even though the US often imposes its will on its allies, most of them have submitted to the US dominance.18Liu Feng, “Order Dominance, Internal Disputes, and the Transformation of the US Alliance System,”pp.28-29.Fourth, the composition of the US alliance system is complex and made of close and distant relationships.Over time, the US has developed a security architecture consisting of multilateral networks, “hub and spoke” bilateral alliances, and exclusive“mini-lateral” alliances.At the same time, the US allies include both developed countries such as France, Germany, and Japan, and very small states such as Kuwait and Haiti, which have developed close or distant relationships with the US depending on their history, cultures,geostrategic positions and values.

Historical Evolution of the US Alliance Strategy

The US alliance system and strategy are not done in one go but as a result of development over a long period from scratch.It can roughly be divided into five stages.19See Chen Xiaowei, A Study of the US Alliance Strategy, Beijing: National Defense University Press,2002, pp.9-42; Chu Zhaofeng, “A Study on US Alliance Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era,” p.2.

From spontaneous alignment to purposeful wartime alliance and isolationism

The first stage spanned from the colonial period to the outbreak of the First World War.At this stage, the United States began to develop the idea of alignment, experiencing spontaneous alignment to purposeful wartime alliance and then to isolationism.It is the initial stage of the alliance strategy.

The earliest US alignment history can be traced back to the colonial period.When the British colonists came to the American continent in the early 17th century, they aligned with some American Indian tribes against others to survive and thrive.The history of alliances in the US started in 1775, with the 13 British colonies formally formed a union.During the War of Independence, the United States and France forged a union to fight against Britain and finally won the independence war.However, after the War of Independence, the US pursued a policy of isolationism for a long time; as President George Washington stated in his farewell address in 1796, “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”20C.V.Crab, American Foreign Policy in Nuclear Age, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1983,p.146.Successive US governments have largely followed the principle of isolationism.Adopting isolationism was a US strategic decision when the country was weak in order to stay away from the disputes of the Old World and build up its strength.

Winning world wars and achieving national rise through wartime alliances

The second stage lasted from the outbreak of the First World War to the end of the Second World War.With the help of wartime alliances,the United States won the wars and began to rise.World War I was an important turning point in the development of American alliance strategy.The US declared war on Germany in April 1917 as an entente power,temporarily abandoning the principle of isolationism.During the war,the US implemented the military strategy of its allies.Though it did not formulate its own alliance strategy, the US has since increased its awareness of alliances in the military strategy.During World War II, the US began its Project Rainbow in 1939, deciding to align with the United Kingdom and put Europe before Asia in its strategic priorities.21Mark A.Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2001, pp.23-28.After the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, the US declared war on Japan and joined the World Anti-Fascist Alliance to fight against the Axis powers, and played a key role in the strategic decision-making of the allies.This was particularly the case in the Pacific battlefields, where the UK, Australia, New Zealand and other allies followed the American-led alliance strategy.It was the first time in history that the United States successfully implemented an alliance strategy.

Global alliance against socialist camp during the Cold War

The third stage covered the entire Cold War period when the United States established a global alliance system to fight against the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union.It was a period when a US-led comprehensive alliance system was built, developed and consolidated to the full extent.As the Cold War unfolded, the US came forward to the international arena to uphold the international order dominated by Western powers.With a reputation gained and huge power accumulated in the war, the US concluded a series of political and military treaties around the world, establishing an alliance system to impose political isolation, economic blockade and military deterrence against the Sovietled socialist camp.From 1948 to 1955, the US signed treaties with a good number of countries in the Americas, Europe and Asia: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Australia-New Zealand-US Security Treaty, the US-Japan Security Treaty, the USPhilippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty,the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, etc.In 1955, the Baghdad Pact was founded under US sponsorship; though not a member, the US had de facto control over the alliance.By doing so, the US achieved strategic encirclement of the socialist camp from its “backyard” to the Far East and from Western Europe to the Middle East.During the Cold War,the US continued to enhance its alliance, setting up new military bases in allied countries to compete with the Warsaw Pact, which played a crucial role in winning the Cold War.

During this period, the US alliance strategy had a clear goal: to compete with the Soviet Union for world hegemony on the one hand and to control and use the alliances for its own interests on the other.The theories and practices of US alliance strategy continued to develop and improve during the Cold War, making them the cornerstone to support US global hegemony and bipolar confrontation.22Chu Zhaofeng, “A Study on US Alliance Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era ,” p.2.Moreover, the US turned the traditional wartime alliances into a peacetime comprehensive alliance strategy integrating deterrence and combat through economic, political, and military means.23Wang Weimin, Alliance Theories and America’s Alliance Strategy, p.136.In a nutshell, during the Cold War, the US established an alliance strategy based on geopolitics, underpinned by ideologies and Western values by means of economic and military assistance and security guarantees, and promoted it in various flexible ways.24Li Jingzhi, “Analysis of American Alliance Strategy,” p.49.

“Scepter of the American empire” with expanded functions and scale

The fourth stage spanned from the end of the Cold War to around 2012, during which the United States made major adjustments to its alliance strategy, successfully turning it from an instrument against the socialist camp into the “scepter of the American empire.” After the end of the Cold War, the US became the only superpower, and the military alliance against the Soviet socialist bloc suddenly lost its strategic adversaries and goals.However, the US soon found a new goal and focus and developed the system into an important tool to maintain its post-Cold War unipolar hegemony while reducing and postponing the global and regional turmoil and conflicts caused by the Cold War.To this end,the US took active steps to adjust and optimize its alliance strategy and increase the functions and scale of its alliance system.In Europe, the US vigorously promoted NATO’s eastward enlargement to achieve triple goals: first, to include the “new Europe” of Central and Eastern European countries into the Western camp to strengthen the alliance; second, to continuously erode the neighboring geostrategic space of Russia to prevent its comeback; and third, to deter the centrifugal tendencies of France,Germany and other Western European powers and maintain its alliance leadership in Europe.25Wang Weimin, Alliance Theories and American Alliance Strategy, p.138.NATO played a central role in the Kosovo War and the Libyan War successively and became a tool for the US to implement its global strategy.The US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific has also regained its vitality after a short “drifting” period.In response to China’s rise, the US-Japan alliance gradually transitioned from a “master-servant”relationship to a true military alliance by gradually “releasing Japan out of the cage” to deter and balance against China.Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in particular, the US strengthened its military alliances in the region in the name of anti-terrorism.During the Iraq War, the US requested Japan to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq, and Japan took the opportunity to achieve the goal of direct overseas deployment.The US also took the opportunity to open up a “second front” against terrorism in Southeast Asia and resumed the use of some military bases in Thailand and the Philippines.

Refocusing on traditional geostrategic issues and strengthening the system in response to major-power rivalry

The fifth stage began from 2012 and continued to the present, at which the US alliance strategy has once again undergone a profound transformation, focusing on major-power competition and specifically targeting China.After the victory in the war against terror, the US refocused on traditional geostrategic issues, especially dealing with the challenges from other major powers.Marked by the Obama administration’s official launch of the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy in 2012, the US shifted its strategic focus eastward and began to target the fast-rising China.Its alliance strategy accordingly turned to serve to goal of containing China by strengthening and consolidating the alliance system.After Trump took office in 2017, he publicly identified China and Russia as strategic rivals,speaking of great-power competition with a laser-sharp focus on China.During the Obama and Trump presidencies, the US accelerated NATO’s eastward expansion, including North Macedonia as the 30th member state in 2020, and increasing pressure on Russia from Europe.In the Asia-Pacific,the US has focused on strengthening bilateral and multilateral alliances to contain China.In 2012, it began to rotate and deploy about 2,500 marines in Darwin, Australia.In 2014, it signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines and obtained the right to use five naval and air bases in the country.In 2015, the US and Japan largely revised the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, making it clear that the alliance was global instead of regional in scope.In 2019, the US, Japan,India and Australia resumed the quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad).Also in 2019, the US Department of Defense issued the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, announcing the creation of an Asia-Pacific partnership network.At this stage, the US has consolidated and strengthened the traditional bilateral and multilateral alliances formed during the Cold War while trying out new groupings by establishing some exclusive “mini-lateral” mechanisms such as the US-Japan-ROK military cooperation and the Quad.To pursue“America First” and reduce the cost of maintaining US hegemony, the Trump administration adopted a more unilateral strategy, which alienated the US from its European and Asian allies to a certain extent and made their disagreements loom larger than their mutual needs.The US withdrew from multilateral mechanisms one after another, treating its allies in a transactional approach, pressuring NATO member states, Japan, and the ROK to increase military expenditure, and requesting them to concede economic benefits.Nevertheless, Trump has made the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific far more connected and exclusive.26See Ge Hanwen, “US Alliance Policy and Alliance System in the Trump Era,” Forum of World Economics & Politics, No.1, 2019, p.120; Zhong Feiteng, “The Trump Doctrine and the Transformation of the American Alliance System,” Contemporary American Review, No.3, 2019, p.20-47; Liu Feng, “Order Dominance, Internal Disputes, and the Transformation of the US Alliance System,” pp.38-40.

Throughout the history of the United States, the genes, philosophy and strategies for alliance are embedded in the country’s development,buttressing the establishment and maintenance of its hegemony.The US application of alliances has also undergone profound changes, from the tactics of isolationism to a strong instrument and a main pillar of majorpower rivalry that serves the US grand strategy at present.

Adjustments of the US Alliance Strategy

If it is true that the United States in history once ignored alignment and later recognized its importance, then today, it is a new stage in which the US gives unprecedented attention to its alliance strategy.After Joe Biden took office, he termed China “the most serious competitor.” To cope with the challenge from China, one of the most prominent strategic adjustments to Biden’s China policy is to repair and revitalize the relationships with allies that Trump had somehow alienated.The US has attached unprecedented importance to its allies and taken the theories and practices of the alliance strategy to a new height.In reviewing Biden’s diplomatic and security practices in the past three years, the revitalization of alliances has taken a critical position in the US national security strategy.

On the one hand, it is to reverse the negative impact of the Trump administration on the US alliance system, return to the US tradition, and quickly restore cooperation with allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.On the other hand, with the relative decline of its power and the contraction of its hegemony, the US depends more on the strength of its allies to seek its advantageous status in the major-power competition.Speaking on the US government’s approach to China in May 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken included the alliance strategy in the new trichotomy of the country’s China policy: “invest, align, compete.”27Antony J.Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022,https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china.The US National Security Strategy report released in October 2022 further emphasized that the alliances and partnerships worldwide are the country’s greatest assets.28The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf.The Biden administration is profoundly adjusting its alliance system,forging a “united front” to counter China in an all-dimension and all-field comprehensive manner.The alliance strategy of the Biden administration reflects a series of new trends and features best manifested in the following four areas.

Promoting an Asia-Pacific NATO

Promoting an Asia-Pacific NATO means to forge a NATO-like Asia-Pacific alliance by multilateralizing and connecting the existing Asia-Pacific hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system.While an Asia-Pacific NATO has yet to truly take shape, the United States is forging a “minilateral” alliance model and trying to connect these exclusive groups and finally create the Asia-Pacific version of NATO.To this end, the Biden administration has reorganized and integrated existing alignments and partnerships through mechanisms that can be summarized in “5432”: “5”for re-energizing the Five Eyes alliance, “4” for upgrading the Quad, “3”for establishing the trilateral security partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS), and “2” for strengthening bilateral alliances and partnerships.29On March 7, 2022, Wang Yi, China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister, said that the US “5432”format in the Asia-Pacific is not a blessing for the region but a curse that disrupts peace and stability.

The Five Eyes is a multilateral alliance for intelligence cooperation established during the Cold War.Its predecessor was the US-UK intelligence cooperation during World War II, which was later joined by Australia, New Zealand and Canada successively after the war.The Five Eyes operated against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.It targeted terrorism in the first decade of the 21st century, coordinating global cyber spying, monitoring, and intelligence gathering, and became a “Matrix” created by the US.In recent years, the Five Eyes alliance has undergone a new transformation, mainly targeting China and Russia.Besides a close watch on the internet and information of China, the Five Eyes countries have got involved in new areas, such as working together to interfere in Hong Kong affairs.Their consular officers in Hong Kong offer training to and support local anti-China forces and separatists to incite violence, making their conculates the headquarters of interference and subversion.They prohibit Huawei and ZTE from entering the 5G communications business and pressure other countries to follow suit.They launched an investigation into Chinese scientists and researchers and fabricated cases of espionage while jointly introducing a national cybersecurity strategy and launching large-scale cyber-attacks and penetration worldwide.They also plan to include Japan in the alliance to become the “sixth eye” to make up their intelligence gap in Northeast Asia.Japan has already actively participated in Five Eyes intelligence operations in the maritime and space fields, becoming the “eye” to monitor the Asia-Pacific region.India and France are also considering joining the Five Eyes alliance.

Established in 2007, the Quad was in a hibernation state for ten years until Trump reactivated it in 2017.After taking office, Biden upgraded it comprehensively from a ministerial meeting to a summit.In recent years,the Quad four have organized multiple Malabar joint military exercises with expanding subjects and scale.The Quad cooperation has also been growing, with special working groups on maritime security, public health,key technologies, cybersecurity, etc.In particular, at the second Quad summit in Tokyo in May 2022, the four countries launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) in the name of tracking illegal fishing to share maritime information in the Indo-Pacific and improve the capabilities of maritime situational awareness of their allies and partners.The Quad also seeks to enlarge its membership; the ROK has indicated it will increase its participation in Quad activities.At the same time, the Quad has tried to include more countries to contain China through the “Quad+” arrangement.Southeast Asian countries are the main targets for Quad enlargement, and the US is encouraging the UK to join the“Quad+” mechanism.The Quad has also organized meetings on issues of vaccines and technology through Quad+ Indonesia, and Quad+ Vietnam,the ROK and New Zealand.

In September 2021, the US, the UK, and Australia announced the establishment of a trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS,which represents a major adjustment to the alliance system of the Biden administration.Kurt Campbell, US Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific,described AUKUS as “the most important strategic innovation” of this era.30Sarah Canales, “AUKUS ‘Most Important Strategic Innovation’ as China Looks to ‘Break’ Australia:US President Joe Biden Advisor Kurt Campbell,” The Canberra Times, December 1, 2021, https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7533455/aukus-not-doomed-to-fail-as-china-wants-to-break-australia-bidenadvisor.

First, AUKUS is an alliance for nuclear technologies.The US and the UK will support Australia in building eight nuclear-powered submarines,marking the first time the US transfers military nuclear technology to another country.Australia is only the second country besides the UK, with which the US shares its nuclear power technology.The US considered Australia a weak link to its deployment in the Asia-Pacific.Once the nuclear submarines are deployed, it will greatly enhance Australia’s presence in the South China Sea and strengthen its deterrence to China as the nuclearpowered vessels can stay invisible for a long time underwater.The enhanced Australian military power would also enable the US to act quickly when an “emergency” occurs around China.In December 2021, the US, the UK and Australia held a Joint Steering Group meeting, reaffirming the trilateral commitment to bring Australia’s nuclear-powerd submarines into service at the earliest possible date and define the optimal pathway for Australia to acquire the submarines.At the end of July 2022, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin appointed a Senior Adviser for AUKUS, who will “advise the secretary and coordinate efforts across the Department to move rapidly in delivering on the promise of this historic partnership to help Australia establish a conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capability.”31“Statement on AUKUS Senior Adviser,” US Department of Defense, July 29, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3109966/statement-on-aukus-senior-adviser.In March 2023, after 18 months of consultation, the three parties announced that AUKUS would implement the nuclear submarine scheme in multiple stages.The US first sold the Virginia-class nuclear submarines to Australia and finally delivered SSN-AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines.The first SSN-AUKUS submarine may not be delivered until the late 2030s.Still, the US and the UK have confirmed that they will station nuclearpowered submarines in Australia in the next few years to fill the gap in underwater combat capabilities.

In addition to the implications of military deployment, AUKUS symbolizes the establishment of an “Anglo-Saxon iron triangle” and demonstrates that it has become the core of the Indo-Pacific strategy, with the three countries expected to stand by each other in Asia-Pacific affairs.In the future, AUKUS countries will also cooperate in key and breakthrough technological fields, including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity,quantum computing, digital technology and underwater capabilities.32“AUKUS and Indo-Pacific Security,” May 19, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12113.The Washington Postreported that despite the absence of explicit mention of China, “the objective of the new alliance was clear: challenging the country’s growing economic and military influence.”33“U.S.Will Share Nuclear Submarine Technology with Australia as Part of New Alliance, a Direct Challenge to China,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/09/15/us-will-share-nuclear-submarine-technology-with-australia-part-new-alliance-directchallenge-china.

Since the Biden administration came to power, the US has significantly strengthened the traditional bilateral alignment in the Asia-Pacific,attempting to build a regional architecture to contain and deter China, with the US-Japan alliance as the major pillar, the US-Australia alliance playing an auxiliary role, and the US-ROK and US-Philippine alliances as flanks.34Shi Yinhong, “Status Quo of the US Alliances and Coalition’s Military State Against China,” Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs, No.2, 2022, p.11.

The US-Japan military cooperation is gearing increasingly against China and has begun to prepare for future contingencies.At the US-Japan“2+2” meeting in March 2021, the Japanese Defense Minister and the US Secretary of Defense agreed that militaries of the two countries would cooperate closely to defend Taiwan in the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which means that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces would protect US warships and military aircraft.35Shi Yinhong, “Status Quo of the US Alliances and Coalition’s Military State Against China,” p.2.Biden committed to giving Japan “extended deterrence,” i.e.providing the nuclear umbrella, during his trip to Asia in May 2022, while the Kishida government is cooperating with the US to advance Japan’s “offensive military capabilities.” At the beginning of 2023, the US and Japan announced at their “2+2” meeting that the US military will deploy in Okinawa by 2025 the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, with advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,anti-ship, and transportation capabilities.36“Joint Statement of the 2023 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2),” January 11, 2023,https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/11/2003143683/-1/-1/1/FACT-SHEET-JOINT-STATEMENT-OF-THE-2023-US-JAPAN-SECURITY-CONSULTATIVE-COMMITTEE.PDF.The Littoral Regiment was established to prepare for the great-power war and the dominance of the offshore sea.When US Secretary of Defense Austin visited Japan in June 2023, he claimed that the two countries were “working to modernize their military alliance in the face of threats from China, North Korea, and Russia.”37“US, Japan Modernizing Military Alliance: Austin,” The Defense Post, June 1, 2023, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/06/01/us-japan-modernizing-military-alliance.

Australia is becoming the new cornerstone in the framework of the US Indo-Pacific strategy.According to the US Congressional Research Service,Australia will be rearmed and likely equipped with advanced weapons from the US, including long-range, Tomahawk cruise, anti-ship, hypersonic missiles and unmanned submarines.38“AUKUS and Indo-Pacific Security,” May 19, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12113.The two countries announced at their “2+2” meeting in December 2022 that they would stand together to strengthen cooperation on China-related security issues and “affirmed that Australia and the United States would continue the rotational presence of US capabilities in Australia, across air, land, and maritime domains.This would include US Bomber Task Force rotations, fighters, and future rotations of US Navy and US Army capabilities.” They even agreed to“invite Japan to increase its participation in Force Posture Initiatives in Australia.”39“Joint Statement on Australia-U.S.Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2022,” US Department of Defense, December 6, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3238028/jointstatement-on-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2022.

There has also been significant progress in US-ROK relations.In May 2021, the two countries decided to terminate the US-ROK Missile Guidelines, lifting the restrictions on the range and payload of ROK missiles and allowing the ROK to have the “sovereignty” in developing mediumand long-range missiles.The move was clearly directed against China.The Biden administration took President Yoon Suk-yeol’s coming to power as an important opportunity to draw the ROK closer to the US.At the same time, Yoon has broken the country’s relatively balanced relati40“Washington Declaration,”The White House, April 26, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2.onship between China and the US, leaning towards the latter and becoming hawkish in his China policy.The ROK also made it clear to purchase and deploy the THAAD system, enhance nuclear deterrence, and strengthen ROK-US-Japan trilateral relations.In April 2023, the US and the ROK adopted the Washington Declaration, agreeing to grow and expand their strategic partnership into “a truly global alliance” and strengthen extended deterrence.The US also decided to further enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets, including the nuclear ballistic missile submarine, to the Korean Peninsula.Yoon recently even stated that the ROK-US relationship had been upgraded to a “nuclear-based alliance.”41“South Korea’s Yoon Says Alliance with U.S.‘Nuclear-Based,’” Reuters, June 6, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/south-koreas-yoon-says-alliance-with-us-nuclear-based-2023-06-06.

The US-Philippines alliance was also upgraded soon after the new Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., took office.During US Secretary of Defense Austin’s visit to the Philippines in February 2023,the two sides agreed to open four new US military bases in the Philippines under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) framework.In April of the same year, the Philippines officially announced the location of the new bases, three of which are located on Luzon Island, south of Taiwan, and the nearest Camilo Osias naval base, only over 400 kilometers away from Taiwan Island.42“US-Philippines Strengthen Military Alliance to Target the Taiwan Strait?” Lianhe Zaobao, April 12,2023, http://www.zaobao.com/realtime/china/story20230412-1382333.The two sides also decided to resume joint cruises in the South China Sea that were suspended during the Duterte presidency.

Promoting an Indo-Pacific NATO

Promoting an Indo-Pacific NATO means to bring Europe into the Asia-Pacific and enhance NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs.Once in office, President Biden has committed to repairing and improving transatlantic relations while making efforts to connect the transatlantic and Asia-Pacific alliances and pull NATO and its major European allies into the Asia-Pacific to address the China challenge.The White House’s Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States report in 2022 points out that the US will connect partners in the Asia-Pacific and Europe in new ways.43The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” Feburary 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.So far,NATO has made three major moves in its eastward foray into the Indo-Pacific.

There are significant changes in NATO’s focus and attitude towards China.In 2019, for the first time, NATO identified China as a challenge that needed to be addressed in the communiqué of the NATO London summit.In 2021, the communiqué of the NATO Brussels summit claimed that China was a “systemic rival” and constituted “systemic challenges.”At the end of June 2022, the NATO Madrid summit approved the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, which accused China of posing “systemic challenges” and claimed that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values” while its “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security.” The document also asserted that“the deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.”44“NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.Although China is far away from the NATO defense area,NATO identifies China as a “systemic challenge” across regions under the leadership of and in cooperation with the US, signifying a new chapter in its China policy.

NATO and its major member states have stepped up involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs.In line with the global strategy of the United States,NATO has made the so-called involvement in the Asia-Pacific a focus of its global expansion.European powers such as the UK, France, and Germany have launched one after another their Indo-Pacific strategies or policy guidelines, supporting a “free and open Indo-Pacific order” and penetrating strategically into the Asia-Pacific.In particular, NATO has repeatedly emphasized its support for “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea and maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.In July 2022,during the 24th annual Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference, the Chair of the NATO Military Committee and the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command focused their discussion on the so-called “freedom of navigation” and “maritime challenges.”45“First Chair of the Military Committee to Attend Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference,” July 28,2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_198110.htm.In February 2023, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg made a rare statement during his visit to Japan that the Chinese mainland had “no justification” to intimidate Taiwan and that “any attempt by China to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait will cause severe consequences for regional and global security.”The pronouncement is the NATO Secretary-General’s most provocative statement on the Taiwan question thus far.46“NATO Chief Says China Has ‘No Justification’ for Taiwan Threats,” Nikkei Asia, February 1, 2023,https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/NATO-chief-says-China-has-no-justification-for-Taiwan-threats.The UK, France, Germany, and other NATO members have also actively participated in military activities in the Asia-Pacific region, increasing their military presence in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.In August 2022, the US, the UK, France,Germany, the Netherlands and other countries participated in the Pitch Black 2022 joint military exercise in Australia, and the German Air Force sent fighter jets for the first time.Inspector General of the German Armed Forces Eberhard Zorn expressed that Germany would again participate in the joint exercise in Australia in 2023 and send a fleet to the Asia-Pacific in 2024.47Wang Yuanyuan et al., “A Review of NATO’s New Strategic Trends,” Peace and Development, No.6,2022, p.37.

NATO members and US allies in the Asia-Pacific are forging a cooperative relationship of mutual support.NATO claims that developing global partnerships with a focus on the Asia-Pacific will be an important part of the NATO 2030 initiative agenda.It will collaborate with Japan,the ROK, Australia and New Zealand in areas such as cyberspace, cuttingedge technology, combating disinformation, maritime security, climate change and supply chain resilience through the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP).At the Brussels summit in June 2021,NATO announced it would strengthen political dialogue and cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the ROK to maintain a “rules-based international order.” In May 2022,NATO held a meeting of defense ministers with these four countries,and in June of the same year, they participated in the NATO summit for the first time.The ROK and Japan also joined the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) in May and November 2022, respectively.In January 2023, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg pledged to jointly deal with the “China-Russia challenge” and strengthen cooperation in the fields of maritime security, weapons control and cyberspace.They also emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.In April of the same year, NATO invited the four Asia-Pacific foreign ministers of Japan,the ROK, Australia and New Zealand for a five-party meeting focusing on China-Russia relations.Recently, NATO also intended to open a liaison office in Japan.Once implemented, it will be NATO’s first liaison office in Asia, making it a significant extension of the Western military alliance to the Asia-Pacific.

The US-led NATO, Quad, AUKUS and the bilateral alignment have built together an alliance system to contain China and Russia simultaneously so that the US can mobilize and synergize the forces of its Atlantic and Pacific allies.While the US interests in the Asia-Pacific are increasingly supported by its allies in Europe, its interests in Europe are likewise gaining more support from allies in the Asia-Pacific.

Expanding military alliances to all functional areas

Currently, the Biden administration is expanding the non-military functions of traditional alliances to encompass military, economic, values,technology, and energy issues and serve the multiple objectives of military deterrence, technological competition, supply chain restructuring,ideological suppression in its all-round suppression against China.

In the ideological area, the US and its allies, speaking loftily of values and human rights, integrate ideological factors into their geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry with China.The Biden administration frames the US-China rivalry as a competition between democracy and autocracy in the 21st century, cajoling up its allies to impose joint sanctions on China over the issues of Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and inciting disputes on the South China Sea issue against China’s “illegitimate claims” and “coercion”to neighboring countries.In March 2021, the European Union’s foreign ministers decided to impose sanctions on China under the pretext of socalled “human rights violations,” which were released almost simultaneously with the UK, the US and Canada.The Biden administration also organized two Summits for Democracy in December 2021 and March 2023, gathering more than 100 countries, who labelled China and Russia “authoritarian”and themselves “democratic,” allegedly to oppose authoritarianism and corruption and protect human rights.

In terms of economy and technology, the US asserts that economic security is national security.While easing trade tensions that had intensified during the Trump presidency, the Biden administration is building “small yard, high fence” with allies and partners to reshape supply chains and technological competition and forming a closer alignment to pressure China.In June 2021, the US launched the Build Back Better World (B3W)partnership for global infrastructure construction.In March 2022, the US proposed to chip manufacturers from Japan, the ROK, and Taiwan of China the idea of a so-called “Chip 4 alliance” to curb China’s development momentum in the semiconductor field and exclude it from the industrial chain.In May of the same year, Biden officially proposed the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework of 12 regional countries during his first trip to Asia.In May 2023, at the G7 Hiroshima summit, the seven countries decided to have a Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to warn early on socalled China’s “economic coercion,” share information quickly, and convene regular meetings for relevant consultations.During the G7 summit, the Quad partners also announced the launch of the Quad Investors Network to coordinate investment and production strategies for energy and high-tech products, aiming at establishing reliable supply chains to reduce dependence on China.The purpose of all these measures is to try to create a US-led trans-Pacific economic circle that contains China in the name of economic and technological cooperation, to pressure these countries to decouple from China’s economy and technology, and at the same time to hedge against the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Integrating allies and partners

In contrast to his predecessor’s solitary approach to foreign affairs,Biden focuses on the relationship with traditional treaty allies and works more on strategic interaction and overall connection among allies and partners to build an integrated system of alliances and partnerships that incorportes all like-minded countries.In the modernized system, the boundaries between allies, quasi-allies and partners are no longer clear.Currently, the US is building the new alliance system by “empowering” its allies and partners and rigorously promoting security cooperation between them.

First, the US connects allies and partners of different groupings to strengthen their military cooperation and become close quasi-allies with each other.The “2+2” security talks between US allies are an important signal.Since 2021, Japan has established “2+2” mechanisms with Australia,Germany and the Philippines.In January 2022, Japan and Australia signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement, stipulating that militaries of both sides will be able to go to each other’s country for training, joint exercises and disaster relief operations in the future.The arrangement is the first of its kind Japan has signed with a country other than the United States.In January 2023, Japan and the UK signed another Reciprocal Access Agreement, allowing the two countries to station troops on the other side’s territory.It is particularly worth noting that the ROK-Japan bilateral relations have warmed up quickly and come to a historic reconciliation,obviously thanks to continuous US efforts behind the scenes.The US role in this process also indicates Washington’s need for the solidarity of Japan and the ROK to deal with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) and contain China.48Jiang Guiying, “Analysis of Japan-ROK Leaders’ Restart of Shuttle Diplomacy,” Lianhe Zaobao, May 7, 2023, https://www.zaobao.com/news/world /story20230507-1391923.

Second, the US uses its allies to reach out to more countries in the Asia-Pacific.In recent years, the US has been urging Japan to sell weapons and equipment such as patrol boats and maritime patrol aircraft to Vietnam,Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries to advance US strategic layout in Southeast Asia on the one hand and to improve their capabilities of defense and maritime situational awareness to deal with China in the South China Sea on the other.Leveraging the geographical location of Australia, the US is also improving its influence and force projection in the South Pacific.In May 2023, during the G7 Hiroshima summit, the US convened a meeting with eight countries, including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Vietnam, Australia and the ROK, to expand the camp of allies and partners.

The Development Dilemma Facing the US Alliance Strategy

The alliance system is an important long-term strategic asset of the United States, which plays a key role in implementing the country’s national strategy at various stages.The Biden administration has strengthened,consolidated, and upgraded the US alliance strategy unprecedentedly and quickly.However, the current measures to adjust and strengthen the alliance strategy may not necessarily achieve the desired effect, and the attempt to build an anti-China alliance also faces many constraints.The excessive expansion of the scale and functions of the alliance system may also become a negative strategic asset and burden on the US.Moreover, the alliance itself has a dilemma with conceptual and practical constraints of “entrapment,”“abandonment,” and “buck-passing,” among others.In the long run, the US will face the following challenges in developing its alliance strategy, with the US and its allies increasingly divergent in their interests and divided on their attitudes towards China, and its partners becoming more independent in decision-making.

There are huge constraints in building a US-led anti-China alliance system.The United States is stepping up efforts to build a global alliance system against China, and the system is slowly taking shape.Still, it is difficult to be completely formed, mainly because US allies are economically and geographically dependent on China to different degrees.On the one hand, the Asia-Pacific allies that the US is trying to win over do not follow the US full-heartedly.Many regional countries have long pursued nonalignment policies and identified themselves as neutral and independent major countries.India will remain in such a strategic position for a long time and does not want to become a pawn in the China-US geopolitical rivalry.It has not whole-heartedly followed the US to contain China, as seen in the limited progress of Quad in the military field except the Malabar exercise.The ASEAN countries also have complex attitudes towards China.They have mostly stayed with the strategy of balance between major powers,relying on China for the economy and the US for security instead of taking sides between the two countries.China has remained ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 13 consecutive years since 2009, and ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner from 2020.Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative is increasingly synergistic with the infrastructure development strategies of Southeast Asian countries.

On the contrary, the US proposition of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework seems to be empty talk even without mention of core issues such as free trade areas and zero tariff, therefore not appealing to most Asian countries.On the other hand, European countries are not ready to overwhelmingly join the anti-China camp.Europe and the US remain divided on attitudes towards China, with the latter regarding China as the most consequential strategic competitor while the former views China as an economic and technological challenger but not a threat to European security and military.After his visit to China in April 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron expressed that Europe must strengthen its strategic autonomy against the pressure to become a follower of the United States and avoid being trapped in the US-China confrontation over the Taiwan question.49“US State Department: G7 Will Resist Any Coercion from China,” Lianhe Zaobao, April 17, 2023,http://www.zaobao.com/news/world/story20230417-1384175.Germany and some other European countries support China’s multilateralism and oppose the EU following the US footsteps regarding its relations with China.

Tensions and disputes between the US and its allies hinder the alliance’s cohesion.The US military alliance system has never been monolithic since the first day of its setup.The US and its allies have divergent interests and demands, as well as various internal conflicts, and therefore its allies vary on how closely they follow the US leadership.

First, there is tension between the US hegemony and the independent decision-making of its allies, essentially a contest of control and counter-control between the US and its allies.The traditional alliances established by the US after World War II were “authoritarian”in nature, with the US being the leader and other allies as followers.Since the Cold War ended, the US allies have been increasingly inclined to act autonomously in strategic decision-making.Europe emphasizes a“sovereign Europe” to oppose American control, and opposition against US troops on their territories is often voiced in Japan and the ROK.The ROK has insisted on taking back its wartime operational control,which has been postponed by the US several times.Second, there are differences in worldview and values, largely between the US and its European allies.During the Iraq War in 2003, there were great differences of opinion within NATO, as the “old Europe” represented by France and Germany firmly opposed the US military actions.Germany didn’t even participate in the 2011 NATO military operation against Libya.To demonstrate the profound transatlantic divide, Robert Kagan described America as from Venus and Europe from Mars on major strategies and international issues.50Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Chinese edition),Liu Kun, trans., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013, p.2.Third, there are disputes on cost-sharing.The Trump administration regarded the US alliances as a deal, requesting fees for US military protection and provoking lengthy discord between the US and Europe.Despite major policy changes towards US allies,the Biden administration still relies financially on their support, often resulting in a conflict of interests.Fourth, there are ambiguities in US strategic commitments, typically with the US security commitments to Japan and the Philippines.The US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security does not explicitly include the Diaoyu Islands in the scope of US defense assistance.Similarly, the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty has no provision for whether the defense clauses apply to the South China Sea.Nevertheless, to win over Japan and the Philippines,the US has repeatedly made verbal promises to the two countries.Since 2017, then US Vice President Mike Pence, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, President Biden, and Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan have all promised Japan to defend the Diaoyu Islands,emphasizing the applicability of Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty.To the Philippines, many senior officials, including Sullivan and Austin,reiterated that the US commitment to Philippine security is ironclad and that the Mutual Defense Treaty extends to “Philippine armed forces,public vessels, or aircraft anywhere in the South China Sea.”51“Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J.Austin III Meeting with Philippine Senior Undersecretary and Officer in Charge of the Department of National Defense Carlito Galvez,” US Department of Defense,Febuary 2, 2023, http://www.defense.gov/news/releases/release/article/3286507/readout-of-secretary-ofdefense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-meeting-with-phillippine-seni.However,the US fulfillment of its promise needs to be tested in practice, and the two countries are also concerned whether the US would turn away from them at a future critical moment.

It is uncertain whether the allies will follow the United States to get involved in potential conflicts with China.Military intervention is a more dangerous action for the US-led coalition.52Li Jingzhi, “Analysis of American Alliance Strategy,” p.54.During the Ukraine crisis, the US and its allies jointly imposed sanctions and punishments on Russia in all areas with a whole-of-government approach.Conservative anti-China forces in the US repeatedly promoted the idea of “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” in an attempt to drum up support for further intervention in the Taiwan question.The “Ukrainization” of the Taiwan question is among other US initiatives to work with its allies in potential intervention and conflicts against China in the future.However, given their interests and relations with China, US allies have concerns about whether to go ahead with the United States.

Looking at Japan’s recent moves, the country is actively cooperating with the US in military deployment for future conflicts across the Taiwan Strait.In its recent three security documents, namely the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program,China is termed as “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge,”and Japan will possess “counterstrike capabilities,” reach 2% of the current GDP in defense spending by 2027, and increase military deployment in Okinawa.53“Japan Establishes New Ground Self-Defense Force Base on Ishigaki Island, Okinawa,” Lianhe Zaobao, March 17, 2023, http://www.zaobao.com/new/world/story20230317-1373309.The 2015 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation has laid the legal basis for Japan’s intervention in Taiwan Strait operations: “The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force in response to situation where armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.”54“The Guidelines for Japan-U.S.Defense Cooperation,” April 27, 2015, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf.Nevertheless, Japan always stays highly sensitive to China-Japan relations.Given the history of Japan’s China policy and the interaction between the two countries, Japan walks on two legs of both alignment with the US and coordination with China, adopting a holistic view and maintaining an overall balance in its strategy towards China with a focus on economic implications affecting people’s livelihood and pragmatic cooperation.Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect Japan also to try to develop a constructive and stable relationship with China in the future.

The ROK came to a consensus with the US during the Roh Moo-hyun administration that the two countries would cooperate comprehensively in the event of the DPRK’s military provocations, but the ROK would not step into a conflict over the Taiwan question.In May 2021, however, the US-ROK joint statement expressed concerns about the situation in the Taiwan Strait.And in May 2022, the two countries announced that they would develop their strategic alliance to a “global scope.” Despite the changes in rhetoric, it is not necessary that the ROK intends to get involved in potential military conflicts between the US and China.On the one hand, the ROK has long pursued a “hedging strategy”and “strategic ambiguity” between China and the US.It will neither give up its security reliance on the US nor sacrifice the economic benefits from its cooperation with China.55Sukjoon Yoon, “The South Korea—US 2+2 Talks: Who Came Out Ahead?” The Diplomat, March 22,2021.On the other hand, the current Yoon Sukyeol administration’s US-ingratiating China policy is, to a certain extent,strategized in exchange for US support on other issues, such as the DPRK’s nuclear issue and semiconductor chips.As for the Philippines, despite the opening of multiple military bases to the US, the country’s primary interests remain its national security and regional stability.The Philippine government recently reiterated that the Philippine military bases would not be used for the US arsenal for operations in the Taiwan Strait nor to refuel and repair US ships.56“Philippine Foreign Minister: U.S.Army Not to Store Weapons in Philippine Bases for Operations in the Taiwan Strait,” April 19, 2023, https://www.zaobao.com/news/se/story20230419-1384990.Therefore, in the event of a China-US conflict in the future, the participation of the ROK, the Philippines and other US Asia-Pacific allies will be constrained by the overall situation of their relations with China.

A recent Rand Corporation report analyzed the tendencies of US Asia-Pacific allies to engage themselves in a significant combat contingency.It concluded that the willingness of all regional allies and partners to intervene is highly restricted.Australia and Japan have significant security interests in major Asian contingencies.Still, both will face political (and, in the case of Japan, legal and constitutional) hurdles to participating in wars that do not directly engage them at first.The ROK values the alliance with the US but has little interest in being a belligerent party outside the Korean Peninsula.“New Zealand and the Philippines have few air assets to devote to a major fight and strong incentives to remain aloof from distant wars.”57Michael J.Mazarr, “U.S.Major Combat Operations in the Indo-Pacific Partner and Ally Views,”https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA967-2.html.

For most European countries, East Asia, including the Taiwan Strait, is far outside NATO’s defense zone.They would be very cautious about being involved in East Asia, just as France, Germany and other Western European powers adopted an independent attitude in several previous conflicts after the Cold War.

Prospects of the US Alliance Strategy and China’s Response

The next ten years are critical for the United States to “outcompete China.”The US will employ more notable means to contain China’s development as the world enters a new round of upheavals and transformation.As the greatest asset of major-power competition, the US alliance strategy in its China containment strategy will be enhanced through comprehensive and profound integration and reshaping, and the transformation of the alliance strategy will be accelerated to build a “united front” against China.First, the US is likely to establish and expand more exclusive “mini-lateral” circles in the Asia-Pacific,for example, instituting a US-Japan-ROK trilateral intelligence alliance and a US-Japan-Australia trilateral security partnership or installing a new Quad consisting of the US, Japan, the Philippines and Australia.Second, the US allies and partners may strengthen their connections.On the one hand, the US-led Asia-Pacific “mini-lateral” arrangements may enlarge themselves or network with each other according to various issues and build into a more interconnected architecture that targets China.On the other hand, NATO may further sign up Japan, the ROK, Australia, and New Zealand to step into Asia-Pacific affairs, especially with Japan as a fulcrum.Predictably, the two significant US alliance systems in the Asia-Pacific and across the Atlantic will work more closely.Third, the US alliance system will be further structured to prepare a war, especially for military movements in the Taiwan Strait.US Defense Secretary Austin stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2023 that the country will be “working closely with our allies to upgrade our force posture in the region” and make “new investments in Japan’s defense,including moves to develop a counterstrike capability.”58“A Shared Vision for the Indo-Pacific: Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J.Austin III at the Shangri-La Dialogue,” June 2, 2003, US Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/article/3415839/a-shared-vision-for-the-indo-pacific-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-au.Special attention should be paid to the construction and possible use of US bases in the Philippines, the new development of US-Japan military integration, the new deployment of Japanese Self-Defense Forces and US military in Okinawa,and possible further involvement of NATO in the Taiwan Strait.Fourth,the US alliance system will get involved in a broader range of areas, with deepened cooperation between the US and its allies and partners in maritime security, supply chain restructuring, technological competition, ideological suppression, infrastructure, etc., and particularly a “united front” against China to offset the so-called risks.

The continuous US efforts to strengthen its alliance strategy have explicit purposes and targets, which will inevitably negatively impact China,the Asia-Pacific, and the world.First, the collective engagement of the US and its allies in Asia-Pacific affairs, particularly hotspot issues, exacerbates tensions in the region with profound implications for regional security order,and brings turmoil and conflicts.Second, the US alliance against China will significantly increase the difficulties of China’s diplomacy and raise the risk to its strategic environment in the neighborhood.It will also negatively impact the Belt and Road cooperation, challenge China’s regional strategic interests, and undermine the mutual trust between China and neighboring countries.Third, it poses a direct negative impact on the well-being of the Chinese people, as the US turns its allies and partners against China economically, technologically, and militarily to hinder and contain China’s development.

In the face of a new round of US adjustments to its alliance system and the accelerated construction of an “anti-China alliance,” China must maintain strategic focus and determination.At the same time, China should keep a close eye on the motives, measures and progress of these adjustments and make corresponding strategic plans, preparations and choices based on in-depth analysis, with multiple countermeasures in store to deal with the changing situation confidently.

First, China must continue to deploy its unique economic advantage to break through the economic containment and stay unswervingly to promote economic globalization through.In particular, China should further synergize the Belt and Road Initiative with the national development strategies of neighboring and developing countries, and enhance the in-depth implementation of the RCEP to hedge against the impact of economic containment with tangible benefits.

Second, China must stay true to the philosophy of “partnership instead of alliance” to build a more solid global partnership network and seek understanding and support from more countries.On the one hand, China must increase strategic communication with countries in the Asia-Pacific, adhere to the vision of “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness,” and steadfastly pursue its foreign policy of building friendships and partnerships with its neighbors to provide more public goods for countries in the region and enhance strategic mutual trust for a community of shared future with neighboring countries.Specifically,China should help maintain an ASEAN-centered regional cooperation framework, promote multilateral regional security cooperation mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS to enhance the cohesion with its neighbors and increase the consensus on national security for the region.It should also advocate open and inclusive cooperation to offset the impact of exclusive small circles and effectively overcome the bloc-based regional order led by the US.On the other hand,China must properly resolve disputes with neighboring countries, especially the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,while working together with its neighbors on issues such as the Korean Peninsula, Afghanistan and the nuclear issue of Iran to enhance China’s prestige as a responsible major country.

Third, China must work from the outside to create intermediate buffer zones and to make friends with US allies such as Europe, Japan, and the ROK for more consensus.On the one hand, China must strengthen trade and economic cooperation with the US allies, and on the other hand,actively expand cooperation on issues related to the everyday concerns of mankind, especially in non-traditional security fields such as climate change, public health, and energy security, to offset the competition and confrontation from the US-led alliance system.

Conclusion

The alliance strategy grew from scratch to become a major tool of the United States to maintain its hegemony, and now it has become a main pillar of its involvement in great-power competition.Today, the US attaches unprecedented importance to the alliance.It will continue to strengthen its alliance strategy in the future, optimize and integrate the system, and especially work to build a well-connected and integral coalition against China.Meanwhile, many US allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific are moving closer to the US, adjusting their alliance and China strategies, and strengthening their strategic interactions within and between regional alliances.The developments have given impetus to the overall strong momentum of the US alliance system and rising strategic threats and challenges to China, which also brings risks of division, confrontation, and conflict to the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the world.

However, influenced by the American grand strategy and domestic politics, the US alliance strategy is also facing a series of challenges and constraints from within and without.These constraints will bring uncertain prospects for the alliance system.Given this, China still has room to deal with and deter the joint pressure and risk-provoking military attempts by the US and its allies.In the face of the Biden administration’s new round of adjustments to the US alliance strategy, China must stay highly alert and closely monitor the actual and potential threats brought about by the continuous strengthening of the current US alliance system, and make long-term preparations to deal with related security risks.China must, on the one hand, use the contradictions and divisions between the US and its allies to hedge against the impact and pressure, and on the other hand,enhance major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and develop cooperation with neighboring countries and US allies to prevent the true formation of an alliance against China and an international system divided once again by confrontations and conflicts of different camps.