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01 America’s “Double Containment” Strategy against China and Russia: Changes and Enlightenment,by Zhang Wenzong, Deputy Director and Research Professor at the Institute for American Studies,CICIR; and Wang Jingyuan, Undergraduate at University of International Relations. In recent years, the major-country competition strategy pursued by the United States against China and Russia is essentially“soft containment”, and the shadow of a new cold war is hanging over the international community. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022, the US and its allies implemented a “hard containment”strategy against Russia, thus provoking a strong backlash from Russia and plunging the two sides into a new cold war. At the same time, the United States continues to regard China as its primary adversary and steps up its strategic containment against China. There are also voices in the US of “double containment” against China and Russia, that is, “hard containment” of both China and Russia in order to launch an all-out new cold war. This article analyzes that the Biden administration does not have the will and ability to carry out a comprehensive confrontation with China and Russia at the same time, and it is in the common interests of the international community to prevent a new cold war from spreading from Europe to the Asia-Pacifc region. In addition to China’s strategic planning,the US should also avoid stepping on China’s “red line”, especially on the Taiwan issue. America’s major Asian allies should be well aware of the enormous harm a new cold war would do to their own economic and security interests, and rein in America’s extreme actions. The fact that most Asian countries, especially ASEAN, adhere to the position of not taking sides is of great significance to regional peace and stability. It is also important for Western multinationals to make good use of China’s high-level opening-up policy and continue to play a “ballast” role between China and the US and the West.

22 The Influence of America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy on China-ASEANRelations and Its Countermeasures,by Liu Zhi, Senior Research Fellow at the “Belt and Road” Research Institute, Director of the Lancang-Mekong Sub-region Research Center, and Doctoral Supervisor of Yunnan University; and An Dongcheng, a PhD Candidate at the Institute of International Relations, Yunnan University. The Indo-Pacific strategy is a geo-balancing framework of the United States to integrate the Indian and Pacific Oceans and counterbalance China’s influence. As the hub connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, ASEAN occupies an important position in the layout of the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States. The Biden administration has precisely wooed ASEAN at the regional and national levels, and shown a trend of linkage in the political, security and economic felds. Its recently released Indo-Pacifc Strategic Report puts forward the strategic policy of “shaping China’s neighboring strategic environment” and reshaping the feld of competition with China, and positions ASEAN as a key ally and partner. The United States’ wooing and positioning of ASEAN has created pressure to divide China-ASEAN relations, but it is subject to ASEAN’s interest demands and policy choices, which also provides opportunities for the development of China-ASEAN relations. China should actively defuse the impact of the US Indo-Pacifc strategy on China-ASEAN relations and consolidate the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two sides.

44 Strategic Compass: A New Direction for EU Security and Defense,by Wang Yujing, PhD Candidate at the Center for European Studies and the School of International Relations, Renmin University of China; and Fang Lexian, Professor at the Center for European Studies, Renmin University of China. Over the past few years, the EU has worked hard to upgrade its security and defense sector, and introduced “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense” in March 2022. This is an important development in EU’s security and defense policy, which has derived from changes in its perception of global and regional threats and a rethink of its own defense policy. The Strategic Compass sets out action goals in four areas: crisis management, threat response, investment orientation and partnership,as well as specific means for implementation. This means that the EU attaches greater importance to improving the coherence and consistency of European defense, pays more attention to hard power competition,and further seeks strategic autonomy in security and defense, which has important geopolitical implications for other international actors. But the policy content of the Strategic Compass itself is fowed, and factors such as the political will of the EU and its member states, the ability to implement the action plan, and the long-term dependence on the US and NATO may also limit the realistic outcomes of the Strategic Compass.

63 The Impact of Finland and Sweden Joining NATO on theGeostrategic Landscape of the Arctic,by Dr. Xiao Yang, Professor at the School of Political Party and Diplomacy, Beijing International Studies University, and Guest Researcher at the CPDS. The security landscape in the Arctic region has changed from the post-Cold War pyramid-shaped pattern of “one superpower and several great powers” to a dumbbellshaped pattern with Arctic NATO countries and Russia as the ends, and Finland and Sweden as the buffer zone. Therefore, the key to NATO’s containment of Russia lies in how to draw the neutral countries in northern Europe into the NATO camp, so as to build a “security circle around the Baltic Sea” to contain Russia, increase geopolitical security risks faced by Russia’s core economic zone, and complete the “NATOization” of the Arctic. The Arctic has gradually shown its strategic value as it is linking the security landscapes of Europe, Asia and America. Northern Europe is no longer the marginal zone of Europe, but the core zone of the Arctic geostrategic landscape. The choice of the Nordic countries to follow NATO’s strategy is not only caused by the pressure of the strategic confrontation between Russia and the US, but also the internal promotion of their Western identity, and more importantly, it is related to the comprehensive prediction of the trend of the strategic interaction between Europe, Russia and the United States by their leaders and parties. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO will further shake the fragile balance of power in the geostrategic landscape of the Arctic.

81 Strategic Competition between China and the US in the Field ofSubmarine Cable and Its Influence,Wu Qiong, PhD Candidate at the School of International Relations, Nanjing University; and Dr. Pu Jingxin, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Languages, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. In recent years, the strategic competition between China and the US in the field of submarine cable has become increasingly fierce. In order to suppress China, the US has repeatedly stepped up strategic competition with China in this field by means of technological “decoupling”, spy submarine monitoring, and“third party” forces. Its main considerations are as follows: frst, the US is carrying out an all-round technological containment and encirclement against China; second, submarine cable is becoming a key field of strategic competition among major countries; and third, the massive data transmitted in the submarine cable is becoming an important strategic resource. The strategic competition between China and the US in the feld of submarine cable will undoubtedly bring a series of negative effects to their bilateral relations, such as damaging mutual trust, increasing the risk of military confict, and hindering the relevant technological cooperation between China and the United States. In the face of US actions of eavesdropping on Chinese cables and suppressing Chinese enterprises,China is taking countermeasures by building a “four-in-one” architecture system of diplomacy, law, technology and infrastructure, backed by its strong comprehensive strength, to safeguard its national sovereignty,security and development interests as well as legitimate rights and interests of its enterprises.

103 The Biden Administration’s Continuation and Adjustment of US-Taiwan Military Relations,by Xia Liping, Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations and Deputy Director at the Institute of China’s Strategic Studies, Tongji University; Ma Yanhong and Ge Yixing, Assistant Research Fellows at the Institute of International and Public Affairs, Tongji University. The Biden administration has both continued and adjusted the US-Taiwan relationship under the Trump administration. Both administrations have laid out US-Taiwan relations from the perspective of the Indo-Pacifc strategy, focusing on strengthening Taiwan’s asymmetric combat power, boosting exchanges between US and Taiwan military personnel, dispatching US military teams to stay in Taiwan in rotation, enhancing joint training and exercises between the US and Taiwan militaries, upgrading the level of mutual visits between US and Taiwan military officers, and consolidating bilateral intelligence

119 Evaluation and Analysis of South Korean Youth Group’s Cognitionand technical information sharing. The Biden administration has made more explicit its pursuit of the strategic goal of “containing China by using Taiwan”, attached greater importance to building a united front to contain China on the Taiwan issue, begun to make actual preparation for military intervention on the Taiwan issue, upgraded and strengthened the US-Taiwan defense and security dialogue, issued a new version of the “interaction guidelines” for US and Taiwan officials, and signed the “Memorandum on Establishing a Maritime Patrol Working Group”with Taiwan. The development of US-Taiwan relations has sent a wrong message to the Tsai Ing-wen administration and the Taiwan independence forces, enhanced the Taiwan military’s ability to resist reunification by force, made it more difficult for the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait, and seriously interfered in China’s internal affairs.Strengthening military ties between the US and Taiwan and challenging China’s red line will only lead to a confict across the Taiwan Strait, thus bringing disaster to Taiwan and also to the US itself.of China,by Yu Wanying, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Institute of Regional and Country Studies, Peking University. 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and South Korea. Over the years, China-ROK relations have developed smoothly and made remarkable achievements in many felds. However, the two countries also face many challenges in the process of enriching their strategic cooperative partnership. In recent years, the ROK public, especially the youth, has increased their negative perception of China, which should be paid attention to. As a generation that has grown up together with China-ROK relations, the ROK youth will become a major force driving the development of bilateral ties in the future. It is necessary to study the main reasons for the rise of South Korean youth’s negative perception of China,take targeted measures to continuously improve China’s cultural soft power,broaden the path of national cross-cultural communication in the digital era,innovate the exchange mode between Chinese and South Korean youth and enhance friendship, so as to maintain the long-term development of China-ROK friendly and cooperative relations.