Good and Bad Options For Washington

By Clifford A.Kiracofe

W ill Washington lose the future？ Yes and no. If the U.S. stays with its reckless and counterproductive policy of hegemony， then yes. If it drops its policy of hegemony and pursues a restrained and prudent course， then the answer might be no.

Since World War II （WWII）， the U.S. has lost four unnecessary wars： in the Korea Peninsula， Viet Nam， Iraq and Afghanistan. In recent days， the debacle of the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan reminded the world of the debacle of its retreat from Viet Nam. A military pullout from Iraq （and Syria） is inevitable.

Losing four unnecessary wars of choice with an untold cost in blood and treasure suggests that the U.S. has a leadership as well as a governance problem. President Dwight Eisenhower campaigned on getting the U.S. out of President Harry Trumans Korean War. He followed through on that promise and then cut the Pentagon budget.

In his farewell speech， Eisenhower warned against the growth of the “military-industrial complex.” History has proven him correct about the disastrous effects of its influence in Washington.

But will the U.S. Congress take a hard look at the 20 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq？ And after that hard look， will Congress start a change in foreign policy and national strategy？

Probably not. In D.C.， business as usual is the business of the politicians who have abdicated any responsibility for the consequences of their reckless and unnecessary wars and counterproductive foreign policy.

Justification of the Korean and Viet Nam wars rested on the pretext of “anti-communism.”Justification for the Iraq and Afghan wars rested on the pretext of “anti-radical Islamism” and“human rights.” Today， justification for the Cold War-style confrontation with China rests once again on “anticommunism.”

Lost in hegemonism

The pursuit of hegemony is in the nature of imperialism. The imperialist phase of U.S. history arguably began with the war with Spain in 1898 and had the usual features of colonialism. The so-called “Grand Strategy”Washington has pursued since WWII is a mishmash of 19th and early 20th century strategies as proposed by such experts as British strategist Halford Mackinder， Dutch strategist Nicholas Spykman， and American Admiral Alfred Mahan.

Washingtons Afghanistan intervention was based on the 19th century “Great Game” in which British imperialism confronted the Tsarist Russian Empire in Central Asia with Afghanistan as a key objective. Of course， the British Empire was defeated in Afghanistan， which has been called the “graveyard of empires.”