Russia’s Adjustments to Its European Policy amid the Reshaping of Transatlantic Relations

Transatlantic relations have initially warmed up after President Joe Biden took office， while a series of incidents such as the Russia-Ukraine border confrontation and escalating tensions in the Black Sea region have contributed to a further downturn in RussiaEuropean Union relations. In Moscow’s opinion， the EU’s collective action towards Russia is mainly driven by political security considerations and human rights concerns， represented respectively by the Ukraine crisis and the Navalny incident. At an expanded meeting of the Foreign Ministry Collegium in November 2021， Russian President Vladimir Putin， while laying down a red line for his Western counterparts， clarified Moscow’s basic stance towards Europe. Compared to previous versions， terms such as “establishing a partnership with the United States” and“consolidating mutually beneficial cooperation with the European Union”have not appeared in the latest Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation， which has been interpreted as a fundamental change in Russian foreign policy.1 Grasping the connotations， motivations and contributing factors to Russia’s adjustments to its policy towards Europe will contribute to a better understanding of and facilitate further research into the dynamics and trends of Russia-EU relations， as well as the Russia-EU-US tripartite interactions.

Connotations of Russia’s Policy Adjustments

During Donald Trump’s presidency， a combination of geopolitical differences， economic competition， and internal socio-political changes led to a drastic shift in transatlantic relations.2 Among the contested issues were the substantial divergences between Washington and Brussels on military spending for NATO， the digital tax， and trade protectionism. The EU’s call for greater strategic autonomy and more policy independence had been regarded as an opportunity to mitigate growing tensions between Brussels and Moscow. However， after Biden took office， the EU and the US began to reshape their transatlantic partnership， trying to confine their divergences and thereby resist and neutralize Russia’s attempts to divide the transatlantic alliance. In the meantime， Brussels has adopted a new approach to Russia characterized by “principled indifference” and “tough engagement.”3 In this context， Russia has reinforced its policy formula of “cutting， freezing， and dividing” against Europe， enhanced its frontier deterrence capability and built a “security arc” around the Black Sea， and pushed forward “the decoupling of issues” in attempt to reshape the Russia-EU relationship as neither friend nor foe.

Strengthening policy formula against Europe

For Europe， the transatlantic alliance provides necessary security guarantee and strategic support， based on which the EU can play its role under a multilateral framework.4 One of the core aspects of reshaping the transatlantic relations is to synergize the EU’s and the US’s positions and policies towards Russia. Former US President Donald Trump’s remarks that NATO is “obsolete，” coupled with his “America First” principle， had once caused a mental divide and much turmoil among policymakers within NATO. By reiterating that Russia would remain the main adversary for NATO until 2030， the “Russia threat” was exploited by Biden to restore the transatlantic consensus.5 In June 2021， the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a joint communiqué on EU-Russia relations， summarizing the EU’s policy as simultaneously “push back， constrain and engage” Russia.6 At the level of member states， the “French-German consensus，” whose main idea is to restore the EU-Russia dialogue， is in conflict with the “ingrained Russophobia” of Eastern European countries， who are pressuring the EU to reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies as soon as possible7 and calling for further measures to deal with Russia’s alleged “malicious acts.”8 In response to the EU’s changed stance， Russia has strengthened its policy formula of “cutting， freezing， and dividing.”

First， Russia cuts its ties with NATO following the principle of “nonreciprocal retaliation.” In 1997， Russia and NATO signed a partnership agreement and pledged to stop treating each other as adversaries， refrain from threat or use of force against each other， cooperate on disarmament and develop partnerships. In 2002， the Russia-NATO Council was established， and institutional communication had never completely stopped despite the Russo-Georgian war and the Ukraine crisis. In October 2021， in retaliation for NATO’s expulsion of eight members of Russia’s mission to the alliance and constrain the number of positions Russia can accredit to NATO to 10， Russia not only shuttered its permanent mission to NATO but also suspended the operation of NATO’s Military Liaison Mission and Information Office in Moscow， thus completely cutting all direct communication channels between Russia and the organization. The Kremlin also accused NATO of reverting to the Cold War path and claimed that their relationship was “even worse than that during the darkest days of the Cold War.”

Second， Russia freezes its interaction with the EU following the principle of “reciprocal restraints.” From Russia’s perspective， the EU is unlikely to make any drastic adjustments going beyond the framework of the five guiding principles of the EU’s Russia policy， put forward by former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini.9 To avoid undermining its foreign policy consensus， the EU will be forced to maintain the status quo and minimize the potential risk of adjustments to its policy. Unlike the de facto severance of its relations with NATO， Russia does not intend to completely bypass the EU. Instead， based on the premise of maintaining contacts on lowpolitical issues， Russia is trying to avoid its relationship with the EU being defined by NATO’s confrontational logic， while waiting for opportunities to normalize relations with the EU. Although it is true that， in response to the EU’s sanctions against Russian officials and enterprises， Russia reciprocally barred eight officials from the EU and its member states from entering the country， Russia did not renounce its right to participate in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe， retained technical dialogue mechanisms such as the EU-Russia Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee and the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue， and prompted EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borrell to visit Russia. Russian President Putin even published an article in German weekly newspaper Die Zeit， stressing that Russia， as one of the largest countries in Europe， would keep a constructive， honest， and open mind to restore comprehensive partnership with Brussels.10 This contrasts with the previous statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that as a single entity， the EU no longer has any link with Russia.

Finally， Russia forms a limited “issue-based coalition” between Russia and selective EU member countries following the principle of “dividing and hedging.” Compared with Germany， France， Italy， and other countries from the “old Europe，” the “new Europe，” like the Eastern European and Baltic states， bears a heavy historical burden and adopts a stronger antiRussian stance， and thus pushes the EU to impose harsher sanctions against Russia. By enhancing economic and technical cooperation with the “old Europe，” the Kremlin wants to influence the integrity of the EU’s sanctions against Russia through a policy of differentiation. In addition， Brexit has split Europe into EU and non-EU camps， and the EU’s internal hierarchy based on development stage and comprehensive power is emerging. All this has created and legitimized a niche that Russia may fill.11 At the same time， the ambiguity of the EU’s strategy towards Russia is also perceived as an opportunity to divide the transatlantic alliance.12 For example， Russia has straightened the political and economic logic of its energy policy towards the EU through the Nord Stream-2 project， targeting major markets such as Germany， France， the Netherlands and Austria and exploiting the “energy lever” to influence their political decision-making. Besides， Russia has also taken advantage of some member states’ ignorance of EU collective interests amid the pandemic， and promptly expanded its anti-pandemic cooperation and vaccine diplomacy， which included sending medical groups to Italy， promoting recognition， application and manufacturing of its Sputnik V vaccine in Italy， Hungary， Greece and other countries. In general， Russia attempts to form a limited “issue-based coalition” with different EU member states， focusing on common interests in specific areas.13 However，unlike traditional military， political， and even value-based alliances， the two parties are not bound by any strategic framework or oriented towards any common identity， instead enjoying more flexibility in cost-sharing and collective action. This kind of collaboration widens the EU’s internal divergence on the perception of Russian threat and to hedges against the EU’s internal pressure on extending sanctions against Russia.

Enhancing frontier deterrence capability to build a “security arc” around the Black Sea

Although the Trump administration intended to ease confrontation between the United States and Russia， it failed to do so mainly due to the political pressure caused by the investigation into possible collusion between Trump’s 2016 campaign and Russia. After Biden took office， the US used the collective action under the NATO framework as a major instrument to consolidate anti-Russian values and set up the agenda of containing Russia. Since then， the US has organized or participated in a series of military exercises， such as “Poseidon 2021，” “Defender-Europe 2021” and “Sea Breeze 2021，” with the Black Sea and its adjacent waters as the core area， which set new records in terms of frequency and scale. The entry of USS Mount Whitney command ship and USS Porter destroyer into the Black Sea at that time caused strong dissatisfaction on the Russian side， and the British Royal Navy’s HMS Defender was expulsed after it passed through Russia’s territorial waters. On October 21， 2021， NATO defense ministers agreed on the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and its implementation plan， and pledged to prepare for simultaneous attacks by Russia in the Baltic and the Black Sea regions.14 Putin noted that it was the entry of NATO’s missile ships into the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea that led to changes in the overall political and security situation， and that NATO’s dispatchment of strategic aviation units and use of actual combat weapons in “unplanned” exercises has posed a serious challenge to Russia. In response，Russia is strengthening frontier deployment and security deterrence pivoting on the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea， and is accelerating processes such as the integration of Russia and Belarus into a union state， the Russia-Armenia security cooperation， and the integration of the Donbas region into Russia. Furthermore， it is safeguarding political security along the border between Russia and Europe， as well as emphasizing the necessity to respond to the“information warfare.”

In terms of military security， Russia strengthens its frontier deployment and regular surveillance and patrol in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea， with the intention to constitute security deterrence on Europe at both its northern and southern ends. For example， the Russian Black Sea Fleet has conducted joint naval and air exercises with the air force of the Southern Military District and the Air Defense Army. Through unannounced combatreadiness inspections， additional airborne regiments were sent to the western border region to enhance the force’s mobile defense capability. The Russian Ministry of Defense has accelerated the construction and modernization of the Novorossiysk and Sevastopol naval bases in the Black Sea and plans to establish 20 new military units in the Western Military District. Russia has equipped the Black Sea Fleet with “Zircon” hypersonic missiles and several Gorshkov-class frigates to make up for the shortage of large and mediumsized combat ships. In addition， the Baltiysk naval base has basically finished the renovation of warship mooring facilities. By laying new power supply lines and pipelines， the base has created conditions for the deployment of the Steregushchiy-class corvette which carries “Zircon” hypersonic missiles. Russia also plans to equip the Baltic Fleet with Su-30SM2 fighters by the end of 2022， to form effective deterrence against NATO.

In terms of political security， Russia has pushed forward integration processes in Belarus， South Caucasus， and eastern Ukraine to consolidate the frontier areas of Russia-Europe confrontation. The Black Sea region， where the Russo-Georgian war， the Crimea crisis， and the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted， is an important sector in the conflict between Russia and the West， and thus is of great strategic value. In light of the US Secretary of Defense’s recent visits to Georgia， Ukraine and Romania in an effort to bolster US military support and enhance defense cooperation by signing documents such as the Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative and the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership，15 Russia intends to warn NATO of its push to establish “de facto alliances” with Georgia， Ukraine and other countries in this region through political， economic， diplomatic and other means， and secure Russia’s southwestern flank by preventing the US from forming a military bloc around the Black Sea.

First， Russia has promoted the institutional integration of Russia and Belarus into a union state. In the wake of the Belarusian election protests， the forced diversion of a Ryanair flight to the Belarusian territory， among other incidents， Europe has toughened economic sanctions against Belarus， including a ban on new loans from the European Investment Bank. This， coupled with impacts of the pandemic， had a strong negative effect on the Belarusian economy. During his visit to Russia in September 2021， Belarusian President Lukashenko and Putin not only reached an agreement on 28 cooperation programs for the construction of the Union State， Belarus also obtained a loan of US$630 million to meet urgent needs. On November 4 of the same year， Putin and Lukashenko signed an integration decree during an online meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State， which sets forth the Guidelines for Implementing the Provisions of the Treaty Establishing the Union State in 2021-2023. By carrying out 28 sectoral programs， the Union State is trying to promote a coordinated macroeconomic strategy， introduce unified taxation principles， implement common policies in financial， industrial and agricultural sectors， and harmonize regulations for the oil， gas， electric power， and transport services markets. Minsk and Moscow also approved the Military Doctrine of the Union State which aims at creating a stable and secure atmosphere on the external border， jointly resisting any attempt to interfere in their internal affairs， and using regional forces of the Union State as a security shield for themselves and the post-Soviet space. Although the integration decree does not involve pendent issues such as subject identity and sovereignty transfer， nor is it substantively the rebuilding of the Soviet Union， Russia is still able to transform Belarus， a traditional strategic “buffer zone” between Russia and the West， into a new“confrontation front” through quasi-military security engagement， political and economic support， and guidance of public opinion.

Second， Russia has strengthened security cooperation with Armenia. Russia’s delayed intervention in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resulted in Armenia’s defeat in the regional war. The initial ceasefire agreement proposed by Russia also failed， indicating the decline of Russia’s control over the post-Soviet space. It has become a priority for Moscow’s regional policy to increase the strategic centripetal force and systematic military dependence of the countries in the post-Soviet space on Russia. It also aims to consolidate the exclusive status of the Eurasian Economic Union（EEU） and the Collective Security Treaty Organization （CSTO）. At present， Russia and Armenia are inclined to deepen security cooperation， including increasing the number of Russian troops at the 102nd military base in Gyumri and reinforcing Russia’s assistance in Armenian military institutional reforms. The two countries even discussed the deployment of Russian troops on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The leader of the Armenian Alliance Party， Tigran Urikhanyan， proposed the establishment of an “Armenia-Russia Alliance，” in other words， to advance the integration of Armenia and Russia along the lines of the Russia-Belarus Union State and deal with Armenia’s socio-economic matters within EEU and CSTO frameworks. With its increasing dependence on Russia in political， economic， security and all other aspects， Armenia is about to become a pivot in Russia’s reconstructed regional security structure.

Third， Russia has sped up social and economic integration with eastern Ukraine. In addition to issuing Russian passports to residents of the Donbas area and organizing local elections， Russia also grants quasinational treatment to products from Donbas in the name of anti-pandemic and humanitarian support. In November 2021， Putin signed a decree to provide humanitarian assistance to Donetsk and Lugansk， two self-declared republics in the Donbas region， and facilitate the access of their goods into the Russian domestic market， granting them the same status as Russian goods in government procurement. Strengthening socio-economic ties with eastern Ukraine， especially in the fields of trade and logistics， will help Russia consolidate social support in the struggle with NATO in Ukraine.

In terms of information security， Russia makes efforts to prevent the EU’s penetration into its internal affairs and ideological sphere. The new version of Russia’s National Security Strategy includes a separate chapter on information security， which highlights several new threats such as cyberattacks， espionage， disinformation， monopolies by transnational corporations， and cybercrime. It also emphasizes the necessity to maintain sovereignty and security in the virtual sphere， and predicts that cyberspace will become a major battleground in Russia-Europe disputes. Moreover， Europe’s political mobilization on the internet and support for political protests in Russia is considered by the Kremlin as attacks on the country’s sovereignty. As a national security priority， Russia is taking action against any sabotage and incitement by some countries that are exploiting Russia’s internal problems， and is countering the “new Cold War” and “hybrid war”with the Western bloc over cyberspace， judicial， social and NGO affairs.

Reshaping Russia-Europe relations as neither friend nor foe

During the Trump administration， the French-German consensus on Europe’s stance towards Russia contained the scope and intensity of European-Russian tensions. For example， French President Emmanuel Macron once called for a reassessment of the EU’s strategic view on Russia， suggested the creation of a French-Russian Security Cooperation Council and a restart of the “2+2” strategic dialogue between foreign and defense ministers， while at the same time pointing out that the hostile policy toward Russia adopted by Europe in recent years had failed.16 Then German Chancellor Angela Merkel repeatedly called for talks with Russia and criticized the United States for imposing extra-territorial sanctions against the Nord Stream-2 project.17 She holds the view that Europe’s energy policy should not be decided by Washington and insists on promoting energy cooperation with Russia.18 The EU also intends to regard Russia as a nominal partner for cooperation in political， economic， social， and foreign affairs. However， after Biden took control of the White House， some European countries accused France and Germany of failing to help Ukraine preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity， of failing to prevent the buildup of Russian troops on Ukraine’s border， which undermined the confidence of EU member states and NATO allies bordering Russia.19 Meanwhile， France and Germany met fierce opposition when they put forward the idea of holding a summit between Brussels and Moscow.20 In response to Europe’s internal disputes and quest for autonomy， Russia does not seek the lifting of sanctions， but wants to reach consensus with Europe along the path of “issue decoupling，” to remind Europe of their traditional links in geopolitics， economy and mobility of people， reduce the feeling of enmity and shape Europe into an independent“pole” in the Russia-Europe-US tripartite relationship.

In terms of approach， Russia promotes the “issue decoupling” between consensus building and geopolitical confrontation. While strengthening its frontier deterrence capability， Russia also attempts to expand consensus with Europe on both traditional and emerging issues. For example， in the name of maintaining European energy security and sovereignty， Russia is building consensus with Europe against extra-territorial sanctions， promoting energy cooperation including the Nord Stream-2 project， and calling for resumption of the EU-Russia Gas Advisory Council and its subordinate working groups on the prediction of long-term scenarios of natural gas and on the development of gas transport infrastructure. At the same time， in response to US sanctions on European companies that do business with Russia and Washington’s threats to cut off Russia from the SWIFT financial messaging service， Moscow tries to build consensus with Europe against American financial hegemony， supporting the euro as the main currency in international settlements and reducing the share of US dollars in foreign trade with European companies. Russia also proposed a joint information database with Europe to provide solutions for sanctioned companies and called for establishing a legal mechanism at the EU level for this purpose. Russia regards scientific and technological cooperation as a growing opportunity for building consensus， both at the level of the EU and its key member states. For example， the EU-Russia Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee proposed that science， technology， and innovation cooperation， including the Horizon Europe program， should serve as a bridge between the EU and Russia.21 Specialized bilateral mechanisms such as the Russian-French Economic， Financial， Industrial and Trade Council and the Russian-German High-Level Working Group on Strategic Economic and Financial Cooperation have become key platforms for pragmatic RussiaEurope cooperation. In addition， Russia hopes to resume Russia-Europe interaction on international and regional issues by building limited consensus concerning issues such as the uncoordinated withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the stalled talks over the Iran nuclear deal.

In terms of perception， Russia makes effort to reduce the mutual sense of enmity. As some European leaders proposed to reassess the EU’s policy towards Russia and seek for a more pragmatic and responsible mode of interaction， Russia also tries to mitigate the sense of animosity and see the EU sanctions as a forced move to demonstrate transatlantic unity and conform to reality of US-Russia confrontation. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko pointed out three prerequisites for improving RussianEuropean relations： the EU should abandon its hostility towards Russia and adopt a cooperative stance， NATO must give up its attempts to drag Russia into a new Cold War， and European countries have to shake off US influence and show some autonomy in their policies towards Russia. Putin also indicated that although Europe remains Russia’s main trade and economic partner， the former tends to ignore the obvious benefits of political， economic， cultural and people-to-people interaction with its neighbor when it turns to sanctions， unfriendly actions and unfounded accusations against Russia. He believes that EU sanctions have caused both parties huge capital， employment and market losses， and hopes that the normalization of Russian-European relations can be realized as soon as possible. Chairman of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Foreign Minister， Igor Ivanov， said that Russia cannot be torn away from Europe， because Europe without Russia would not be complete， and that Russia and the EU should set out a strategic roadmap based on mutual interests.

Motives for Russia’s Policy Adjustments

Against the backdrop of the reshaping of transatlantic relations， it cannot be denied that the rift between the United States and Europe has narrowed accordingly， and that their policy towards Russia is increasingly aligned. However， the restructuring of global supply， industrial and value chains， emerging crisis of the liberal international order and intensifying competition among major powers， have all made Russia， Europe and the US simultaneously develop their respective identities， special interests and values. Therefore， by balancing its policy towards Europe， Russia hopes to tackle the new normal in its political and security relations with Europe after the US comeback， and strengthen its energy leverage and the integration of mutual interests while catering to Europe’s demand for strategic autonomy， thus playing a more proactive role in the Russia-Europe-US interaction.

First， Russia intends to address the dual effects brought by the changes in transatlantic relations and European strategic autonomy. Trump’s “America First” principle led to the resurgence of the rhetoric that“the Atlantic alliance has collapsed” and the narrative of “reinventing the West，”22 which constituted the ideological basis for Europe to question the status quo of transatlantic relations.23 During this time， the concept of a“sovereign Europe” became the focus of discussion among EU institutions and think tanks. For instance， in a paper on diplomatic and security strategy released by the EU External Action Service， called Sharing a Vision and Acting Together： A Stronger Europe， the word “autonomy” became a frequently used expression. The strategy itself suggests that appropriate ambition and strategic autonomy are essential for the EU to improve its capacity to safeguard peace and security.24 A report by the European Council on Foreign Relations， titled Strategic Sovereignty： How Europe Can Regain the Capacity to Act， emphasizes that “sovereign Europe” means enhancing the geopolitical competitiveness of member states， especially their capacity for autonomous decision-making when dealing with major powers such as the US， China and Russia. It advocates stimulating and integrating Europe’s comparative advantages and influence， and increasing the independence of member states from outside forces.25 It has thus become a general consensus that the EU strives to become an independent geopolitical actor and strengthen its position in the global political arena.26 Russia hopes to fully utilize this“sovereign Europe” factor and help Europe realize strategic autonomy.

However， it is worth noting that Europe’s strategic autonomy in reshaping transatlantic relations has dual effects： while it stresses the need to reduce political and security dependence on the US， it also calls for taking precautions against and counterbalancing other major powers such as Russia and China. Europe and the United States both emphasize that Russia has never jettisoned the idea of building a “quasi-alliance” in the Eurasian region. When dealing with conflicts in the post-Soviet space， Russia tends to establish exclusive “dispute settlement” mechanisms and coerce the West into reducing its support for former Soviet states with the threat of force. The post-Soviet space is only superficially independent and in reality controlled by Russia and thus contains security risks for Europe.27 Moreover， Europe’s ambitions for strategic autonomy are not separate from the universal values and the type of civilization associated with the “Greater West.” Former Chairman of the European Commission Jacques Delors once said that EU integration follows the concept of “concentric circles，” where member states make up the core， and the rest is divided into peripheral areas， the circle of friends and other countries.28 In European foreign policy practice， Russia is still classified as one of the “other countries，” a clear sign of the discrepancy between its geographical identity and its value identity， which shapes the troubled relationship between Russia and Europe.29 Therefore， Russia’s formula of “cutting， freezing， and dividing，” while still catering to Europe’s desire for more strategic autonomy， seeks to increase internal divisions between the European Council， the Council of the European Union， the European Commission， the European Parliament， the European External Action Service and other EU institutions when it comes to sanctions against Russia and their interference into Russia’s social system or any region traditionally under Russia’s geopolitical influence.

Second， Russia wants to alleviate its political anxiety and insecurity in the post-Soviet space. The post-Soviet space is a vital part of Russia’s geostrategic framework and the main arena for conflicts between Russia and Europe. This area has a “center-periphery” structure， in which the peripheral countries cannot replace Russia with someone else， but may to various degrees be able to shake off Russia’s domination or influence.30 The EU has tried to cut off the traditional ties between Russia and the Eastern European and Baltic states， replacing the “mutual security guarantees” advocated by Russia with an integration process based on the “European future.”31 In recent years， political concepts， represented by localization and “de-Russification，” are emerging in the post-Soviet space， especially in the region around the Black Sea， which is located right between Russia and the West. There is a rising demand in countries of the region for reducing the reliance on Russia and playing a balancing role between Russia and the West. For example， after being elected as Prime Minister of Armenia in 2018， Nicol Pashinyan began to change his previous pro-Russian orientation and developed partnerships simultaneously with Russia， the EU and NATO， without depending on any of them alone. When Moldovan President Maia Sandu entered office in 2020， she asked Russia to withdraw the 14th Army Corps from Transnistria and wanted to end the country’s division through joint efforts with Ukraine. Moldova also wants to form a trilateral military alliance with Ukraine and Georgia in the Black Sea region. Belarussian President Lukashenko also once made active overtures to Europe and the United States before he eventually returned to his “one-sided” policy towards Russia due to the turmoil surrounding his presidential reelection.

In addition， some countries are trying to strengthen the building of their respective national identities， implementing a language policy of “derussification” and devising a more independent and balanced politicoeconomic strategic conception， which is perceived by Russia as a major challenge to its sphere of traditional influence. Therefore， Russia emphasizes the common cultural identity and historical memory of countries in the post-Soviet space， while claiming that Moscow would treat the growing independence of these countries with extra care but without interfering into their domestic affairs with “instructions” or “money.” In addition， Russia tries to enhance its frontier deterrence capabilities and promote regional processes on various fronts in order to build a “security arc” around the Black Sea. This serves to restore the atmosphere of good neighborliness， security， and cooperation in the post-Soviet space， and alleviate the political and security concerns in Russia’s neighborhood through interaction under EEU and CSTO frameworks.

Third， Russia is extending its policy leverage in the energy sector. In October 2021， Putin announced at the “Russia Energy Week”International Forum that Russia plans to become carbon neutral by 2060. Russia intends to use its carbon-neutrality agenda to accelerate the transition to renewable energy， which also reflects its growing anxiety about the rapidly narrowing “window of opportunity” for profiting from fossil fuels. On the one hand， the forecast of global decline in fossil fuels demand evokes anxiety in the energy market， and pushes Russia to harvest its dividend of existing oil and gas more quickly. Pavel Zavalny， Chairman of the Committee on Energy of the Russian State Duma， said that Russia needs to grasp the time window of relatively stable global demand for hydrocarbons by 2040 and do its utmost to exploit oil. Russia’s Energy Strategy-2035 suggests that the total oil production of Russia may drop rapidly after 2029. On the other hand， the decline of the political dimension in oil and gas products causes Russia’s fear of losing power. The “shale revolution” led by the US and the “new energy revolution” led by the EU are changing the traditional outlook of global energy politics. The Western sanctions against Russia and attempts to prevent Russia from increasing its say over energy issues through introducing new technology further challenges Russia’s status as a global energy superpower.32

Energy cooperation is a vital element affecting Russian-European relations. The EU is the world’s largest consumer of gas. Gas comprises a quarter of its total energy consumption and its annual demand reaches 480 billion cubic meters. Russia provides around 40 percent of the EU’s imported natural gas， making it the EU’s largest gas supplier. In 2019， Russia’s natural gas exports amounted to 236.9 billion cubic meters， of which 192.6 billion cubic meters were exported to Europe， accounting for 81 percent.33 To use energy as a lever to influence Russian-European relations has become one of the driving forces behind Russia’s policy towards Europe. Russia wants to take advantage of the Nord Stream-2 project to form an “issue-based coalition” with certain EU member states as a tool to influence the EU and squeeze the political space of Ukraine as a transit country for gas. Meanwhile， as gas pipelines to Europe and the take-or-pay business model are being undermined by the spot market for liquefied natural gas （LNG）， Russia also hopes to extend its leverage in the energy sector to the“carbon neutral” domain by expanding LNG exports to Europe.

Fourth， Russia has been paying close attention to complementary cooperation with Europe. Although Russia-Europe relations have reached a low point on political and security issues， there is still a high degree of complementarity and stability in their trade and economic interaction， whereas the United States and Russia have drastically reduced their economic， social， cultural and people-to-people ties. In the economic and trade field， the EU is Russia’s largest foreign trade partner and main energy export destination. In the scientific and cultural field， more than 200 Russian institutions have participated in the EU’s Horizon 2020 program.34 More than 520 Russian researchers participated in the Marie Sk？odowska-Curie Actions （MSCA）.35 Russia also ranks at the top in terms of the number of participants in short-term exchanges under the “Erasmus+” program.36 By 2019， more than 4 million Schengen visas had been issued to Russian citizens， accounting for 27 percent of the total amount， and the EU had provided aid worth more than 13 million euros to Russia to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.37 The EU has listed some areas of cooperation in its latest “engagement” policy towards Russia，38 which has also become an important starting point for Russia to promote “issue decoupling” and reshape its relationship with the EU as neither friend nor foe.

Fifth， Russia has revised the romantic tendency in its Europe policy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union， Russian-European relations have experienced ups and downs along with changes in international politics and domestic political considerations. From 1991 to 1994， Russian-European relations were in the stage of “integration and recognition，” which focused on the promotion of “economic integration” and “political recognition.”Guided by Yeltsin’s policy of “total Westernization，” Russia accelerated its alignment with the West in system， concept， and practice through the “shock therapy.” European civilization， if without Russian element in it， was once considered “inferior.”39 From 2000 to 2008， Russian-European relations entered the phase of “retrospection and coexistence，” where the return to“Greater Europe” and linking the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans became Russia’s main strategic orientation.40 Putin once pointed out that Russia has been， is， and will be the largest European country， and that European dreams and culture， human rights， justice， and democracy have been the value standards of Russian society for centuries. However， the accelerated eastward expansion of the EU and NATO， the Russo-Georgian war， and the Crimean crisis brought Russia’s return to Europe to a halt and reanimated the scenario of hostile conflicts. The opinions of Nikolay Danilevsky， a Russian political commentator in the 19th century， who claimed that only by containing Europe can Russia realize its true interests， regained popularity among some Russian elite. Formerly established presumptions about the special partnership between Russia and the EU， namely that “Russia belongs to the European civilization，” about “the special advantages of Russian-European economic， financial， technological， and trade relations” and that “the EU’s legal and social model is attractive to Russia，” tended to lose credibility. For example， polls conducted by the Levada Center of Russia and the Albert Schweitzer Foundation of Germany show that “Generation Z” （14-29 years old） Russians do not share a European identity.41 Some people hold the view that with the inter-generational transition of leadership， Russia may abandon its quest for Western membership and chart an independent course in world affairs.42 When Russian-European relations deviated from the core of mutual needs during the Trump administration， they evolved romantically rather than pragmatically. However， in the context of the reshaping of transatlantic relations， Russia must redefine and adjust the core objectives and basic orientations of its policy towards Europe in light of changing domestic perceptions.

Contributing Factors

There is an opinion that， with the end of Putin’s fourth presidential term and the departure of the so-called “Putin generation” from the political arena， there may be a breakthrough in relations between Russia and the West. Russian-European relations until 2030 may enter a path of “cold partnership，” i.e.， the two sides cooperate in the fields of climate change， digital development and visa facilitation， but disputes on security issues remain. For the time being， there are still many variables affecting the adjustments to Russia’s policy towards Europe.

Exogenous factor： volatility of transatlantic relations

First， shifts in the strategic focus of Europe and the United States have affected the internal balance of Russia’s Europe policy formula. As a staunch “transatlanticist，” Biden is committed to reinvigorating the transatlantic partnership which he considers “the cornerstone for achieving all goals”43. By strengthening top-level coordination， suspending the “tariff war” and disputes over aircraft subsidies， and by partially rolling back sanctions against the Nord Stream-2 project， Biden has initially mended the rift between the US and the EU， consolidated the multilateral system based on shared values44 and better synchronized positions of the US and the EU on sanctions against Russia.45 While the US gives priority to its“dual containment” policy towards China and Russia， it is of much less importance to Europe. The US push for a new security architecture in the so-called Indo-Pacific region has also caused a great deal of distrust between the US and Europe. For example， the creation of the US-UK-Australia trilateral security partnership （AUKUS）， including their plans to cooperate on nuclear submarines， sparked strong discontent and diplomatic turmoil in France. Recently， the European External Action Service drafted a “Strategic Compass” program， aiming to establish “rapid deployment capability” and a“European military force” to deal with crisis independently from the United States. The final version could be adopted in March 2022， when France holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union.46 It is suggested that the increasing strategic alienation， the drifting apart of interests， and the weakening common identity between Europe and the US have initiated a downturn of the transatlantic relationship， which will transform from an alliance to a more balanced partnership.47 With more strategic shifts and divergences， Europe and the US may also move further apart in their Russia policies， leaving more room for Russia to rebalance its attitude towards Europe.

Second， the trend of Russia-US relations has shaped the Russia-EU- US trilateral framework. At present， there are desires both on Russian and the US side to maintain dialogue and curb confrontation. On October 13， 2021， US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs， Victoria Nuland， visited Moscow. To make this happen， the two countries had adjusted the“blacklist” of sanctions， demonstrating their flexibility in communication. The two sides are ready to hold the third round of the US-Russia bilateral strategic stability dialogue and are actively planning a second Biden-Putin summit. As Russia and the US are eager to maintain their high-level interaction， Europe and Russia are also expected to boost their strategic foresight and crisis management capabilities， and thus leave room to reduce their enemy stereotypes. In general， however， Biden will continue to target Russia over value differences， and use NATO to deter Russia’s“belligerent behavior，”48 as the nature of the structural conflict between the two countries is hard to change. In terms of geopolitics， Russia seeks to build a world of multi-polarity and coexistence， but the US wants to reaffirm the legitimacy of the transatlantic alliance by intensifying Russian-European conflicts， making it hard for Russia to maintain its strategically defensive position. As the fabric of Russia-US relations consists of military-security interaction which can hardly evade inherent security dilemma，49 the two sides are now enmeshed in new areas of titfor-tat confrontation such as the outer space， the Arctic and cyberspace. The disputes between the US and Russia regarding the global order and their respective roles， international security， and development are heated and such clashes will persist throughout the entire “Russia-West”macroscopic social discourse. Consequently， Russia and the EU will also feel constrained when they intend to decrease the scale of tensions and resume limited dialogue.

Finally， the awareness of “red lines” is key to keeping Russian-European confrontation under control. For now， Russia and NATO have no intention to cross each other’s “red lines” and “containment and counter-containment”is still the dominant strategic logic on both sides. For example， despite increased military assistance to Ukraine， NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has reiterated that there is no consensus among member states on Ukraine’s NATO membership and that NATO’s collective defense clause does not apply to Ukraine. Russia has de facto cut off communication channels with NATO， but is still in contact with the United States， Germany， France， and other major member states of the alliance to prevent serious consequences caused by strategic miscalculation. Black Sea states such as Turkey and Bulgaria still seek a balance between NATO and Russia， rejecting any abrupt changes in the status quo of regional security. Therefore， Russia’s strategy of enhancing deterrence and constructing a “security arc” around the Black Sea is introduced in a cautious manner to minimize chances of direct conflicts between the two sides.

Endogenous factor： constraints of domestic politics

First， the resetting of the French-German consensus prevents Russia and Europe from forming a limited “issue-based coalition.” It is uncertain whether the new German government will continue Merkel’s legacy50 and carry on its role as a special liaison for dialogue with Russia. Recently， German regulators have suspended approval for the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project and asked the operators to transfer its main assets and staff to a German subsidiary before it can conclude the verification process，51 which raised speculations about new changes to German-Russian relations. France， an advocate for a moderate stance towards Russia， will have its presidential election in April 2022， and any upsetting of the “FrenchGerman consensus” may prevent the EU and Russia from forming even a limited joint agenda on issues such as energy cooperation and pandemic control， and reduce the effectiveness of summit diplomacy between Europe and Russia. Furthermore， if significant changes in Russia’s domestic political situation occur as a result of European influence， including mass rallies， demonstrations or other political activities， Putin’s policy of détente would be affected to varying degrees. Previously， more than a hundred Russian human rights activists， lawyers， scholars， and social activists signed a petition to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to have the legality of the amendment to Russia’s constitution examined，52 which sparked intensive domestic opposition on both sides to any RussianEuropean détente.

Second， domestic political processes have consolidated the logic of“sanctions and counter-sanctions.” It has been the core strategy of Europe since the end of the Cold War to build up an integrated supranational organization that can strengthen the collective identity of its citizens while keeping Russia out by means of the transatlantic alliance. The amendment to the Russian constitution provides a legal platform for Putin to run for the presidency again after his current term and offers a practical basis for the idea of “Putin’s long state，” which would uphold sovereign democracy， strengthen national identity and national rejuvenation. The “postPutin era，” long expected by the US and the EU， may evolve into a “long Putin era” and reinforce the European’s suspicion and fear about Russia’s“authoritarianism.”53 Russian scholars and policy-makers are convinced that the Navalny incident reveals that sanctions against Russia are rooted in domestic politics， and it does not believe the EU is capable of creating a unified political and economic space and using it as a moral benchmark. Moscow no longer considers the EU， Germany in particular， as a future partner， and the prospect of a special Russian-European relationship has become an illusion.54 As a result， under the impact of the sanctions， Russia’s maneuvering space for moderate policy decisions towards Europe has become even narrower， and there is a surge of voices demanding a cut with the EU and withdrawing from the Parliamentary Assembly mechanism of the Council of Europe. If Europe continues to integrate countries from the post-Soviet space into the EU’s neighborhood framework and conform their political， economic， and social policy with EU membership， then the“sanctions and counter-sanctions” interaction between Russia and the EU will be difficult to dismantle.

Comprehensive factor： security and economic interests

On the one hand， changes in Russia and the EU’s perception of each other influence their policy orientation. In recent years， the promising future of building a “Greater Europe，” by retaining the normativity of conflicts， the relevance of identities and the logic of geopolitics， has slowed down the rapid deterioration of the bilateral relations from political estrangement to full-scale confrontation. The reason why a “New Iron Curtain” between Russia and Europe has not gone down yet lies in the fact that Russia and Europe still keep strong economic， trade， human， and cultural ties.55 Under normal circumstances， this kind of cooperation， which is based on expediency and geographic connections， is helpful to stabilize their fragile balance. However， if NATO continues to intensify its exercises and strengthen deployments around the Baltic and the Black Seas， and tries to increase its influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia， then Russia and Europe may get embroiled in sub-regional confrontation， including competition in the Western Balkans. Moreover， the disputes over the settlement of the Donbas situation may worsen. At the same time， the evolving international landscape also has an impact on the interests of actors. If the political， economic， and military confrontation between China and the US further escalates， the global situation will return to a bipolar state， which would relatively weaken Europe’s ability to shape the regional or even global agenda， and it would force Russia to conform to the general trend that the Asia-Pacific region rises as the center of world power. In this case， Russia would be more inclined to focus on the Eurasian region and change its priority which it has kept for the past 300 years， namely integrating into Europe.56 Russia’s “Greater Eurasian Partnership” is a tacit demonstration of this tendency.

On the other hand， traditional Russian-European cooperation confronts new constraints. Western economic sanctions against Russia as well as Russia’s countermeasures have hit hard the lifelines of Russian-European trade. The interdependence between Russia and the EU has diminished， and the complementarity of Russian and European economies has suffered significantly under the increased competition.57 Total trade volume between the EU and Russia has dropped from US$375.4 billion in 2013 to $218.8 billion in 2020， plunging by around 42 percent. Bilateral trade， which used to anchor the Russia-Europe relations， seems to get gradually defunct. Furthermore， the European Green Deal， as approved by the European Commission， sets the grand goal of transitioning to a new energy paradigm and moving towards carbon neutrality. The introduction of this policy fully represents the EU’s political ambition and strategic plan to take the lead in the global race for green development.58 The EU also adopted the EU Action Plan “Towards a Zero Pollution for Air， Water and Soil” and a proposal for the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism （CBAM）， which further demonstrates its solemn commitment to a green transformation. This has become an obstacle for Russia to make full use of its leverage in energy matters， as it is difficult to reconcile Russia’s energy-based strategic weight with Europe’s de-carbonization process. Besides， the climate issue may become a new area of competition between Russia and Europe as both intend to expand their reach and avoid restrictions over their interests and development.

Conclusion

Looking back at the history of Russian-European relations over the past 30 years， the two sides have often sincerely welcomed establishing a modern partnership and have moved forward in the same direction， while at other times they have been forced to return to the hard facts of reality when the contradictions between recognition and rejection， security and insecurity， independence and dependence came to the surface. As transatlantic relations are being reconstructed， Russia’s policy towards Europe has returned to a pragmatic path， striving to alleviate political anxiety and security concerns by strengthening the “cutting， freezing， and dividing” formula， promoting counter-sanctions and counter-hostility policies at the political level， strengthening counter-containment actions and frontier deterrence capability， and seeking limited cooperation by “issue decoupling.” However， whether Russia and the EU can keep confrontation under control and reach meaningful cooperation is still dependent on various internal and external factors.

We can envisage that Russia’s three-pronged policy formula will strengthen the differential interaction mode and multi-dimensional game between Russia and the EU. On the positive side， the limited joint agenda between Russia and EU member states may increase common interests between the two sides or among small circles of countries， which might embroil the EU into the dual dilemma of diminishing marginal effects of sanctions against Russia and increasing internal disagreements. On the negative side， Russia’s growing intention and capability of frontier deterrence and the continuous buildup of a “security arc” around the Black Sea will significantly increase concerns on both sides along the Russian-European border. The need for dialogue on critical global and regional problems will most likely not change NATO’s obstruction to the development of Russia-EU relations. Driven by the view that security prevails over economy， intermittent cooperation against the backdrop of lasting confrontation may become a normalcy between Russia and Europe.

As for the relationship among Russia， the EU and the United States， on the premise that the new normality of confrontation between Russia and the United States does not change fundamentally， Europe lacks a practical foundation for developing an independent European-Russian relationship based on its policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Since “Russia threat” still serves as the reason for NATO to exist and as the glue that holds Europe and the US together as a value alliance， it would still be a long way to go for Europe to transcend the existing institutional framework， overcome its capacity shortcomings and bridge the ideological gap if it wants to become a truly independent pole in the Russia-Europe-US constellation.

Zhao Long is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Governance Studies， Shanghai Institutes for International Studies （SIIS）.

1 Igor Denisov， “What Russia’s National Security Strategy Has to Say about Asia，” July 14， 2021， https：// thediplomat.com/2021/07/what-russias-national-security-strategy-has-to-say-about-asia.

2 Zhang Jian， “Changes and Prospects of Transatlantic Relations，” Contemporary International Relations， No.9， 2018， p.35

3 Mark Leonard， “The Russia Strategy Europe Needs， European Council on Foreign Relations，” February 22， 2021， https：//ecfr.eu/article/the-russia-strategy-europe-needs.

4 Jin ling， “Sovereign Europe： EU Transition to Hard Power？” International Studies， No.1， 2020， p.68.

5 “NATO 2030： Factsheets，” NATO， June 2021， https：//www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/ pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf.

6 European External Action Service， “EU-Russia Relations： Commission and High Representative Propose the Way Forward，” 2021， https：//ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_3010.

7 Michael Emerson， “With Russia Threatening Ukraine with War， What Should the EU Do？” April 12， 2021， https：//www.ceps.eu/with-russia-threatening-ukraine-with-war-what-should-the-eu-do/.

8 “EU Rejects Merkel-Macron Call for Leaders’ Talks with Putin，” Bloomberg， June 25， 2021， https：// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-24/eu-rejects-merkel-and-macron-call-for-leaders-talks-withputin.

9 These principles refer to full implementation of the Minsk agreements； closer ties with Russia’s former Soviet neighbors； strengthening EU resilience to Russian threats； selective engagement with Russia on certain issues such as counter-terrorism； and support for people-to-people contacts.

10 Vladimir Putin， “Being Open， Despite the Past，” June 22， 2021， http：//en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/65899.

11 Alexander Baunov， “An Alternate European Path： How Brexit Will Benefit a Democratic Russia，”February 6， 2020， https：//carnegie.ru/commentary/80994.

12 Nigel Gould-Davies， “Europe Urgently Needs a Geopolitical Purpose，” April 9， 2021， https：//www.iiss. org/blogs/analysis/2021/04/russia-eu.

13 Some scholars also use concepts such as “coalition of the willing，” “ad hoc coalition，” “united front”and “functional coalition” to decribe coalitions around specific issues. See Shi Tianyi， “Why do countries form alliances for specific issues？” Forum of World Economics & Politics， No.3， 2020， pp.23-48.

14 “NATO Agrees Master Plan to Deter Growing Russian Threat，” Reuters， October 22， 2021， https：//www. reuters.com/world/europe/nato-agree-master-plan-deter-growing-russian-threat-diplomats-say-2021-10-21/.

15 US Department of Defense， “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Visit to Georgia，” October 18， 2021.

16 “Obstacles to the Improvement of EU-Russian Relations，” People’s Daily， July 2， 2020.

17 “Pompeo Warns Energy Majors Over New Russian Gas Pipelines，” Bloomberg， July 15， 2020， https：// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-15/pompeo-threatens-sanctions-on-eu-companies-over-nordstream-2-kcnh97fq.

18 “Europe’s Energy Policy Made in Europe， Not Washington： Defiant Germany Again Hits Back at US Targeting Nord Stream Two Pipeline，” Russia Today， July 16， 2020， https：//www.rt.com/news/494961-germany-us-targeting-nord-stream2.

19 Martin Hurt and James Sherr， “Some Initial Lessons Identified for the West from Russia’s Action against Ukraine，” April 21， 2021， https：//icds.ee/en/some-initial-lessons-identified-for-the-west-fromrussias-action-against-ukraine.

20 Guy Chazan， “Berlin and Paris Propose Reset for EU Relations with Moscow，” Financial Times， June 24， 2021， https：//www.ft.com/content/03528026-8fa1-4910-ab26-41cd26404439.

21 European External Action Service， “EU-Russia Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee Met via Video Conference，” June 21， 2021， https：//eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/100412/eu-russia-joint-science-and-technology-cooperation-committee-met-video-conference_ en.

22 Dominique Mo， “Reinventing the West，” Foreign Affairs， November/December 2003， pp.67-73； Charles A. Kupchan， “The End of the West，” The Atlantic Monthly， Vol. 290， No.4， 2002， pp.42-44.

23 Sun Chenghao， “Changes and Prospects of Transatlantic Relations，” Contemporary International Relations， No.3， 2021， p.25.

24 European External Action Service， “Shared Vision， Common Action： A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy，” June 2016， https：//eeas.europa.eu/archives/ docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

25 Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro， “Strategic Sovereignty： How Europe Regain the Capacity to Act，”June 2019， https：//ecfr.eu/publication/strategic_sovereignty_how_europe_can_regain_the_capacity_to_act. 26 Sven Biscop， “Geopolitical Commission： A Powerful Strategy？” September 16， 2019， http：// egmontinstitute.be/a-geopolitical-commission-a-powerful-strategy.

27？Dumitru？M？nz？rari，？“Russia’s？Policy？Designs？in？the？Post-Soviet？Space：？Coercing？into？Cooperation，”？ 2021， https：//icds.ee/en/russias-policy-designs-in-the-post-soviet-space-coercing-intocooperation/.

28 Jean-Fran？ois Drevet， “What Borders for the EU： What Relations with a Variable Geometry Neighborhood？” September 2013， https：//institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/eulimits-drevet-nejdi-sept13-1.pdf.

29 Mark Entin and Ekaterina Entina， “The European Vector of Russia’s Foreign Policy： On the Anniversary of Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe，” March 2， 2021， https：//russiancouncil.ru/en/ analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-european-vector-of-russia-s-foreign-policy-on-the-anniversary-ofrussia-s-accession-to-the-counc.

30 Xue Fuqi， “Russia in the World System and China-Russia Cooperation，” World Affairs， No.11， 2021， p.17.

31 Eugene Rumer， “Russia and the Security of Europe，” June 30， 2016， https：//carnegieendowment. org/2016/06/30/russia-and-security-of-europe-pub-63990.

32 Peter Rutland， “The 2020 Oil Crash： Is Russia Still an Energy Superpower？” March 27， 2020， http：// www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/2020-oil-crash-russia-still-energy-superpower.

33 “How Many Natural Gas Pipelines Are There Between Russia and Europe？” September 25， 2021， http：//www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202109/25/t20210925_36945273.shtml.

34 The project is a funding tool for the implementation of the EU’s innovation policy， with a planned seven-year term （2014-2020） and a total budget of around €77 billion.

35 The project is the European Union’s flagship research funding program which aims to promote crosssectoral and inter-disciplinary research collaboration.

36 The program is earmarked for EU support for education， training， youth and sport in Europe， with a total budget of around €26.2 billion.

37 European External Action Service， “Facts and Figures about EU-Russia Relations，” June 16， 2021， https：//eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eeas-eu-russia_relation-en_2021-07.pdf.

38 These areas refer to jointly fighting the pandemic， coordinating responses to climate and environmental issues， increasing economically-driven technical cooperation with the Russian government， providing visa facilities for Russian citizens， and cooperating in the Arctic， Iran， Afghanistan， and other regions on counterterrorism， non-proliferation， conflict prevention and other issues.

39 Mark Entin and Ekaterina Entina， “The European Vector of Russia’s Foreign Policy： On the Anniversary of Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe.”

40 Richard Sakwa， “Multilateralism and Nationalism in an Era of Disruption： The Great Pandemic and International Politics，” Journal of International Analytics， Vol.11， No.3， 2020， pp.129-150.

41 58 percent of respondents deny that Russia is a “European country，” 64 percent believe that a conflict between Russia and the West is inevitable， and 42 percent believe that Russian-Western relations would always be marked by mistrust.

42 Nikolas Gvosdev， “Now No Longer European As Well？” June 9， 2020， https：//www.fpri.org/ article/2020/06/russia-now-no-longer-european-as-well.

43 “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference，” February 19， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-atthe-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference.

44 Erik Brattberg， “Transatlantic Relations after Biden’s First 100 Days，” May 6， 2021， https：// carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/06/transatlantic-relations-after-biden-s-first-100-days-pub-84472.

45 “U.S.， EU Impose Sanctions on Russia for Navalny Poisoning， Jailing，” Reuters， March 3， 2021， https：//www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny-wrap-idUSKCN2AU27Y.

46 “Strategic Compass： EU Sets Dates for New Military Force，” Reuters， November 16， 2021， https：//www. reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/strategic-compass-eu-sets-dates-new-military-force-2021-11-16/.

47 Jin Ling， “Reshaping the US-European Relations： From Alliance to a More Balanced Partnership，”China International Studies， No.2， 2021， pp.85-110.

48 Michael McFaul， “How Biden Should Deal with Putin，” Foreign Affairs， June 14， 2021， https：//www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-06-14/how-biden-should-deal-putin.

49 Liu Fenghua， “The Prospects of Russia-US Relations and Its Implications，” China International Studies， No.2， 2021， p.67.

50 Dmitri Trenin， “Merkel’s Legacy， as Seen from Russia，” October 1， 2021， https：//carnegiemoscow.org/ commentary/85475.

51 “Germany Suspends Approval for Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline，” The Guardian， November 16， 2021， https：//www.theguardian.com/business/2021/nov/16/germany-suspends-approval-for-nord-stream-2-gaspipeline.

52 “Venice Commission to Probe Russia’s Constitutional Amendment，” TASS， January 28， 2020， https：// tass.com/politics/1113639.

53 Robert Pszczel， “Dealing with Russia as It Is， Rather Than as We’d Want It to Be，” May 10， 2021， https：//rusi.org/commentary/dealing-russia-it-rather-we-want-it-be.

54 Fyodor Lukyanov， “The Time to be Yourself，” Russia in Global Affairs， Vol.19， No.1， Janurary/March 2021， p.5.

55 Zachary Paikin， “EU-Russia Relations after the Biden-Putin Summit，” June 23， 2021， https：//www. ceps.eu/eu-russia-relations-after-the-biden-putin-summit/.

56 Fyodor Lukyanov， “Is Russia’s Dialogue with the EU Coming to an End？” The Moscow Times， October 15， 2020.

57 Yin Hong， Gao Xianghong and Liu Fei， “Russian-European Trade Relations in the Context of Western Economic Sanctions，” Russian， East European and Central Asian Studies， No.5， 2018， p.80.

58 Xu Tingya and Chai Qimin， “Interpretation of the European Green Deal and Implications for China，”World Environment， No.2， 2020， p.66.