英文目录、摘要

CONTENTS

Can the Performance Appraisal System Restrain Intangible Corruption of the Executives of the Central Enterprises? The Test of Intermediary Effect Based on Incentive Efficiency of Compensation Contract

CHIGuohuaZHUJunqing(3)

Political Connection and Manager′s Tone Management:Reputation Constraint or Resource Support?

HEKangWANLimei(17)

The Nature, Effect and "Policy-Institution" Evolution Logic of Macro Policy

PANGMingchuan(28)

Early-warning Feature of Macro-prudential Index and Pro-periodicity Characteristic Test

YINXiangyi(40)

The Social Ecological Quality Measurement of China′s Industrial Development

WUHaoqiang(52)

Hukou Transfer Tendency and Influencing Factors of Rural Migrants in Cities

WANGChengliWANGHongna(64)

Research on Characteristics and Patent Value of Chinese Patent Gold Award

CHAORongLONGMinHUANGXiaoling(73)

Can Fiscal Transparency Curb Corruption?

DUYabin(82)

Signal Transduction, Reputation Constraint and Investment Risk Mitigation

ANQiangshenZHANGXiao(92)

Margin Trading, Managers′ Confidence and Corporate Environmental Investment

LIUYanxiaQIHuaijinLIUSiqin(102)

Trade Network and OFDI: An Empirical Evidence Based on Multinational Panel Data from 1970 to 2018

LVYueWEIYaning(113)

The Effect and Mechanism of Trade Liberalization on Consumption Pollution in China: An Empirical Test Based on Household Sulfur Dioxide

KEMeigao(125)

The Impact of Social Trust on Corporate Customer Social Responsibility

NIEJunRANRong(137)

Venture Capital Management Investment and Technology Commercialization Performance of Start-up Enterprises

CAOWu(147)

JOURNALOFZHONGNANUNIVERSITY

OFECONOMICSANDLAW

No.5.Sep. 15，2020

HIGHLIGHTS

CanthePerformanceAppraisalSystemRestrainIntangibleCorruptionoftheExecutivesoftheCentral
Enterprises?TheTestofIntermediaryEffectBasedonIncentiveEfficiencyofCompensationContract

CHI Guohua1ZHU Junqing2

·3·

(1.InstituteofAuditScience,NanjingAuditUniversity,Nanjing211815,China；
2.SchoolofAccounting,DongbeiUniversityofFinanceandEconomics,Dalian116025,China)

Abstract:In order to explore the governance mechanism of executive corruption from the perspective of incentives, based on the insurance of "Interim measures for the assessment of management performance of Heads of Central enterprises" in 2009 and combination of both the difference in difference method and the intermediary effect model, this paper empirically tests the impact of the changes in the performance assessment system in Central enterprises on the intangible corruption of senior executives. The results show that the intangible corruption of the executives has been significantly reduced after the implementation of this system, and this mechanism is realized by improving the incentive efficiency of the compensation contract; further, this mechanism more lies in reducing excessive incentive than in insufficient incentive. It mainly occurs in areas with strong property protection and law enforcement, and has no significant effect in areas with weak property protection and law enforcement. In addition to "putting power in the cage of the system", it is equally important to establish an appropriate incentive mechanism in the process of anti-corruption, and the incentive efficiency partly depends on the coordination of the institutional environment. All of these findings have certain reference value for comprehensively understanding the corruption governance mechanism and further promoting the "three-non-corrupting" mechanism.

Keywords:EVA Assessment; Executive Intangible Corruption; Compensation Contract; Insufficient Incentive; Excessive Incentive

PoliticalConnectionandManager′sToneManagement:ReputationConstraintorResourceSupport?

HE Kang1WAN Limei2

·17·

(1.SchoolofAccounting,SouthwesternUniversityofFinanceandEconomics,Chengdu611130,China；
2.ChinaInstituteofFinanceandCapitalMarkets,Beijing100032,China)

Abstract:Based on the data of private listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2017, this paper explores the influence of political connection of executives on tone management of annual reports. The empirical results show that the relationship between political connection and tone management of annual reports is significantly positive. Further analysis shows that the positive correlation between political connection and tone management is more significant in the group with stronger resource effect, higher media attention and litigation risk, and the tone management has no significant correlation with the company′s future business performance, but is significantly positive correlated with secondary offerings. This paper not only enriches the literature on text information disclosure, but also helps investors make more rational decisions.

Keywords:Political Connection; Tone Management; Text Analysis; Information Disclosure

CanFiscalTransparencyCurbCorruption?

DU Yabin

·82·

(SchoolofPublicAdministrationandPolicy,RenminUniversityofChina,Beijing100872,China)

Abstract:Although most studies have indicated that fiscal transparency plays an important and positive role in curbing corruption, few studies have ever explored whether this impact is different under different conditions. Based on principal-agent theory, this paper firstly explores the mechanism through which transparency can reduce corruption and the conditions under which this beneficial effect is more likely to materialize, and then empirically examines these based on Chinese provincial panel data during the 2006-2016 period and GMM method. The analysis results suggest that fiscal transparency reduces corruption significantly, and this effect is even stronger in settings with a higher degree of internet penetration, presence of social organizations, and audit accountability. Therefore, only when the public actually obtain and digest government information and have some instrument at hand to increase authorities′ accountable pressure, fiscal transparency can deter corruption and the abuse of public power.

Keywords:Fiscal Transparency; Corruption; Principal-Agent Theory; Audit Accountability; Moderating Effect

MarginTrading,Managers′ConfidenceandCorporateEnvironmentalInvestment

LIU Yanxia1QI Huaijin2LIU Siqin2

·102·

(1.SchoolofEconomicsandManagement,BeijingUniversityofChemicalTechnology,Beijing100029,China;
2.SchoolofAccountancy,CentralUniversityofFinanceandEconomics,Beijing100081,China)

Abstract:Based on the data of listed companies in Chinese main board market from 2008 to 2017, this paper explores the influence of managers′ confidence and margin trading on corporate environmental investment. The results show that there is a negative correlation between managers′ confidence and corporate environmental investment. Margin trading can not only promote corporate to improve environmental investment, but also alleviate the inhibiting effect of managers′ confidence on corporates′ environmental investment, which suggests that margin trading plays a certain external governance effect. Cross-section analysis shows that the restraint effect of managers′ confidence on corporate environmental investment is more significant in low environmental regulation region and non-heavily polluting enterprises, and the external governance effect of margin trading is more significant in non-heavily polluting enterprises. Overall, this article provides empirical evidence for the relationship between managers′ confidence and corporate environmental investment and the environmental governance effect of the margin trading, and provides a theoretical reference for further improving the corporate environmental responsibility system and solving environmental governance issues.

Keywords:Margin Trading; Managers′ Confidence; Environmental Investment

TradeNetworkandOFDI:AnEmpiricalEvidenceBasedon
MultinationalPanelDatafrom1970to2018

LV Yue1WEI Yaning2

·113·

(1.AcademyofChinaOpenEconomyStudies,UniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics,Beijing100029,China;
2.SchoolofBusiness,ShanghaiUniversityofFinanceandEconomics,Shanghai200433,China)

Abstract:Based on the bilateral trade data of UN Comtrade database from 1970 to 2018, this paper measures the index of trade network between 150 countries and regions in order to analyze the effect of trade network′s position on OFDI. The results of this paper show that the distribution of kernel density of global trade network′s PageRank centrality shows right-biased distribution, which means that only few countries established trade relationships with many partners, and the center of the global trade network is relatively concentrated, but the network is increasingly presenting a "multi-center" phenomenon with further development of international division; the OFDI flows of a country will increase significantly with the development of its position of trade network; the position of trade network promotes OFDI more significantly for developed countries and in the post financial crisis era; the position of trade network can promote a nation′s levels of financial and internet development and position of GVC to improve its OFDI. Therefore, higher-quality globalization and economic development will be achieved if we develop our trade network and cultivate new advantages of international economic cooperation and competition, which will also transform our nation to a "capital-exporting" investing power.

Keywords:Trade Network; OFDI; PageRank Centrality

TheEffectandMechanismofTradeLiberalizationonConsumptionPollutioninChina:
AnEmpiricalTestBasedonHouseholdSulfurDioxide

KE Meigao

·125·

(SchoolofBusiness,HuanggangNormalUniversity,Huanggang438000,China)

Abstract:According to the unique mechanism through which trade liberalization affects consumption pollution, this paper constructs the theoretical model, and tests the mechanism that trade liberalization affects consumption pollution in China by using Chinese provincial panel data of household sulfur dioxide from the year 2000 to 2015. The theoretical findings show that the environmental effects of trade liberalization in the field of consumption are composed of scale effect, technique effect and trade-induced composition effect; and the countries or regions with stricter environmental regulations consume the less consumption of CGP goods, and their technology of reducing consumption pollution emission is better. The empirical results show that as far as household sulfur dioxide is concerned, scale effect improves the level of consumption pollution in China, while technique effect and trade-induced composition effect lower the level of consumption pollution in China, and on the whole, trade reduces the per capita emission of household sulfur dioxide in China. There does not exist an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) of household sulfur dioxide in China, but the “Pollution Haven” hypothesis (PHH) of in the field of consumption is established in China.

Keywords:Trade Liberalization; Consumption Pollution; “Pollution Haven” Hypothesis ; Environmental Kuznets Curve

TheImpactofSocialTrustonCorporateCustomerSocialResponsibility

NIE Jun RAN Rong

·137·

(SchoolofPublicAffairs/ChinesePublicServicesResearchCentre,ChongqingUniversity,Chongqing400044,China)

Abstract:Using the data of Chinese Investment Climate Survey (World Bank 2005), we examine the effects of social trust on corporate customer social responsibility. The results show that corporates in regions with a high level of social trust have a better corporate customer social responsibility performance. The positive relation between social trust and corporate customer social responsibility is more statistically significant in non-state-owned enterprises and firms with stronger bargaining power. Moreover, we also find the effects is more significant in regions with lower quality law environment. Our results indicate that social trust is an important factor to promote corporate customer social responsibility. The article not only enriches the research on the factors affecting corporate social responsibility and the economic consequences of social trust, but also provides useful reference for government departments to promote corporate social responsibility.

Keywords:Social Trust; Social Norms; Informal System; Corporate Customer Social Responsibility