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Defense Cooperation between China and ASEAN Countries

2017-03-28LiuLin

China International Studies 2017年6期

Liu Lin

Defense Cooperation between China and ASEAN Countries

Liu Lin

Since the beginning of the 21st Century, China-ASEAN relations have entered into a period of rapid and all-round development, with their cooperation being hailed as a demonstration of China's cooperation with neighboring and developing countries. Defense cooperation between China and ASEAN started relatively late compared to their political and economic cooperation, and yet through the efforts of both parties, it has achieved substantial progress, and represents a tremendous potential. The defense cooperation, in deepening the strategic trust between China and ASEAN with the intention of establishing a strategic partnership, has played a crucial role in pushing the China-ASEAN relationship to a higher level.A systematic summing up of the recent years' development in the China-ASEAN defense relations, looking at the reasons for its development and the challenges it poses, will be important both for our understanding and for drawing practical conclusions.

Main Features of China-ASEAN Defense Cooperation

Due to a lack of mutual trust and the sensitivity of the issue, defense cooperation has lagged behind in China's relations with most Southeast Asian nations. During the Cold War, China's relations with both Vietnam and Indonesia deteriorated to the point of rupture. China had not yet established diplomatic relations with Singapore and Brunei, and it belonged to theopposing camp to Malaysia and the Philippines. China only maintained military and defense ties with individual Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Myanmar. While China established or normalized diplomatic relations with all ASEAN member states shortly after the end of the Cold War, defense cooperation between the two sides remained limited due to the United States' promotion of a quot;China threatquot;. However, China's insistence on not depreciating the renminbi during the 1997 Asian financial crisis won the confidence of the ASEAN nations and provided the turning point in China-ASEAN relations. In the new century, China and ASEAN have forged a strategic partnership aimed at peace and prosperity and have enhanced their mutual trust, and subsequently, defense cooperation between China and all ASEAN nations began to advance rapidly. It's worth noting, however, that China's defense ties with maritime Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia,Malaysia and Singapore have in some areas reached or even surpassed the level of its relations with its traditional Southeast Asian friends such as Thailand,Myanmar and Cambodia. China-ASEAN defense cooperation is continually expanding in both scope and depth and bears the following key features.

Cooperation spans a broad area.Defense diplomacy or defense cooperation between nations generally may take the following ten forms:(1) bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defense officials; (2) appointment of defense attachés to foreign countries;(3) bilateral defense cooperation agreements; (4) training of foreign military and civilian defense personnel; (5) Provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defense management and military technical areas; (6) contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units and ship visits; (7) placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries' defense ministries or armed forces; (8) deployment of training teams; (9) provision of military equipment and other material aid; (10) bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes.1Bhubhindar Singh amp; See Seng Tan, quot;Defence Diplomacy and Southeast Asia,quot; in Bhubhindar Singhamp; See Seng Tan, From 'Boots' to 'Brogues': The Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, RSIS Monograph No.21, 2011, p.2.

Previously China-ASEAN defense cooperation was limited to high-level visits and the provision of equipment and military assistance. In recent years,especially since China and ASEAN established their strategic partnership in 2003, both sides have attached increasing importance to defense and military cooperation. In various subsequent joint statements and communiqués,defense cooperation has been significantly deepened and concrete areas of cooperation clearly defined. As these statements highlight, China-ASEAN defense cooperation has been continuously enriched by various initiatives in all ten areas of cooperation except numbers (7) and (8), including high-level exchanges, military education and training, ship visits, joint exercises, arms sales and military assistance, and defense industrial cooperation. Areas that in the past were relatively weak and backward, such as ship visits, joint exercises and industrial cooperation, are now beginning to provide the defense relationship with new momentum. Take joint exercises for example, which in recent years has become a sign of the path-breaking progress in China-ASEAN military relations. Since 2007, China and Thailand have held three anti-terrorism exercises for Special Forces code-named quot;Strikequot; and three joint Marine Corps military exercises code-named quot;Blue Strike.quot; More than 1,000 personnel from both sides participated in Blue Strike 2016 and China for the first time sent ships and aircraft to the exercise.2quot;China, Thailand Start Joint Military Exercise,quot; Xinhua, May 21, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/21/c_135377888.htm.Since 2009 China and Singapore have had three joint exercises code-named quot;Cooperationquot;and China and Indonesia have also held joint training exercises for Special Forces in 2011 and 2012 under the code-name quot;Sharp Knife,quot; and antiterror exercises in 2013 and 2014 code-named quot;Sharp Knife Airborne.quot;3quot;China, Indonesia Complete Anti-Terror Exercise,quot; China Daily, November 12, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/12/content_17097461.htm; quot;'Sharp Knife Airborne - 2014' Concludes,quot;People.cn, November 6, 2014, http://en.people.cn/n/2014/1106/c90786-8805326.html.Since 2014, China has held three joint military drills with Malaysia codenamed quot;Peace and Friendship.quot; The 2015 exercise between the two countries included land, air and naval forces, which was the largest bilateral military exercise between China and an ASEAN country.4quot;China, Malaysia Hold Joint Military Exercise,quot; China.org.cn, September 18, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-09/18/content_36619462.htm.In December 2016 China also held a joint drill with Cambodia on humanitarian rescue and disaster relief named quot;Dragon Gold.quot;5quot;Cambodia, China Begin Joint Drill on Humanitarian Rescue, Disaster Relief,quot; Xinhua, December 15,2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/15/c_135908352.htm.

Furthermore, with the rapid development of China's defense industry,and its production capacity and high-end defense Ramp;D now on a par with that of the West, the relatively low-priced and Chinese-produced advanced weapons have had more appeal to ASEAN countries. Some of them have begun defense industrial cooperation with China or expressed an intention to do so. In the Joint Action Plan on China-Thailand Strategic Cooperation signed in May 2007, defense industrial cooperation was one of the 15 areas that the two sides were determined to advance between 2007 and 2011. When the former Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visited Thailand the same year, the two countries further discussed the possibility of joint arms production. In December 2016,the spokesperson for the Thai Defense Ministry revealed that Thailand and China were planning to jointly build a factory for the production of military equipment in Thailand. In October 2016, China and Malaysia signed a framework agreement on the joint development of the Malaysian Navy's littoral mission ships. And the defense ministries of China and Indonesia noted in a December 2013 joint communiqué that the two sides should quot;explore new forms of cooperation in military equipment technologies to provide necessary support for the facilitation of bilateral defense industrial cooperation.quot;6quot;China, Indonesia Strengthen Defense Exchanges and Cooperation,quot; December 18, 2013, http://3g.china.com/act/568_18225039.html.

Combination of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. For a long time, China-ASEAN defense cooperation was primarily conducted on a bilateral basis. But with the emergence of regional multilateralism and the establishment of a series of multilateral security mechanisms initiated by ASEAN, China-ASEAN defense cooperation added new platforms on which to operate. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has on many occasions sent officers to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the defense ministers of ASEAN countries have repeatedly attended the Xiangshan Forum, which was created by China for international military academic exchanges in an effort to promote regional peace and security. At the same time, the PLA has participated in various joint exercises under a multilateral framework.In March 2016, for example, China and Malaysia co-chaired the fourth ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx). In 2013 and 2016, the PLA sent delegates to the ADMM+ Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise. Since 2002, China has also hosted the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC), the ASEAN+3 Workshop on Disaster Relief by Armed Forces, the Asian Symposium on UN Peacekeeping, and the China-ASEAN Defense and Security Dialogue, among other events. It is noteworthy that these multilateral mechanisms do not exclude bilateral exchanges, and countries often utilize them as an opportunity for bilateral interactions. Thus China-ASEAN defense cooperation has gradually advanced from being purely bilateral relations to combined bilateral and multilateral exchanges, and the bilateral interactions in multilateral settings supplement and support each other, further enhancing the mutual understanding and trust between the armed forces of both sides and raising bilateral cooperation to a higher level.

From enhancing mutual trust to highlighting practical cooperation.During the Cold War, there was, for ideological reasons, widespread hostility,suspicion and mistrust toward China among Southeast Asian countries.Shortly after the end of the Cold War, under the influence of the quot;China threatquot; rhetoric from the West and due to unresolved issues with Vietnam,Cambodia and Indonesia over questions of land borders, the Khmer Rouge and overseas Chinese, there were still misgivings about establishing defense relations. Consequently, the two sides had to overcome the lack of trust before post-Cold War cooperation could be established. And creating that trust became the initial step in an attempt to create defense relationships and it took some time to bring this about. The immediate target was to create a bond of long-term trust between the parties. Currently, this still remains a major objective, but with cooperation deepening, both ASEAN countries and China have started to shift their focus from simply emphasizing the value of cooperation and mutual trust to highlighting practical cooperation in various areas, with exchanges on both technical and tactical levels, as well as advancing numerous specific proposals, such as encouraging dialogue between military services, expanding the scale of exercises, promoting exchanges of junior officers, jointly developing weapons and equipment, and strengthening collaboration between schools and universities. Joint training and exercises between China on the one hand, and Thailand, Malaysia,Singapore and Indonesia respectively on the other, China-Vietnam joint patrols of the Beibu Gulf, and the desired intent of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia to conduct defense industrial cooperation with China, are all examples of this shift. Besides, China's arms exports to ASEAN countries,which have gone from the simple export of light weapons with relatively low technological content to the export of high-end weapons and equipment,reflects the deepening of mutual trust and bilateral cooperation. For example,in March 2016 Indonesia's Defense Ministry indicated that it was assessing the feasibility of purchasing a China-made gun/missile integrated air defense system.7quot;Indonesia Eyes China-Made Air Defense System,quot; The Diplomat, March 3, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/indonesia-eyes-china-made-air-defense-system.In January 2017 Thailand announced that it would buy the MBT-3000/VT-4 tank and three S-26T submarines from China.8quot;Thailand will Purchase More Military Equipment from China,quot; January 4, 2017, https://www.militer.or.id/1186/thailand-will-purchase-more-military-equipmefrom-china.It should also be noted that China is starting to put forward plans and proposals based on the particular concerns of individual countries and their circumstances. For instance, China in recent years has been promoting exchanges on political work in the military with Vietnam due to the ideological affinities between these two countries. For Thailand, China highlights joint exercises and training, as well as defense industrial cooperation. For Malaysia, China proposes improving multi-sector coordination mechanisms to enhance bilateral cooperation.

Preparing for long-term planning and raising the institutionalization level. In the past, the areas of defense cooperation between China and ASEAN countries were relatively limited and so defense cooperation was conducted on a temporary basis and required no long-term planning.Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has successively established annual defense consultation mechanisms with Thailand (2002), Vietnam(2005), the Philippines (2005), Indonesia (2006), Malaysia (2006),Singapore (2008) and Myanmar (2013). With Indonesia it has set up a maritime dialogue mechanism and a joint committee on defense industrial cooperation. With Vietnam it has set up the joint patrol mechanism for the Beibu Gulf and a high-level discussion mechanism on the border issue. With Myanmar there exists a quot;2+2quot; consultation mechanism between senior officials from foreign and defense ministries.Moreover, China and Thailand have also signed a Joint Action Plan on Strategic Cooperation. China has reached with Malaysia a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation, has reaffirmed with Singapore a commitment by both sides to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation through a four-point consensus,9The four-point consensus is: both sides will strengthen the healthy and steady development of their defense relationship based on mutual respect and accommodating each other's security concerns for mutual trust; both sides will enhance dialogue and mutual understanding through the conduct of regular highlevel meetings and strategic consultation; both sides will promote confidence building and mutual trust by strengthening practical cooperation, such as joint training exercises; both sides will deepen people-topeople ties and friendship by increasing working-level exchanges and dialogues between both militaries.See quot;China, S'pore to Widen Military Ties,quot; China Daily, November 14, 2014, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2014-11/14/content_15191099.html.and has signed an agreement with the Myanmar military on an MOU to establish consultation between each other's border defenses and to manage border affairs. All these have provided guidance for China-ASEAN toward a standardized mechanism for their defense cooperation.

Motivations for Deepening Cooperation

The advance of China-ASEAN defense cooperation is driven by multiple factors, and is consistent with the security and strategic demands of both sides.

China's attitude toward developing defense ties with ASEAN countries has become much more positive.After the end of the Cold War,particularly since the beginning of the new century, China has attached increasing importance to its neighborhood diplomacy, proposing the basic principles of quot;treating them sincerely and honestly and making them friends and partnersquot; and quot;bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors,quot; as well as new concepts such as quot;amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.quot; Chinese President Xi Jinping has also emphasized that the basic tenet for China's diplomacy with its neighbors is to quot;treat them as friends and partners, so neighboring countries benefit from China's development, and to have China also benefit from the joint development,quot;and that China must uphold inclusiveness and quot;promote regional cooperation with an open mind and with greater enthusiasm.quot;10quot;Xi Jinping: China to Further Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries,quot; Xinhua, October 26,2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/26/c_125601680.htm.At the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Xi proposed a new Asian Security Concept featuring common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. The new security concept advocates and guarantees the security of all countries,integrates traditional and non-traditional security, promotes security through dialogue and cooperation, and focuses on both development and security to ensure enduring security. This important concept has undoubtedly created a favorable atmosphere and environment in the overall relationship between China and its neighbors. As part of its neighborhood diplomacy, China has also become more active in developing defense ties with ASEAN countries,as it helps alleviate ASEAN countries' security concerns about China and promotes mutual strategic trust. Some international scholars believe that the strengthening ties provide China with insights into the doctrine, tactics and capabilities of foreign military forces, enhance China's political influence in Southeast Asia, and offsets, through military assistance programs, Southeast Asian countries' existing defense relations with other external powers.11Ian Storey, quot;China's Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,quot; in From 'Boots' to 'Brogues': The Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, p.91.

Changes in ASEAN countries' strategic conception of China.In the past, a major obstacle of China-ASEAN defense cooperation has been the hostility, fear and concerns of ASEAN countries about China's rise, which was mainly derived from their understanding of China's behavior during the Cold War. A Singaporean scholar has classified China's threats to Southeast Asia during the Cold War into two types: one is the so-called communist threat, referring to China's support for the communist forces in Indonesia,Thailand and Malaysia from the 1960s to the 1970s; the other is the allegedquot;war menacequot; to Vietnam in 1979.12Eric Teo Chu Cheow, quot;ASEAN+3: The Roles of ASEAN and China,quot; in Saw Swee-Hock, Shen Lijunamp; Chin Kin Wah, ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p.61.These historical impressions have had a lasting impact and made ASEAN countries believe that the manner in which China realized its own national interests would be a cause of concern for them. Since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, with the trends toward multi-polarization and global economic interdependence rapidly gathering momentum, the influence of ideology in ASEAN's perceptions of China has been greatly reduced. The emerging economic strength of ASEAN countries and changes in China's foreign policy have shifted ASEAN's focus in the direction of bilateral economic and trade cooperation.China's strategic shift from an ideologically-oriented policy to a pragmatic policy13Ibid., p.62.has also served to alleviate the worries of ASEAN countries and reassured them that China prefers cooperation over conflict. This sense of China's moderation and willingness to cooperate has increased their desire to cooperate with China in the area of defense. At the same time, as security threats have become increasingly complicated and more diverse, and where unilateral efforts are hardly adequate to counter non-traditional issues such as terrorism, transnational crimes, piracy, the proliferation of weapons and natural disasters, there are more and more common interests between ASEAN and China in dealing with these challenges, and thus strengthening dialogue and cooperation becomes absolutely crucial. Of course, defense cooperation is considered by ASEAN countries as a means of integrating China into the regional cooperation process where the strategic balance and ASEAN's autonomy are maintained through mutual restraints between the major powers. A common security structure avoids Southeast Asian affairs being dominated by one single power and helps maintain regional peace and stability.14Li Yiping amp; Zhuang Guotu, eds., International Relations in Southeast Asia since the Cold War, Xiamen University Press, 2005, p.144.

China's burgeoning role in regional security affairs.The advance of China-ASEAN defense cooperation moves almost in parallel with China's growing military might. China's role in regional security has witnessed a significant rise following its growing comprehensive capabilities, and this has increased ASEAN's willingness to cooperate with China. In recent years, the Chinese military has participated on a more frequent basis in major overseas operations including anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden,the UN peacekeeping missions and the emergency withdrawal of overseas Chinese, and it has gained rich experience in organizing, commanding and coordinating military operations. This has created more favorable conditions for China and ASEAN countries to hold joint exercises and training, and has allowed ASEAN countries to gain more benefit from those programs.At the same time, with China's rise as a major power exhibiting a greater desire and greater capabilities to provide common goods for regional security,it has become a force that ASEAN countries tend to rely on in fighting terrorism, combating piracy, providing maritime security and responding to natural calamities. China is also willing to play its role as a major country and has proposed a series of initiatives. All these would be advantageous for expanding China-ASEAN defense cooperation.

Challenges Ahead

While China-ASEAN defense cooperation has witnessed all-round rapid development since the beginning of the 21st century, the level and depth of that cooperation is still far from adequate. First, the size of China's arms sales to ASEAN countries remains relatively small. Statistics show that China's military exports to Southeast Asia amounted to only $316 million from 2000 to 2009, but during the same period, the arms sales of the United States and Russia to the region were $3.19 billion and $3.29 billion respectively.15SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms_trade/values.php.There has been an increase in China's arms sales to the region, but the gap between its sales and those of the United States and Russia is still significant. Moreover, China's arms exports are smaller in kind,consisting mostly of the sale of tanks, helicopters and anti-ship missiles.Second, China's port calls to ASEAN countries are still too infrequent,only once or twice a year on average. In contrast, the US Navy port calls to ASEAN countries are much more frequent, with the Philippines being the most frequently visited.16Michael McDevitt, quot;The Contribution of Maritime Exercises to U.S. South China Sea Policy,quot; March 4, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/the-contribution-of-maritime-exercises-to-u-s-south-china-sea-policy.In 2012, the US Navy visited the Philippines 88 times, and in 2013 they visited as many as 140 times. Third, defense industrial cooperation between China and ASEAN is still at an early stage.Despite the agreements or understandings reached with Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia in this regard, substantial follow-up has been slow in coming.Fourth, the joint exercises and training between China and ASEAN countries remain at a low level. Compared to the thousands or even tens of thousands of military personnel that participate in the joint exercises between the United States and ASEAN countries, China's joint exercises are still small in size; the subjects are relatively simple, mainly centered on countering nontraditional security threats such as terrorism and natural disasters; and these occur mainly on a bilateral basis since China has still not succeeded in being able to conduct multilateral joint exercises or training with several ASEAN countries. The reasons for these are the following:

ASEAN's balance of power restrains China-ASEAN defense cooperation. The first obstacle to further development of China-ASEAN defense cooperation is the desire on the part of ASEAN countries to maintain a quot;balance of powerquot; between the major powers in the region. In Southeast Asia it has always been easy for major powers to exert influence and therefore, since the Cold War concluded, the Southeast Asian nations have adopted a policy of promoting a quot;balance of powerquot; in order to create a system of checks and balances between the powers, not allowing any one of them to become dominant in the region and in this way maintaining ASEAN's maximum security. This strategy is certainly directed in part towards China. Although there has been continual progress in China-ASEAN relations, for historical and geo-political reasons, a belief in the theory of quot;China threatquot; still exists in ASEAN countries and has taken roots in parts of the population. In recent years, with the rise of China and the advance of its military, particularly its naval, modernization, ASEAN countries' concerns over China have been aggravated. Some view China as a potential threat, and fear that a strong China will seek to become a hegemonic power in the region and will conduct a policy of aggressive expansion and economic penetration. Therefore, ASEAN countries remain reserved in quite a few areas in spite of the increasing defense cooperation with China. They hesitate to expand too quickly large-scale joint exercises and training, and prefer single-service exercises within a limited field rather than comprehensive exercises that include all services.17Prashanth Parameswaran, quot;Did China Just Boost Military Ties with Thailand?quot; The Diplomat, February 7, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/did-china-just-boost-military-ties-with-thailand.Moreover, the ASEAN countries have also increased their defense cooperation with other powers such as the United States, Japan, India and Australia. All of these have been done with consideration of balancing the influence of China.

The US, Japan and India scale up military relations with ASEANcountries.Also in recent years the United States, Japan and India have in succession accelerated their own military penetration in Southeast Asia in order to secure their own strategic interests. Concerned with the rise of China, the ASEAN countries also hope to draw the other major powers into regional affairs in order to balance Chinese influence. Thequot;Asia-Pacific rebalancequot; strategy of the United States under the Obama administration became a critical pillar of this policy, with the United States strengthening its defense relations with several regional allies and partners.The US established the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement(EDCA) with the Philippines in 2014 and on this basis acquired in 2016 access to five military bases of the Philippines. With Singapore, the US reached an agreement to deploy four littoral combat ships in Singapore.Relations between the US and Vietnam have also improved, as the US lifted its arms embargo against Vietnam in 2016. Besides, the United States has held joint military exercises with Southeast Asian countries on a frequent basis, strengthening maritime security cooperation. In 2015, the US launched the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative,and planned to invest $425 million in the next five years to enhance the maritime security capacity of the Southeast Asian nations, especially their maritime domain awareness capacity. Japan has increased its involvement in the region since the beginning of the 21st century on the pretext of countering piracy. In recent years, as the South China Sea issue has heated up, Japan has been leveraging maritime issues in order to strengthen defense cooperation with regional countries, providing the coast guards of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines with patrol ships and personnel training. India's quot;Look Eastquot; and subsequent quot;Act Eastquot; strategies have both highlighted Southeast Asia. India's naval fleets have in recent years visited the ports of Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore, and have held joint exercises with these countries. India is also strengthening defense cooperation with ASEAN countries in areas such as personnel training, military assistance and arms sales. For instance, it signed with Malaysia an MOU on defense cooperation and hosted Malaysian pilots for flight training, and has helped Vietnam maintain MiG jets, train pilots and submarine crews, and produce small and medium-sized weapons and military equipment. There are relatively deep and long historical relations between the United States,Japan and India on one side and Southeast Asian countries on the other,and the defense relationship is relatively well-developed, which could lead to ASEAN countries relying more on these nations for their defense needs.In recent years, these major powers have gone further in strengthening their defense ties with ASEAN members and this has to a certain extent reduced the desire of regional countries to cooperate with China, and pushed them to encourage a quot;balance of powerquot; strategy in order to maximize their interests.

The South China Sea issue still restricts China-ASEAN defense cooperation.For a long time, the South China Sea disputes have been an obstacle to the development of China-ASEAN relations. With tensions in the South China Sea constantly rising in recent years, maritime frictions or disputes over fisheries could easily lead to a conflict that would inevitably harm or even set back relations. If that occurred, ASEAN-China relations and defense relations would definitely take a pounding. For instance,while China-Philippine relations made some progress under the Arroyo administration and China provided engineering equipment of a military nature to the Philippines, in 2012 the official bilateral relationship fell to its lowest point after a confrontation over the Huangyan Island (Scarborough Reef), which almost led to a complete suspension of military-to-military exchanges. Similarly, military cooperation between China and Vietnam was suspended after the Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff eroded strategic mutual trust. Moreover, the existence of the South China Sea issue has caused some ASEAN countries to remain wary of developing defense ties with China,with grave concerns over the scope and form of cooperation. All these have hampered the further development of China-ASEAN defense relations. For example, Vietnam and the Philippines, who have the most disputes with China in the South China Sea, have barely imported military equipment from China, except light weapons in a limited quantity.

Conclusion

Despite the problems and underlying challenges, defense cooperation between China and ASEAN countries has advanced over the two decades since the end of the Cold War because of the strong desire of both sides to steadily deepen that cooperation. This becomes an inevitable trend as China translates its growing political and economic clout into military and security influence and is also consistent with the interests and demands of ASEAN countries. Defense cooperation has now already become a key pillar of the deepening China-ASEAN relations. It will play a decisive role in the development of China-ASEAN relations in the future.

China and ASEAN countries need to move forward on the present basis to tap the potential of security cooperation and to firmly push forward toward deepening their mutual cooperation. Measures that could be taken include: first, strengthening high-level visits and exchanges in order to provide strategic guidance for bilateral defense cooperation and enhance strategic trust;second, expanding the scale and the scope of people-to-people exchanges,especially exchanges of junior officers; third, increasing the complexity of joint exercises and training, and transitioning from low-sensitivity subjects to highsensitivity ones; fourth, promoting a higher level of institutionalization in the defense cooperation and maintaining the continuity in the cooperation;fifth, expanding the areas of defense industrial cooperation to achieve more substantive results, and developing concrete innovative cooperation initiatives;sixth, advancing coordination between different branches of the militaries;seventh, reinforcing arms sales and military assistance to militarily backward countries, and aiding them in building their military capabilities. Nevertheless,one should also keep in mind that China-ASEAN defense cooperation began relatively late and from a relatively low level. Therefore, both sides should have reasonable expectations regarding its development, squarely face up to the problems and challenges which may arise, and handle disputes properly in order to expand the areas of cooperation.

Liu Lin is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Foreign Military Studies, Academy of Military Science of the People's Liberation Army of China.