The Strengthening of US Competition withChina and the Future Trend of China-US Relations

Liu Feitao



The Strengthening of US Competition with
China and the Future Trend of China-US Relations

Liu Feitao

Liu Feitao is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies.

With the continued advance of the US’s “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific,” the divergence between China and the United States regarding maritime disputes and cyber security has been exacerbated from time to time, further demonstrating the United States’tough stance toward China and its tendency to strengthen competition with China. Some scholars argue the China-US relationship has come to a “tipping point” where it is closer to intensity in all respects.1David M. Lampton, “A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” May 11, 2015, http://www. uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/.Thus it is of great practical significance to find out how to objectively view and properly handle the competitive relationship between China and the United States for the promotion of the new type of major power relations between them.

The US policies show that it is strengthening its competition against China

The “National Security Strategy” released by the United States in February 2015, stated that the United States “will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.”2“National Security Strategy,” February 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_ national_security_strategy.pdf.Such a statement shows that strengthening its competition against China hasbecome a prominent aspect of both the United States’ strategy toward China and its rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific strategy.

The United States has increased the allocation of military resources in the region for higher deterrence.

In recent years, the United States has regarded China as a competitor and a potential strategic adversary. Its 2012 “Defense Strategic Guidance”clearly defined China as a “potential adversary” pursuing the strategies of “anti-access and area denial.”3“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,”January 2012, http://www. defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.And the United States’ 2015 “National Military Strategy” set its primary goals as “deterrence, anti-access and defeating the adversary”; stressing that currently and in the foreseeable future the United States should pay more attention to the threats from state actors.4“The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015,” June 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/ Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.With the strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific being continuously promoted, there appears an increasingly obvious tendency for the United States to contain, deter and interfere with China. Even aggressive action has been taken in some regions. For example, the United States has allocated 60 percent of its naval, air, online and space forces to the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has also reinforced the military power of the second island chain, which centers on Australia and Guam, by dispatching 2,500 people troops and equipping C-band radars and space telescopes in Australia, while upgrading and expanding the Guam military base with the plan to transfer nearly 10,000 US troops from Okinawa to Guam. Other examples include the United States’ pivot to the Philippines and the dispatching of four littoral combat ships to Singapore. A particularly aggressive action of the United States has been propelling the “militarization” of the regions around the South China Sea in the name of “safeguarding freedom of navigation,”which poses a challenge to China’s sovereignty and security interests in the South China Sea. The following are examples of some of the major movesby the United States: its naval vessels broke into the 12-mile territorial seas of Chinese islands and reefs, its air force planes flew across the territorial airspace over Chinese islands and reefs; its carrier battle group and B-52 strategic bombers were deployed in the South China Sea with provocative public announcements; and for the first time, P-8 Poseidon aircraft were allocated to Singapore so as to enhance the surveillance of the South China Sea. Moreover, the United States has updated its “Air Sea Battle (ASB)”concept to the “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC),” showing a clearer targeting of the so-called global commons, including seas, airspace, space and cyberspace.

An activist depicting a farmer wears a U.S. flag during a rally against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal in front of the government house at Santiago, Chile, February 4, 2016.

The United States is building up its network of allies to maintain leadership in the region.

US President Obama once declared that the leadership of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region will always be the fundamental core of thecountry’s diplomatic policies. The basis of such “leadership” is its Asia-Pacific alliance system. Therefore, the United States firmly opposes any condemnation of and challenges to the legitimacy of its Asia-Pacific alliance. As a result, the United States has focused on reinforcing its coordination and cooperation with its traditional allies such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand; and is actively developing partnerships or quasi-ally relationships with countries including India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. It is also sparing no efforts to push forward trilateral security cooperation among groups such as the US-Japan-South Korea, the US-Japan-Australia, and the US-Japan-India, etc., trying to weave a network of Asia-Pacific alliances or partnership relations. It is also increasing its diplomatic inputs into Indo-China Peninsula countries such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia via “forward deployment” diplomacy; especially by striving for a breakthrough in relations with Myanmar and actively exerting influence on political reform in Myanmar.

The United States has been fighting for leadership on international order and rules.

Against the backdrop of the remodeling of the international order and the readjustment of international rules, the United States has focused on the fight for leadership in international rule making and has tried to control its hold on such leadership by strengthening competition with China in areas such as the cyberspace, international finance and regional trade frameworks. On the issue of cyber security, the United States even chose brinkmanship as its means of competition. In May 2014, the United States announced it would sue five Chinese soldiers on charges of cyber spying. And then in April 2015, Obama signed an administrative order, announcing that the United States would impose sanctions on individuals and entities that attack US networks. On the issue of building up regional trade frameworks, the United States has mainly relied on the promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), excluding China from the Asia-Pacific regional trade negotiations and frameworks that it leads. In doing so, the United Stateswants to change the pattern that Asian countries rely on the United States politically while relying on China economically. It wants Asian countries to rely on the United States economically at least as much as they rely on China, so as to gain more competitive advantages and consolidate its leadership in Asia-Pacific affairs. In the 2015 Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, Obama stated that “China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage.”5The White House, “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,” January 20, 2015, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015.When the early agreement of the TPP was reached, Obama again stated, “When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy.”6The White House, “Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” October 5, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership.The US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter even said “…in terms of our rebalance in the broadest sense, passing the TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier.”7Ashton Carter, “Remarks on the Next Phase of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” April 6, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606660/remarks-on-the-next-phase-of-theus-rebalance-to-the-asia-pacific-mccain-instit.What is more, the US believes that a series of measures taken by China, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which has been promoted by China and does not include the United States, the proposition to start the Asia-Pacific free trade zone as soon as possible, the initiative to found the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Belt and Road Initiative, are all strategic responses to TPP. All these demonstrate that China and the United States are already in competition over the Asia-Pacific economic order. And that the United States is determined to gain the initiative and play the “leading role” in the order construction and rulemaking of the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States has been criticizing the China model in order to maintain the “legitimacy” of the US model.

Since the global financial crisis, the polarization and ossification ofdomestic politics in the United States has pushed forward the reflection of western scholars on the deficiencies of the US model. Francis Fukuyama didn’t say that “history has come to an end” in his article “The Future of History.” But in contrast, he started to study the decline of the US-led Western democracies and admitted the advantages of the China Model.8Francis Fukuyama, “The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?” January 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-01-01/future-history.Canadian professor of political science Daniel Bell even predicted in his book The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy that China’s development model could become an alternative to the Western democratic system in the future.9Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2015, p.4.The success and expanding influence of China’s development model have worried the United States. Consequently, the United States speaks highly of the US development model while criticizing the China model. Former secretary of state Hillary Clinton stated in an article titled “America’s Pacific Century” that the United States’“capacity to come back stronger is unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a model that remains the most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind.”10Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” October 11, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/ americas-pacific-century/.President Obama also stated that “prosperity without freedom is just another form of poverty” and “democracies … have succeeded here in Asia. Other models have been tried and they have failed – fascism and communism, rule by one man and rule by committee.”11White House, “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.During the G20 conference in Brisbane in 2014, Obama publicly supported the “Occupy” demonstrations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by saying that “people in Hong Kong are speaking out for their universal rights.”12White House, “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Queensland,” November 15, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-president-obama-university-queensland.While the former deputy assistant secretary of state for Asia-Pacific affairs Thomas Christensen once said, “The United States does not take measures to incite politicalturmoil in China, but Washington still promotes political liberalization and a move away from one-party rule.”13Thomas J. Christensen, “Obama and Asia: Confronting the China Challenge,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2015, Volume 94, No. 5, pp.28-36.The above statements show that the United States has gradually realized that competition between the US and China models has materialized. Therefore, the United States has been competing with China either openly or secretly on the issue of development models.

Reasons to strengthen competition with China

The United States has strengthened competition with China not only because the comparative power between the United States and China has changed, but also because of the impact of other factors, including the relative decline in the international influence of the United States, the adjustment of roles in the interaction of the United States and China, as well as the United States unrealistic expectations of China.

The United States is worried about losing its hegemonic position because the gap in comprehensive national strength between the United States and China is narrowing.

According to research by the Institute of China Studies of Tsinghua University, in the past 20 years, the comprehensive national strength of China has been on an uptrend, rising from a 4.03 percent share of the global power in 1990 to 16.57 percent in 2013, an increase of 12.54 percent. The comprehensive national strength of the United States, meanwhile, has experienced a downward trend over the same period, declining from a 22.71 percent share of global power to 16.32 percent in 2013, a decrease of 6.39 percent.14Hu Angang et al., “Assessment of the Comprehensive National Strength of the US and China (1990-2013),” Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Science), No. 1, 2015, p. 26.The US consulting company HIS has predicted that, “In 2024, China will overtake the United States in terms of nominal gross domesticproduct (GDP) measured in US dollars. In 2024 … China’s nominal GDP will be $28.25 trillion to the US’s $27.31 trillion” and “China’s share of world GDP is forecast to rise from around 12 percent in 2013 to 20 percent by 2025.”15“China to Become World’s Largest Economy in 2024 Reports IHS Economics,” September 7, 2014, http://press.ihs.com/press-release/economics-country-risk/china-become-worlds-largest-economy-2024-reports-ihs-economics.Though there’s still a gap between China and the United States in terms of some core competences such as military power, science and technology and soft power, it is also a truth that the gap is narrowing, which means China is growing into the only country that can challenge the hegemony of the United States. The contrasting trends in the strength of the two countries has resulted in suggestions that the two countries may become caught in the Thucydides’ trap, whereby there must be conflict between existing powers and emerging powers, thus the United States has growing suspicion of China. In the view of the United States, China has already grown from being a potential threat to the biggest practical challenge. That is why the United States is taking precautions against China and pressure on China has increased sharply.

The United States has entered into a period of sensitivity as it seeks to maintain its hegemony even as capability to control and manage international affairs is decreasing.

The relative decline in the overall national strength of the United States has brought about an obvious decline in its international control and management capabilities. First, the United States’ capability to call upon and integrate its allies has decreased. For instance, the United States was not able to have its European allies all agree to impose sanctions on Russia. Also, its cooperation with Japan and South Korea in East Asia has barely harvested any significant fruit. In addition, in the Middle East, the United States tried to warm relations with Iran, which was publicly questioned and opposed by its ally Israel. Second, its ability to control and carry out actions on hot issues is not as strong as it used to be. For example, on the Ukraine issue,the United States exposed its bottom line that it would not resort to military force too early, which handed Russia the initiative and advantage. Likewise, on the issue of Syria, the United States hesitated to take action, which has allowed Bashar al-Assad to remain in power even though the United States seeks his removal. And on the nuclear issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the United States has pursued a policy of “strategic endurance,” which has contributed to the standstill in efforts to peacefully resolve the issue. Third, The United States’ capability to handle relations with major powers has declined. This can be seen from its relationship with China. The United States has seldom responded directly and positively to China’s initiative that the two countries forge a new type of relationship between major powers, which has resulted in more uncertainty in the relations between the two countries. Another example is the United States’game with Russia. Russia has sent troops to both Ukraine and Syria while the United States has only responded passively. The United States was not able to determine how severe the challenge from Russia would be, neither is it able to tell the future of US-Russia relations. Because of the its reduced capability to control and manage international affairs, the confidence of the United States in its abilities is clearly less than it was and “decline” has become a sensitive word in its domestic society. The United States has entered into a period of sensitivity about maintaining its hegemony. Consequently, irritability and overreaction have become two typical features of its behavior.

The change of China’s role in the global economy has had impacts on US interests.

China has seen a continuous rise in its economic strength and is undergoing vigorous transformation and upgrading of its economic structure. As a result, China’s role in the global economy is changing, and the distribution of economic interests between China and the United States is also changing, which has had impacts on US interests.

China is now transitioning from simply being a big manufacturer to a manufacturing country with high competence and endogenousinnovation. In May 2015, the State Council of China promulgated Made in China 2025, the guidelines for the first 10 years of China’s strategy to upgrade its manufacturing. China wants its overall manufacturing ability to reach the mid-level of powerful manufacturing countries by 2035. By its 100th anniversary, China will try to become one of the most powerful manufacturing countries in the world with significant advantages in the field of manufacturing as a leader in innovation. If this strategy is successfully carried out, the core advantage the United States’ hegemony relies on will be challenged.

China is also transitioning from a country with a capital shortage to country that exports capital. In recent years, China has performed quite well in terms of its foreign reserves, foreign investment and the acceleration rate of investment to the United States. The total foreign reserves of China exceeded $3,500 billion by October 2015, making China the largest country in terms of foreign reserves. In 2014, China hit a record high of $123.12 billion in foreign direct investment, ranking third in the world for a third consecutive year. China’s direct investment to the United States has also grown very fast. In 2014, China’s direct investment to the United States surpassed that of the United States to China for the first time.16“Bulletin of the Ministry of Commerce on the Statistics of China’s Foreign Direct Investment in 2014,”Sept. 17, 2015, http://cn.chinagate.cn/webcast/2015-09/17/content_36611384_2.htm.The structure of trade relations between China and the United States is undergoing tremendous changes.

Moreover, China is transitioning from passively accepting international economic rules to being an active rule maker. And the way of distributing economic interests between China and the United States is changing. China’s history of reform and opening-up has seen China become continuously more integrated into the international order and adapt to international economic rules. During this process, China was generally a passive acceptor and adapter. But in recent years, China has propelled the quota reform of IMF and pushed forward the foundation of the BRICS Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. All these have marked Chinabecoming an active maker and reformer of the international economic rules.

Last but not least, the development model of China is also being transformed. It is transitioning from focusing on the speed of development, ignoring governance, to a scientific development model which emphasizes both speed and governance. China is now comprehensively deepening reforms and promoting the rule of law. Under such circumstances, the supernational treatment enjoyed by foreign enterprises including US enterprises has weakened. Thus the pressure from the competition of doing business in China has increased.

The failure of their expectations for US-style of democratization of China has disappointed US conservatives.

To the US politicians who support a conservative policy toward China, since the Nixon government, a basic assumption was that by supporting the reform and opening-up of China and nurturing the emergence of its middle class, the country would finally realize “democratization.” However, the success of the China model means this has not materialized.17Robert A. Manning, “With China challenging the U.S.-led regional framework in Asia, Americans are being forced to reconsider long-standing assumptions,” May 21, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ americas-china-consensus-implodes-12938?page=show.As early as 2006, The China Fantasy written by James Mann tried to convince people that capitalism would not be able to bring China democracy. In February 2015, Michael Pillsbury stated in his book The Hundred-Year Marathon that one of the wrong assumptions about US policy toward China was that China would adopt the democratic model proposed by the United States. That this has not been the case has deeply upset and disappointed among the conservative elite in the United States; even David Shambaugh who is usually seen as a China hand expressed the appalling theory of “the collapse of China.” Such negative views are gradually becoming an impetus for the United States to change its China policy and increase its competition with China. In April 2015, the US Council on Foreign Relations stated in its report Revising US Grand Strategy toward China that “China represents and

will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come. As such, the need for a more coherent US response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue.” And “Because the American effort to ‘integrate’ China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to US primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.”18Robert D. Blackwill, Ashley J. Tellis, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” April 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/revising-us-grand-strategy-toward-china/p36371.

Factors that constrain the United States’ strengthening its competition with China

Although the United States has done a lot to strengthen competition with China, the overall competition still remains in a controllable range because of the deepened interdependence between China and the United States, the improvement of diverse communication mechanisms, and the strategic mutual understanding to build up the new type of relationship between major powers.

The depth, width and symmetry of interdependence between the two countries have continued to increase.

The bilateral investment and trading scale between China and the United States have expanded continuously. In 2014, the total trading volume of the two countries amounted to a record high of $555.1 billion, year-onyear growth of 6.6 percent. The two countries are the second-largest trading partner to each other. The United States is China’s largest export market and sixth-largest place of origin for imports while China is the United States’third largest export market and largest source of imports. Meanwhile, there exists the balance of financial terror between the two. Up to the end of August of 2015, China remained the biggest creditor country of the UnitedStates holding $1,270.5 billion of US Treasury Securities in hand.19“China increases holdings of US Treasury Securities to 1,270 Billion US Dollars,” Oct. 18, 2015, http:// news.takungpao.com/paper/q/2015/1018/3219392.html.In addition, their communication in terms of culture, tourism and education also hit a record high. In 2014, there were about 4.37 million visits of people between the two countries, the highest number in history. And for the first time the number of Chinese people visiting the United States (2.28 million) surpassed that from the United States to China (2.09 million). Moreover, the number of overseas students from China studying in the United States reached 490,000; making China the largest place of origin for overseas students to the United States.20“China-US relations,” July 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/ bmz_679954/1206_680528/sbgx_680532.

Different communication mechanisms have become increasingly complete and sound which offers a systematic guarantee to reduce the intensity of competition.

China and the United States have established more than 90 mechanisms for dialogue and communication, covering areas such as the military, politics, economy and trade, science and technology, and the environment. Typical mechanisms in the fields of politics and security include visits between the heads of state, a hotline between the heads of state, the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, regular communication between officials of the two sides, political consultations at the deputy foreign minister level, negotiations on anti-terrorism, consultations of the working group for anti-terrorism in finance, and dialogues on human rights. Mechanisms in the fields of economy and trade, science and technology, and the environment include: the China-US Joint Economic Committee, the China-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the China-US Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the China-US Joint Commission on Environmental Cooperation, and the China-US Energy Policy Dialogue. The major communication mechanisms in themilitary field are the military hotline between the two countries, China-US maritime military consultations, the strategic security conference at the level of deputy foreign ministers, consultations on multilateral arms control and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, defense consultations at the deputy defense minister level, and consultations on arms control and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the level of department directors. In the fields of culture, education, health and the judiciary, there are: China-US high level consultations on cultural exchanges, public health conferences at the minister level, working group meetings for the security of food and feed, consultations on education at the deputy minister level, the China-US joint liaison group for the cooperation on law enforcement, regular meetings between at high levels between the Transportation Ministry of China and the United States Coast Guard, and cooperation for law enforcement on cyber security. The above mentioned communication mechanisms are not only devoted to establishing and increasing trust between the two countries, but also regularization of their interaction. This can be seen from mechanisms such as the notification of major military actions, the code of conduct for unexpected encounters at air and sea, and the negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement. In sum, these mechanisms have effectively reduced the intensity of the United States’ competition with China and the risks of misjudgments.

Moving in the direction of new type of relationship between major powers is the bottom line for the United States and China.

As two big military powers with nuclear weapons, China and the United States should avoid strategic competition and confrontation, especially the kind of confrontation that existed between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. This is in line with long-term interests of the peoples of the two countries. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, he pointed out that there is actually no Thucydides’ trap. However, from time to time, major powers havemisjudgments that could bring about the Thucydides’ trap.21“Address of President Xi Jinping on the Welcome Dinner of the Government of Washington State and US Friendly Groups,”Sept. 23, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-09/23/c_1116656143.htm.Likewise, President Obama also once said that he does not recognize the Thucydides’trap.22“President Xi Jinping Stressed during his Meeting with President Obama: Strengthening Strategic Mutual Trust between China and the US, and Pushing forward the Development of the New Type of Relations between Major Powers,” Sept. 25, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/ t1300385.shtml.And US national security advisor Susan Rice stated that, “We reject reductive reasoning and lazy rhetoric that says conflict between the United States and China is inevitable, even as we’ve been tough with China where we disagree. This isn’t a zero-sum game. Our capacity to manage our differences is greater than that.”23White House, “National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice’s As Prepared Remarks on the U.S.-China Relationship at George Washington University,” September 21, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/09/21/national-security-advisor-susan-e-rices-prepared-remarks-us-china.The above official expressions show that it is a bottom-line consensus and strategic agreement between China and the United States to avoid the Thucydides’ trap and build a new type of relations between major powers. Such consensus has effectively restrained US conservatives from being too radical in their policies and measures toward China, and has made the United States aware of the bottom line when it increases its competition with China. For example, it is very aggressive for the United States warships to intrude into the 12-mile limits of Chinese islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the US warships obeyed the principle of “innocent passage,” which meant the US army was intended to lower the aggression of such behavior in order to reduce the risk of practical military confrontation with China.

Cooperation has been strengthened simultaneously thus competition has been weakened.

Despite the United States’ intention to strengthen competition with China in an all-round way, it cannot ignore the increasing need for cooperation with China in stabilizing the global economy, expanding military communications, maintaining regional security and propellingglobal governance. This has restrained the impulse of the United States to strengthen competition with China and softened the intensity of the United States’ competitive behavior. Currently, besides the traditional fields of cooperation such as bilateral trade, regional security and non-proliferation, there are also new highlights and growth points.

Global governance, especially climate change, is a new growth point in the cooperation between China and the United States.

Military communications and cooperation have become a sustained highlight of China-US relations. In November 2013, for the first time, the two countries held a joint humanitarian aid and disaster alleviation drill in Hawaii. In 2014, the PLA Navy attended the RIMPAC naval exercises led by the United States and the “Cobra Gold”joint military drill held by the US and Thailand. In the same year, China participated in a joint military drill with the United States and Australia. In the first half year of 2015, the United States made high-profile interventions in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But in spite of the severe quarrels between the two sides, Chinese Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission Fan Changlong still kept to his schedule and visited the United States. During his visit, the two sides not only agreed to a new mechanism of communications between their ground forces, but also expanded consensus on the issue of South China Sea. The US publicly announced that the issue of South China Seas was not a problem between China and the United States, thus the United States would not take sides in the sovereignty disputes in the region. It said it hoped relevant parities could solve the problems in a peaceful way via negotiations and consultations.

Global governance, especially climate change, is a new growth point in the cooperation between China and the United States. During President Obama’s visit to China in 2014, the two countries published the US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, which stated their respective goals and actions in response to the climate change. They agreed to make efforts together to help the negations in Paris conference reach a successful

conclusion and to strengthen their practical cooperation in the field of climate change. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, the two sides moved forward and published the US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change. In the statement, the United States reaffirmed its determination to donate $3 billion to the Climate Change Fund, while China announced it invest 20 billion Chinese renminbi to establish the Fund for South-South Cooperation on Climate Change,24“US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change,” Sept. 25, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet. com/2015-09/26/c_1116685873.htm.in order to support other developing countries to better respond to the climate change. All these reflected the dedication and efforts of the two countries to promote successful climate change talks in Paris. In addition, the United States and China signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation, aiming at cooperation on broader issues including sustainable development, food security, public health, disaster alleviation and humanitarian aid.

Future trends

While the United States has strong inner momentum to strengthen its competition with China, it also faces subjective restraints and buffers. Thus it is unlikely that China-US competition will escalate out of control and become a confrontation like the Cold War. However, more prominent competition will become a major feature of the interaction between the two countries.

China and the United States will embrace a strategic adaptation period of greater competition.

The root cause of the United States’ growing competition with China is its fears that it will lose its hegemony. With the further rise of China’s national strength, the United States will go on feeling worried and anxious. And thus the intensity of competition with China will keep on increasing in the long run. Based on these views, no matter if it is the Democrats or the Republicans that win the 2016 US election, there will be no big changein the United States’ competition with China. Currently a special situation is that the Obama government might get tough with China on issues of human rights, trade, Taiwan and China’s maritime disputes, etc. under the pressure of the Republican candidates and other domestic hard-liners against the backdrop of US presidential election. It could even use a confrontation policy of brinkmanship on some very sensitive issues.

Competition will remain in a controllable range.

Generally speaking, the competition between China and the United States will remain in a controllable range because of the restraints imposed by the interdependence of China and the United States, the United States’acceptance of most regulations in the mechanisms for the China-US communications, the softening and buffer effect from the continuously expanding and deepening cooperation, and the bottom-line consensus of no conflict and no confrontation. On the issues where there is prominent divergence, friction and contradictions, the two sides should learn to keep strategic prudence and self-restraint, and try not to go to extremes so as to involuntarily provoking a showdown. In the meantime, due to the bonding derived from the need for cooperation, the two sides need to positively control their competition and ensure it is generally on a harmless track, which could effectively protect their mutually beneficial cooperation from unnecessary disturbance. And what is especially important is that the two sides should avoid taking a one-sided approach and regard competition as the primary factor in the China-US relationship so as to ensure it will not fall out of control into overall confrontation.

Competition can be changed into new opportunities for cooperation.

The contrasting strength between China and the United States means both sides adopt a pragmatic expectation for results: neither side is expecting a total success or a total failure. Mutual compromise is the best way out of their competition. As US scholar Professor David Lamptonsaid, “The words ‘accommodation’ or ‘compromise’ in either China or the United States should not be dirty words. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence.”25David M. Lampton, “A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” May 11, 2015, http://www. uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/.For instance, recently the issue of cyber security has become an issue of huge divergence between the two countries. The competition to make the rules on cyber security has become fierce. In September 2015, US media claimed that the Obama administration was ready to announce it was imposing sanctions on Chinese corporations because of hacker problems. Confrontation on the issue was on the verge of breaking out. To resolve the issue, President Xi Jinping dispatched Meng Jianzhu, the secretary of the Political and Judiciary Commission under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, to visit the Unites States for in-depth communication on cyber security. During President Xi Jinping’s subsequent visit to the United States, China and the United States agreed that neither side should engage in the cyber theft of intellectual properties, trade secrets and other confidential business information or knowingly support such behavior.26“List of the Fruits of President Xi Jinping’s National Visit to the US,” Sept. 26, 2015, http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1300767.shtml.Both sides agreed to establish a joint high-level dialogue mechanism on the fight against cyber crimes. The fierce competition on the issue of cyber security was thus effectively controlled and managed and transformed into cooperation on the enforcement of law in cyberspace.

Competition will push forward the construction of an inclusive order in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States’ strengthening of competition with China is aimed at maintaining its regional hegemony and the leadership in political, economic and security affairs. However, China does not intend to challenge the United States’ legitimate interests and traditional advantages in the Asia-Pacific region when it discusses the “order” in the region. It is just striving for reasonable room to shoulder its international responsibilities and provide international public products under the existing order. With the increasing of its comprehensive national strength, China’s ability and will to shoulder international responsibilities is also rising. Thus it is an irresistible trend for the overburdened United States to yield some room for China to provide some international public products and share international responsibilities with China, which will help the establishment of an inclusive political, economic and security order in the region. In the example of the game between the two countries on the matter of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, at the very beginning the United States was opposed to the initiative, thinking China was trying to build its own sphere of influence and to challenge the international financial order led by the United States. But with the participation of major Western countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, the United States softened its stance. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, the two sides reached a consensus: China promised that the new financial institution would follow the principles of the existing global financial institutions and be professional, transparent, efficient and effective. It would also adopt high standards in terms of environmental requirements and governance of the existing international financial institutions. Meanwhile, the United States promised it would carry out the 2010 quota and governance reform plan of the International Monetary Fund as soon as possible. And it would support the Chinese renminbi being adopted in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights basket of currencies. Consequently, the divergence and the frictions deriving from the AIIB have been effectively controlled, and the two sides have found out a conciliatory and acceptable solution to their competition over the international financial order.

The United States’strengthening of competition with China is aimed at maintaining its regional hegemony and the leadership in political, economic and security affairs.

Conclusion

Although the United States has been strengthening its competition with China, the fact that the interests of the two countries are becoming increasingly interrelated has not changed. There is still mutual need to cooperate on regional and global issues. Interdependence and mutual respect is still the major facet that defines the nature of China-US relations, which makes it inevitable that cooperation surpasses competition in the overall relations of the two countries. Both sides should be fully aware of this fact and deal with situations in a calm and rational way. That is to say, the two sides should first prevent the tendency to go to extremes. While it is true that it will be an “ostrich policy” divorced from reality if either country onesidedly emphasizes cooperation while ignoring the competition between them, over-emphasis or even exaggeration of their competition could give rise to unrealistic and pessimistic conclusions. Second, the two countries should insist on the fundamental direction of working toward constructing a new type of relations between major powers, so as to manage and control their competition in a constructive way. Based on the strategic bottom line of no conflict and no confrontation, China and the United States should reinforce their strategic communication, establish long-term mechanisms for risk management and control and crisis resolution, and to the largest extent avoid serious emotional opposition and strategic misjudgments. They should keep their competition on a manageable track. Finally, both countries should try to create cooperation from their competition. By adapting to the strengths of the other, so as to create more room for cooperation, and by seeking and making new cooperative growth points in the fields such as cyber security, space, development cooperation, climate change, anti-terrorism and the control and prevention of infectious diseases, both of countries should strive to alter their competition to win-win cooperation and maintain the overall stability and healthy development of China-US relations.