Japanese Diplomacy in the “Abe 2.0” Era

Since the Japanese government launched its so-called “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands, the Sino-Japanese relationship has been on the verge of collapsing.Both sides are now pondering whether their rivalry will result in a lose-lose situation for all, or whether they will keep an open mind and get bilateral relations back on the right track.Of course, this outcome mainly depends on the policy decisions made by the Japanese leadership.Since he assumed power, Abe has ostensibly been willing to improve Sino-Japanese relations.In reality however, he has taken an even tougher policy towards China and made diplomatic arrangements to encircle China.Abe’s behavior is closely related to his political conceptions and strategic goals.These conceptions and goals will not improve the Sino-Japanese relationship; instead, they will drag it to an even more dangerous situation.

I.The Conservative Policies of Abe

Shinzo Abe is the only post-war prime minister to be re-elected years after resigning.Abe’s return has attracted wide attention and he has continuously put forward conservative, “out of line” political conceptions.During his second term, Abe has highlighted not only his conceptions of conservatism but also his willingness to thoroughly carry out these conceptions in order to achieve all related political goals.

Abe’s core political concept is to allow Japan to get rid of the post-war system and become a leading global power.1“General policy speech by Prime Minister Abe at the 165th Session”, Sep 29, 2006, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/abespeech/2006/09/29syosin.html.In 2006 when Abe was still in his first term, he published a political blueprint entitled “Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan” - the publication articulated Abe’s goal to get rid of the post-war system,and Abe identified this objective as his responsibility.In a term that lasted less than one year, Abe strove to pass the National Referendum Law on constitutional revision procedures, as well as a related act to upgrade the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense.When he was re-elected head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2012,Abe published his second political blueprint.This one was entitled“Towards a New Country” and set “concluding the post-war system and independently establishing a constitution” as “the party-building idea of the LDP.”2Abe, Shinzo, “Towards a New Country”, Bungei Shunshu (Jan 2013), pp124-133.

Abe has sought to extricate Japan from the post-war system, above all else seeking to remove restrictions on Japan’s military development and use of military force (Article 9, Peace Constitution).A real constitutional revision not only necessitates public support but also involves complicated legal procedures.As such, Abe has done what the LDP has been doing for decades: make the constitution dysfunctional by passing some functional laws.Abe’s short-term goals are to exercise the right of collective self-defense; upgrade the Self Defense Forces (SDF) into a National Defense Force; strengthen military manpower; and get permission for the use of military force overseas.

In fact, these objectives can be summed up in one sentence: to build a powerful modern Japanese army that can use military force overseas.The right to engage in collective self-defense means that when the United States believes it is under attack, Japan will be able to take part in the war overseas.The alteration from Self Defense Forces to National Defense Forces is not simply a renaming issue,but rather a crucial question related to the direction of Japanese military development.Under the legal definition of the current Self Defense Forces, Japan can only develop military forces for selfdefense purposes.The National Defense Forces will be allowed to develop offensive capabilities.As for using military force overseas,the conservatives believe it is an indispensable right as a “political power.”

Germany revised its constitution only after it had finally settled all of its historical wrongdoings.In contrast, Japan does not intend to completely settle its historical issues.Instead it has tried to reshape the country’s spiritual traits by reversing the verdict of Japan’s World War Two invasion, comprising the core appeal of the conservative groups.This kind of political culture makes Japan’s constitutional revision extremely dangerous.One of the most important sociopolitical elements of Abe’s re-election is the overall right wing shift in Japanese politics.In the 46th general election of the House of Representatives in December 2012, the Abe-led LDP resumed its one-party rule, earning 294 seats.Even more noticeably, the emerging right wing Japan Restoration Party became the third largest party with 54 seats - only three seats fewer than the Democratic Party.At this point, Japanese conservatives nearly have a monopoly over the country’s politics.As the leader of Japan, Abe’s clear-cut conservative stance on historical issues makes people concerned about where he will lead Japan.

Abe not only shows a personal preference for Japan’s imperial history, but also is good at using his power to reverse Japan’s historical verdict.During his first term, as his first step in breaking away from Japan’s post-war system, Abe forced Congress to revise the Basic Act on Education,3“Basic Act on Education” (the old,Act No.25 of March 31, 1947).It is an important product of the Japanese democratic reform after the war.Its core conception is to abandon the education of ultranationalism.And it sets up the goal to train students as “people respecting personal dignity,seeking the truth and longing for peace” and adopts the basic conceptions of Democratism education including freedom, democracy, equality and peace.which used to be regarded as the “Peace Constitution” in the area of education.The revised act4“Basic Act on Education” (the new), Act No.120 of December 22, 2006.adopted more nationalist conceptions of education and emphasized so-called patriotic educational processes.

Given that conservatism has taken a dominant role in Japan’s public life, this development gave some textbooks more legal room to distort historical truths.In remarks that were directed at the Japanese Congress in March 2007, Abe declared that there was no evidence demonstrating that Japanese soldiers had forcefully recruited“comfort women.” By extension, Abe refused to apologize for Japan’s actions.His rhetoric received widespread condemnation from the international community, and the US House of Representatives even passed House Resolution 121 demanding that the Japanese government formally acknowledge that its army forced many women into sex slavery during World War II, apologize to the victims and accept its historical responsibility, and define the issue of comfort women as “the largest-scale human trafficking crime in the 20th Century.”

Though several years have passed, Abe’s position nonetheless remains the same, and he said that he would reconsider Japan’s “three talks” reflecting on the history by Miyazawa (1982), Kawano (1993)and Murayama (1995) after he came to power.He also vowed to gather all the political forces in Japan that support abolishing the talks on historical reflection as well as revising the Peace Constitution, all in order to “create a new landscape in Japanese politics.”5“Former Prime Minister Abe: Mr.Hashimoto is a comrade-in-arm; the first step of political regrouping for the coming election of the lower house”, Sankei Shimbun, August 28, 2012.Abe even publicly challenged the Tokyo Trial.In his first parliamentary debate in 2006, Prime Minister Abe declared that “Class-A war criminals”were war criminals adjudicated by the Tokyo Trial, but that from the perspective of Japanese domestic law, Class-A war criminals were not war criminals at all.In March 2013, Abe again questioned the verdict of Japanese war criminals, claiming that the decisions made by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East were “not formed by the Japanese themselves, but rather by the victorious Allies, and it is by their judgment only that [Japanese] were condemned.6“Prime Minster Abe said Tokyo Trial was ‘a judgment by the victorious nation’ at the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives”, Sankei Shimbun, March 13, 2013

After calling for a total reassessment of postwar politics in the 1980s, conservatives have persistently sought to make Japan a political power again.As an economic power, Japan has the capacity to take on the role of a political power in the international community.However, whether Japan’s political power is realized depends not on its military might, but rather on whether Japan’s political will can be accepted by the international community.Because Abe has not tried to settle historical issues and is accused of revising the Peace Constitution, he is attempting to create favorable conditions for achieving his political goals through diplomacy.He has attempted all means to highlight the importance of the US-Japan alliance, all while targeting China as a potential enemy.

On the one hand, Abe intends to achieve a strengthening of Japan’s military force so that it can be used overseas.On the other hand, he is about to use China’s rise and the Diaoyu Islands issue as an excuse to exaggerate the“China Threat Theory,” stirring up ultra-nationalist sentiments in Japan and preparing for constitutional revision.

II.Cooperating with the US to Strengthen Japan

The US-Japanese alliance lies at the core of Abe’s diplomatic and security strategy.Abe regards this alliance as the essential guarantee to realizing his political goals.He believes that the alliance with the US will determine whether or not Japan can attain “political power”status.He has also stated that making Japan a “trusted, respected and esteemed leading country”7“General policy speech by Prime Minister Abe at the 165th Session”, Sep 29, 2006, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/abespeech/2006/09/29syosin.html.demands both economic and political support from the United States.Abe has argued that the primary reason behind the Democratic Party’s failed diplomacy lies in the fact that the party did not recognize the importance of the US-Japanese alliance and instead tried to strike a balance between China and the United States.As a result, Abe believes that “reshaping US-Japanese mutual trust and strengthening their alliance” are “the first steps[in rebuilding the] diplomacy and security of Japan.” But Abe’s real intention, concealed beneath layers of rhetoric, is not to increase Japan’s dependence on the United States.Rather, his intention is to use the US alliance to achieve his own political goals.

Abe has three objectives when he emphasizes the importance of the US-Japanese alliance.

First, Abe wants to build up Japan’s dominance in the Asia Pacific region with the help of US strategy.As early as his first term, Abe had already started to transform the US-Japanese relationship from one of “attaching” or “following” to a relationship of “promoting” or“conspiring.” On regional issues of common strategic interest to the United States and Japan, Abe has taken on the role of a “promoter”or a “conspirer” - all in an attempt to realize Japanese dominance over Asian affairs.He took advantage of US strategies that demanded Japan’s global assistance and defined the US-Japanese alliance as one“for the world and Asia.” On this basis, he argued that Japan should turn to assertive diplomacy in order to contribute to the unity of Asia.However, the first of his “assertions” was to propose a bill to the UN Security Council that would impose sanctions against North Korea for its missile tests, implying the use of military force.

Such “diplomacy with assertions” made Abe look like the manager of US global strategy in Asia.Japan not only took on the role of a promoter on concrete issues such as sanctions against North Korea; it also actively promoted trilateral or small-scale multilateral cooperation on regional security, with the US-Japan alliance as the central axis.Abe put forward the Asian Gateway Initiative, intending to establish Japan’s leading role in Asia under the new context.As for Japan’s regional strategy, former Foreign Minister Taro Aso proposed the creation of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,” and Abe advocated “diplomacy based on values,” actively promoting an “alliance of values” between Japan, the United States, India and Australia.

Abe nominated Nobukatsu Kanehara, director general of International Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA), who has called for “diplomacy based on values,” to become his Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary.He also appointed Shotaro Yachi, a firm believer in the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” who served as Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry during the Aso administration, to become the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary.After taking office, Shotaro Yachi published an article highlighting the importance of the US-Japanese alliance and positioned this diplomatic relationship as the “backbone” of Japan’s attempt to promote its international standing.Under the context of the United States’ so-called “rebalancing” towards the Asia Pacific, Abe has continued to promote military and political cooperation based on the US-Japanese alliance, extending this cooperation to the USJapanese-Australian and US-Japanese-Korean trilateral consortia.These developments expose Abe’s ambition to attain joint dominance over the region with the United States.

Second, Abe is seeking to use the alliance to overcome the restraints of the Peace Constitution and realize Japan’s dream of becoming a political power.Abe argues that Japan’s “top priority is still to remove the post-war system.” The final version of the LDP’s manifesto,entitled “Seizing Back Japan,” not only listed thirty essential items such as nationalization of the Senkaku Islands (known in Chinese as“Diaoyu Islands”), revision of the Peace Constitution and prescribing the Emperor as head of state; it also declared the administration’s will to set up a National Security Council, strengthen the function of the Prime Minister’s official residence as a national headquarters,establish the Basic Law on State Security and allow Japan to embrace its right to collective self-defense, which is prohibited by the current constitution.8“Manifesto of LDP: seizing back Japan”, http://special.jimin.jp/political_promise/index.html?tg=act3.After taking office, Abe expected that he could take advantage of practical security issues in order to achieve a breakthrough in Japan’s right to collective self-defense.

However, Abe’s objectives faced strong opposition from different political forces within Japan.Natuso Yamaguchi, leader of the New Komeito Party, a political ally of the LDP, objected to Abe’s policy ambitions.Yamaguchi clearly articulated his disagreement over Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense through constitutional revision: “This would lead to the use of military force outside the territorial land, sky and water of Japan.If the constitution is to be revised, there must be a full discussion of the risk that things might get out of hand.”9“Yamaguchi of New Komeito: we should be cautious to talk about allowing Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense”, Sankei Shimbun, January 13, 2013.Yohei Kawano, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, pointed out that if the right to engage in collective self-defense were granted, Japan would not only be involved in wars when “emergencies” took place; once allies go to war, he said, Japan would also have to take part in them, and the fundamental principles of the Japanese constitution would be fundamentally changed.

Facing domestic opposition, Abe instead turned to reviewing the Guidelines for US-Japanese Defense Cooperation.With the intention of expanding the functions of the SDF, he sought to take on subjective responsibility for issues such as ballistic missile defense.His ultimate goal is to bypass the Peace Constitution and exercise the right to collective self-defense.10“Guidelines for U.S-Japan Defense Cooperation: discussion on the revision towards the right of collective self-defense begins”, Mainichi Shimbun, January 18, 2013.On February 20, before visiting the United States, Abe told Asahi Shimbun that “Japan’s ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense is critical to the very maintenance of the US-Japanese alliance.”11

Such rhetoric indicates that Abe is seeking to strengthen his country’s alliance with the United States, but in fact he is striving to attain equal status for Japan.He said that by “exercising its right to collective self-defense, Japan will no longer be subjected to the United States, but [rather it will be] equal to [the United States].As such,the alliance and its control force will be further strengthened.Neither the SDF nor the US Forces need to use military force anymore.”12Abe, Shinzo, “Towards a New Country”, Bungei Shunshu (Jan2013), pp124-133.It is clear that Abe is aiming for Japan to share an equal position with the United States.

Third, Japan is pushing to contain China, gain military 11 “Keynotes of the interview on Prime Minister Abe: governance by law over the East China Sea is important and decisions against the national interests will never be made”,Asahi Shimbun,February 21, 2013.independence and achieve co-dominance over the region with the United States.Since the United States put forth its policy of“rebalancing” towards the Asia Pacific region, Japan has emerged as an important strategic pillar of the United States.Under this strategy,Abe it hoping to take advantage of the Diaoyu Islands issue and the South China Sea dispute in order to contain China alongside the United States, achieving co-dominance over the entire region.Abe said: “Japan and the US must have a full understanding of China’s moves in the East and South China Sea…it is also crucial for Japan and the US to reach consensus on protecting the freedom and prosperity of the seas through governance by laws and rules.”13“Keynotes of the interview on Prime Minister Abe: governance by law over the East China Sea is important and decisions against the national interests will never be made”, Asahi Shimbun,February 21, 2013.

Of course, in order to ensure Japan’s control over these rules, it must also strengthen its military capabilities.As such, Japan has seized the opportunity to ask for support from the United States in an attempt to improve its military capabilities.On December 27, 2012, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera announced that Prime Minister Abe’s decision to revise the National Defense Program Outline was aimed at strengthening the function and deterrent capabilities of the SDF, while also supporting the United States’ new national defense strategy.At the LDP’s National Defense Meeting in early 2013, the Party decided to appropriate an additional 120 billion yen on military expenditures, overshooting the original budget of 4.7138 trillion yen for 2012.This extra amount will be used to buy Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and E-2C early warning airplanes in order to monitor Chinese ships and aircrafts that enter the territorial area around the Diaoyu Islands.

At a cabinet meeting held on January 23, 2013, the Japanese cabinet made the formal decision to revise the National Defense Program Outline and the Midterm Defense Buildup Program, all in order to ensure that Japan has the military capabilities to deal with emergencies without US assistance.The revision was also aimed at promoting Japan’s ability to execute a “timely response to various situations” and “defend its territory, territorial waters and territorial skies.” The Ministry of Defense also set up the Defense Capability Research Council in order to revise the National Defense Program Outline and the Midterm Defense Buildup Program.

III.Arrangements in the Asia Pacific Region to Contain China

Since the conclusion of the Cold War, Japan’s Asia Pacific strategy has been aimed at gaining regional dominance.However, due to China’s rising economic power and political influence, Japan now looks upon China as its major competitor for regional dominance.To achieve its goal of becoming a political power and playing a dominant role in East Asia, Japan must contain China’s influence.In fact, during Abe’s first term, the goal of containing China had already become a feature of Japan’s regional diplomacy.Since coming to power again, Abe has further clarified that containing China is the goal of his diplomatic policy in the region.

While the United States is furtive in its targeting of China, Abe publicly states that China is a potential Japanese enemy.He is trying to squeeze China’s strategic space and force China into submission in its bilateral relations with Japan.Abe openly stated that when faced with a rising China, Japan should push forward its security cooperation with other democratic powers like India and Australia on the basis of the US-Japanese alliance.He stressed that building“relations of trust with countries that share Japan’s values and states of strategic importance like Vietnam will bring new changes in Japanese-Sino relations.” Only by strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries can Japan contain China’s rise and carry it back to the international order, Abe added.14“Security cooperation among Japan, U.S, Australia and India: Prime Minister Abe starts arrangement to improve the relations with China”, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 28, 2012.

There are three “frontlines” in Japan’s attempt to contain China.The first is the US-Japanese-Korean military triangle in the North.The second is the US-Japanese-Australian security triangle, as well as the US-Japanese-Indian triangle in the South.And the third frontline is with ASEAN countries that retain strategic importance.These three frontlines were all advanced during Abe’s first term, and he has unsurprisingly emphasized these same issues since reclaiming power.At the end of 2012, Abe published an article on the “Project Syndicate” website calling for an “Asian Democratic Security Diamond” including Australia, India, Japan, and Hawaii (the United States) to contend with China.He added that he was “prepared to invest, to the greatest possible extent, in Japan’s capabilities as part of this security diamond.”15“Prime Minister Abe advocates containing China’s maritime strategy by ‘Democratic Security Diamond’”, Tokyo Shimbun, January 16, 2013.

There are three approaches for Abe to rope in Asia Pacific countries.The first approach is to lobby countries to jointly promote the “common values of democracy and freedom” and treat China as a political “heretic.” The second approach is to use security issues,especially the South China Sea and so-called freedom and security of navigation, in order to frame China as a common security threat.The third approach is to suppress China’s “going global” economic strategy through economic and monetary diplomacy.

At the beginning of 2013, the Abe administration launched a series of diplomatic activities in China’s neighborhood.First, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso visited the rapidly transforming country of Myanmar, completing a visit that was viewed as a prologue to“encircling” China.Aso not only promised Myanmar a debt writeoff of 500 billion yen.He also resumed economic aid that had been suspended for over twenty years and put forth a plan to provide 50 billion yen of aid by the end of March.Such actions and promises indicate Japan’s intention to push for the “democratization” of Myanmar and in order to make it a member of the so-called “common value” camp.

Afterwards, Abe sent a special envoy to Korea to seek a breakthrough in the bilateral impasse that occurred after a dispute broke out over the Takeshima islands (known as “Dokdo” in Korea).Abe was sure that Japan would take a tough stance toward China if cooperation could be achieved between Japan, the United States and Korea.In the meantime, he also dispatched Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida to the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore and Australia in order to boost cooperation on the common goal of balancing China.Kishida emphasized that dealing with China’s booming maritime activities was a “common problem,”16“Prime Minister Abe calls for cooperation to contain China during his first overseas visit”,Kyodonews, January 15, 2013.and he pushed for cooperation in balancing China.During his visit, Japan provided the Philippines with 54 billion yen in low-interest loans and helped improve the Philippine Coast Guard’s equipment and training facilities, selling the country ten multifunctional patrol boats.

Finally, Abe himself visited Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia.In Hanoi, Abe highlighted sovereignty disputes with China as the“common strategic interests” of the two countries.In Jakarta, Abe proposed the “Five New Principles” on relations with ASEAN,17“The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy”, website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/25/abe_0118j.html.placing “common values” as the first priority.The Japanese media widely accepts the fact that Abe intends to strengthen his focus on Southeast Asia while keeping pace with the United States’ eastward shift, all in an attempt to contain China’s rise.18“Prime Minster Abe proposed Five New Principles with Southeast Asia to contain China,with governance by laws and rules as the key point”, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 18, 2013.“Prime Minister Abe intends to contain the maritime activities of China by Five New Principles with Southeast Asia”, Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 2013.

Japanese diplomatic attempts to encircle China also include controlling sea-lanes.At a March 2013 meeting with Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan President and Commander in Chief, Abe said that “China’s boom in maritime activities is a common concern in the region”19“Prime Minster Abe told the President of Sri Lanka: ’China is the common concern in the region.’”, Sankei Shimbun, March 14, 2013.and that he hoped that the “Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces could berth at Sri Lankan ports at any time.”20“Japan-Sri Lanka Summit (abstract)”, website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kinkyu/20/H302013031515365201A/.He also inserted the strengthening of maritime security cooperation in the surrounding Indian Ocean region into the joint statement.21“Japan-Sri Lanka summit agreed on strengthening cooperation for maritime security”, Kyodo News Agency, March 14, 2013.Japan’s control over sea-lanes also permeates its cooperative relationship with India.In January, Japan held the first maritime affair dialogue at the director general-level with India.Later, Japan approved the export of “US-2” seaplanes to India in order to strengthen communications with India and contain China.22“Japan exports seaplanes to India to contain China”, Kyodo News Agency, March 25, 2013.

To encircle China and avoid any loopholes, Abe has spared no efforts in winning over Mongolia, China’s landlocked neighbor.On January 9, 2013, Japan and Mongolia held their first working-level consultation between their respective ministries of foreign affairs and defense mechanisms.In late March, Abe paid a visit to Mongolia and the two sides decided to create a framework for policy dialogue between Japan, Mongolia and the United States.23“Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Mongolia: agreement on a trilateral framework for policy dialogue including the US”, Mainich Shimbun, Mach 31, 2013.Abe has continued to highlight “values,” stating that “Japan will attach importance to relations with countries that share the values of rule of law and basic human rights.”24“Japan-Mongolia summit agreed on a trilateral framework for policy dialogue including the US, with the intention to contain China”, Sankei Shimbun, March 30, 2013.Abe visited Russia in late April in order to promote bilateral economic and security cooperation and check on the rapid development of Sino-Russian relations.

IV.Abe’s Tough Stance against China under Difficulty

Abe’s diplomatic attempts to encircle China are a clear reflection of his Cold War mentality.His policies go against the trend of the times and are thus doomed to fail.First, due to Abe’s extremely tough stance on the Diaoyu Islands issue, which is a critical issue affecting Sino-Japanese relations, there has been no pathway to the negotiation of a settlement.As a result of the confrontation caused by Abe’s diplomatic attempts to encircle China, bilateral relations have come to a standstill.Second, Abe’s actions have lost Japan its moral high ground and are very hard for the international community to accept.Third, Abe’s toughness will eventually cause serious damage to Japan’s interests and his misguided policies will face opposition from domestic forces.Trapped in the deadlock of Sino-Japanese relations,Abe has proposed a summit with Chinese leaders.But he has done nothing substantive to improve bilateral relations, instead oftentimes make insolent public remarks.Such contradictions demonstrate that Abe’s domestic political and international strategic goals are in conflict with Japan’s overall interests.

Abe at one point attached importance to Sino-Japanese relations.When interviewed by Sankei Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, in December 2012, he emphasized the Sino-Japanese relationship as one of the most important bilateral relationships.But Abe seems to only understand China’s importance from an economic perspective.As a result, Abe has repeatedly stressed that even if there are conflicts of national interest, the two countries must remain calm and prevent causing any damage to their economic interests.

In fact, Abe has always applied the principle of separating politics from economics to address conflicts between his conservative strategy and his approach to Sino-Japanese relations.During his first term,Abe proposed “strategic relations of mutual benefit” in order to break up the deadlock caused by former Prime Minister Koizumi’s obstinate stance on historical issues.This policy succeeded because it was under the precondition that Abe would not visit the Yasukuni shrine.As a result, China was willing to understand and accept Abe’s conception of “strategic relations of mutual benefit,” all in order to push the development of Sino-Japanese relations.

But this conception could only enable bilateral cooperation in some fields, and it has done nothing to help deal with strategic contradictions between China and Japan.On the contrary, as Abe promotes his “values diplomacy” in Asia, strategic conflicts have been aggravated, resulting in “cold politics and hot economics”between the two countries.The root cause of this situation is that there are fundamental differences between Abe’s implementation of his conception and China’s understanding of Abe’s conception.Abe argues that the neighborly and friendly principles established by the leaders of China and Japan in 1972 are simply tools to achieve national interests, and that these tools should not be taken as the end goal.25Abe, Shinzo, “Towards a New Country”, Bungei Shunshu (Jan2013), pp124-133.

As a result, Abe believes in replacing neighborly and friendly relations with strategic relations of mutual benefit, separating economics from politics and completely taking bilateral relations as a commercial connection.According to Abe, China and Japan’s material interests are inseparable, even if they take very different approaches to politics and national security.

Abe’s policy of separating economics and politics has failed largely because of the Diaoyu Islands issue.For historical reasons that are known to all, if China and Japan give up on the principle of neighborly and friendly relations and only emphasize their respective interests,it will be impossible for them to resolve their differences.It will also become more likely that a conflict will break out.Furthermore, the Diaoyu Islands dispute is not simply an issue of sovereignty.It belies a much deeper historical problem between China and Japan.

The Japanese government’s untrustworthy actions on this issue have resulted in longstanding tensions between the two countries,prompting Chinese popular boycotts of Japanese goods that have heavily hit Japanese exports.Statistics from the Japan External Trade Organization show that Japan’s exports to China dropped by 10.4 percent compared to 2011, reaching only USD 144.7 billion in 2012.26“Japan-China trade in 2012: the total Japanese export to China dropped for the first time in the past three years with a trade deficit over 40 billion dollars”, JETRO, February 20, 2013.Japanese exports to China dropped for the first time in the past three years, with cars and construction machinery suffering the most serious blows.Ultimately, in spite of Abe’s proclaimed beliefs,“cold politics” have resulted in “cold economics” between China and Japan.

Abe is obsessed with his “great power strategy” of revising the Japanese constitution and strengthening his country’s military force.As such, he does not have a sober understanding of the importance of Sino-Japanese relations and the future global development direction.Given the continued right wing shift of Japanese politics, China must remain high alert regarding the direction of the “new country”that Abe is committed to building.Furthermore, China must ask what Abe’s policy will mean for the future of Sino-Japanese relations.

While remaining alert regarding Abe’s policies, the Chinese side should also not ignore that there remain numerous Japanese forces and factions that are striving for improvements in bilateral relations.Already in 2013 there have been multiple visits to China by Japanese politicians, including former Prime Ministers Yukio Hatoyama,Tomiichi Murayama and Yasuo Fukuda.Former Secretary General of the LDP Koichi Kato and New Komeito Party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi have also visited China in an attempt to break the two countries’ bilateral deadlock.Business figures from the Japan-China Economic Association and the Association for the Promotion of International Trade of Japan have likewise made great efforts to improve bilateral relations.It is anticipated that these efforts will eventually affect Abe’s “official residence-led”diplomacy, adjusting Japan’s strategy and pushing Sino-Japanese relations in a more positive direction.