The Implications of Myanmar’s Democratic Transition

Shi Yongming

The Implications of Myanmar’s Democratic Transition

Shi Yongming

Since assuming power in March 2011, Myanmar’s civilian government has been committed to democratic transition in the country that is in accordance with the Constitution. Its efforts have not only led to positive changes in Myanmar society but also contributed to regional stability and development. More importantly, the country’s self-motivated transition has offered new lessons for other countries dealing with similar issues. This being said, Myanmar’s transition still faces a myriad of challenges. As a result, the government should increase constructive interactions with pro-democracy groups and ethnic minority insurgents in Myanmar as well as with the outside world.

I. A Democratic Transition Based on the New Constitution

Western analysts believe Myanmar’s new government has made vigorous efforts since its inauguration to promote political reconciliation in an effort to get the West to lift sanctions. In reality, Myanmar, which was previously ruled by a military junta, started its democratic transition in 2003 with the implementation of a seven-step Roadmap to Democracy. After adopting a new Constitution and holding elections for legislative bodies and government agencies, the transition process is now entering a third phase – democratic governance. The success of the transition thus far shows the inclusiveness of Myanmar society. This inclusive culture has enabled the country to popularize a Constitution that remains unacceptable to the West, establishing a multi-party system through elections that have been widely disapproved of by Western countries. The civilian government’s pursuit of democratic governance is only recently beginning to earn the West’s approval and recognition of its achievements. It should be acknowledged that Myanmar has blazed a new and more model for national transition.

1. The new Constitution lays legal foundation for Myanmar’s democratic transition.

Myanmar’s Roadmap to Democracy is grounded in the country’s new Constitution. Adopted in 2008, the new Constitution enshrines principles of democracy that are universally recognized in Western countries. For instance, it calls for the separation of powers in the state power structure. “The three branches of sovereign power namely, legislative power, executive power and judicial power are separated, to the extent possible, and exert reciprocal control, check and balance among themselves,” it reads. Since Myanmar is a multi-ethnic nation, the Constitution establishes a federalist government system and a bicameral parliament consisting of the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities). This structure ensures that people from all ethnic groups have the equal right to take part in political affairs. Myanmar practices a “genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system,” as well as a “market economic system.”It also upholds the “eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality.” These fundamental tenets testify to the democratic nature of the new Constitution.

The protection of ethnic minorities’ rights and interests, however, is only one of the distinct features of Myanmar’s new Constitution. By drawing on historical lessons, the Constitution states that Myanmar will adhere to the objectives of “nondisintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty,” while practicing “a multi-party democratic system and market economy in accord with the national situation.” Based on this vision, it seeks to ensure national unity, social stability, and economic growth by providing the military with a central role in state leadership.

The Constitution pledges to “enable the Defense Services to participate in the national political leadership role of the state.” It also reserves a quarter of parliamentary to military representatives. These provisions have subjected the Constitution to widespread criticism in Western countries and have even prompted all-out rejection by some domestic political groups. Nevertheless, democratic principles have prevailed in the Constitution. It can still be considered as the legal groundwork for Myanmar’s democratic transition.

2. The multi-party system paves the way for Myanmar’s democratic transition.

A number of Myanmar’s pro-democracy groups have accepted the new Constitution and sought to lay the social foundation for Myanmar’s democratic transition.

Although the new Constitution does not completely conform to the standards of Western democracy, some pro-democracy groups in Myanmar have embraced it without resistance. This attitude has helped bring the new Constitution’s positive role into full play. There are several reasons for parties opposing military rule to change their stance.

First, the Constitution leaves much room for these parties to take part in political affairs while creating conditions for developing democracy peacefully. Although the West has criticized the fact that the Constitution reserves a quarter of the seats in both houses of parliament, opposition parties believe they will still be able to have a large influence on the remaining three quarters of the seats that are elected. In Myanmar’s 1990 elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi took 392 of the 492 seats in parliament, or nearly 81% of the total. If it can win 80 % of the elected seats in future elections, the NLD will become the majority party, occupying 60% of the total parliamentary seats. Theoretically, if militarybacked leaders go egregiously against public desires, opposition parties will be able to organize effective election campaigns to deprive the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) of its control of parliament.

Second, the political goals of several pro-democracy parties are to take part in state politics and protect their political rights– not simply the preservation of their power. Furthermore, many parties believe that it takes time to realize democracy and that Myanmar should develop democracy based on current conditions with an incremental approach. The National Democratic Force is a telling example. The party was formed by former NLD members after the NLD was formally disbanded in May 2010. It signed up for elections with 161 candidates, the third largest party numerically compared to other registered parties. Another example is the All Mon Region Democracy Party, the only ethnic Mon political group to compete in the 2010 elections. The party, founded in April 2010, disagrees with the resistant policies of other parties such as the New Mon State Party. “Participating in the elections does not mean that we are going to be the government’s slaves and do whatever the government wants. We are going to raise our voice for our people in the parliament,” said party Chairman Nai Ngwe Thein. U Thu Wai, Chairman of the Democratic, further stated that his party would continue to push for democratic change in Myanmar although it won only three seats in regional legislatures. Despite their reservations about the 2008 Constitution, these pro-democracy parties have made the most of the opportunities presented by the Constitution and continued their push for democracy in Myanmar through political involvement.

The USDP-led multi-party democratic system established in the first elections has laid the political foundation for Myanmar’s democratic transition. Extensive participation and a wide array of elected parties were the salient features of the 2010 elections. Before the elections, 47 political parties applied for election registration, and 37 of them were registered and able to compete in the elections. Of these parties, 21 were named after minority ethnic groups. More than 3,000 candidates, including 82 independent candidates, stood for the polls.

Election results showed that the USDP obtained 77.9 % of the seats in both houses of Myanmar’s parliament. Fifteen other parties and two independent candidates shared the remaining seats. Although the multi-party political system has come to be dominated by the USDP, the power of pro-democracy parties should not to be underestimated. Take for example the National Unity Party and the National Democratic Force. With its military background, the former recommended 1,000 candidates in the recent election, with 63, or 6.3 % of their total candidates, being elected. The latter belongs to the pro-democracy camp. Of its 161 candidates, 16 were elected, amounting to nearly 10 % of the total candidates. This provides evidence of the considerable public support it enjoys. In addition, representatives from 11 ethnic minority parties were elected to the lower house, known as the Pyithu Hluttaw. Though the number of representatives is not large, they represent the nation’s diverse ethnic minorities and are capable of exerting considerable influence on government decision-making. It should be noted that the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, whose members are mostly ethnic minorities, won the second largest number of seats in Myanmar’s united parliament. The participation of pro-democracy and ethnic minority parties in the 2010 elections bolstered the country’s political diversity.

3. The civilian government’s democratic approach is the key to a successful transition in Myanmar.

It goes without saying that the adoption of the Constitution and the mere holding of elections do not mark the completion of Myanmar’s democratic transition. The key to a successful transition lies in the new government’s performance. In order to prove the validity of the democratic system, the new government must follow democratic governing principles, rather than clinging to its former outdated practices.

The United States has held a negative and skeptical attitude toward Myanmar’s Constitution and elections. U.S. President Barack Obama issued a statement on November 7, 2010, the day that the elections were held, declaring that the elections were “neither free nor fair, and failed to meet any of the internationally accepted standards associated with legitimate elections.” But external accusations such as Obama’s will not serve as an incentive for Myanmar’s civilian government to proceed with its democratic transition. The real motivation lies in Myanmar’s Roadmap to Democracy and the aspirations that it holds to become a strong nation. In accordance with the Roadmap to Democracy, the civilian government is obligated to build a “modern, developed and democratic nation” using powers granted by the Constitution. To realize this goal, President U Thein Sein pledged in his inaugural speech to implement the separation of powers, to promote the establishment of regulations to meet the needs of the market economy, and to seek social and political reconciliation under a multi-party system.

In implementing the doctrine of the separation of powers, Myanmar will adjust the powers and functions of the various levels and branches of its government. The adjustment will lead to changes in the scope of government power and the country’s governance model. In his inaugural speech, President U Thein Sein said that in addition to adhering to the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, Myanmar will also divide powers between union and regional governments. “We have to build mutual cooperation and understanding between the Union Government and Region/State Government and between Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (union parliament) and Region/ State Hluttaw,” he said.

The new government has adopted a more open and democratic approach to boosting the development of a market economy in Myanmar. The government has meaningfully changed the goal of national economic development from “developing other economic sectors in an all-round way based on agriculture” to “further developing agriculture, building a modern industrialized country and developing other economic sectors in an all-round way.” The government has also pledged to open Myanmar to the outside world. Myanmar will not only attract foreign investment but also take an active role in the development of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in preparation for the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The government will also reform its tax system and consider privatizing some state-owned enterprises. In addition, it will make decision-making more democratic. The new government held a workshop on reforms for national economic development in Nay Pyi Taw, the capital city, on August 19, 2011. Participants ranged from state leaders to high-ranking officials, regional leaders to parliamentarians, economists to party leaders, and representatives from enterprises, media and NGOs. Aung San Suu Kyi was also invited to attend the workshop.

The government has also vowed to strengthen cooperation with political parties and NGOs while promoting democracy in society. In his inaugural speech, President U Thein Sein said that democratic practices should be adopted not only among elected representatives but also among ordinary citizens. “I promise that our government will cooperate with the political parties in the Hluttaws, good-hearted political forces outside the Hluttaws and all social organizations,” he said. He said he hoped that every citizen would serve national interests within the constitutional framework, and not try to disrupt the democratization process or harm peace, stability, and rule of law. “The Union Government welcomes all actions done within the constitutional framework, but will prevent and take necessary action against all actions done outside the constitutional framework,” he said.

II. Impacts of Myanmar’s Democratic Transition

1. The democratic transition provides a legal framework to resolve political disputes, allowing Myanmar’s peaceful reconciliation to move ahead.

The most important achievement of Myanmar’s democratic transition so far has been the political reconciliation between the government and Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. Conflicts between Aung San Suu Kyi and Myanmar’s former military regime came to power when the latter refused to hand over power to the NLD despite its election victory in 1990. The junta also detained many pro-democracy activists, including Aung San Suu Kyi. As a result, the NLD refused to take part in the 2010 elections. Shortly after the elections, the newly freed NLD leader called for not only dialogue with the military regime but also a “nonviolent revolution.” While addressing the possibility of having Western countries lift their sanctions on Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi maintained her long-held position that these sanctions should remain in place. This stance put her at great odds with Myanmar’s new civilian government.

Many factors have prompted Aung San Suu Kyi to change her attitude toward the new government. For one thing, the pro-democracy parties’ participation in the 2010 elections has helped strengthen Myanmar’s multi-party system. For another, Aung San Suu Kyi was convinced that the new government would introduce reforms after holding talks with leaders that included President U Thein Sein. “I think the president wants to achieve real positive change,” she said following a meeting with Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN Special Rapporteur on the state of human rights in Myanmar, in August 2011. After a third meeting with Union Minister for Labor and for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, U Aung Kyi said on September 30, 2011,“We are not opposing the election on principle. We accept that election is part of democracy. Procedures and preparations of the election are what we are considering.” In a bid to advance political reconciliation, the government amended the Political Parties Registration Law to remove legal barriers for the NLD’s re-registration. The NLD applied for re-registration on November 25, 2011, and Aung San Suu Kyi decided to run for a parliamentary seat in the byelections scheduled for April 1, 2012.

The democratic transition has accomplished the political reconciliation between the government and Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD.

Political reconciliation in Myanmar is quickly gaining momentum. The NLD’s re-registration has influenced other opponents of the new Constitution to include themselves in the new system. On November 25, 2011, the Mon National Democratic Front, a party that rejected the Constitution, formed a coalition with the All Mon Region Democracy Party, which won 16 seats in the 2010 elections, to jointly compete in regional byelections. Political reconciliation has contributed not only to the deepening of Myanmar’s multi-party democracy but also to the resolution of the country’s ethnic conflicts. The Karen National Union has said that it hopes that Aung San Suu Kyi will take a part in negotiations between the government and ethnic minority rebels as a mediator.

2. The democratic transition has mollified confrontation between Myanmar and the United States, helping promote regional stability.

Myanmar’s domestic political wrangling has long taken a toll on its foreign relations. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and other Western nations have complicated relations between countries in the region.

Pressure exerted by Western countries on Myanmar has adversely affected ASEAN solidarity. At one time, ASEAN members even discussed whether they should abandon the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, a principle one of the organization’s major political pillars. Myanmar gave up its ASEAN rotating chair in 2005 to avoid inflicting damage on ASEAN unity. While the United States censured Myanmar for its human rights record, Myanmar’s opposition accused the government of possibly colluding with North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. This sensitive claim could easily have escalated confrontation between the West and Myanmar. Before U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s visit to Myanmar in November 2011, Senator Richard Lugar said the Senate Foreign Relations Committee received information five years ago that Myanmar’s Government intended to develop nuclear weapons with the help of North Korea. Also, given the spread of political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, it could also be argued that lingering political tensions in Myanmar may have posed a grave threat to regional stability.

Myanmar’s democratic transition, however, has led to improvements not only in relations among ASEAN members but also between the United States and Myanmar. Clinton paid a historic visit to Myanmar on November 30, 2011, becoming the first U.S. secretary of state to visit the country since 1955. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda also held talks with Myanmar’s President U Thein Sein in Indonesia on November 18, 2011. Ten days later, Japan and Myanmar held an official development aid policy consultation in Nay Pyi Taw. Australia sent its foreign minister to Myanmar at the end of June for the first visit since 2002, while the EU dispatched its highestlevel delegation to Myanmar since 1989. Myanmar is gradually easing relations with Western countries and stabilizing domestic political situation, helping improve regional stability and development in Southeast Asia.

3. The democratic transition helps deepen China-Myanmar relations.

Western sanctions on Myanmar drew attention to relations between China and Myanmar, with Western countries accusing China of encouraging Myanmar in its ways. In 2009, responding to decades of failed sanction policies, the Obama administration started using sanctions as a means to push for engagement and change within Myanmar. It also believed that sanctions resulted in warming ties between Myanmar and China, which do not serve U.S. strategic interests. With this policy shift, the Obama administration attempted to estrange Myanmar from China through engagement. After Myanmar’s Government suspended the Myitsone Hydropower Project – a huge joint project between Myanmar and China – in September 2011, Western countries believed that Myanmar would keep a distance from China and seek to improve relations with the United States.

Contrary to Western predictions, relations between China and Myanmar have continually improved since Myanmar’s civilian government took office. President U Thein Sein paid a visit to China in May 2011, meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and other top political advisers such as Jia Qinglin, whose official title is chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The two countries also signed a joint statement on the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership. In light of their flourishing relationship, Myanmar’s suspension of the hydropower project is better understood as a result of domestic politics, not shortfalls in Sino-Myanmar relations. The halt of the project will no doubt inflict losses on Myanmar’s economic development. It is unimaginable that Myanmar’s Government will pursue improvements in the Myanmar-U.S. relations at the expense of economic opportunities involving China. Moreover, Myanmar’s relationships with China and the United States are not mutually exclusive. Difficulties in its relations with the U.S. do not result from its close ties with China, but instead from the United States’ hostilities and prejudice against Myanmar.

Myanmar’s democratic transition is conducive to the deepening and strengthening of China-Myanmar relations.

From both short-term and long-term viewpoints, Myanmar’s democratic transition is conducive to the deepening and strengthening of China-Myanmar relations. The main driving force underlying the ties is the inherent amity between the two neighboring countries. In recent years, hostile external pressure has awakened both to the importance of cementing good neighborly bonds. Since Myanmar started to devise its Roadmap to Democracy, the Chinese Government has been a firm supporter of Myanmar’s ongoing political transition. Myanmar’s democratic transition will not lead to enmity with China; instead, it will create a more favorable political environment for China and Myanmar to promote harmony in Myanmar’s domestic politics as well as in its foreign relations. As neighbors, China and Myanmar enjoy a relationship that dates back thousands of years. Since many ethnic groups reside on both sides of the China-Myanmar border, ethnic conflicts in north Myanmar often destabilize the border area. Myanmar’s democratic transition will promote reconciliation between ethnic rebels and the government, a development that will help secure the border area. At the same time, the process will drastically lower the political risks facing Chinese investors in Myanmar.

III. The Challenges Ahead

Since Myanmar’s democratic transition exhibits characteristics distinct to its national character, some analysts are doubtful about how far it can go and whether the democratic transition will be an irreversible process. But Myanmar’s future is shaped not strictly by the new government’s policies but also by other political groups’ attitudes toward the transition.

1. Controversy over “political prisoners” draws attention to the need of establishing standards to assess Myanmar’s democratic transition.

The United States and other Western countries believe that the release of so-called “political prisoners” is one of the most important factors in judging the authenticity of Myanmar’s democratic transition. This is also an issue that hinders the improvement of political trust between Myanmar’s authorities and the country’s pro-democracy groups. Whether the issue is valid, how “political prisoners” are to be defined, and whether the issue should be resolved politically or legally all remain points of contention.

First of all, the issue’s validity should be put to question.“Political prisoners,” as labeled by Western countries, are not recognized by Myanmar’s laws. During the ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011, President U Thein Sein said that his government does not agree that around 1,700 of the Myanmarese people are serving jail terms because of political activity. “We punished them because they violated our laws,” he explained.“There are a lot of people in prison for breaking the law, so if we apply the term [‘prisoner of conscience’] to just one group, then it will be unfair to others.”

Moreover, if it tries to cater to all of the West’s demands, Myanmar will face legal and political dilemmas. The new government granted widespread amnesty in May and October 2011, freeing more than 21,000 prisoners. More than 200 of these prisoners were designated as “political prisoners” by the West. Also, the sentences of death row inmates were commuted to life in jail and all other sentences were reduced by one year. In all of these cases, amnesty was granted universally. The government must pass laws before giving amnesty to a specific group. If it frees“political prisoners” without a legal basis, these unlawful acts will violate the democratic principle that states countries must be governed according to the law.

Underlying the issue of “political prisoners” is the fight for the final say in setting standards for Myanmar’s democratic transition. If the country accepts Western charges, Myanmar will have to proceed with its democratic transition at the command of the West, putting the transition process at risk. The settlement of this issue will therefore have a great bearing on the future of Myanmar’s transition.

2. Some of Myanmar’s ethnic problems are beyond the mandate of the democratic transition.

Myanmar will be forced to confront many complicated ethnic problems in its democratic transition. Since gaining independence in 1947, ethnic clashes have caused political turmoil in much of the country. Under the 1947 Constitution, which enshrined a federalist system, democracy and ethnic autonomy, all ethnic groups were united to help establish a modern country. But acute conflicts between these groups made Myanmar anything but a united nation. In restoring the main tenets of the 1947 Constitution, the new Constitution has amended provisions granting independence to some minority ethnic groups by underlining the importance of national solidarity. As a result, some ethnic minority militants have become cautious about the possible reemergence of Bamar chauvinism.

Before the 2010 elections, the military regime sought to persuade ethnic minority rebels to integrate themselves into border guard units and local police forces, all while attempting to turn ethnic minority political factions into political parties. This policy made a real difference. Of the 40 ethnic minority militant groups in Myanmar, 15 laid down their arms to the government, five joined border guards, and 15 were integrated into government forces. Only the Kachin Independence Army, the United Wa State Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the New Mon State Party, and the Karen National Union have yet to reach agreements with the government.

Since taking office, the civilian government has intensified efforts to make peace with ethnic insurgents that are yet to accept the new Constitution. While continuing to implement its predecessor’s reintegration and reconciliatory policies, it also hopes to localize ethnic conflicts based on Myanmar’s federalist system. While arguing that insurgents do not represent their ethnic groups, it has called on these groups to address their problems within the framework of ethnic autonomy.

Insurgents, however, have shown little interest in increased autonomy within the union. Instead, they want the government to allow them to exercise autonomy with armed forces – a demand that would be very unwise for the Myanmarese government. There are at least three reasons why it is unlikely for rebels to quickly reconcile with the government. First, they are categorically opposed to the new Constitution that guarantees the military’s leadership, demonstrating a stark lack of trust for the new government. Second, leaders of insurgent groups are reluctant to forsake the interests that they have gained through long-term armed struggle for independence. Third, foreign intervention in Myanmar’s domestic politics ensures that their struggle maintains outside funding and support.

For fear of being defeated individually by the government, rebel groups have forged alliances in the hope of negotiating with the government together. This has only added to the difficulties of reconciliation. The government maintains that separate negotiations should be conducted because of the rebels’ different conditions and aspirations. In November 2011, the government reached out to the Karen National Union’s recently established Peace Committee. The organization, however, said it would not reconcile with the government individually. At that time, the Kachin Independence Army was engaged in fierce fighting with government forces.

The Kachin Independence Army ended the ceasefire agreement it signed with the government in February 1994 and opened sparked violent conflict with government forces after the 2010 elections. Disputes between the Kachin Independence Army and the government over hydropower projects were the direct cause of these renewed conflicts. The organization, the first ethnic minority rebel group founded after Myanmar’s independence, has grown to become the leading anti-government force in Myanmar. Yet it is not a rebel group with clear political goals. In the past, it has even conducted illegal activities such as drug trafficking, though it later quit due to international pressure. Given its vague political aspirations, the government finds it difficult to deal with the organization by political means.

The Kachin Independence Army has posed challenges to Myanmar’s democratic transition. In light of the absence of adequate democracy, in remains unclear whether transition measures such as ethnic autonomy, a federalist system, and multi-party democracy can compel rebels to give up their vested interests. In fact, ethnic problems are not necessarily the result of a lack of democracy. India, dubbed by the United States the largest democracy in the world, also has ethnic problems. The Indian Government has not only violently suppressed ethnic insurgents but also asked for military assistance from Myanmar in doing so. While Myanmar’s democratic transition is conducive to the peaceful settlement of its ethnic conflicts, conflating the two issues up may obstruct progress in the transition.

3. The future of Myanmar’s multi-party democracy

Myanmar has established essential institutions for its democratic transition. Future challenges for the country’s multi-party system will mainly come from the process of the transition itself.

The first challenge is determining the nature of the relationship between the government and the opposition under a multi-party system. Although the new political system has been put in place, many legal and institutional adjustments have yet to be made. Whether opposition parties can cooperate with the ruling party and the government in institutional and social reforms will determine Myanmar’s political stability as well as the outcome of the country’s democratic transition. Myanmar’s parliament adopted a law allowing peaceful protests on November 24, 2011, demonstrating a desire to become more open politically. But it was also a sign that Myanmar’s reformers valued the pursuit of political rights on a superficial level over in-depth reforms of social and economic systems – a problem that may disturb the country’s transition process.

Another challenge is how to handle the relationship between foreign intervention and the domestic transition. Myanmar’s democratic transition needs international recognition and encouragement. In particular, the United States should lift its decades-long sanctions on the country. Since the sanctions focus more on its own geopolitical interests than on Myanmar’s transition, the United States prefers to change its policy toward Myanmar step-by-step rather than rapidly scrapping sanctions. During her visit to Myanmar, Clinton did not promise to lift the sanctions. The U.S. aims to induce Myanmar to realize democracy in accordance with U.S. standards, but inherent in this aim, the U.S. also wants the country to tilt diplomatically in favor of the United States, or at least away from China. As the multi-party system continues to develop, Myanmar’s future hinges on whether it can make steady progress in its political transition in line with its own roadmap.

Shi Yongming is an associate research fellow with the Department for International and Strategic Studies at China Institute of International Studies.