The Trend of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy under the Yanukovych Administration

Li Ziguo

The Trend of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy under the Yanukovych Administration

Li Ziguo

After winning out in the Ukrainian presidential election in February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych started to readjust Ukraine’s foreign policy, shifting from his predecessor’s “pro-Western”diplomatic line to a more balanced one. He has actively promoted Ukraine’s integration and cooperation with the European Union and taken membership in the EU as the country’s strategic direction; improved ties with Russia with a view of securing more energy concessions; pursued a non-aligned policy and joined no military bloc; and developed friendly relations with world powers such as the United States and China to obtain more room for development. In July 2010, President Yanukovych signed the Law of Ukraine on the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy, a document that provides a legal basis for his policy readjustments. Over the past year, Ukraine’s foreign policy has basically been successful, while its external environment has witnessed significant improvements.

I. Firmly Pushing forward Its Integration Co-

operation with the European Union

Europe remains the top diplomatic priority of Ukraine’s foreign policy. On March 1, 2010, Yanukovych paid a visit to the EU headquarters less than a week after he took office and sent the EU two clear and important messages: first, Europe was to remain the primary priority of Ukraine’s diplomacy, which would be subject to change in the future; second, Ukraine was to improve its relations with Russia, but such an improvement did not imply that Ukraine would side with Russia. An improvement in Ukrainian-Russian relations is beneficial not only to Ukraine but also to the rest of Europe, and it will help to secure a stable supply of natural gas to Europe. By choosing Europe as his first visiting destination, Yanukovych intended to appease opposition parties in his country, demonstrating to the pro-Western voters that he was not “a puppet of the Kremlin” and, to diplomatically win over Western countries’approval of himself and eliminate American and EU anxiety over his coming into power. After this visit, Yanukovych reaffirmed time and again that Ukraine’s integration into the EU is the country’s strategic policy and that Ukraine hopes to strengthen its comprehensive cooperation with the EU. Ukraine-EU relations have not deteriorated as a result of former President Viktor Yushchenko’s stepping down; various negotiations and cooperation between the two sides have been moving forward in a well-ordered way.

Over the past year, integration efforts between Ukraine and the EU have focused on three aspects: promoting the ratification of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, negotiations on visafree regime, and accelerating the establishment of Ukraine-EU Free Trade Area (FTA). Ukraine has made steps forward but without major breakthroughs.

The negotiation on the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement kicked off at the Paris summit in September 2008. At the summit, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who held the rotating presidency of the European Council, announced that the EU would negotiate with Ukraine and sign an Association Agreement, with the goal of deepening the“special relationship” between the two parties. For Europe, an Association Agreement will push Ukraine closer to the EU in term of political, economic, judicial and other standards. For Ukraine, signing an Association Agreement with the EU indicated that it had become a candidate state on the list of future EU enlargement, the first step in joining the EU. But negotiations on the agreement have yielded no results over the years. At the Ukraine-EU summit in Brussels in November 2010, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso expressed his hope that the agreement could be signed at the 2011 summit. The EU’s commitment to Ukraine has given Ukraine hope that membership will soon be attained.

Negotiations on visa-free regime date back to 2005. In February of that year, the Ukraine-EU Action Plan was passed at the 8th meeting of the Cooperation Council between Ukraine and the EU, and the two sides proceeded to conduct negotiations over visa-free travel as well as the establishment of an FTA. In the same year, Ukraine put into practice the visa-free regime for the citizens of the EU countries, but the EU has not yet given the same treatment as Ukrainian citizens. In 2008, Ukraine officially launched negotiations with the EU on visa-free regime, but the EU issued a range of demands on Ukraine, demands that focused on the following four aspects. First, there were demands pertaining to the visa itself. The EU asked Ukraine to ensure visa security, which included using biometric technology to encode the relevant information of a person. Second, the EU required Ukraine to enhance its administrative management, strengthen its efforts to crack down on illegal immigrants, and improve its border management. Third, the EU requested that Ukraine vigorously fight against organized crime in the field of public security, including drug and human trafficking. Lastly, the EU asked Ukraine to maintain good diplomatic relations with other European countries. At the Brussels summit in November 2010, the two sides signed an Action Plan on visa-free travel, indicating that they had basically reached an agreement on the conditions of visa-free travel and that Ukraine could sign a visa-free accord with the EU once it meets the conditions imposed by the EU. In May 2011, Ukrainian vice Prime Minister Klyuyev Andriy claimed that Ukraine would actively fulfill its commitment to the EU and adopt biometric technology to identify passports within the year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stated, “The time of carrying out visa-free travel depends on when Ukraine can meet the conditions reached between the two sides”. It was an interim achievement for Ukraine even though there was no exact date that was decided upon.

The Ukraine-EU FTA was also put forward in the Ukraine-EU Action Plan adopted in 2005. On February 18, 2008, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson announced in Kiev that the two sides had officially launched negotiations on the establishment an FTA. There had already been fifteen rounds of negotiation by February 2010, and the two sides are expected to sign a free trade agreement by the end of 2011. The EU indicated that it would fully support the development path adopted by Ukraine, and it allowed Ukraine to export its steel and iron products and textiles to the EU duty-free. In the agricultural sector, 80% of Ukraine’s agricultural products would be dutyfree in EU markets. The primary divergence between the two sides is that Ukraine hopes to enter the EU’s logistics and transportation market, but the EU completely excludes it from these negotiations; there are also some differences with regards to some technological standards and trademark disputes, among other issues. In addition, Ukraine is very concerned about the potentially negative impacts of establishing an FTA. For instance, Ukraine’s agriculture subsidies are only onesixth the size of such subsidies in the EU, leaving Ukraine unable to compete with the EU in the agricultural sector. Also, the certification system for agricultural products demanded by the EU will exclude milk, eggs, and other products produced by the ordinary farmers – they produce 70% of the milk and egg products in Ukraine – from the European market, as they are unable to handle such a complicated certification process. Although Ukraine expects to sign an FTA with the EU as soon as possible, it is still hard to predict how much they will actually benefit from such an agreement.

Before the FTA negotiations with the EU yielded any real results, Ukraine and the European Free Trade Association –including Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland –signed a free trade deal in October 2010, a development that is seen as a supplement to Ukraine’s integration into the EU.

Ukraine is not only an important member of EU’s Eastern Partnership program, but also a major platform for the EU to expand its influence eastward. As a result, the EU’s strategic objective is to win over Ukraine. As President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy put it, “Ukraine is a partner of strategic importance to the EU.” However, given the global financial crisis that currently afflicts the EU, it would be imprudent to consider further enlargement at the present moment; the EU will be very cautious on enlargement issues in future, but it also cannot eliminate Ukraine’s aspirations of joining the EU. As a result, the EU will try to prolong the preparatory work for Ukraine to join their Union. The bilateral ties will continue to move forward in a gradual and somewhat arbitrary manner, rather than with the breakthrough of membership.

II. Substantially Improving Its Relations with Russia

1. Improvements in Ukrainian-Russian relations

After experiencing years of friction with Russia, in addition to the severe impact of economic crisis, Ukraine can no longer bear the heavy burden of hostility towards Russia. Improving relations with Russia was an urgent task when Yanukovych came to power, and Russia had high expectations on Ukraine’s new president, hoping to make up for “the five years wasted.” On March 5, 2010, immediately after his visit to Europe, Yanukovych paid a visit to Moscow, bringing a quick warming of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia. Yanukovych made commitments on several major issues affecting Ukraine-Russia relations. First, Ukraine would not join NATO. Second, it would ensure the status of the Russian language in Ukraine and extend the tenancy of the Russian Black Sea fleet base in Ukraine. Third both sides agreed to develop economic, trade, and investment links, promote bilateral cooperation in such fields as energy, aerospace, aviation, nuclear energy, transportation, information, and even the military. The two countries also decided to set up National Committees responsible for consultations on specific matters of cooperation within these areas. This visit set a tone for the “friendly relations” between Ukraine and Russia in the coming years.

On April 21, 2010, Russia and Ukraine signed an “Extension Agreement on the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in Sevastopol”and a “Supplemental Agreement on the Purchase and Sale Contract between Gazprom, Russia and Naftogaz, Ukraine in 2009-2019” – effectively taking verbal hospitality and making it into concrete action. The Extension Agreement of the Black Sea Fleet provides that on the basis of the existing agreements, the naval base of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in Sevastopol, Ukraine will extend for 25 years (2017-2042), and that Russia has the right to ask for a further extension of five years if the two parties have no objections when it expires. This agreement reinforces Russia’s military presence in Ukraine, constitutes an important weight for Russia to hold back Ukraine’s accession to NATO, and could be seen as an important victory for Russia in its competition with NATO over Ukraine. Linked to this agreement is the Supplemental Agreement on the Russia-Ukraine gas contracts, according to which Ukraine’s natural gas imports from Russia will increase from 33.75 billion cubic meters to 36.5 billion cubic meters in 2010, while Russia will offer a 30% discount off the contract price to Ukraine, with the highest discount not to exceed $100 per thousand cubic meters. These two agreements have consolidated a positive trend in bilateral relations between the two countries, laying the foundation for further improvement of Russia-Ukraine relations.

In May 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev paid a visit to Ukraine and the two sides signed a Russian-Ukrainian border demarcation agreement, an intergovernmental cooperation agreement on the use and development of the Glonass navigation system, and an agreement on strengthening cooperation in the two countries’ banking, scientific, educational, and cultural sectors. On October 4, 2010, the first Russian-Ukrainian Inter-regional Economic Forum was held in Russia and the two sides signed a framework for interregional and border cooperation in 2011-2016. On October 20, 2010, Russia and Ukraine signed a protocol on reporting relevant information about the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The agreement stated that Russia was obliged to inform Ukraine of information concerning the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine. Such information includes the number and composition of the fleet’s personnel, as well as its weaponry and equipment. In May 2011, Russia and Ukraine also held a joint military exercise named the “Water-Way of Peace, 2011”. In addition to the signing of a series of agreements, Ukrainian and Russian leaders also congratulated each other on their respective national birthdays, clearly revealing that their personal relationships have witnessed huge changes from the past. In a word, Ukrainian-Russian relations and the personal relationships between their leaders have seen significant progress in the past year of Yanukovych’s rule.

2. Ukraine is in a dilemma for the direction of economic integration.

Although Ukrainian-Russian relations have made progress in terms of economic, political and security areas, the EU still remains a priority for Ukraine. Russia knows that although Ukraine’s integration into the EU currently focuses on the economic field, Ukraine will eventually break away from Russia’s sphere of influence and become a “true European country.” The Europeanization of Ukraine, through the implementation of bilateral cooperation in social areas such as visa-free travel and legislative standards, will also affect other countries in the “Eastern Partnership” program such as the Transcaucasian countries. As a result, Russia’s economic and even security integration with the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS) will face tremendous challenges. Therefore, Russia is trying to win over Ukraine, but at the same time it is fighting against Ukraine, doing its utmost to defer the country’s integration into the EU. On the one hand, Russia welcomes Ukraine’s integration and cooperation in the CIS region; on the other hand, it cautions Ukraine not to launch a Ukraine-EU FTA. On March 16, 2011, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that Russia would express its welcome if Ukraine is ready to join the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Putin also said that Ukraine would soon be able to join the Customs Union with favorable conditions and without waiting too long. In April 2011, during his visit to Ukraine, Putin said that Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union would save the country $8 billion in the gas sector alone. In his attempt to win over Ukraine, Putin also made a number of warnings: “We know that Ukraine is conducting negotiations on establishing an FTA with the EU, but in doing so Ukraine would have to make concessions in a number of sectors that are very sensitive to your economy…In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), Ukraine’s tariff rate is only half that of the Customs Union. If the Ukraine-EU FTA is started, many Ukrainian goods that are unable to enter the EU market will shift into the Russian market. Russia will not permit Ukrainian goods to enter the markets of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus at the present low-tariff rate…” and Russia will have to “build a tariff border” against Ukrainian goods which “will result in severe consequences”. At a press conference in May 2011, Russian President emphasized that Ukraine could not have its feet in two camps.

Differing from Russia’s carrot-and-stick methods, the EU firmly believes that Ukraine will continue to carry out economic integration with the EU and expects that it will engage wholeheartedly in the Ukraine-EU FTA. Stefan Füle, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, said that Ukraine’s admission into the Customs Union within the framework of a common economic space was inconsistent with its pursuit of a free-trade agreement with the EU. The EU’s attitude forced Ukraine to keep a certain distance from its integration with Russia.

From the Ukrainian perspective, although its integration with the EU is beset with difficulties, “Europeanization” remains its underlying strategic objective, and it is only a temporary move for Ukraine to undertake economic integration within the CIS framework; it is a move that Ukraine in some ways has to adopt under its current economic level because its products are currently unable to meet the EU’s standards. However, Ukraine is also very clear that it can not do without Russian energy resources, let alone the CIS market, to overcome the current crisis, and that these traditional partnerships are very important to its economy. Oleg Ustenko, Executive Director of the Bleyzer Foundation, argued that Ukraine was inclined to strengthen its economic ties with Russia because it needed to sell its products in the Russia and other CIS markets. He pointed out that though Kiev tends to integrate with the EU, in recent years the EU share in Ukrainian exports has been in consistent decline, dropping from 35% in 2003 to little more than 20% in 2009. Ukrainian officials also indicated that it was impossible for Ukraine not to cooperate with the Customs Union because of Russia’s crucial role in Ukrainian trade; Russia accounted for 26.1% of Ukraine’s exports and 36.5% of its imports in 2010, a clear indicator of their close bilateral economic ties. Ukraine must not turn a blind eye to the integration measures in the CIS framework, such as the free trade agreements; at the same time, in consideration of the EU, it has to stay away from the Customs Union. CIS integration intends to eliminate barriers to free trade among member countries and abolish import duties and indirect taxes, so it is conducive to their mutual trade and will attract other countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program; the Customs Union, on the other hand, seeks to establish a common economic space with Russia and will exert an influence on Ukraine’s integration and cooperation with the EU. Ukraine’s current average tariff is only 4.5%, while that of the Customs Union is 10.25%. If Ukraine wants to join the Customs Union, it will have to increase its tariffs, an act that will be in conflict with its commitments to the WTO and the Ukraine-EU FTA. Russia’s warm invitation to join the Customs Union thus places Ukraine in an awkward predicament, and Ukraine has no choice but to evade a decision for various reasons. In April 2010, Yanukovych said, “Ukraine has joined the World Trade Organization and has now integrated itself into the WTO. We make our policies in accordance with WTO principles, and now we will not join the Customs Union among Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan because the operating principles and laws of the WTO do not allow us to do so.” In December 2010, Vasyl Chushko, then the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, softened his ministries stance and said that Ukraine had decided to participate as an observer in negotiations on the Customs Union within the framework of a common economic space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but that it had no intention of joining the Customs Union. In March 2011, Yanukovych also said that Ukraine would be ready to cooperate with the Customs Union and sign a series of documents on cooperation in a “3+1”model. Obviously, it their realistic interests compel Ukraine continuously soften their position on joining the Customs Union. Ukraine does not want to offend Russia, and it is also aware of the great significance of the Customs Union and the CIS market for its own national interest. However, integration with the EU is still perceived to be more attractive. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko said, “Both shortand long-term prospects should be taken into account. The EU market is several times larger than that of the Customs Union. We need to cooperate not only with the EU, but also with the Customs Union.” Ukraine is thus in an awkward position with regards to integration.

3. There are still pending issues centering on energy between Ukraine and Russia.

Over the years, the controversy over natural gas between Russia and Ukraine has been a recurring issue nearly every year. Energy is an effective means for Russia to clamp down on Ukraine and the problem is not yet straightened out. Ukraine holds that the agreement, reached between Ukraine and Russia in 2009, of linking the price of natural gas to that of oil is very unreasonable, and that the high price of natural gas is an important reason for its long-term economic crisis. As a result, Ukraine has continually been asking for a revision of the 2009 contract. Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov insists that the original pricing model through contract is enslaving Ukraine and must be revised. On February 5, 2011, Yanukovych said that Ukraine was unsatisfied with the current price of Russian gas. Although a 30% discount agreement based on the price in 2009 was reached last year, Yanukovych said that “the price is too high for us and will in any case hit our economy.”Ukraine had no qualms with the price discount agreement; rather it complained that the benchmark price identified in the 2009 contract was too high. Russia rejected the request to revise the 2009 contract, but agreed to set up a working group for further discussion. Russia expects to realize the merger of Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz through negotiations. Of course, Russia will hold Ukraine’s Naftogaz after the merger, because Ukraine’s Naftogaz together with Ukrainian natural gas pipeline transportation system will only make up a 5% share of the joint venture. The merger proposal was put forward by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in April 2010, but it was rejected by Ukraine. In September 2010, Yuriy Boiko, Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine, said that it would be impossible for the two companies to merge. To increase the attractiveness of the proposed merger, Russia proposed to take several additional steps. The first step was to establish a joint venture for which both sides would provide valuable assets. Russia would use its gas field to become a stakeholder, while Ukraine would take out its natural gas pipelines to the EU,which are exactly what Russia covets, to buy a share. Russia also offered Ukraine a list of gas fields for the joint venture. In February 2011, Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Management Committee of Gazprom, said that if the two companies merged, the price of natural gas for Ukrainian customers would be reduced to the levels in Russia, and that his company would maximize the use of the Ukrainian gas pipeline system and invest in its expansion, increasing its annual transport capacity from 95 billion m3 to 125 billion m3. Russia has thus put forward rather attractive conditions in their quest to control Ukraine’s pipeline. Ukraine, however, is reluctant to give up their only means of restraining Russia, but they cannot break away from their dependence on Russia. Similar to Belarus, turning over 50% or more of its shares in the pipeline in exchange for low-price energy may be a more realistic option for Ukraine; the value of the Ukrainian pipeline will shrink greatly once the two energy pipelines – “South Stream” and “North Stream” – are completed.

Politically, Russia expects Ukraine to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but Ukraine has made it clear that it will not do so. On June 4, 2010, Yanukovych said, “According to international law, any act of undermining the territorial integrity of a country is prohibited. I have never recognized [their independence].” Obviously, no matter it is out of consideration for its own interests or its relations with the West; Ukraine will not cater to Russia and is even quite vigilant against the Russian approach.

Culturally, Yanukovych hopes to grant Russian the status of the second national language, but he has distanced himself from this initial commitment. According to the Constitution, Ukrainian is the only official language of Ukraine, and to make Russian a second official language, revisions would have to be made to the Constitution. Yanukovych has stated that it will be difficult to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary in Parliament to amend the Constitution. So he proposed drawing up a charter on regional and minority languages in order to replace the original plan. In October 2010, the Party of Regions, the Litvin Bloc, and the Communist Party submitted a bill to Parliament on Ukrainian languages that was jointly drafted by the three parties. The draft granted Russian the same status as Ukrainian in daily life and gave it more rights, including the right to choose Russian as a teaching language by schools, than any other minority language. Contrary to the fact that there has been no substantial progress in granting Russian status as the second national language, Yanukovych has called for a strengthening of the status of Ukrainian and even criticized some officials for their being unable to speak Ukrainian. Ukrainian Prime Minister Azarov, who cannot speak Ukrainian, responded actively to the call and said that he was “doing his utmost to learn the language, such as reading the documents written in Ukrainian and practicing oral communications in Ukrainian.” In early 2011, the closing of the only library of Ukrainian literature in Russia resulted in strong dissatisfaction from Ukrainian opposition parties, and it will inevitably bring stronger opposition if Russian in fact wants to become the second official language of Ukraine.

Generally speaking, the economic ties between the two countries will become closer, and more Russian enterprises will invest in Ukrainian enterprises. But Ukraine will by no means abandon the EU and become a strategic appendage to Russia. As a result, the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia will remain in a “close but not intimate” state.

III. Pursuing a Non-alignment Security Policy and a New European Security Concept

Being caught between two major powers – the EU and Russia– it is by no means easy for Ukraine to maintain a balanced foreign policy. Over the years, pro-Western policies carried out by former President Yushchenko did not bring any substantial benefits to Ukraine, instead triggering political turmoil and constituting a significant reason for continued hostility in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Although Ukraine is unable to achieve economic success in both ways, its non-alignment security policy does allow it to conduct a balanced foreign policy. In January 2010 when he was running for election, Yanukovych made it clear that Ukraine would remain neutral, neither joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In his inauguration speech, Yanukovych stated that Ukraine would continue its cooperation with NATO, but that the issue of joining NATO should be decided by the Ukrainian people through a referendum. Ukraine will remain a non-aligned country in order to maintain its integration process with the EU and former Soviet republics. Ukraine also strives to develop security cooperation with both NATO and Russia without offending either of them.

In July 2010, Yanukovych signed the Law of Ukraine on the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy, a document that officially recognizes the legal status of Ukraine as a non-aligned country and abolishes the provisions on seeking to join NATO. According to the Law, non-alignment is to remain the basic principle of Ukrainian foreign policy. Ukraine will not join any military-political alliance, but it will participate in improving and developing the European collective security system and continue to cooperate with NATO and other military-political blocs on issues of their respective interests. Of course, Ukraine is also impartial in its approach to Russia’s invitation to join CSTO. On July 27, 2010, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that it was not a pressing issue for Ukraine to join CSTO. In the future, Ukraine will act in accordance with their policy of non-alignment and in the pursuit of their national interest rather than hastening to join any military organization.

While practicing their policy of non-alignment, Ukraine also expects to serve as a bridge between the EU and Russia and puts forward its own version of a new European security concept. Ukraine maintains that the new European collective security system should be built with participation from all European countries on an equal footing, so as to ensure the security of all countries in the region. During the Lisbon summit in November 2010, NATO urged Russia, Ukraine, and other countries to join the European Anti-Missile System, but Ukraine did not respond because Russia’s attitude was not adequately clear. In February 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visited Ukraine, expecting Ukraine to participate in the European Anti-Missile System in an active manner. But, after two-hours of closed-door talks, Yanukovych perfunctorily said that Ukraine was only willing to strengthen its effective cooperation with NATO within the existing mechanisms and frameworks. Obviously, Ukraine has little interest in enhancing their bilateral military cooperation, and it will not rush to take a stand before Russia has a clear position on the new European Anti-Missile System. In January 2011, Yanukovych stated in an interview with CNN that Ukraine could make the relations between Moscow, Washington and Europe more stable, and that Ukraine was willing to serve as a bridge for communications between Russia and the EU.

As a result, both the EU and Russia are largely satisfied with Ukraine’s neutrality. Ukraine conforms to Russia’s demands and explicitly refuses to join NATO. Russia has also got its wish to extend the time limit of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine and is satisfied with Ukraine’s neutrality on security issues. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also said that NATO respects Ukraine’s non-alignment, but that its door remains open to all democratic countries. In August 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said at her meeting with visiting Yanukovych that Ukraine could not be forced into choosing between a pro-Russian and a pro-West stance, and that Ukraine could potentially play an important role as a middleman in EU-Russian relations. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also said she understood the Ukrainian practice of pursuing a balance between Western countries and Russia. In fact, it is unimportant for Ukraine to serve as a bridge of communication between the EU and Russia; what is important is that neither the EU nor Russia requires Ukraine to choose their respective sides. This temporarily frees Ukraine from taking sides on security issues and expands its room to maneuver between the EU and Russia.

IV. Actively Developing Its Friendly Relations with the World’s Major Powers

As part of its balanced diplomacy, Ukraine has also sought to accelerate the development of its relations with the world’s major powers, holding meetings with the leaders of China, Germany, France, Canada, Japan and other major countries, reaping the benefits of such good relations.

As early as April 2010, Yanukovych held a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Washington. In September 2010, little more than six months after he took office, Yanukovych paid a visit to China and the two sides signed a series of documents on cooperation, including the “Joint Statement on Raising the Overall Level of Bilateral Friendly and Cooperative Relations between the People’s Republic of China and Ukraine” and the “Main Direction for the Development of China-Ukraine Relation in 2010-2012.” These documents covered bilateral relations, aerospace, infrastructure, finance, inspection and quarantine, customs, commerce, rail transportation, electricity and many other fields. These fields addressed the rail transit from Ukraine’s capital Kiev to its airport as well as airport facilities, both of which are to be financed and constructed by the Chinese. In addition, the two sides set up a Cooperation Committee at the level of the vice-premier under which there are many sub-committees on cooperation covering the economy and trade, science and technology, agriculture, aerospace, culture, and education. Yanukovych said that it was in accordance with Ukraine’s national interest to deepen its relations with China as a result of China’s rapid economic development, and that the two sides had tremendous potential for cooperation in almost all areas. Yanukovych’s visit represented a sudden rapprochement of Sino-Ukrainian relations that had suffered during the Yushchenko era. To implement the agreements reached between the two sides, Ukrainian Prime Minister Azarov visited China in April 2011. During this visit, he stressed that it was of strategic importance for Ukraine to strengthen its relations with China.

Germany, France, Japan, and Canada are among the world’s major economies, while Germany and France are also among the traditional big powers in Europe. Naturally, they constitute the focus for Ukraine to develop bilateral relations of cooperation. On August 30, 2010, Yanukovych paid a visit to Germany and held talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, during which he sought to obtain Germany’s support for the Ukraine-EU FTA. On October 8, 2010, Yanukovych visited France and signed a “Roadmap for Ukrainian-French Relations in 2011-2012,” while both sides also agreed to expand their bilateral exchanges. In October 2010, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was invited to visit Ukraine, and during his visit he stated that Canada would continue to strengthen its friendly relations and cooperation with Ukraine. In January 2011, Yanukovych paid a visit to Japan and the two sides signed a Memorandum of Cooperation between Ukraine and Japan, deciding to hold the Capital’s Day in each other’s capital, while Ukraine also pledged to support Japan in their mission to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The two sides also signed a series of agreements on cooperation, covering urban management, transport, energy, and other areas. With an aim of entering the rapidly developing Asian markets, Yanukovych paid visits to Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei and other countries in March 2011; the visits were an attempt to secure markets for Ukrainian goods, help Ukrainian enterprises enter the local capital market, and learn the experiences of economic reforms among these countries. It is clear that Ukraine does not limit its focuses to Europe, but tries to find partners for cooperation in an extensive manner. It seeks to find a position of balance within the wider international spectrum.

Ukraine’s relationship with the United States is not only important but also somewhat sensitive. The United States was somehow disappointed with the defeat of Yushchenko in the presidential election, as they had lent support to the incumbent through the color revolutions, and they were suspicious of the policies that Yanukovych was going to adopt. Despite these concerns, the United States accepted the result of the Ukrainian presidential election. On March 11, 2010, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine John F. Tefft said that the United States was prepared to cooperate with the new Ukrainian administration, and that the United States “hopes that Ukraine will further implement its reforms which are conducive to the state, economy, and society”. In April 2010, Yanukovych held talks with U.S. President Barack Obama at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington. Ukraine pledged to give up its highly enriched uranium and ship them out by April 2012; the United States, in turn, offered a total of $40 million to Ukraine as compensation. Ukraine’s renouncement of nuclear weapons and highly enriched uranium is a forceful testament to the“nuclear-free world” put forward by Obama and demonstrates that Ukraine truly hopes to dispel U.S. concerns over its new administration. After seeing that Ukraine did not fully align itself with Russia, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton paid a visit to Ukraine in July 2010 with an objective of strengthening its relationship with Ukraine. Since Yanukovych came to power, this was the first visit by a senior U.S. official to Ukraine. During the visit, Clinton said that Ukraine should be free of external influence in choosing its partners for cooperation, and that the United States would support Ukraine’s economic reforms and expect its leadership to work out concrete steps in developing democracy. Subsequently, Ukraine, the United States, and Turkey held an annual military exercise called“Sea Breeze 2010.” After continuous contacts, the United States and Ukraine have greatly enhanced their mutual trust. Caught in a severe economic crisis, Ukraine needs the United States’ support in such matters as securing loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ukraine knows that it cannot emerge from its economic crisis by relying solely on Russia, and that it will require the support of international financial institutions such as the IMF, in which the United States and the West occupy a dominant position. The United States has tried to win over the new Ukrainian administration, but more of its policies are warnings that come with the expectation that Ukraine will move closer to the West.

V. Conclusion

During the first year of Yanukovych’s rule, Ukraine has changed the “one-sided” foreign policy of its former regime. However, with regard to its economy, membership in the EU remains Ukraine’s constant priority and “going west” is its strategic direction. As a result, although the Ukraine-Russia relationship has undergone rapid improvements, it is hard to deem it an intimate relations, as Ukraine will not return to Russia’s “embrace.” Simultaneous with its integration into the EU, Ukraine will also actively develop economic cooperation with the CIS countries, as the current level of its economic development determines that Ukraine cannot do without the markets of Russia and other CIS countries. In political and military realms, Ukraine will not seek to join NATO and pursues a policy of non-alignment that will help it maintain a balance between the EU and Russia – it will seek to extend this balance into the coming years. Ukraine will also continue to develop its relations with the world’s major powers so as to find a broader market and source of investment for its economic development.

Li Ziguo is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Department of SCO Studies at China Institute of International Studies.