论白令海峡的法律地位

2011-04-07JoshuaOwens

中华海洋法学评论 2011年2期

Joshua Owens

论白令海峡的法律地位

Joshua Owens*

本文主旨是探究白令海峡的法律地位,特别是有关国际航行海峡的管理体制问题。在检视国际法的相关文献,特别是检视《联合国海洋法公约》后,本文得出结论认为白令海峡应被认定为是用于国际航行的海峡,通过者享有过境通行权;白令海峡沿岸国——俄罗斯和美国——的法律立场也会在本文中探讨。随着北极航线使用率的增加,白令海峡的地缘政治地位可能会有新的变化,因此最好能建立一个透明公正的管理体制以便应对。如何根据国际法并且参照其它国际海峡实施的管理方法来建立这一体制,本文将提出若干建议以供参考。

白令海峡用于国际航行的海峡过境通行

一、引言

在北极圈所有海峡中,白令海峡是最窄的,也许也是最重要的一个海峡。尽管到现在为止,白令海峡还没有像西北航道和东北航道那样造成很多争议,但和这两个航道不同的是,其不能被绕行。换言之,只要关闭白令海峡,那么从白令海到北冰洋的船舶通道都将会被一举关闭。如同南太平洋的马六甲海峡那样,白令海峡是处于至关重要位置的天然要塞。在此区域大规模商业航行开始之前,如果有可能预防性地解决关于主权和外国船舶通行权的相关法律问题,那么将极大地有利于避免未来不必要的冲突和紧张。

白令海峡位于俄罗斯最东部大陆的凸出处和美国最西边大陆的凸出处间,是一条狭窄的海洋通道,其将北太平洋和北极水域连接起来。北极出口非常少,而白令海峡是其中一个,但是,鉴于历史上其海洋运输量相当少,到目前为止这个事实并没有造成一个重大的全球性问题。①See discussion below in sec.Ⅱ(B).然而,正如近期一些学术论文和相关新闻报道所证实的,对北极的兴趣,特别是关于北极资源(包括生物和非生物资源)开发和运输航线使用的兴趣正在随北极冰层的不断消失而不断增加。②An attempt at presenting an exhaustive list would be unnecessarily cumbersome,but for an idea of recently-published academic pieces on the subject,see Angelle C.Smith,Frozen Assets:Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War,George Washington International Law Review,Vol.41,2010,p.651;Aldo Chircop, The Growth of International Shipping in the Arctic:Is a Regulatory Review Timely?,The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,Vol.24,No.2,2009,p.355;Michael Byers,Who Owns the Arctic?Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North,Vancouver:Douglas&McIntyre Publishers INC,2009;Roger Howard,The Arctic Gold Rush:The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources,London:Continuum International Publishing Group,2009.毫无疑问,其中最重要的航道就包括了东北航道和西北航道,俄罗斯和加拿大各自主张对此两航道享有主权。有关这些航道法律地位这个棘手问题有待圆满的解决,此问题并不在本文的讨论范围之内。但是,“低调的”白令海峡有可能构成穿越这些航道的航线组成部分。③See Figure 1.See also E.J.Molenaar,Arctic Marine Shipping:Overview of the International Legal Framework,Gaps,and Options,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy, Vol.18,2009,p.293(remarking that“all trans-Arctic marine shipping must pass through the Bering Strait”).因此对白令海峡法律地位进行研究,对其潜在的地缘政治意义进行分析,包括对其环境保护和沿岸国家的管理进行讨论并提出建议,都将会有实际可用之处。④The present essay will analyze global issues from a realist perspective,taking account of the fact that,unless the international zeitgeist for development,sustainable or otherwise,is drastically altered soon,the demand for resources will push implacably toward large-scale exploitation of the Arctic,including mining,shipping,fishing,touring and other such commercial activities.One hopes that as access increases,the proper environmental protections will be enacted and enforced with an equivalent fervor through appropriate national legislation and international fora.For an alarming warning on the dangers posed by reckless development in the Arctic,see Andrew Van Wagner,It’s Getting Hot in Here,So Take Away all the Arctic’s Resources:A Look at a Melting Arctic and the Hot Competition for its Resources,Villanova Environmental Law Journal,Vol.21,2010,p.189.It should be noted that Donald Rothwell’s insightful presentation Arctic Choke Points and the Law of the Sea,Australian National University—ANU College of Law Research Paper No.10-81,2010 has broken ground on the analysis of the Bering Strait as it relates to law of the sea;however due to the comprehensive nature of that paper’s topic,it still seems worthwhile to delve further into circumstances pertaining specifically to the Bering Strait.

本文在接下来的第二部分介绍了关于海洋法的一些相关背景资料以及关于白令海峡的相关情况,在第三部分考察了俄美两个沿岸国的法律立场,本文的第四部分提出了在未来,对于白令海峡进行谨慎、无冲突管理的一些建议。

二、白令海峡和国际海洋法

为了更好地理解商业航行、国际交往与白令海峡的关联性,本部分的法律分析会从该海峡的地理状况和地理限制开始,也会进一步讨论其在国际海洋法之下的意蕴,并着重于1982年的《联合国海洋法公约》。①United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaties and Agreements:Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea(done at Montego Bay),opened for signature December 10,1982,UN Doc.A/Conf.62/122,16 Nov 1994;reprinted at International Legal Materials,Vol.21,p.1261 and U.N.T.S.,No.1833,p.397[hereinafter UNCLOS].

(一)地理因素及其法律意蕴

白令海峡由亚洲到北美大陆,从俄罗斯的迭日涅夫角到阿拉斯加的威尔士王子角,测量距离大约53英里(约85千米,45海里)宽,深度在30～50米之间。②World Atlas,Bering Strait,at http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/bering.htm, 11 October 2011.In the Arctic Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment,it is observed that“[a]t the strait’s narrowest point,the continents of North America and Asia are just 90 km apart.”Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Arctic Council,Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,190 pp,at http://www. arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download= 245:the-amsa-2009-report,p.106,30 November 2011.靠近海峡中央有大代奥米德群岛和小代奥米德群岛,两个群岛之间是美俄两国国界线。③This boundary was reaffirmed in the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary,1 June 1990,International Legal Materials,Vol.29,p.941(hereinafter 1990 US-Soviet Boundary Agreement).See map 1.1990 US-Soviet Boundary Agreement,Art.2(1)states:“From the initial point,65°30′N.,168°58′37″W.,the maritime boundary extends north along the 168°58′37″W.meridian through the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea into the Arctic Ocean as far as permitted under international law.”In effect,the boundary line runs neatly between the two Diomedes,as shown in map 2.For the Senate document including the text of the agreement as well as the US Senate’s advice and approval thereof,see Senate Treaty Document 101-22,at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125431.pdf,11 October 2011.This agreement has not been ratified by the Russian Duma.这两个小群岛分属俄美两国,相距仅4千米。

在海峡最狭窄处,即两海角邻近之处没有公海或专属经济区,而这两者都可以为潜在的通行者提供充足的航行自由。④See UNCLOS,Arts.58(1),87(1).实际上,在小代奥米德群岛(美国)和威尔士王子角间的水域构成了一片领海,而无其它水域。①See map 2 and accompanying explanation.根据国际法规定,领海是沿岸国家享有完全主权的区域,②See UNCLOS,Art.2.对于其它国家船舶享有的无害通过权可以进行警告。③See UNCLOS,Art.17 reads:“Subject to this Convention,ships of all States,whether coastal or land-locked,enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”关于“无害通过权”这一术语的意蕴,《联合国海洋法公约》规定通过时应“继续不停和迅速进行”④See UNCLOS,Art.18.以及“不损害沿海国的和平、良好秩序或安全”。⑤See UNCLOS,Art.19(1).《联合国海洋法公约》第19条第2款列举了许多可被视为非无害的活动,这些活动包括但不限于使用武力、捕鱼、故意污染和起落飞机。⑥Interestingly,this article does not state whether the list is exhaustive,leaving the possible interpretation that other acts may also be considered“prejudicial to the peace”of a coastal State.本文关注的是那些并没有违反无害通过原则的活动,如集装箱货船、油轮、渔船的商业航行。

白令海峡不仅仅是因为包含领海而必然构成一个会吸引很多未来海上运输的地方。在接下来小标题的内容中会简单地评估通过白令海峡而建立和维持大洋航线的可行性。

(二)海运可行性

如之前所暗示的,白令海峡可能会在大洋航线中扮演一个重要角色。在通过北极(东北或西北)航道时,商船、军舰、科研考察船、渔船及其它船舶都有兴趣通过此海峡。迄今为止,在北极的航行活动相对很少,⑦Take,for example,the fact that from 1903 to May 2010,only 135 voyages had gone through the Northwest Passage.Sixty of those voyages,nearly half,had taken place since 2000:this indicates a growing trend of willingness to brave the Arctic.Lawson W. Brigham,The Fast-Changing Maritime Arctic,Proceedings,May 2010,U.S.Naval Institute,Annapolis,Maryland,at https://www.princeton.edu/lisd/events/talks/brigham_ may2010.pdf,p.56,12 October 2011.See also 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, pp.36～49(recounting the history of Arctic navigation).有史以来,北极恶劣、不可预知的天气和险恶的覆冰往往都使投资者和探险者打消此念头,当然极少数最强悍的冒险家除外。①Nicholas Wapshott,Strife Looms between America,Canada over Route,N.Y.Sun,11 October 2007,at http://www.nysun.com/foreign/strife-looms-between-america-canada-over-route/64337/(stating that“[u]ntil now the passage has been icebound and immensely dangerous to navigate”),12 October 2011.On the other hand,2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment,p.36,relates that navigation among indigenous peoples in the Arctic has been afoot since ancient times;at p.49 it points out that accumulating the necessary field data“may help to reduce the perceived risks of year-round marine transport in the Arctic,”which suggests that in the Arctic Council’s view,current obstacles to Arctic marine shipping are certainly not insurmountable.然而伴随近期融冰引起的适航可能性不断增加,潜在的北极地区活动参与者开始重新考虑他们的定位。②Matt Roston,Note and Comment,The Northwest Passage’s Emergence as an International Highway,Southwestern Journal of International Law,Vol.15,2009,p.450(asserting the likelihood of Northwest Passage becoming a major navigational route following the ice melt);Roger Howard,The Arctic Gold Rush:The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources,London:Continuum International Publishing Group,2009,pp.109～110(stating that the distance of a Tokyo-London voyage could be reduced by 3,500 miles if using Arctic routes instead of the Suez Canal or as much as 5,500 if used instead of the Panama Canal;the author further relates that a Bremen-Shanghai voyage could be reduced by 3, 200 miles;in short,the distance of many such journeys would be cut by about a third).很清楚的是这两条航道——想必它们都要穿过白令海峡——具有经济可行性,或者说在未来会如此。在描述东北航道(经常也称北方航道③Some sources use the two appellations“Northern Sea Route”(NSR)and“Northeast Passage”synonymously;more accurately,the two should be considered separate entities,the NSR constituting the center portion of the longer Northeast Passage.See Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001,pp.269～291.The present essay usually employs the term NSR because the discussion revolves around Russia’s legal stance concerning this route,which it regards as a domestic one.)时,一个评论者做了如下说明:

北方航道连接了巴伦支海和白令海峡。当可通航时,连接亚洲和欧洲的航道比起通过苏伊士运河的替代航线要快三倍。这将显著减少在泛太平洋和北欧及欧亚大陆间的运输时间和运输费用。④Ariel Cohen,From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access:Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy 2010,Backgrounder,No.2421,Heritage Foundation,at http://thf_media. s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf,p.9,12 October 2011.

但是在穿越这两条北极航道时有一些困难。就北方航道而言,与由俄罗斯联邦所提出的主权问题有密切关系的是莫斯科政策,即强制性为通过俄罗斯沿岸的运输船舶提供破冰船服务。①Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2001,pp.284～285.Another commentator notes:“Russia’s mandatory ice-breaker fees are high,and the fees are not directly linked to actual services rendered. For instance,during light summer ice conditions,an ice-strengthened vessel may be able to transit the NSR unescorted,but will still have to pay a full fee.The fee system is a major obstacle to transit traffic,and since the opening of the NSR to foreign vessels in 1991,the Russian authorities have yet to design a system that encourages the use of the route even under otherwise ideal conditions.”Claes Lykke Ragner,Den norra sjövägen,in Torsten Hallbeg ed.,Barents-ett gränsland i Norden,Stockholm:Arena Norden,2008,pp.114～127[English translation unpaginated,at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/clr-norden-nsr -en.pdf,16 October 2011.].这些服务费用过高,②Claes Lykke Ragner,Den norra sjövägen,in Torsten Hallbeg ed.,Barents-ett gränsland i Norden,Stockholm:Arena Norden,2008,pp.114～127.尽管有报告显示近期有些航行是在没有破冰船的协助之下完成的,③Michael A.Becker,Russia and the Arctic:Opportunities for Engagement within the Existing Legal Framework Symposium:Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,American University International Law Review,Vol. 25,2010,p.241(stating that in August 2009 two German-owned ships,the Beluga Fraternity and Beluga Foresight,“undertook and completed the voyage,with Russian approval and without ice-breaker assistance”).这意味着俄罗斯可能会改变其北方航道航行政策。④Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2001,pp.286～288.Outlines a possible solution to problems posed by Russian administration of its NSR,namely internationalization of said passage,perhaps via an international NSR Convention.同样地,对于西北航道是否位于加拿大内水还是属于用于国际航行海峡这一问题也存在分歧。⑤See generally John Kennair,Conference:International Arctic Change and the Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean Seabed,An Inconsistent Truth:Canadian Foreign Policy and the Northwest Passage,Vermont Law Review,Vol.34,2009,p.15;James Kraska,Symposium:Mounting Tension and Melting Ice:Exploring the Legal and Political Future of the Arctic,International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.1109;Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde,Symposium:Mounting Tension and Melting Ice:Exploring the Legal and Political Future of the Arctic,Who Controls the Northwest Passage?,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.1133.与北极航线相关的这些不确定性因素会让那些可能使用这些航线的谨慎投资者打消念头。现在已有很多资料详述俄罗斯和加拿大的北极水域管理问题、这两国的主权主张和其它国家的相应回应,基于本文的目的,对此不再进行深入讨论。①For recent treatments of the subject concerning Canada’s position,see Rob Huebert,Canada and the Newly Emerging International Arctic Security Regime,in James Kraska ed., Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change,New York:Cambridge University Press, 2011,p.193;Christopher Mark Macneill,Gaining Command and Control of the Northwest Passage:Strait Talk on Sovereignty,Transportation Law Journal,Vol.34,2007,p.355; Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel,Politics,Pride,and Precedent:The United States and Canada in the Northwest Passage,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.4,2009,p.204;for a look at Russian policy and practice,in addition to the discussion below in sec.Ⅲ(a)of the present text,see also Betsy Baker,Symposium,Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,Law,Science,and the Continental Shelf: Russia and the Promise of Arctic Cooperation,American University International Law Review,Vol.25,2010,p.251;R.Douglas Brubaker,The Russian Arctic Straits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,2005;David L.Vander Zwaag et al.,Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping,Dalhousie University Marine&Environmental Law Institute,10 October 2008,at http://arcticportal.org/uploads/bC/JU/bCJUa KAo52XTt HDZ359QNA/5.nov AMSA-Governance-of-Arctic-Marine-Shipping-Final-Report-1-Aug.pdf, pp.62～68,30 November 2011.Some foundational works on the subject include Donat Pharand,Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law,New York:Cambridge University Press,1988 and Erik Franckx,Maritime Claims in the Arctic:Canadian and Russian Perspectives,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1993.

除了对破冰船费用和主权的关注外,还需要考虑恶劣的天气。从海运来说,与世隔绝以及不断增加的与天气有关事故发生的可能性,就等同于增加了风险。当然这并不是说其不可克服,如一位评论者指出:“如果海运需要使用东北航道,保险公司将会提供必要的风险承保。”②Rakish Suppiah,The Northeast Arctic Passage:possibilities and economic considerations, Mar Studies,Vol.32,2006;Maritime Studies,Vol.151,2006,unpaginated,at http:// www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2006/32.html,p.151,12 October 2011.不可否认,在某些方面,相比更为传统的苏伊士或巴拿马运河航线来说,北极航道目前是不大宜航的航线,但可以想象一下,在北极,随着未来基础设施的改善和有关松解航行限制的多边协议的达成,会有越来越多的主体有意愿使用北极航线,特别是私营部门。最终的结果将是白令海峡在海运流量不断增加,尽管增加的多少在某种程度上很可能受制于环保考虑。如此假设下,本文在接下来部分将会讨论把《联合国海洋法公约》中用于国际航行海峡的管理体制适用于白令海峡的问题。

(三)用于国际航行海峡的管理体制

如上文所推出的结论,通过白令海峡的船舶应享有不少于《联合国海洋法公约》规定的无害通过的权利。③See UNCLOS,partⅡ,sec.3,subsec.A.然而另一个重要问题仍然存在:白令海峡将会被视为用于国际航行的海峡吗?用于国际航行的海峡,由《联合国海洋法公约》规范管理,①See UNCLOS,partⅢ.提供航行者过境通行的权利,是一个比无害通过更自由的制度。这两种不同的通过制度在两个独立的区域实施:过境通行,仅在用于国际航行的海峡中享有;无害通过,仅在不能被分类为用于国际航行的海峡水域的领海或不适用过境通行的国际航行的海峡水域中享有。②See UNCLOS,Art.45 and United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,Art.16(4);see also Ana G.López Martín,International Straits:Concept, Classification and Rules of Passage,Madrid:Springer,2010,pp.109～149.如前所述的非无害活动清单使相关无害通过的声称无效,这多少有些限制性;③UNCLOS,Art.19(2).这些条件中许多并不适用于航行或飞行在用于国际航行的海峡中实施过境通行权的船舶或飞行器。④R.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.105.关于过境通行的管理机制,如邱吉尔和劳思所言:“尽管并不存在需要遵守的‘无害’标准,但是船舶和飞行器在行使权利时注定要避免武力威胁或使用武力……然而,这与其说是行使过境通行权利的条件,不如说是过境通行的附属义务。”⑤R.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.107(emphasis in original).具体而言,这意味着拥有海峡的国家并不被允许为了确保这些船舶“要避免武力威胁或使用武力”而限制外国船舶沿着其海岸实施过境通行的权利,因为这种做法将会大幅减少航行自由,而航行自由正是最初制定过境通行管理机制的目的所在。

另外,“任何活动,如果不是行使过境通行权,将会受制于《联合国海洋法公约》的‘其它适用条款’……因此,任何威胁一个沿岸国家的活动将会使船舶或飞行器受到无害通过制的管制,在这种情况下的通行将会被制止,因为没有“无害”条件。”⑥R.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.107.换句话说,只有在面对异乎寻常挑衅时,沿岸国家才有理由取消过境者的过境通行权。在用于国际航行的海峡中执行过境通行权时,恰恰是什么才构成越轨行为本身就是没有确切定义,并依赖于许多因素,其中包括政治因素、经济因素,因此可以说声称行使航行权的航行者和执行管辖权的沿岸国家间的冲突是不太可能发生的。⑦Such as the Corfu Channel case,discussed below;see also Mark Valencia,Policy Forum Online 08-013A:US Hypocrisy in the Strait of Hormuz?,12 February 2008,Nautilus Institute,unpaginated,at http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/ security/08013 Valencia.html,12 October 2011(analyzing the legal implications of certain Iran-US naval incidents that occurred in Iran’s territorial sea).

这里需要强调一下无害通过制和过境通行间的主要差别:其一,过境通行权的行使可能会被飞机器和船舶所享有,潜水艇也可以从用于国际航行的海峡水下穿过,过境通行不可以被中止;其二,领海的无害通过权没有授予飞行器,潜水艇必须在水面航行且要显示国旗,这样的话,通行权可能会在某些情况下被沿岸国家所中止,①See UNCLOS,partⅡ,sec.3,subsec.A,UNCLOS partⅢand accompanying text.除非是在无害通过制度下的用于国际航行的海峡。②UNCLOS,Art.45.1949年国际法院听审了克拉基海峡争议,其是在国际法下定义用于国际航行的海峡的一个先例。③International Court of Justice Report,1949,p.4.法院确立了一个“质优于量”方法来鉴定用于国际航行的海峡,详文如下:

人们会问,检验的标准是通过海峡的交通流量抑或是其对国际航行的重要性吗?然而在法院看来,决定性的标准主要是连接公海两个部分的地理情况和其被用于国际航行的事实。该海峡不是连接公海的两个部分的必要航线,而只是爱琴海和亚得里亚海间的一条替代航线,这一点也不是决定性的。但其历来是国际海上运输的一条有用航线。④International Court of Justice Report,Rep.4,1949,p.28.

这一描述有一定的主观性,或者说至少存有司法自由裁量权,即在定义哪些海峡符合作为用于国际航行的海峡的条件,哪些不符合的问题上——例如一个海峡要达到何种程度才是一个“国际海上运输的有用航线”。《联合国海洋法公约》第37条规定了用于国际航行的海峡制度适用于“公海或专属经济区的一个部分和另一部分之间用于国际航行的海峡”。白令海峡符合这个标准,然而很明显的是,本条排除了仅连接公海和一个国家领海的海峡,或者专属经济区和一个国家领海的海峡。⑤In contrast,the United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,Art.16(4)provided:“There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.”This arrangement was reached at the behest of Israel and its allies,in order to ensure free navigation to and from the port of Eilat.Wang Zelin,Research on the Legal Status of Arctic Passage,Doctoral Thesis,Xiamen University,2011(Ch.),p.13.UNCLOS,Art.45 upholds the principle that innocent passage may not be suspended in SUFINs which connect“a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State”.用于国际航行的海峡的一些例子包括了直布罗陀海峡、霍尔木兹海峡、曼德海峡、马六甲海峡和多佛海峡。⑥R.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.105.现在并不存在权威机构来明确定义世界上用于国际航行的海峡,因此似乎一个海峡被选定作为用于国际航行海峡不只是一个法律过程,还是政治和外交过程;⑦For example,in 1971 Indonesia and Malaysia jointly declared that the Straits of Malacca were not“an international waterway”.Nadaisan Logaraj,Navigational Safety,Oil Pollution and Passage in the Straits of Malacca,Malaya Law Review,Vol.20,1978,p.288.而且,这些政治、外交上的主张,私营部门的声音,在某些程度上甚至包括法律,都不是固定不变的,而是在不断变化中。在没有国际法院或法庭裁决的情况下,决定性因素很可能是国际共识,特别是在一个特定海峡中利益相关最大国家之间所达成的共识。自然而然,沿岸国对于环境和安全的关注会经常与非沿岸国的航行利益相冲突。不言而喻,如同两条北极航道的情况,在沿岸国管辖权利益和自由航行间形成切实可行的平衡将不会是一帆风顺的,而且两个阵营间的意见很难达成一致。考虑到这些因素,我们接下来将会审视白令海峡作为用于国际航行的海峡的可行性。

(四)白令海峡作为用于国际航行的海峡的可行性

在界定一个地理实体时,除了基本的地图或地理上的注意事项外,还需着重考虑有关国家的一些无形因素,就拿白令海峡来说,两个沿岸国之间就有一个显著区别:美国仍不是《联合国海洋法公约》成员国,①As of August 2012.然而其认为公约中关于“海洋的传统使用”的规定已成为了国际法惯例,②See President Ronald Reagan’s Statement on United States Ocean Policy,10 March 1983, International Legal Material s,Vol.22,1983,p.464;American Journal of International Law,Vol.77,1983,p.619.因此尽管其未正式参与《联合国海洋法公约》管理机制,美国在某种程度上也受其制约。③The US Dept.of State’s website recounts America’s track record vis-à-vis UNCLOS,at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/convention/,15 October 2011.没有规定禁止将一个毗连非成员国的海峡指定为用于国际航行的海峡,所以在决定白令海峡法律地位时,美国的非成员地位不应起主要作用,而应通过国际讨论和合意达成决定。

白令海峡现在不是一条海上高速公路,④Though according to Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,at http://www.arctic-council.org/index. php/en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download=245:the-amsa-2009-report,p.109,30 November 2011:“approximately 150 large commercial vessels pass through the Bering Strait during the July-October open water period,”excluding“fishing vessels,which are generally smaller,as well as fuel barges serving coastal mining activities and coastal communities.”See map 3 for an idea of traffic volume through the Bering Strait in recent years.但不能因此而必然排除在任何时候其将会被视为用于国际航行的海峡的可能。如果审慎阅读《联合国海洋法公约》条款就不会得出这样一种解释,即认为要在后来认定一个特定海峡为用于国际航行的海峡,其在《联合国海洋法公约》颁布时就拥有用于国际航行的海峡的地位;①UNCLOS,Art.37 states that the SUFIN status and accompanying right of transit passage“applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.”There is no chronological precondition mentioned here defining when international traffic must begin in a strait for it to be considered a SUFIN.相反,从逻辑上其结果必然是:即使一海峡在1982年没有大量的国际运输,一旦国际航行开始,其在以后仍能被认定为用于国际航行的海峡。想必某些国家的或单方面的主张并不能成为在一个特定位置产生国际航行的最终障碍。因此,考虑到白令海峡的地理位置适宜性以及用于运输的北极航线不断增加的可能性,那么根据国际法,白令海峡应被视为用于国际航行的海峡,在此航行者享有过境通行权。

三、美国和俄罗斯的法律立场

本部分试图通过分析各政府的相关主张、政策或实践,探讨两个沿岸国在将白令海峡划分为用于国际航行的海峡这一观点上所持的法律立场。

(一)俄罗斯

从俄罗斯方面来看,很难在考量白令海峡时不考虑其与北方航道(传统上是俄罗斯国内航线)的相关性。如A.科恩所解释:“俄罗斯联邦的北极政策宣称‘在俄罗斯联邦,北方航线被视为其在北极区域的一条全国统一的运输环节’,这是俄罗斯的国家利益”(省略相关脚注)。②Ariel Cohen,From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access:Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy 2010,Backgrounder,No.2421,Heritage Foundation,at http://thf_media. s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf,p.9,12 October 2011.而且,俄罗斯的现行北极法律制度应在其历史背景(包括苏联政府)下进行解读。③Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy,Vol.18,2009,p.330(stating that“the current legal regime of Arctic marine shipping in the Northern Sea Route”is based on regulations dating back to 1990,a year before the USSR’s collapse).概括北方航道航行的整个历史并不在本文的探讨范围之内,但一些关于在俄罗斯管辖下的北极水域的现行管理若干要点需要在这里重申一下。本文在接下来几段里会试图勾勒出俄罗斯有关通过白令海峡航行的立场,方法是通过审视其根据国际法和国内法应承担的义务责任。

1.国际义务

作为《联合国海洋法公约》的缔约国,俄罗斯联邦应该授予通过其领海的航行者无害通过权;然而由于《联合国海洋法公约》第234条特别规定了冰封区域,俄罗斯(与其它极圈国家)颁布和执行相关措施来保护脆弱的海洋环境并确保安全航行的自主权在北极冰封区域也因此明显扩大了。①UNCLOS,Art.234 reads:Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention,reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation,and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.该点再加上《联合国海洋法公约》所规定的封闭海和半闭海制度下对于北极管理特权的可能主张,②Joshua Owens,Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas:A Glimpse at State Practice with Special Regard to the Arctic,China Oceans Law Review[to be published](asserting that a similar regime based on the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas’regime may be established in the Arctic ocean).构成了俄罗斯根据国际法在北极执行超越措施的主要杠杆。③There are,of course,other international treaties that influence Russia’s governance of its Arctic waters,but none so germane to the issues at hand as the ones discussed above.A list of other relevant sources of international law with implications for Arctic governance may be found in Michael A.Becker,Russia and the Arctic:Opportunities for Engagement within the Existing Legal Framework Symposium:Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,American University International Law Review,Vol.25,2010,pp.233～234.

由于北太平洋暖流的汇入,白令海峡在一年中冰川覆盖的时间没有北极更北地区那样长,④See Lynn Mc Nutt,How Does Ice Cover in the Bering Sea Vary from Year to Year?,National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association(NOAA),Bering Climate Essay,undated and unpaginated,at http://www.beringclimate.noaa.gov/essays_mcnutt.html,2 November 2011(observing that ice usually begins forming in the Northern Bering Sea in late fall and lasts until late spring).但这两个沿岸国家对第234条有关保护北极环境规定的执行将可能也适用于白令海峡,因为通过白令海峡的交通运输要么刚退出北极水域,要么将迅速进入更北的北极水域。然而,这些措施的颁布和执行必须“适当顾及航行”。⑤UNCLOS,Art.234.显然,这种规定阻止了沿岸国家试图阻碍或干扰航行,因此,俄罗斯方面试图褫夺或者说阻止通过白令海峡的自由航行的任何企图,将可能遭到来自其它国家的抗议,这些抗议的国家包括美国,其立场会在下个部分进行讨论。无论怎样,因为海峡有两边,如果俄罗斯的政策不能为航行者所接受,那么通行者会更倾向选择在美国领海通过海峡;同样,如果美国征收通过其领海穿越海峡的费用,在交通运输上的数量增加只会导致对美国有利的情况,这种情况是另一个北极竞争对手不愿意看到的。①The collection of fees by a riparian state from vessels merely transiting through its territorial sea is not allowed,while charging for special services is.See UNCLOS,Art.26.

苏联使用直线基线确定其海洋区域的界线,但美国拒绝接受这种方法。②Pacific Ocean,Sea of Japan,Sea of Okhotsk,and Bering Sea:Straight Baselines:USSR, Limits in the Seas,No.107,US State Dept.,Office of the Geographer,1987,at http:// www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/ls107.pdf,p.3,2 December 2011.This source states that many of USSR’s straight baselines“do not meet the international legal criteria for drawing such baselines.”See also Sam Bateman and Clive Schofield,Conference Paper,State Practice Regarding Straight Baselines in East Asia:Legal,Technical and Political Issues in a Changing Environment,presented at Difficulties in Implementing the Provisions of UNCLOS,Monaco,2008,unpaginated(remarking that“[t]he former USSR claimed a system of straight baselines in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan,which has been protested by the United States”),at http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS08Folder/Session7-Paper1-Bateman.pdf,2 December 2011.苏联以直线基线划定的界线,包括了俄罗斯沿岸和四个俄罗斯群岛间的若干海峡:维尔基特斯基、绍卡尔斯基、德米特里·拉普捷夫、桑尼科夫。③Katarzyna Zysk,The Evolving Arctic Security Environment,in Stephen Blank ed.,Russia in the Arctic,2011,Strategic Studies Institute,at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute. army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1073,p.108,2 December 2011.据推测,俄罗斯联邦已经继承前苏联的海洋主张,另有声明除外,④Maritime Claims Reference Manual,US Dept.of Defense,2005[hereinafter MCRM],at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/MCRM.pdf,p.489,2 December 2011.但是直线基线这一规则在白令海峡划线问题上赋予了俄罗斯更大的领海范围;⑤Map:USSR Straight Baseline Claims in the Bering Sea,accompanying Limits in the Seas, No.107,1987,US State Dept.,Office of the Geographer,at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/maps/ls107b.html,2 December 2011.基于这个理由,没有必要深入评价俄罗斯在《联合国海洋法公约》框架下的直线基线有效性来判断其关于通过白令海峡航行采取的可能立场,然而可能值得注意的是1997年俄罗斯批准《联合国海洋法公约》时发布的声明:虽然联邦选择拒绝根据《联合国海洋法公约》对“有关海洋边界划定或那些涉及历史海湾或权利”进行强制纠纷解决,但其也明确“反对在过去或未来在签属、批准或者同意加入公约时做出的、或基于与公约相关联的任何原因做出的任何违反公约第310条规定的宣言和声明”。俄罗斯联邦认为无论在何种措词或名义下,这种宣言和声明并不能排除或改变公约条款在适用于做出这些宣言和声明的公约成员国时所产生的法律效力。基于这个原因,在俄罗斯联邦政府处理与其它公约成员国的关系时,不会考虑这些宣言和声明”。⑥This declaration may be viewed by clicking“Russian Federation”,at http://www.un. org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm,2 December 2011.从这里可以推断出,俄罗斯并不认为其对直线基线的使用与《联合国海洋法公约》的规定不一致。①See UNCLOS,Arts.298(1)(a)(i),309,310.The US disagrees:according to the MCRM,US Dept.of Defense,2005,at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/MCRM.pdf,p.489,2 December 2011,Russia’s straight baseline claims“are not recognized by the U.S.U.S.protested claims in 1984-1987 and conducted operational assertions in 1982,1984,and 1986.”其有意拒绝通过《联合国海洋法公约》纠纷解决机制来解决有关“历史海湾或权利”的主张,这是否揭示了对于其直线基线主张的法律地位的不确定性,这是一个值得认真揣摩的问题。

根据美国国防部所说,“1998年俄罗斯(在其关于内水、领海和专属经济区的联邦法案中)似乎并没有撤回关于历史海湾的主张”。②MCRM,2005,US Dept.of Defense,at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/MCRM.pdf,p.489,2 December 2011.相反,俄罗斯似乎并没有将其内水范围扩展到包括了白令海峡,关于此,据作者所知也没有任何其它相关法案。

2.国内立法

关于在北极水域航行的俄罗斯立法,已有多位学识渊博的学者进行过详尽分析,③See Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy,Vol.18,2009,p.327;Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2001;R.Douglas Brubaker,The Russian Arctic Straits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2005.因此本文不再对此进行深究。不过我想说的是,俄罗斯的国内立法——尽管国内立法比起国际法所要求的来说,授予了更大的执行权和更少的义务,特别是关于直线基线——早已过时,亟需修改。④Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy,Vol.18,2009,p.342(noting that“substantial changes are to be expected concerning the legal regime applicable to foreign shipping in the Russian Arctic in a not too distant future”).如前面部分所指出,现在外国船舶,虽然是少量的,可以在没有破冰船服务下通过北方航道。⑤Michael A.Becker,Russia and the Arctic:Opportunities for Engagement within the Existing Legal Framework Symposium:Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,American University International Law Review,Vol. 25,2010,p.241.这意味着俄罗斯将越来越愿意向外国航运开放北方航道。换个角度来说,俄罗斯自己的立法清楚地表明白令海峡大部分范围并不构成北方航道的一部分,①The relevant legislation provides that the NSR ends“in the east(in the Bering Strait)by the parallel 66 N and the meridian 168 58′37″W.”1990 Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route,approved 14 Sept.,1990,29 Izveshcheniia Moreplavateliam[Notices to Mariners](18 June,1991)(Rus.),quoted in Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy, Vol.18,2009,p.331.This point lies some ten minutes’latitude north of the Diomede Islands,a distance of about 18 km(10 nm).See map 2.因此以白令海峡是北方航道组成部分为由来试图禁止或阻碍通过海峡的航行的法律依据是站不住脚的。总之,前述分析表明俄罗斯在国际义务之下应该授予通过其领海的船舶无害通过权;承认白令海峡是用于国际航行的海峡将会迫使其允许航行者有通过海峡的过境通行权;尽管如此,如本文其它部分所述,俄罗斯将享有有关在冰封地区保护环境的一些权利;②See sec.IV of the present text and UNCLOS,Art.234.最后,如果俄罗斯能够使其在监管方面作出的努力与美国在白令海峡颁布和执行的相关措施相协调,那就再好不过了。

(二)美国

美国历来崇尚航行自由,维护传统上对于海洋的利用,如航行、飞越。③See Reagan’s Statement on U.S.Oceans Policy,10 March,1983,International Legal Material s,Vol.22,1983,p.464;American Journal of International Law,Vol.77,1983,p. 619.For a detailed account of US protests against“excessive maritime claims”,including restrictions on navigation,see Robert Smith,Navigation Issues in the Law of the Sea,in Kim,Park,Lee&Paik ed.,Maritime Issues in the 1990s:Antarctica,Law of the Sea and Marine Environment,Seoul Press,1991,pp.87～125;See also J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1996.对于白令海峡,美国也想要采用相类似的方式来使用。如前面所指出的,美国关于过境通行的立场是“众所周知的”。④J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,p.284.罗奇和史密斯引用包括美国发布的备忘录和其它外交文件等很有说服力的资料表明:美国希望在用于国际航行的海峡维护过境通行的自由。⑤J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,pp.284～287.例如,里根总统明确表明“依据国际法规定,比如《联合国海洋法公约》有关适用条款,在美国的领海里……所有国家的船舶和飞行器享有通过国际海峡的过境通行权利。”⑥Presidential Proclamation 5928,27 December 1988.Cited in J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1996,p.285.至于军舰,美国主张其仅在执行过境通行时,不会威胁到沿岸国的领土主权。①Aide-memoire delivered 4 December 1984 from American Embassy Stockholm,State Department telegram 355149,1 December 1984;American Embassy Stockholm telegram 08539,10 December 1984.Cited in J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,p. 286.美国认为“过境通行也适用于在通过国际海峡时。”②J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,pp.286～287.依据近期美国国务院的情况陈述,“过去的执政党(共和党和民主党)、美国军事部门、相关工业和其它组织强烈支持加入公约。”③Fact Sheet on the Law of the Sea Convention,1 July 2011,Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,[emphasis in original],at http://www.state. gov/g/oes/lawofthesea/factsheets/177207.htm,2 December 2011.自从里根时代起,关于通过国际海峡的过境通行,美国政府的立场从未改变;有关白令海峡的问题仍然是其是否具备国际海峡航行使用的条件。如上文第二部分的(三)、(四)以及在其它资料中所总结的,答案毫无疑问是肯定的。④See Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Arctic Council, Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download=245:the-amsa-2009-report,p. 109,30 November 2011;Donald Rothwell,Arctic Choke Points and the Law of the Sea, Australian National University—ANU College of Law Research Paper No.10～81,2010, p.17(relaying the US military’s view:“Bering Strait East[the US half]and Bering Strait West[the Russian half]are recognized by the US Navy as international straits for the purposes of the LOSC.”).针对这些情况,从政策方面可以稳妥地假定美国会尽一切努力以确保在白令海峡通过其领海的所有国家船舶的过境通行权。

从商业立场看,不断增加的交通运输经常会导致税收的不断增加(假设一部分运输船舶会停靠美国港口或利用其它相关服务),这想必也符合美国的发展利益。如前所述,美国可能希望严格规范北极交通,以促进保护脆弱的北极海洋环境。⑤See Jerry Beilinson,Oil Drilling in the Arctic Ocean:Is It Safe?,24 June 2011,Popular Mechanics,at http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/oildrilling-in-the-arctic-ocean-is-it-safe,4 November 2011(observing that the conclusion regarding the safety of offshore drilling in the Arctic in a recent USGS study“seems to be that there’s still a great amount we just don’t know”).理想情况下,这些措施将不会由单方面来实施,而是通过适当的国际平台,如北极委员会或者国际海事组织来实施:这些组织已经发布了相关文件,如北极委员会的《北极海运评估报告2009》和国际海事组织近期修订的《极地水域航行船舶操作指南》。无论如何,环境保护措施不必过度地干扰航行自由。总之,美

国极不可能会试图阻碍在白令海峡合理使用过境通行权。①See Wang ZeLin,Research on the Legal Status of Arctic Passage,Doctoral Thesis,Xiamen University,2011(Ch.),p.33(recounting the US interpretation that straits may be considered SUFINs regardless of the point in time at which international navigation commences);William Schachte,International Straits and Navigational Freedoms,Remarks prepared for presentation to the 26th Law of the Sea Institute Annual Conference Genoa, Italy,1992(relating the US’s view that navigational freedoms are paramount and should be preserved to the fullest extent possible),at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65946.pdf,30 November 2011.See also Christopher Mark Macneill,Gaining Command and Control of the Northwest Passage:Strait Talk on Sovereignty,Transportation Law Journal,Vol.34,2007,pp.356～364(reiterating US’s stance toward the freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage).

四、未来白令海峡管理的若干建议

白令海峡沿岸两国在鼓励自由航行和贸易的同时保护脆弱的北极海洋环境,以便有效管理白令海峡,两国在处理管理事务时有许多选择,在海峡被频繁用于商贸船舶通行前这些措施的一部分或全部就可以先一步实施。当然白令海峡的某些管理特权应授予美国和俄罗斯,因为在白令海峡只有其领海,而没有公海。这些特权中就可能包括对助航设备或领航费等特殊服务支出进行征税;②This would be fully in accordance with UNCLOS,Art.26,which stipulates:(1)No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea;and(2)Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship.These charges shall be levied without discrimination.外国船舶也必须遵守根据国际法颁布的本地法规,包括国内环境法、关税法或者移民法。③See UNCLOS,Art.42(4).虽然这样说,沿岸国家还要与相关国际组织——特别是北极委员会和国际海事组织——协作、合作起草和实施关于海峡航行的法案,这是为谨慎起见,甚至也是必要的。在管理白令海峡时,国际海事组织的《极地水域航行船舶操作指南》毫无疑问是一个有用的工具,尽管其在法律上不具约束性。④ϕystein Jensen,The IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters: From Voluntary to Mandatory Tool for Navigation Safety and Environmental Protection?, 2007,Fridtjof Nansen Institute,(stating the desirability of establishing binding legal requirements for ships operating in polar waters),at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNIR0207.pdf,pp.23～24,4 November 2011.《指南》在2009年修订,但没有达到具有法律约束的地位。⑤Developing a Mandatory Polar Code-Progress and Gaps,Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition,34thAntarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Buenos Aires 2011,at http:// asoc.org/storage/documents/Meetings/ATCM/XXXIV/Developing_a_Mandatory_Polar_ Code___Progress_and_Gaps.pdf,p.3,30 November 2011.现正在进行谈判,以通过国际海事组织公布一个有约束力的极地法典,这可能在2013年实现。①Developing a Mandatory Polar Code-Progress and Gaps,Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition,34thAntarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Buenos Aires 2011,at http:// asoc.org/storage/documents/Meetings/ATCM/XXXIV/Developing_a_Mandatory_Polar _Code___Progress_and_Gaps.pdf,p.6,30 November 2011.

两个沿岸国的直接合作也将是最合适的。通过科学知识、专业调查和评估的公开共享,两国将更能有准备地合作设计理想的大洋航线,②UNCLOS,Art.41.认定并减轻环境问题,更经济有效地安排充足的助航设备和通信设备;③UNCLOS,Art.43.有了政治和谐局面并通过团结合作,双方能一同规划一个行政管理框架以保护双方的利益,并避免被其它国家钻漏洞(如上文所提到的)。④See sec.Ⅲ(A)of the present text.双方在白令海峡和楚克奇海已经就漏油预防和处理达成了初步协议,⑤The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations(signed 11 May 1989,entered into force 17 August 1989),U.N.T.S.,No.2190,p.180.然而鉴于协议适用范围的特定性,其它重要的环境因素没有包括在其中。《北极海运评估报告2009》指出了关于在白令海峡建立安全、可持续的航行条件所涉及的尚未解决的若干关注点。⑥Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Arctic Council, Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download=245:the-amsa-2009-report,p. 109,30 November 2011:current areas in need of improvement include emergency response such as search and rescue;lack of differential GPS coverage,sufficient navigational aids, very-high frequency communication services and a traffic separation scheme.如果费用、规范和要求是有既定标准的,那么当外国船舶通过一个国家的领海而不是另一个国家的领海时,是不存在所谓的优先问题的;虽然交通运输量的不平等不会必然引起紧张,但是如果考虑财政问题的话,那么就有存在紧张的可能性:例如,如果更多的船舶通过一个国家领海而穿越海峡,那么此国家应承担更大的财政负担吗?关于这一点,为了适当管理白令海峡,应当进行跨国性磋商,以谋求在环境、航行或其它相关费用怎样征收上达成一致。

在为白令海峡管理设计管理制度时,沿岸国家可以参照历史较为悠久的用于国际航行的海峡——在这些实例中最值得注意的或许是马六甲和新加坡海峡。①For pre-UNCLOS commentaries on Malacca Straits administration,see Michael Leifer, Malacca,Singapore and Indonesia,Sijthoff and Noordhoff,1978;See also Nadaisan Logaraj,Navigational Safety,Oil Pollution and Passage in the Straits of Malacca,Malaya Law Review,Vol.20,1978,p.287.For more current treatments,see Lim Lei Theng,Safety of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:Modalities of Cooperation, Rapporteur’s Report,Singapore Journal of International&Comparative Law,Vol.2, 1998,p.254;NihanÜnlü,Straits of Malacca,International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,Vol.21,No.4,2006,p.539.诸如预防污染、船舶标准、法律执行和大洋航线设计等问题,以前的解决办法可以用来参考,必要时,可以做一定的修订以适合北极环境。建立合适的白令海峡管理机制的一个最重要问题是如何获取充足的经费。在马六甲海峡,如浮标和信号灯等助航设备的供给和维护经费的主要来源是日本的马六甲海峡委员会。②Gurpreet S.Singhota,The IMO’s Role in Promoting Safety of Navigation and Control of Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,Singapore Journal of International&Comparative Law,Vol.2,1998,p.291.这说明除了沿岸国,其他利益相关方会乐意支付必要的费用以满足达到在白令海峡安全航行的环境。因此俄美应考虑识别那些可能会认为北极安全航行与其利益攸关的主体。一些候选者包括亚洲海运“大户”:中国、日本、中国香港、中国台湾和韩国;其它的频繁使用者可能还有挪威、加拿大、冰岛和英国。当然,一些私营部门——特别是海运业——也应值得考虑。

在过去几年里,马六甲海峡沿岸国家(即印度尼西亚、马来西亚和新加坡)已经与国际海事组织和其它使用海峡的国家合作,以提高海峡的安全和治安水平,全方位解决管理问题。③See Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.233.这种合作机制产生的一个值得注意的成果是海上电子航线,一个“航行支持和管理系统,其使海上环境管理与保护系统和最先进的海洋航行技术相结合。”④Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.236.乔休尔·胡解释道:“海上电子航线会给船舶实时提供重要的航海信息,如潮汐和水流信息,并且实现集成电子导航。海上环境管理与保护系统将能在地图上标出石油和化学溢出物的轨迹,提供溢出损失评估,监控沿岸和海洋环境,提供环境影响评价。海上电子航线能使每一艘船在整体交通管理系统之下精确航行,其将显著地增加船舶安全和航行安全,从而降低可能引起灾难性环境污染事故发生的风险。”⑤Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.236.这一系统的安装尚未完成。这一项规模庞大的工程不仅显示了从利益相关方获得经费的可行性,而且特别反映了沿岸国和使用国在实施此类工程时希望能得到国际海事组织的帮助。

这一使用国/沿岸国联合体在吉隆坡举行的2006年会议上在六个主要工程建议书的基础上创设了一个“合作机制”,包括“合作做好并准备相关力量以应对发生在马六甲海峡和新加坡海峡的有毒物质危险,包括建立有毒物质应急中心,”①Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.237.以及“为马六甲和新加坡海峡建立一个潮汐、水流和风速测定系统,以提高航行安全和海洋环境保护水平。”②Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.238.美俄应考虑在白令海峡其它利益相关方和国际海事组织的帮助下实施类似工程,特别是在未来大量石油、天然气和其它有毒物质通过白令海峡运输的情况下。因为白令海峡相对较浅,公开可用的频繁、精确的水文测量结果也会有助于安全地通过海峡。美国海岸警卫队高频度的船舶检查和实施“严厉的”处罚有助于减少在美国水域运行的不适格船舶。③Ho-Sam Bang,Is Port-State Control an Effective Means to Combat Vessel-Source Pollution?An Empirical Survey of the Practical Exercise by Port States of Their Powers of Control,International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,Vol.23,2008,p.744.为了防止不适格船舶绕道经由规制相对松弛(如果情况果真如此)的俄罗斯水域通过,两国有必要通过谅解备忘录或者一些类似文书达成一致,以取得船舶检查的一致并提高通过海峡的整体航行质量。

最后,为方便起见,俄美也可以考虑在白令海峡建立一种类似公路的通行规则:海峡已被代奥米德群岛天然地分成两个部分,代奥米德群岛可以作为中线,在两边的航行交通方向相反。在理论上,向北方航行的船舶在美国领海这边通过,向南方航行的船舶在俄罗斯领海这边通过,经由两国的交通运输量会大致相等;同时碰撞风险将会减少,因为一般情况下所有船舶将会有序通过。在两个代奥米德群岛间包括国界的狭窄分水线处,航行可以被禁止,当然特殊情况除外。

五、结论

北极航行的兴起现在仅仅是一个开始。随着北极冰层的进一步融化,缩短航线里程这个有利条件将会吸引不少航行者向北横穿北极航道。在途中,这些船舶可能会穿过白令海峡。因为白令海峡可能拥有的地缘政治地位,应立即解决其法律地位问题,从而有利于北极商业航行的持续稳定和繁荣。白令海峡应被视为用于国际航行的海峡,在此可以行使过境通行权。沿岸国应尊重此权利,但同时努力适当管理白令海峡以保护北极海洋环境的完整性。俄美应努力加强彼此的合作,以及与使用国和相关国际组织的合作,以使如大洋航线、船舶标准、法律执行、收费标准、通信设备、助航设备等系统制度合理化。通过学习用于国际航行海峡管理的早先范例,俄罗斯、美国和世界其它国家将确定能在白令海峡建立一个健全、可持续的管理框架体系。

附:

Figure 1UNEP/GRID-Arendal.Arctic sea routes—Northern sea route and Northwest passage. UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library(2007).Available at:http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/arctic-sea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-northwest-passage. Accessed 13 Oct 2011.

Map 1NOAA,Office of Coast Survey.Map of US Maritime Zones/Boundaries.Available at http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/mbound.htm(last updated 26 May 2011).Accessed 11 Oct 2011.Image captured via Google Earth.本图描绘了根据1990美苏边界协议所确定的俄美国界。

Map 2NOAA,Office of Coast Survey.Map of US Maritime Zones/Boundaries.Available at http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/mbound.htm(last updated 26 May 2011).Accessed 11 Oct 2011.Image captured via Google Earth.本图为上图所包含的边界部分的特写图像。其显示了边界线沿代奥米德群岛分开;请注意在小代奥米德岛(美国)和威尔士王子角间仅有领海存在。